Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: On November 17, 1916, the Attorney General of Illinois filed a bill in the superior court of Cook county in the name of the People, on the relation of Rufus M. Potts, Superintendent of Insurance, against the Continental Beneficial Association of Philadelphia, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, and its officers, praying that they be enjoined from disposing of or removing from this State any assets of the corporation, (referred to hereafter as the association,) and also praying the appointment of a receiver to take possession and management of the property of the association in this State. The bill alleged the association had obtained a license in 1912 to do business in the State of Illinois; that through mismanagement, extravagance and waste the association had become hopelessly insolvent and its liabilities far exceeded its available assets; that the association had a membership of about 12,000, many of whom were residents of the State of Illinois, holding policies issued to such respective members or re-insurance contracts. On the same day the bill was filed a preliminary injunction was ordered issued, restraining the association from removing or disposing of its assets in this State and appointing the Chicago Title and Trust Company receiver pendente lite, with the usual powers of receivers. Defendants appealed from this interlocutory order to the Appellate Court for the First District. That court affirmed the interlocutory decree. People v. Continental Beneficial Ass'n, 204 Ill. App. 501..

On the 28th of November, 1916, the president of the association filed a bill in the court of common pleas for the county of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, alleging the association was insolvent and unable to continue business; that the directors had passed a resolution authorizing the president to apply for the appointment of a receiver and for the dissolution of the corporation on account of its insolvency. David Phillips was appointed receiver in said suit, as prayed in the bill.

On the 5th day of December, 1916, David Phillips, the Pennsylvania receiver, Adelaide Weiger and Clara Weiger, beneficiaries of a deceased policyholder of the association, filed a bill in the circuit court of Cook county, on behalf of themselves and all other creditors, members and certificate holders, against the association and the Fort Dearborn National Bank, as depository of the moneys of the association, alleging the association was incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania as a fraternal insurance society; that it had engaged in the fraternal insurance business in Pennsylvania and various other States, including Illinois; that the association was insolvent and unable to pay its liabilities and continue business. The bill alleged that at the suit authorized by the directors in the State of Pennsylvania for the appointment of a receiver and the dissolution of the corporation David Phillips was appointed by said court receiver of the association; that he qualified as such and ever since has been, and is, acting as receiver; that Adelaide Weiger and Clara Weiger are the beneficiaries of a deceased policyholder and each entitled to benefits in the sum of $330.66. The bill prayed the appointment of an ancillary receiver to take charge of the property of the association situated in the State of Illinois, wind up the business of the association in this State, and distribute, as directed by the court, the assets and property. The association answered this bill the same day it was filed, admitting its allegations and joining in the prayer for the appointment of an ancillary receiver.

On the 6th day of December, 1916, the People, on the relation of Rufus M. Potts, insurance superintendent, by the Attorney General, filed an amended supplemental bill, alleging the proceedings in Pennsylvania for the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of David Phillips, receiver, there. The bill alleged said receiver was attempting to collect and remove from the State of Illinois the association's assets and property, and prayed he be enjoined

from doing business in Illinois and from interfering with the action of the Chicago Title and Trust Company, receiver, in the collection and distribution of the assets of the association in Illinois, and that all orders previously entered in the proceeding be confirmed and made permanent. The answer to the amended supplemental bill, among other things, denied the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the bill, and denied the right of the Attorney General, on behalf of the People, to file a bill for the purposes for which the amended supplemental bill was filed in the courts of this State. The answer further denied that the proposed withdrawal of assets and property of the association from this State was for the purpose of defrauding anyone, and averred the proposed withdrawal was pursuant to a resolution of the board of trustees of the association that such withdrawal was for the best interests of the association.

On the same day the amended supplemental bill was filed the court entered an order enjoining Phillips, receiver, and the Weigers,. their agents and attorneys, from prosecuting their suit until the further order of the court. The final decree enjoins the association from transacting any further business in Illinois, and orders its assets in this State to be collected and conserved by the receiver appointed in this State, the Chicago Title and Trust Company, for distribution under the order of the court, and further decrees that all orders before entered be and they are confirmed and made permanent. The Appellate Court affirmed the decree, and this court having granted a petition for a writ of certiorari the cause comes here for review.

Plaintiffs in error contend that the Attorney General had no authority, at common law or under the statutes of Illinois, to institute the suit for the appointment of a receiver of a foreign corporation; that the courts of Pennsylvania had exclusive jurisdiction to dissolve the corporation and distribute its assets among its creditors. It is further plaintiffs in error's contention that when Phillips,

the receiver appointed by the Pennsylvania court, filed his bill in the circuit court of Cook county praying the appointment of an ancillary receiver and that court acquired jurisdiction of the association, no other court could supplant the jurisdiction thus acquired; that Phillips had the exclusive right to collect and distribute the corporation's assets among its creditors, and to that end he had power to maintain suits in all States where it had property, and to secure the appointment of ancillary receivers in foreign States to collect assets there situated and transmit them to the domicile of the corporation for distribution. It is argued that as the courts of one State have no power to dissolve a corporation organized under the laws of another State, no suit can be maintained in the name of the people of the State to appoint a receiver of the property of a foreign corporation situated in this State and no such power is conferred by statute.

The act concerning corporations of the character of the plaintiff in error association, prior to the act of 1893, authorized the Auditor of Public Accounts, (now the Superintendent of Insurance,) when he had reason to doubt the solvency of any foreign corporation, association or society, to report the same to the Attorney General, who would thereupon commence proceedings by quo warranto against such corporation, requiring it to show cause why its license to do business in the State should not be revoked. Section 12 of the act of 1895 (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 1759,) provides that the books, papers and vouchers of all corporations to which the act applies shall be subject to visitation and inspection by the insurance superintendent, and the officers of the corporation are required to answer, under oath, inquiries made by said insurance superintendent and to make annual reports, and for neglect or refusal to do so the corporation shall be excluded from doing business in this State. Said section further provides that if the corporation shall exceed its powers and shall fail to comply

with other requirements mentioned, the insurance superintendent shall cause to be commenced an action against the society to enjoin it from carrying on business, "Provided, however, that no injunction against any society within this State, or application for or appointment of a receiver, or action to prevent any such society from carrying on business in this State shall be made or granted by any court, except on the application of the insurance superintendent or of a judgment creditor, and after written notice duly made and served upon the chief executive officer of such society within this State, or if incorporated under the laws of another State then such notice may be served by sending the same to the president or secretary of the society by registered mail at the home office of the society, and a full hearing before such court, whether the party seeking such relief be the State, member of such society or any other person whatsoever."

It is insisted that the office of a proviso is not to enlarge but to limit and qualify what is affirmed in the body of the act preceding it, and this is a general rule of statutory construction; but it has been held that "to this rule of construction, however, there is an exception, which is, that where it plainly appears from a consideration of the entire act that the provision considered was intended by the legislature as an independent enactment, it may be so given effect without reference to the limitations of the preceding portions of the section to which it is apparently a proviso." (Hackett v. Chicago City Railway Co. 235 Ill. 116, and cases there cited.) It seems evident from reading section 12 that the proviso quoted was not intended to limit the scope of the enactment preceding it. Its language could perform no such office. No mention is made, preceding it, of the appointment of a receiver, and the words of the proviso that no receiver should be appointed in such suit except under the conditions prescribed can only mean, as we understand it, that the legislature assumed or had in mind that courts