a question. He said: "It is very difficult to define the indivisible line that divides perfect and partial insanity; but it must rest on circumstances duly to be weighed and considered both by the judge and jury."

In a criminal case, Com. vs. Freth, 3 Phil. Rep. 105, my learned brother, Judge Ludlow, gives us some of the tests in such cases, "the capacity to know whether the act was right or wrong and mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge."

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A review of all the authorities I have been able to examine satisfies me that the true test in all these cases lies in the word "power." Has the defendant in a criminal case the power to distinguish right from wrong, and the power to adhere to the right and to avoid the wrong? In these cases has the defendant, in addition to the capacities mentioned, the power to govern his mind, his body, and his estate? If he possesses this power over his imagination, he will be able to expel all "delusive images," and the like control over his will would subdue all homicidal and other monomania.

You will not understand me as saying that a man is ever endowed with perfect or absolute control over all his faculties. But I use the word power with reference to that control which humanity can expect from humanity. Like all our other attributes, it will vary in degree from great weakness to great strength, but in the rational creature it is never absolutely extinguished.

Mere existence of weakness of intellect is not of itself sufficient to establish insanity, for it may co-exist with some degree (though it may be the minimum) of power.

Lord Hardwicke, in ex parte Barnsley, 3 Atkyns, 172, says "There may be a weakness of mind that may render a man incapable of governing himself from violence of passion and from vice and extravagances, and yet not sufficient under the rule of law and the Constitution of this country to direct a commission."

And in Lord Ely's case, Ridgway's Parliamentary Cases, 521, the same Chancellor is quoted as exclaiming, "God forbid that a weakness of mind only should be a sufficient reason for granting the custody of a person and his estate. For then drunkards, violent, careless, and silly people would all be taken in.”

Lord Chancellor Bowes, in refusing a new commission in the same case, Ibid, 525, said, "Uusound mind does not relate to a degree of weakness, but incapacity." A man may be weak, therefore, in the control of his temper, he may be lazy, obstinate, passionate, speculative, even dissipated and vicious, but still not be of

unsound mind, for he may possess the controlling power without caring to invoke it; or may have weakened his self command by frequent indulgence, without having in fact extinguished it. The principle I have given you is sustained further by the pleadings in this case to which I have already called your attention. The relator has averred that the defendant "has been so far deprived of his reason and understanding as to be rendered altogether unfit and unable to govern himself or to manage his affairs."

I trust that this explanation of the question submitted to us may relieve the case of some of the difficulties which may have been supposed to surround this delicate subject, and may enable us to approach the solution of the facts of this case free from the confusions of science, which sometimes perplex the most learned.

Let us then apply this test of power to the evidence in this case. Has the defendant been so far deprived of his reason as to have lost his power to govern himself or to manage his affairs? I shall not in presenting this branch of the case attempt to repeat to you the whole of the testimony on either side. You have listened to all of it and the thorough discussion it has received, with great attention. I shall therefore content myself with an effort to present the principal points of this case, and to classify the testimony. You will understand that no comment I may make on the evidence is in any way binding on you.

I understand it to be admitted by the relator that the defendant was at one time sane. Her petition for a commission of lunacy against the defendant was sworn to December 21, 1866. In it she says that he has been deprived of his reason "for three years last past." Mr. William Haskell gives the date of the change as 1862, while the family were out West. To the same effect is the testimony of Miss Annie Haskell, and Mr. George Haskell.

We may, therefore, regard it as admitted that the defendant was at one time free from the taint of mental disease. According to all the testimony he had lived for many years prior to 1862, in this city, where he had acquired some property and considerable reputation as a carriage maker. He seems to have become embarrassed pecuniarily about the year 1862, and his property in Arch Street was sold by the Sheriff. In 1862, he removed with his family to Illinois, and attempted, but unsuccessfully, to establish himself there.

It was during his sojourn in the West that the "change" alluded to by some of the witnesses was first noticed. The daughter describes it thus: "One evening mother was sewing; George was

on the sofa; father came down in his night clothes, and cried out he wanted to go home; we could not pacify him." This is corroborated in the main by other members of the family, one of whom states that the next morning the defendant could not recollect anything of the occurrence. Prior to that time Mr. Haskell had been very affectionate to all his family.

According to the testimony of his children, be became, after this, abusive, passionate, and violent. Ellen Dougherty, the servant, says that she noticed the change when he had been "home from the West six months; he first commenced," she says, "about money; there was confusion in the house until he was taken to the hospital; he used profane language to his wife and children."

Having thus fixed the time and the first symptom spoken of by the relator's witnesses, I will call your attention to the other matters relied on as evidences of the defendant's insanity.

1. It is alleged that he carried a pistol and secreted a knife and a screwdriver, and threatened to use one or more of these weapons against his wife.

2. That he also threatened violence to Mr. Horn, to his daughter, to the president, and was hostile to his sons and his family.

3. That he was extremely loquacious; spoke of a patent that he had secured; of a projected tub factory; a carriage factory of large dimensions; of a steamship line; and of other enterprises considered by some of the witnesses as wild and chimerical.

According to his son William, the defendant added to these various projects the intention to study law, to become an author, inspector of boilers, &c.

4. That he tore up the carpets at his home, and put the furniture in the street.

5. That he imagined he had been poisoned.

6. That he has declared he was crazy; that he went out in the yard, pulled up his pants, sat in the glare of the sun, talked to himself, wanted a neighbor's tree removed into his yard, said he owned all the street, threatened to burn the asylum, and moved the bandages from his broken leg.

7. That he made a ridiculous will, and wrote letters containing libels against his wife, one of his sons, and other members of the family.

And lastly, that he sued his son William, upon what is alleged to be by him an unfounded claim.

[The judge then took up the points made by Mr. Biddle for the Commonwealth, and, after reviewing them in detail, said:]

There may be other charges developed by the evidence before you, but I believe that the principal allegations of the Commonwealth's case may be all ranged under the above heads. If you recall any other statements you must give them their proper weight.

These several matters have been referred to by Drs.Jones, Butler, Harbeson, Morton, Ritz, Birkey, and Groves, by Messrs. McCartney, Wm. Haskell, Henry J. Haskell, Geo. Haskell, Loveaire, Albertson, Birkey, and Knight, and by Miss Dougherty and Miss Annie Haskell. You will perhaps attach importance to the evidence of the medical experts. Dr. Jones, Dr. Butler, Dr. Harbeson, and Dr. Birkey are all of the opinion that he was insane at the times of which they speak.

Dr. Morton and Dr. Ritz saw him after he left the insane asylum, and whilst he was in the surgical ward of the Pennsylvania Hospital, in Pine street, for treatment of his broken leg.

They refer to the fact that he insisted on removing his bandages, although cautioned that this course would retard his cure.

Dr. Morton testifies that defendant "did not act as a man of sound judgment would act," but he says, "I would not go so far as to say his mind was unsound."

Dr. M. F. Groves, the last medical expert called by the Commonwealth, has known the defendant thirty years. He speaks of his threats, bad language, and bad behavior, but admits that he has on a previous occasion sworn "that defendant was a wicked man, and that his conduct was wickedness, not lunacy." He adds, "I have not seen enough of him lately to change my opinion.

The Commonwealth further contends that there is proof of insanity in the defendant's family.

Mr. Wm. Haskell speaks of his uncle's derangement, and adds that his father told him "his cousin was deranged."

Dr. Groves says the defendant "was satisfied his brother was crazy." He told me of an aunt "who had hanged herself."

It has been ruled that this evidence is entitled to consideration. Smith vs. Kramer, 1 Am. Law Reg., old series, 353.

The documentary evidence will also be considered by you. The record of the suit against the son, the will, and the letters are all relied on by the relator as sustaining the allegations of insanity. You will, perhaps, regard the letters attacking the wife and child as requiring more of explanation at his hands than the other papers would seem to demand. I shall not read them, for the letters will be sent out with you, and you doubtless remember

their substance. The two to which I particularly allude, contain a serious charge against the wife and an imputation against the child. The wife is described by a number of witnesses as an excellent and amiable lady. Whatever may be your finding, I presume all parties will wish that these letters had never been written. Whilst we condemn the matter and style of this correspondence, we should be careful to remember the defendant's explanations in this behalf. He alleges that they were written under the aggravation of most unusual and distressing injuries. That he had been (as he contends) taken from his home, placed in a station house cell infested with vermin, in the insane department of a public almshouse, and in an insane asylum, where he was confined for months, locked up at night in a ward with raving maniacs. He avers that all this was in pursuance of a conspiracy to punish him for simply attempting to secure to his wife her just share of her father's estate.

A libel is a foul thing, and a libeller is in some aspects of a case the most loathsome of all created beings. He frequently destroys the happiness of the unoffending and the pure, and universally provokes to a breach of the public peace. Of this tendency of libels we have read since the commencement of this trial a sad and fatal illustration in another State. But, bad as the heart of the libeller must be, it by no means follows that his reason is impaired, or else he could never be punished. I have no hesitation in condemning these letters, whether they were the product of a reasoning or of an insane mind. Whilst I speak thus freely of them, I also feel required to notice another feature of this case. It appears by the transcript of Alderman Hutchinson, that on the 24th of May, 1866, a warrant was issued against this defendant on the oath of his son, George W. Haskell, charging the defendant with "threats, and having a large knife or dirk." This warrant, at the request of the prosecutor, was given to officer Widener, who arrested the defendant and took him before the alderman. The transcript records that "the prosecutor not being present, the defendant was held in $1000 bail for a hearing on the 25th instant, at 10 A. M., and in default of bail the defendant was committed." At the time fixed, the transcript says, "neither the prosecutor nor defendant appeared," and this (with the exception of the note, that a transcript was subsequently issued to the defendant,) is the last entry upon the record. The committment, as you are aware, commanded the officer receiving it to take the defendant to the county jail, where he was to be detained in default of bail for a