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better than the inflicting of the full penalty," &c. Now, although we do not believe that even prevention is the only end of punishment, but that revelation and the whole course of nature show retribution to be an essential part of the idea, yet surely the reformation of the individual criminal is a small part of the object of any statute. The statute in question was passed to prevent cruelty; and as a means of such prevention, has ordered the punishment of persons convicted. Now, though it is very possible, that waving the penalty and substituting an appeal to the better feelings of the guilty person may in some cases operate well upon the individual under trial, yet the statute and the manner of enforcing it were intended to act upon the whole class of men for whom it was made, and more especially upon the worst of that class the violent, the hard-hearted, and the naturally cruel,-in the moment of passion,-at the moment when its protection is needed most by those who have no other protector. And who can doubt, that the hands of such men at such times will be stayed sooner by the fear of a full retribution, than by the prospect of a lenient sentence, and an address, however moving, from the judge on the bench. The law was intended to prevent crime, to prevent first offences; to act in terrorem when better feelings have ceased to act, and thus to protect the sailor from cruelty, and not merely to give him redress after it is inflicted; or, still less, merely to reform the perpetrator of the crime.

But even if the judge were convinced that lenity toward the offender would be the surest way of preventing the commission of the same crime by others, it appears to us to be a question quite worth the asking, whether he has any discretion to say that the ends of justice may be best reached by not inflicting the penalty. The statute saysevery person so offending shall on conviction be punished by fine not exceeding $1000, or imprisonment not exceed

ing five years, or by both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence;" evidently giving the judge the discretion of adapting the punishment to the degree of the criminality of the act, and not to the probability of reforming the criminal, or to the judge's own opinion of the policy of inflicting the whole penalty incurred. If the offence is one of an aggravated kind, covering the whole ground of the statute, and more, without any mitigating circumstances in the act itself, is not the judge bound to inflict the full penalty, leaving commutation to the executive, whatever may be the prisoner's deportment at the trial, or his relation to third persons? Can the judge show lenity to such a criminal, even though he should seek it carefully with tears? In short, is not the judge's discretion to be exercised solely in determining from all the circumstances of the case, the degree of criminality of the party, and in modifying the punishment according to that degree of criminality, and not according to any opinion of his own of the probable consequences of such an infliction? If the penalty is wrong in general, the legislature must alter it; and if it works a hardship in a particular case, the executive must modify it.

We are aware that there may seem to be a degree of indecorum in thus freely discussing sentences passed by a judge of so exalted a reputation as he whom it is our good fortune to have presiding over our chief maritime court; yet as the principles developed in these sentences must deeply affect the condition of a large class of men, daily increasing in numbers and respectability; who, too, have few opportunities of making their voice heard before the public; we have thought that among the various subjects. discussed in the columns of a law journal, there is no one more deserving of the serious consideration of the profession, than that which we have thus imperfectly opened to its notice.

R. H. D. Jr.

ART V.-AMERICAN REPORTS AND REPORTERS.

In this country, the decisions and opinions of the judicial tribunals have received more of the legislative sanction, than has been accorded to them in any other. In England, we believe, the business of reporting is entirely unofficial, and the authenticity of reported cases wholly dependent upon the character of the report and of the reporter. In other European states, and especially in France, collections of cases have been and are now published, but they do not seem to be regarded with that respect, with which the English and American lawyers are accustomed to look upon judicial opinions. In almost all the United States, the decisions of the higher courts are required by law to be reported, either by the judges or some of them, or by a reporter officially appointed and paid in part at least by the government; they are distributed at the public expense, in the same manner as the statute laws, besides being sold by the reporter on his own account; and the opinions of the judges are for the most part drawn up in writing. The reported cases are a series of elaborate legal essays, on the various subjects to which they happen to relate, drawn up with the knowledge and expectation that they are to be published, and to become an authoritative exposition of the law and its application. The decisions of our higher tribunals, therefore, which are reported and published in pursuance of some legislative provision, seem to be thereby invested with a sanction and authority, which the English reports have never enjoyed since the days of the year-books.

We have ventured, on a former occasion, to advance the opinion, that, since the first volume of American Reports was published, namely, within the last fifty years, no country has done so much in this department of juridical

literature, as the United States; and the examination of the American reports, which we have gone through for the purpose of this notice, has convinced us of the entire truth of the remark.

In consideration of the great importance of a knowledge of this branch of our legal literature to members of the profession, we shall devote this article to a short bibliographical account of the American reports,' with brief notices of the statute provisions, where any exist, for the publication of the decisions of the courts. In pursuance of this design, we shall first mention those which contain the decisions of the United States courts, comprising the supreme court, the circuit courts, and the district courts. We shall next notice in chronological order (so far as that arrangement may be convenient) the reports of the decisions of the several state courts, commencing with Maine and following the order in which the states are usually mentioned.

Rhode Island has no reports, and we are not aware of the existence of any in the new states of Michigan and Arkansas. The judiciary systems of the different states have nearly all been modified, and some entirely changed in their organization, during the periods through which these reports extend; so that there appears in the account of the reports a much greater variety of courts, than does now in fact exist or ever has existed at any one time. A history of the judiciary systems of the United States and of the several states, though an interesting subject, would extend this article to too great a length. In general, therefore, the names only of the different courts, in which the decisions were made, will be given. Of the comparative authority and value of the different reports, we shall not here attempt to speak. Many of the volumes have been noticed

1 In this article, we have said nothing of the volumes of reports published in the British-American Provinces. All that have come to our knowledge are noticed in vol. xix. p. 246, and vol. xx. pp. 210, 217, 324.

in former numbers of our journal at the time they were published.

UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court. The cases decided in this court, from its organization, February term, 1790, to August term, 1800, inclusive, were reported by Alexander James Dallas, and are contained in the second, third, and fourth volumes of his reports. The cases, subsequently decided, to February term, 1815, inclusive, were reported by William Cranch, and published in nine volumes. From February term, 1816, to January term, 1827, inclusive, the cases in this court were reported by Henry Wheaton, and occupy twelve volumes. On the resignation of Mr. Wheaton, the office of reporter was conferred upon Richard Peters, by whom it is now held. Mr. Peters has published thirteen volumes, containing the decisions of the supreme court to January term, 1839 inclusive. Mr. Peters also published in 1830-4, condensed reports of cases in the supreme court of the United States. These volumes contain condensed reports of all the cases in the second, third, and fourth of Dallas, the nine volumes of Cranch and the twelve volumes of Mr. Wheaton. In his preface, Mr. Peters says, "this work will contain all the cases adjudged in the supreme court of the United States from 1790 to 1827, inclusive, in a form which will make it authority in all judicial tribunals."

The decisions of the supreme court of the United States have been regularly reported, in an unbroken series, from the organization of the court; but the first provision, made by law, relating to the office of reporter, was contained in an act of congress, passed March 3, 1817, and limited to three years only. This statute recognised the power of the court to appoint a reporter; and provided that he should receive from the treasury of the United States, an

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