laws of the United States. But whenever the property has passed, according to those laws, then the property, like all other in the state is subject to state legislation; so far as that legisla tion is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States. Ib. RECORDING OF DEEDS AND MORTGAGES. (Mortgage.) A mortgage was recorded by the town clerk of the place, where the property was, he being the proper officer to record such instruments, under the statute of Rhode Island. He kept two books, in one of which he recorded mortgages, which included real estate; and in the other, mortgages upon personal property only. The mortgage in this case was first recorded in the book kept for recording mortgages on real estate. And he gave a certificate, lodged in the town clerk's office to record, November 20th, 1837, at 5 P. M., and recorded same day, in the record of mortgages in East Greenwich, book No. 4," &c. The court held that this certificate was properly received in evidence, in the circuit court. Anthony v. Butler, 13 Peters, 423.

66

SALE OF A STRANDED VESSEL BY THE MASTER. (Rules respecting.) The right of the master to sell a vessel stranded, depends on the circumstances under which it is done to justify it. The master must act in good faith, and exercise his best discretion for the benefit of all concerned: and a sale can only be made on the compulsion of a necessity, to be determined in each case, by the actual peril to which the vessel is exposed, and from which it is probable, in the opinion of persons competent to judge, the vessel cannot be saved. This is an extreme necessity. The New England Insurance Company v. The Brig Sarah Ann, 13 Peters, 387.

2. (Same.) The true criterion for determining the authority of the master to sell a vessel stranded near a foreign port, or in a port of the United States, or of a different state than that to which the vessel belongs, or in which the owners may be or reside, when the necessity occurs, is the distance of the owners or insurers from the scene of stranding. If by the ordinary means to convey intelligence of the situation of the vessel, the

master can obtain directions as to what he should do, he should resort to those means. But if the peril is such, that there is a probability of loss, and it is made more hazardous by every day's delay, the master may act promptly to save something for the benefit of all concerned, though but little can be saved. There is no way of doing so more effectual, than by exposing the vessel to sale; by which the enterprize of such men is brought into competition as are accustomed to encounter such risks, and who know from experience how to estimate the probable profits of such adventures. lb.

3. (Same.) The power of the master to sell the hull of the stranded vessel exists also as to her rigging and sails; which he may have stripped from her, after unsuccessful efforts to get her afloat; or when his vessel in his own judgment and that of those competent to form an opinion and to advise cannot be delivered from her peril. Ib.

4. (Same.) If the master sells without good faith, or without a sound discretion, the owner may against the purchaser assert his right of property in the sails and rigging; as he may in any case of a stranded vessel, which has been sold without good faith in the master.

Ib.

Ib.

5. (Same.) The court do not think the case of Smith v. Briddle, 2 Washington C. C. R. 150, sound law. It is expressed in terms too broad. SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. (Without delivery.) A bill of sale of personal property, duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, is as valid and effectual to pass the legal title to the vendee, as if there was an actual delivery of the property transferred. Clary and Clary v. Frayer, 8 G. & J. 398. USURY. (Exchange.) There is no rule of law fixing the rate which may be charged for exchange. It does not depend on the cost of transporting specie from one place to another ; although the price of exchange is no doubt influenced by it. Andrews v. Pond and another, 13 Peters, 65.

2. (New security.) If, in consideration of further forbearance, a

creditor receives a new security from his debtor for an existing

debt, he cannot enlarge the amount due by exacting any thing, either by way of interest or exchange, for the additional risk, which he may suppose he runs by this extension of credit; nor on the opinion he may entertain as to the punctuality of payment, or the ultimate safety of his debt. Ib.

III.-MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:-Middle District. COMMONWEALTH, ON THE RELATION OF OVID F. JOHNSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, AGAINST ORISTUS COLLINS.

Quo Warranto:-tenure of judicial office in Pennsylvania ;-operation of the provisions of the amended constitution on the commissions of judicial officers.

THE amended constitution of Pennsylvania was agreed to in convention, February 22, 1838, and ratified by the people on the ninth of October following, to take effect from the first of January, 1839.

By the fifth article of the second section, the tenure of judicial office, which, by the old constitution, was that of good behavior merely, was limited to the several periods of fifteen, ten, and five years, in relation to certain corresponding classes of officers, who were, however, subject as before to the condition of good behavior. By the same article, the power of appointment, which was originally vested in the governor alone, was placed in the hands of the governor, 66 by and with the consent of the senate." The seventh section provided for the going out of office, at certain specified times, of the several judicial officers then in commission, in pursuance of the limited tenure established by the new constitution. The new constitution also provided that the alterations and amendments therein should take affect from the first of January, 1839.

At the time of the adoption of the amended constitution, Oristus Collins, the respondent, held and exercised the office of president judge of the second judicial district of Pennsylvania, in

virtue of a commission bearing date August 8, 1836. On the twenty-sixth day of December, 1838, after the adoption of the new constitution, the respondent resigned his commission, as president judge, and, on the next day, was again commissioned to the same office, agreeably to the provisions of the fifth section of the schedule of the amended constitution, and, under this new commission, entered upon the duties of his office.

On the twenty-third day of May, 1839, the attorney general of Pennsylvania suggested the above facts to the supreme court, who thereupon awarded a writ of quo warranto against judge Collins, returnable the tenth of June following. On the return of this writ, the respondent appeared, and pleaded that he held and exercised the office in question under the commission abovementioned of December 27, 1838. To this plea, there was a demurrer and joinder.

The case was argued by the Attorney General, and James Madison Porter, for the commonwealth, and by Samuel Parke, and Thaddeus Stevens, for the respondent; and the opinion of the court was delivered as follows, by

KENNEDY, J.-"Under the constitution of 1798 the tenure of the judges of the courts therein specially mentioned was during good behavior. By the amendments, however, as they are called, which were agreed on and proposed by the convention of 1838, and approved by a majority of the electors, who voted on the question whether they should become part of the constitution or not, at the general election in that year, the tenure of the judges of the supreme court was changed to a term of fifteen years; the president judges of the several courts of common pleas, and such other courts of record as were or should be established by law, and all other judges required to be learned in the law to a term of ten years; subject still, however, to the condition of each behaving himself well. And further, instead of being appointed . by the governor, as under the constitution of 1790, they are under the amendments to be nominated by the governor, and by and with the consent of the senate appointed and commissioned by him. By the second section in the schedule, which forms

part of the amendments, it is declared, that the alterations and amendments shall take effect from the first day of January eigh teen hundred and thirty-nine, and though it is declared by the third section of the schedule, that the clauses, sections and articles of the constitution of 1790, which still remain unaltered, shall continue to be construed, and have effect as if the said constitution had not been amended, yet the judicial tenure being expressly altered by the amendments, the constitution of 1790 therefore became null and void as to this particular; and all the judges within the state on the first day of January eighteen hundred and thirty-nine, who then held their offices and commissions under it during good behavior, ceased to be judges, by reason of the tenure whereby they held their offices having become terminated, unless some provision can be found to have been made in the amendments to counteract and prevent this effect. The seventh section of the schedule is the only part of the amendments, then, which contains any provision whatever in relation to this point, that can by any possible construction be made to apply to the defendant's case. It is in the following words: "The commissions of the president judges of the several judicial districts, and the associate law judges of the first judicial district, shall expire as follows: The commissions of one half of those who shall have held their offices ten years or more, at the adoption of the amendments to the constitution, shall expire on the twenty-seventh day of February, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine: the commissions of the other half of those who shall have held their offices ten years or more, at the adoption of the amendments to the constitution, shall expire on the twenty-seventh day of February one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, the first half to embrace those whose commissions shall bear the oldest date. The commissions of all the remaining judges, who shall not have held their offices for ten years at the adoption of the amendments to the constitution, shall expire on the twenty-seventh day of February next after the end of ten years from the date of their commissions." All the judges mentioned in this section have their commissions, which were granted under the authority of