the penalty of the crime, are somewhat silly and puerile, for what rational adult would have thought himself beyond the grasp of justice, when behind a door, unless he designed to sell his life as dearly as possible?

"In his examinations, Pechot persisted in saying, that he only pushed the woman with his hand; yet on the day of the act, or the day after, when the son of the deceased pointed to the tools scattered about the stable, and asked him which he used for striking his mother, he replied; if I struck her, I only gave her one blow, but I do not recollect with what,-unless it were this,' pointing to a little wooden mallet he had picked up. Further, Messrs. Toulmouche and Tourneux, charged with the duty of examining the body of the deceased, found, 1, besides a laceration of the integuments of the head, a separation of the whole fronto-parietal suture; 2, four fissures involving the parietal bone, one which extended across the temporal and down to the base of the cranium; 3, several traumatic sanguineous effusions; 4, considerable depression of the brain under the parietal fracture; 5, an inflammatory softening of the middle cerebral lobe. They conclude that these lesions were produced by a weapon that would break and bruise without cutting. Such injuries exclude, at least, to a certain degree, the idea of a simple fall, however rough the object with which the head might have come in contact. If, therefore, we admit that Pechot struck the deceased with a mallet, it must equally be admitted, that an insane person may adopt a system of defence, and persist therein.'

"It was suspected that Pechot was simulating, but so far

1 The reader must bear in mind, that the reasoning which leads to the general conclusion here marked by italics, as well as the other similarly marked in the preceding paragraph, is based upon the fact of Pechot's insanity, which is supposed to be proved by other considerations. Of course they are designed for application in other cases, where the facts indicated in these conclusions might, in the absence of other means of information, be adduced as proofs of sanity, being considered as compatible with the idea of insanity.

was he from this, that previous to Anne Lerussard's death, he was grieved and irritated by being called mad. Since then, before the examining judges (juges instructeurs) he always eluded the direct avowal of his madness. If he did not labor, it was because he was sick; if he did not want his fields sown, it was because they were exhausted, and he could get no manure; if his neighbors testified as to these numerous aberrations, he accused them of saying what they pleased, &c. Thus he presents also a character common to almost all the insane, that of not acknowledging the existence of their disorder, even when they are aware of it themselves."

Notwithstanding the length to which this article has already extended, we cannot forego the opportunity to press upon the attention of our readers some of the important points which this case presents. It ought to convince us, how little calculated to further the ends of justice is the testimony of medical men, in cases of this kind, as generally obtained in this country and Great Britain. If a physician, who was selected on account of his eminence in the particular department of his art that embraces mental disorders, for the purpose of ascertaining the mental condition of a criminal, was unable, after repeated interviews, to discover his insanity, though it actually existed, what confidence can we place in the opinions of those, who have no particular acquaintance with insanity, or perhaps, know less of it than of any other disease, and have had only the most limited means of ascertaining the mental condition of the individual in question? In France, if a rational suspicion be raised that the accused is insane, his trial is delayed, and physicians who are distinguished for their knowledge of insanity are directed by the judicial authorities to examine his case, and report thereon at a subsequent session of the court. In this country and in England, if the friends or counsel of the accused would rest his defence on the plea of insanity, they

are obliged to rely on the testimony of medical witnesses, whose only knowledge of him has been obtained in one or two casual interviews in the prison; or, it may be, that without any previous knowledge at all, they are placed upon the witnesses' stand, and required to state, whether, from the testimony they have heard, they are led to believe the accused to be sane or insane. The evil does not rest here. This testimony, instead of being received as the result of an impartial and scientific investigation of a case for the purposes of justice alone, as medical testimony in such cases. ever should be, is coolly regarded as part of the evidence "for the defence," to be offset by some of an opposite tenor, trumped up, as best can be, by the government counsel. Is there nothing wrong in all this? Is it not a mockery of justice, a setting at nought of the common claims of humanity?

There is another point presented in the management of the above case, which we recommend to the special consideration of our legislators and jurists. No sooner is the insanity of the accused suspected, than the matter is referred to the investigation of those whose studies and habits render them peculiarly fitted to decide it. The jury are not left to be puzzled and confounded by the conflicting opinions of irresponsible men, who may talk of what they know little about, and are more bent on glorifying themselves, or on obtaining a triumph over a professional brother, than advancing the ends of truth and justice. The court too is content to abide by the results of a scientific investigation, modestly declining to enlighten the jury with refined speculations beyond their reach, and to make the issue of the case depend on its notions of the nature and effect of insanity. It seems to have been enough for it to know that the accused was insane, without minutely calculating the extent of his knowledge of right and wrong, or laying down any other metaphysical test of criminal responsibility.

The deliberation, with which the proceedings were con

ducted in the above case, presents a striking contrast to the indecent haste with which they have been too often hurried in Great Britain. More than six months elapsed between the arrest of Pechot and his acquittal, during which the court instituted suitable measures for determining the exact condition of his mind. Where, in the records of the Old Bailey, shall we find a similar instance of humane and enlightened delay? Bellingham, who shot Mr. Percival in the lobby of the house of commons, was tried, condemned, and executed, within eight days of the commission of the fatal act; and though his counsel raised strong suspicions of insanity, which it needed only the testimony of his friends and acquaintances, who lived at a distance, to confirm, yet the opportunity to send for them was sternly refused by the court, as if it were a covert attempt to defeat the ends of justice. Had Pechot been tried immediately after committing the offence, or even after the report of the medical commission, he, too, would probably have suffered as a felon, instead of being consigned to the hospital as a patient. What further arguments are needed to convince us, that when insanity is pleaded in defence, ample time and opportunity should be afforded, for ascertaining, by suitable inquiries, whether the accused is really sane or not? Whatever the result may be, we cannot see what harm can possibly arise from delay.

I. R.

ART. III.-THEORY OF THE RIGHTS OF AUTHORS.

[The following dissertation constitutes Part Third of a Treatise (in French) on the Rights of Authors, in Literature, Sciences, and the Fine Arts, the first volume of which has recently been published at Paris, by AugustinCharles Renouard, author of a treatise published a few years since on Patents for new inventions. It considers the abstract question of the nature of the rights of authors, independently of all legislation on the subject. Two theories have been started as the basis of the positive law relating to copy

right. One of these theories attributes to an author a right of property in his thoughts, and demands the same protection for this property, which the positive laws accord to the proprietor of an article of merchandise. The other considers the composition and publication of a book as a service (voluntary, indeed, but not the less meritorious,) rendered by the author to the public, which entitles him to an adequate remuneration. On the first of these theories is founded the claim of a perpetual copy-right,—the favorite project of some recent writers; on the other, the system of an exclusive privilege to print and sell for a limited period, which is the basis of the laws of all or nearly all the states of the civilized world, on the subject of copy-right. Mr. Renouard, in opposition to almost all the theoretical writers, adopts the latter system, and explains and defends the grounds of his opinion, in a very able and conclusive manner. His arguments, it seems to us, are unanswerable. This discussion is very remarkable in one respect; it leads by reasoning and argument to the same theoretical results, which have been already practically adopted in the existing laws; and, thus, unlike most theoretical speculations, establishes an existing institution upon the firm basis of abstract and immutable principle. The subject of remunerating authors for their services to the public, or, in other words, the law of copy-right, seems, at this moment, to be attracting legislative attention in every part of the civilized world; and, though the question of theory is hardly an open one in this country, since the constitution of the United States gives its sanction to the system of exclusive privilege for a limited period only; yet the subject is not without its interest here, and will probably be much discussed even on theoretical grounds, by the next or some succeeding congress, in reference to extending the privilege of copy-right to English authors, under the new international copy-right law of Great Britain. Under these circumstances, the following theoretical exposition of the principle, upon which the general system of copy-right is founded, will be likely to prove an acceptable contribution to the somewhat scanty knowledge existing among us on this important and really difficult subject. In the course of this dissertation, Mr. Renouard takes occasion to refer to the opinion of Kant, in regard to the rights of authors; and, in another part of his work, he gives an analysis of the doctrines advanced by that author. As every thing which the great German metaphysician has written is worthy of attention; and as his ideas on the matter in question have had no trifling influence, both in the legislation of the German States, and in the formation of the speculative opinions of the German authors; the analysis of his system, inserted in the first part of Mr. Renouard's work, has been translated and annexed to the Theory of the Rights of Authors. In making the following translation, the French word editeur, which does not answer to our word editor, but corresponds more nearly to what we mean by a publisher, has been rendered by the latter word. In English, we have no word except pirate, to designate one who publishes a book without the permission of the author or proprietor;