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La Touche, the chief of the Toulon fleet, having suddenly died when about to set sail. A delay of several weeks ensued, and Napoleon formed a new combination, founded on the experience of the weather prevailing in the now advanced season. The regular blockade of the French ports, especially of those on the Atlantic seaboard, being impossible in the storms of winter, he ordered Ganteaume to leave Brest, and thence to proceed into the Channel, the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons having previously sailed for the West Indies to threaten or ravage the British colonies. The decisive movement was, in this way, to be made by the fleet nearest to Boulogne; but the attention of the enemy was to be diverted by demonstrations which, it might be assumed, would mask the attack, for a time at least, and would probably draw off a considerable force to defend our endangered colonial possessions. This scheme, however, proved also fruitless; for though Missiessy, in the first days of 1805, put out to sea and escaped pursuit with the Rochefort squadron, Villeneuve, the new commander of the Toulon fleet, after getting safely into the Mediterranean, returned, with characteristic indecision, and this detained Ganteaume in port, his orders being not to leave Brest until Villeneuve had passed Gibraltar. A new project was therefore required; and Spain having declared war against England at this conjuncture, and the Spanish fleets, still powerful in numbers, having been added to those of France, and given to the daring and original genius whose destiny it was to be our foe, Napoleon resolved to make use of this hardly-expected accession of force, and to give ampler scope to his naval operations. His plan was grand and able alike, and, notwithstanding all that has been urged by national vanity, it might have been realized. The principle of this scheme was to collect a great naval force at a distance from our shores, to draw off a part, at least, of the English fleets, in order to observe or attack it, and then, returning quickly to Europe, to rally any friendly aid in the way, and to appear in irresistible strength in the Channel. For this purpose Villeneuve, whose fleet had been increased to eleven sail of the line, was to elude Nelson, who had only nine, to rally the French ship left at Cadiz, to join at that port a Spanish squadron of six sail of the line under Admiral Gravina, and

then to make for the West Indies, where Missiessy, who, as we have seen, had got out to sea in the first part of January, would be, it was thought, cruising with the Rochefort squadron. Meantime Ganteaume, with twenty-one sail, was to watch his opportunity, to set out from Brest, and, avoiding Cornwallis, who had about nineteen, to effect his junction in the far Atlantic with Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy; and the four squadrons, which, when combined, would form a fleet of about forty-four sail, were either to make direct for Boulogne, or else to unite with the Ferrol squadron, now raised to fourteen sail of the line, and then to proceed into the Channel. In this way Napoleon conceived a force ranging from forty to fifty sail of the line, allowing for losses and contingencies, would be concentrated at the decisive point in the summer of 1805; and as, if it were combined, it would be greatly superior to any thing which could be arrayed against it, and as, besides, it was reasonable to suppose, that the English fleets would, in part at least, be drawn away and rendered useless, he reckoned with confidence on success.

In compliance with the imperial project Villeneuve set out from Toulon with his eleven ships and six fine additional frigates on the 30th of March, 1805. Nelson, who supposed that Egypt was the real object of the French fleet, was cruising to the south of Sardinia, and the French admiral met no enemy on his way through the western Mediterranean. He passed the Straits of Gibraltar on the 9th of April, was off Cadiz the next day, and on the Iith was in the open Atlantic, having rallied the French man-of-war at Cadiz, and the greater part of Gravina's squadron. After a voyage of little more than a month, the combined fleet of Villeneuve and Gravina, eighteen sail of the line and seven frigates, reached Martinique on the 14th of May; and though the condition of the crews and the ships was far from good in many respects, Napoleon's plan had so far succeeded; for Nelson had been completely eluded; he was being drawn off from the European seas, and the first main division of the French squadrons was at its destination in the West Indies. At Martinique, however, news arrived which shook the vacillating spirit of Villeneuve, already discouraged by the evident want of efficiency in the combined squadrons, and already an

ticipating some unknown disaster, though as yet he had been remarkably fortunate. Instead of remaining in these latitudes, Missiessy had returned to Rochefort, and thus his contingent of five or six sail was absent from the general place of meeting, and could not be expected to make its appearance. The fine weather, too, of an exceptional spring had permitted Cornwallis to maintain the blockade of Brest without interruption; Ganteaume had not been able to get out; and accordingly it was more than probable that the second main division of the combined fleets would not be able to obtain the West Indies. Villeneuve began to fear that the dreaded Nelson would attack and crush him off Martinique, though the force commanded by our great admiral was numerically less by a third than his own and he was still hundreds of miles distant; and he was already meditating a return to Europe, when fresh orders came to confirm his purpose. Napoleon, informed of the immobility of Ganteaume, had modified his project in part, and dispatching Admiral Magon with two sail of the line from the Rochefort squadron to Martinique, he directed Villeneuve to steer homewards, and with his fleet, now of twenty-seven ships, including large and small vessels, to raise the blockades of Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest in succession, and rallying the squadrons in those ports, and overpowering the enemies in his way, to appear off Boulogne in irresistible force. Villeneuve, too glad to avoid Nelson, left the West Indies on the 10th of June and on the 30th was off the Azores, with his whole fleet, as yet intact, on his straight course for the Bay of Biscay. Had he, acting on his own responsibility, now made at once for the Channel and Boulogne, it is difficult to see how the French army could have been prevented making the descent. For during the whole of June, and for weeks afterwards, Nelson and his fleet were far away; Cornwallis and his nineteen or twenty ships, the only force that could have interfered, was held in check by Ganteaume off Brest; the Channel was guarded chiefly by light vessels; and the way to the flotilla, accordingly, lay almost open to the French admiral. But Villeneuve could not take the bolder course; obeying the letter of Napoleon's orders, he prepared to try to reach the Channel by combining his fleet with the squadrons of his colleagues blockaded

in those ports; and he made for the coast of Spain and Ferrol.

Meanwhile Nelson, deceived at the outset as to the destination of Villeneuve's fleet, had been pursuing the French admiral with extraordinary but fruitless energy. Suspecting that Egypt would be the point of attack, he had remained for some time in the Mediterranean, after the departure of the French fleet from Toulon; and it was not until the 11th of May, when Villeneuve was at the other side of the Atlantic, that, with his squadron increased to ten sail of the line, he resolved to set off for the West Indies. Had he been aware of Napoleon's project he would doubtless have made for the Channel, to strengthen Cornwallis off Brest, and to interpose between Villeneuve and Ganteaume; but though he seems to have thought that Ireland might possibly be the enemy's object, he had no conception of the deep-laid scheme of a concentration of hostile force in the Channel. On the 2d or 3d of June he had reached Barbadoes, his well-manned and well-sailed vessels sailing much quicker than those of his foe; but, misled by false information, he turned away from the direction of Martinique, and steered southwards to the mouths of the Orinoco. Apprised of his error he retraced his steps, and on the 10th was at the island of Grenada, with a fleet numbering twelve sail of the line, two under Cochrane, having joined him, and about five or six frigates; and with this comparatively small force he hastened to attack Villeneuve, however numerically superior in strength. But Villeneuve had already left the West Indies, and in a few days was far out of reach; Napoleon's scheme having in this. respect been as yet carried out with complete success. Nelson, eager, anxious, but. still ignorant of the real aim of the French Emperor, now decided on returning to the Mediterranean, thus abandoning wholly the track of Villeneuve; but feeling uncertain as to the enemy's object, he, with rare: forethought, took precautions which, in the event, proved of the greatest importance, though they would almost certainly have been fruitless had Villeneuve steered from the Azores to the Channel. When setting out for the Spanish coast, Nelson dispatched a fast-sailing brig, the "Curieux," with a recommendation to the Admiralty to be on their guard against the French; and this vessel having arrived at.

Portsmouth on the 7th of July, immediate orders were given for a new disposition of the English squadrons, though no English officer, with the exception of the able and ingenious Collingwood, had as yet a suspicion of Napoleon's design. Admiral Stirling, who had been blockading Rochefort, and Sir Robert Calder, who had been blockading Ferrol, were directed to draw off from these ports, and look out for a French fleet at sea, the Admiralty's purpose being, it would seem, to keep the enemy away from Ferrol or Brest, and not contemplating an attack in the Channel. This move, however, had great results, though, but for the indecision of Villeneuve, these might have been of little importance. On the 22d of July the united squadrons, under the chief command of Sir Robert Calder, fell in with the fleet of the French admiral, long delayed by contrary winds on its course; and although Calder had only fifteen sail of the line against the twenty of Villeneuve, he did not hesitate to attack. The action was warm but indecisive, the French and Spanish crews, now some months at sea, having improved greatly in training and discipline; and though Villeneuve lost two ships, he easily made good his way to Ferrol.

Villeneuve had already missed a great opportunity by not making direct from the Azores to the Channel when Nelson was on his way to the Mediterranean. In this, however, he was only conforming to the positive orders of Napoleon, who enjoined him to rally his blockaded colleagues before attempting the decisive movement, though unquestionably he had a latitude of choice which a great commander would have turned to account. But after the action of the 22d of July his conduct hardly admits of excuse, and his irresolute timidity mainly contributed to the failure of Napoleon's design, though the chances in his favor were not so good as they had been when he was off the Azores. He reached Ferrol on the 2d of August with his fleet reduced to fifteen sail of the line -besides the two captured by Sir Robert Calder, three had been left to refit at Vigo -but he found fourteen sail of the line at Ferrol, for the most part in very fair condition; and the Rochefort squadron, now under the command of Lallemand, a good officer, had put to sea and was in the immediate neighborhood. Had Villeneuve,

therefore, as Napoleon has remarked, left Ferrol at once with his twenty-nine sail of the line, rallied the five which comprised the Rochefort squadron, and made straight for Ganteaume at Brest, he would either have avoided Calder, or, probably, have overpowered that admiral, who had not more than fifteen sail of the line, more or less injured by the fight of the 22d; and in either event, Villeneuve and Ganteaume would have opposed fifty-five sail of the line to Cornwallis, who had not more than twenty, and would hardly have failed to reach the Channel. But Villeneuve, though as yet fortunate, delayed irresolutely at Ferrol; he believed that Nelson, Calder, and Cornwallis were awaiting him in the Bay of Biscay, with their squadrons united, to overwhelm him; and he was unnerved by the dread of a disaster hardly, at this moment, possible. For during the first ten days of August, Nelson was far away from the theatre of action; he had reached Gibraltar about the 23d of July, and had then stood out to sea in search of the enemy, of whose position he remained ignorant; and Calder was in the Bay of Biscay, in communication with, but not united to, Cornwallis off Brest; and the French squadrons, therefore, were immensely superior in force to any which here might have met them. Pressed by the imperious commands of Napoleon, who, with true insight, perceived the situation, Villeneuve at last put out, on the 13th of August, his fleet numbering twenty-nine sail of the line, which, by the junction of Lallemand's contingent, could be increased at once to thirty-four, not to speak of eleven or twelve frigates. Had the French admiral, as he had been advised, and as he wrote to his master when setting out, now steered for Brest with his powerful armament, he might still, perhaps, have accomplished his mission, though his opportunity was not as good as it had been on two previous occasions. For by this time Nelson had joined eight ships of his squadron to that of Cornwallis

the great seaman had gone with the rest to Portsmouth-and this considerable addition of force reduced greatly the disproportion between the French and English squadrons, and diminished accordingly Villeneuve's chances. Yet as Cornwallis, with what Napoleon has characterized as "playing into the enemy's hands," about the 16th or 17th of August divided his

augmented fleet into two parts, and sent Calder, with nineteen or twenty ships, in search of Villeneuve in the Bay of Biscay, retaining only eighteen or nineteen himself, the French admiral, if he had sailed for Brest, might still have attained decided success had he been seconded by good fortune. Advancing with his thirty-four sail of the line, he might either have missed Calder or have fought and defeated that admiral, whose force was so inferior to his own; and in that case he might have reached Brest, and having effected his juncture with Ganteaume, been at the head of a fleet altogether superior, in numbers at least, to any adversaries. Instead, however, of taking the bold course, Villeneuve, upon hearing, when out at sea, a false report that a British fleet of twenty-five sail of the line was near, renounced the attempt to carry out the great service for which he had been designed, and turning southerly made for Cadiz, thus completely frustrating Napoleon's project and rendering all his exertions useless. The unfortunate Frenchman did not conjure away the evil fate which he apprehented: he was yet to see the day of Trafalgar.

his fame, turned away from Boulogne to
design the march which terminated in the
glories of Austerlitz. Trafalgar was in a
few weeks to crush his naval power for
the rest of his reign, and he never had an-
other opportunity of renewing the scheme
of 1803-5. Yet the victory of Nelson ought
not to blind us to the imminent peril in-
curred by England, or make us imagine
that a kind of destiny preserves necessarily
our shores from invasion. Napoleon felt
the difficulty of attempting the descent;
but, notwithstanding the inferiority of his
strength at sea, his deep-laid project well
nigh succeeded; his flotilla and army were
brought together; the Admiralty did not
see through his purpose, and left the
Channel dangerously exposed; Nelson
was drawn away from the sphere of oper-
ations, and Villeneuve had more than one
good chance of completely realizing his
master's orders. Had Villeneuve made
from the Azores to Brest, had he after the
action of the 22d of July left Ferrol at
once with his squadron at that port, he
would probably have rallied Ganteaume;
and if so, it is difficult to see how he would
not have had for a few days that mastery
of the Channel which was all that Napo-
leon required to transport his army. Yet
though, as a mere strategic conception,
Napoleon's project was worthy of his pow-
ers, and though, so far as regards a land-
ing, it was more nearly fulfilled than we
like to allow, it rested, we think, on mis-
calculations which rendered it ever liable
to fail, and in its ultimate results, we are
convinced, it must have ended in com-
plete discomfiture. The French Emperor,
sated with victory, and accustomed to the
ascendency of success, would never suffi-
ciently take into account the moral de-
pression of his admirals and the essential
inferiority of his naval forces; he forgot
that Villeneuve was to Nelson what Alvinzi
and Melas were to himself; and, as actual-
ly happened, it was always probable that,
whatever might be the strength of his
fleets, timidity, inexperience, and irresolu-
tion would render his combinations fruit-
less. Considering too the armed force
possessed by England in 1805, and that,
even if it had effected the descent with not
more than the inevitable loss, the French
army must in a few days have lost its com-
munications with France, and could not
possibly have been reinforced, we are sat-
isfied that Napoleon wholly underrated the

Meanwhile the Emperor had arrived at Boulogne, and had placed himself at the head of his army. 'Verhuel's contingent had long before doubled Cape Grisnez and reached Ambleteuse; the entire flotilla, with its matériel on board, was kept in readiness to put to sea; the Texel fleet rode at single anchor, and more than one hundred and fifty thousand men, strung to the highest pitch of enthusiastic daring, awaited only the signal to embark. Napoleon's correspondence during the few days from about the 12th to the 20th of August, 1805, when he thought that Villeneuve and Ganteaume would make their appearance in the Channel, breathes exultation and proud self-confidence; and as we read how, in letters throbbing with passion, he tells his lieutenants that "if they can give him the command of the Channel for twenty-four hours the existence of England will be a thing of the past," all doubts disappear of his conviction that a vast triumph was within his grasp. But the expected sails were awaited in vain; and when at last the dispatch arrived that Villeneuve had baffled his calculations, and "had slunk," as he bitterly exclaimed," into Cadiz," he at once renounced the entire enterprise, and, fortunately probably for

military power required for the expedition; one hundred and thirty thousand or one hundred and forty thousand Frenchmen might have marched to London and ravaged Kent and Sussex; but they could not possibly have subdued England. On

this, as on other occasions, Napoleon held his enemies too cheap, and his landing in England, we firmly believe, must have led to his ruin and that of his army.

[From Temple Bar.

GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS.

BY THE EDITOR.

GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS, whose portrait forms the frontispiece to our present number, was born on the 24th of February, 1824, at Providence, Rhode Island. When he was fifteen years old, his family removed to New-York, where he entered upon his business career in the counting-house of a dry-goods importer. He remained in this position only a year, however, and in the year 1842, in company with his elder brother, went to Brook Farm, where he identified himself with that most famous of American socialistic experiments. He spent a year and a half at Brook Farm, engaged in study and agricultural labor, and then passed another eighteen months with a farmer at Concord, taking part regularly in the ordinary work of the farm.

In 1846, Mr. Curtis went to Europe, and after a year of travel in Italy, entered the University of Berlin, where he stayed a few months, and witnessed the revolutionary scenes of 1848 in that city. The two following years he passed in traveling through central and southern Europe, and especially in Egypt and Syria. The fruit of this latter was a book called "Nile Notes of a Howadji," which he published on his return to the United States in 1850. The book met with sufficient success to encourage the young author, and it was followed by the "Howadji in Syria," published in 1852. In the meantime, he had found a place on the editorial staff of the New-York Tribune, and his third book was a volume entitled "Lotus-Eating," and made up of a series of letters, which he wrote to that journal from the various watering-places.

When "Putnam's Monthly" was started

in 1852, Mr. Curtis became one of the original editors, and held the post until the publication of the magazine was suspended, several years later; and from that time to the present, he has been constantly connected with the best journalism of the country, making for himself a reputation which is higher probably, and at the same time more purely literary, than that of any other man in the profession. As the amiable and cultivated occupant of the "Easy Chair" of Harper's Monthly, as the letterwriting Bachelor of Harper's Bazar, and especially as the editor-in-chief of Harper's Weekly, he has exercised an influence upon the reading public of America, which, if it has not been profound, has certainly been genial, elevating, and refining. There are few men in America, who when they take up their pens can be sure of reaching so wide an audience; and there is scarcely another who, having written so much, can look back over the record and find so little to regret.

Mr. Curtis's labors, however, have not been confined to journalism. He is always in great demand at college and other literary celebrations, and as a lyceum-lecturer, there are only one or two in the country who surpass him in popularity. He commenced his career in this latter field as early as 1853, and though he has not made a business of it, has generally found time in the midst of his other duties to address the people on the great questions of social and political reform.

Mr. Curtis is now forty-eight years old, in the "heyday and prime of life," and will apparently for many years to come occupy the position which at his death will be extremely difficult to fill.

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