positive enemies to each other. They can carry on no commercial or other intercourse with each other; they can make no valid contracts with each other; they can institute no suits in the courts of either country; they can, properly speaking, hold no communication of an amicable nature, with each other; and their property is mutually liable to capture and confiscation by the subjects of the other country. The whole objects and ends of the Partnership, the application of the joint funds, skill, labour, and enterprize of all the Partners of the common business, can no longer be attained.*

Thus a Partnership between alien friends, is at once defeated when they become alien enemies.

- This dissolution, however, only has respect to the future. The parties remain bound for all antecedent engagements. The partnership may be said to continue as to everything that is past, and until all pre-existing matters are wound up and settled. With regard to things past, the partnership continues, and must always continue.

No notice is necessary to the world to complete the dissolution of the association. Notice is requisite when a partnership is dissolved by the act of the parties, but it is not necessary when the dissolution takes place by the act of law. All mankind are bound to take notice of the War, and its consequences. Besides, any special notice would be useless unless joint, and as the partners could hold no lawful intercourse, a lawful joint notice is impossible.

It must not be supposed that peace will have any healing effect, to restore the parties to their rights; the co-partnership being once dissolved by the war, it was extinguished for ever, except as to matters existing prior to the war.f

* Story, on Partnership, pp. 447, 448.

† Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. Rep. U. S.

D

Partnerships.

With regard to the effect of war upon partnerships, where the partners are severally subjects of the belligerent powers. According to Mr. Justice Story, "this point does not seem to have been discussed in our courts of justice until a recent period; yet it would seem to be be a necessary result of principles of public law, well established and defined. By a declaration of war, the respective subjects of each country become positive enemies of each other. They can carry on no commercial or other intercourse with each other; they can make no valid contracts with each other; they can institute no suits in the courts of either country; they can, properly speaking, hold no communication of an amicable nature with each other; and their property is mutually liable to capture and confiscation, by the subjects of either country. Now, it is obvious from these considerations, that the whole ends and objects of the partnership, the application of the joint funds, skill, labours, and enterprize, of all the partners in the common business thereof, can no longer be attained. The conclusion therefore, would seem to be absolutely that this mutual supervening capacity, must, upon the very principles applied to all analagous cases, amount to a positive dissolution of the partnership."*

The law of nations has not even stopped at the points already stated; it proceeds further. The question of enemy or no enemy, depends not upon the natural allegiance of the partners, but upon their domicil.

If a partnership is established, and as it were domiciled, in a neutral country, and all the partners reside there, it is treated as a neutral establishment, and is entitled to protection accordingly. But if one or more of the partners is

*Story, on Partnership, 447.

domiciled in an enemy's country, he or they are treated personally as enemies, and his share of the partnership property is liable to capture and condemnation accordingly, even though the partnership establishment is in the neutral country. The inference from these considerations is, that in all these cases there is an utter incompatibility from operation of law between the partners, as to their respective rights, duties, and obligations, both public and private; and therefore, that a dissolution must necessarily result therefrom, independent of the will or acts of the parties.*

And, as a general rule, therefore, it may be laid down, that if the performance of a covenant be rendered unlawful by the Government of this country entering into war, the contract will be dissolved on both sides, and the offending party, as he has been compelled to abandon his contract, will be excused from the payment of damages for its nonperformance; but it is otherwise, if the non-performance is prevented only by the prohibition of a foreign country.†

In such cases, the remedy only is suspended; and other cases may occur on these principles, where, from other circumstances, the remedy only is suspended until the termination of the war; as for example, in most cases of executed

contracts.

Trading with the Enemy, was at an early period an indict- Trading with the Enemy able offence in the English Court of Admiralty.‡ And in the punishable. time of King William, it was held to be a misdeamenor at common law, to carry corn to an enemy.§

* Story, on Partnership, 449; Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns, 57; 16 Johns, 438.

† Platt, on Covenants, 588; Doe d. Lord Anglesea v, Ch. Wardens of Rugely, 6 Q. B. 113, and cases there cited.

Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. 10, 11, in note,

§ 1 Term. R. Gist. v. Mason.

Cartel Ships.

The law, as I have faintly sketched it out, is founded to some extent on American authorities, where the question has been as fully discussed as in the reports of this country; but there can be little doubt that the law is the same in this country: although a doubt was once thrown on it, by the strong political opinion of Lord Mansfield, as to the policy of allowing trade with an enemy, or assuring an enemy's property. The lustre of his talents, and his ascendancy in the Court of King's Bench, were calculated to continue the delusion. During his time, the question as to the legality of such insurances was never mooted; for he frowned on every attempt to set up such a defence, as dishonest and against good faith.*

The strict rule of interdicted intercourse has been carried so far in the British Admiralty, as to prohibit supplies to a British Colony during its partial subjection to the enemy, and when the Colony was in want of provisions.†

The same interdiction to trade applies to Cartel Ships, or Ships of Truce, that is, to Ships sent to recover prisoners of war; and there is but one exception to this rigorous rule of International Law;-the case of Ransom Bills, which are contracts of necessity, founded on a state of war.

* Per Buller, J. Bell v. Gilson, 1 Bos. v. Pull.

† Case of Bella Guidita, cited 1 Rob. Adm. Rep. 207.

SECTION II.

On Enemies and Hostile Property.

During a peace of thirty-nine years, there has naturally arisen a vast inter-immigration throughout Europe; many complicated commercial and family relations have sprung

up

between nations of different countries; many Englishmen are permanently settled in various parts of Europe; and England, in return, is crowded with Foreigners, who look upon this country as their present and future home. What is the position of these persons at the commencement of war? Who, in fact, are our enemies?

And the previous Section, in which the effect of War on Commercial Relations has been sketched out, must have made it quite evident that it has become important accurately to determine what relations and circumstances impress a hostile character upon persons and property. According to Chancellor Kent, "the modern International Law of the Commercial World is replete with refined and complicated distinctions on this point."

Enemies.

A man is said to be permanently an Alien Enemy, when Alien he owes a permanent allegiance to the adverse belligerent, and his hostility is commensurate in point of time with his country's quarrel. But he who does not owe a permanent allegiance to the enemy, is an enemy only during the existence and continuance of certain circumstances. *

The character of enemy arises from the party being in

* 1 Kent, p. 73