Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry Into the Psychological Character of Logical ProcessesWilliam Graham, 1851 - 320 páginas |
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Página 27
... I de- monstrate any proposition concerning triangles , it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal Principles of Human Knowledge , Introduction , § . x . X idea of a triangle ; which ought not to be PROLEGOMENA LOGICA . 27.
... I de- monstrate any proposition concerning triangles , it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal Principles of Human Knowledge , Introduction , § . x . X idea of a triangle ; which ought not to be PROLEGOMENA LOGICA . 27.
Página 61
... propositions , whose true logical character has been considerably misapprehended by eminent autho- rities . According to the above definition , every judgment in Logic must be regarded as a com- bination of concepts ; every term of such ...
... propositions , whose true logical character has been considerably misapprehended by eminent autho- rities . According to the above definition , every judgment in Logic must be regarded as a com- bination of concepts ; every term of such ...
Página 62
... proposition . If I say , " Cæsar was the conqueror of Pompey , " the immediate object of my thought is not Cæsar as an individual existing two thousand years ago , but a concept now present in my mind , com- prising certain attributes ...
... proposition . If I say , " Cæsar was the conqueror of Pompey , " the immediate object of my thought is not Cæsar as an individual existing two thousand years ago , but a concept now present in my mind , com- prising certain attributes ...
Página 63
... proposition in Logic is not one in which the concept is materially limited to an individual by extralogical ... propositions . Indefinite , or , as they should rather be called , indesignate propositions are an anomaly in Logic , no less ...
... proposition in Logic is not one in which the concept is materially limited to an individual by extralogical ... propositions . Indefinite , or , as they should rather be called , indesignate propositions are an anomaly in Logic , no less ...
Página 66
... proposition , is formed by the combination of terms . But to the judgments distinguished as psychological the definition of Locke is inapplicable , and here the objections of M. Cousin may be urged with full effect . Such are all the ...
... proposition , is formed by the combination of terms . But to the judgments distinguished as psychological the definition of Locke is inapplicable , and here the objections of M. Cousin may be urged with full effect . Such are all the ...
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Términos y frases comunes
act of thought analytical judgments antecedent applicable Aristotle assertion attri attributes axioms cause character conceive conclusion consciousness consequence constitution contingent Contradiction copula definition Descartes determined distinct distinguished Edinburgh Review empirical equal existence experience fact faculties formal thinking former furnish Geometry given Hamilton Hegel Hence hypothesis hypothetical hypothetical syllogisms imagination immediate implies individual Induction inference Kant language laws of thought limits logician Logik Maine de Biran material matter ment mental Metaphysics moral nature necessary truth necessity notion object of intuition object of thought observed Organon perceived perception phenomena philosophy physical portion positive predicate premise present principle of causality Principle of Contradiction Principle of Identity priori proposition psychological pure thinking question racter reasoning regarded Reid relation representative rience sensation sense sensible shew shewn Sir William Hamilton space substance supposed syllogism term theory thing tion triangle true universal volition whole
Pasajes populares
Página 26 - I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing, to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Página 125 - The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Página 36 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there...
Página 72 - finite.' Therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call ' infinite.' No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say...
Página 317 - Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.
Página 61 - Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals.
Página 125 - It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance...
Página 27 - I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color.
Página 292 - If a straight line meet two straight lines, so as to make the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together less than two right angles...
Página 27 - It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree...