Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry Into the Psychological Character of Logical ProcessesWilliam Graham, 1851 - 320 páginas |
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Página v
... relation to the thinking mind and to that mental philosophy of which it forms a portion . The former method has been abundantly tried , and has abundantly failed in the trial . A system of Logic treated in its objective application has ...
... relation to the thinking mind and to that mental philosophy of which it forms a portion . The former method has been abundantly tried , and has abundantly failed in the trial . A system of Logic treated in its objective application has ...
Página vi
... relation to Psychology . The neglect of this relation has been acknowledged as the weak side of the Kantian philosophy : its recognition has been imperatively demanded by the ablest modern writers on the subject . " Selon moi , " says M ...
... relation to Psychology . The neglect of this relation has been acknowledged as the weak side of the Kantian philosophy : its recognition has been imperatively demanded by the ablest modern writers on the subject . " Selon moi , " says M ...
Página x
... relation to my own early studies . The numerous obligations which the work is under to previous writers are most of them acknow- ledged as they occur . One or two , however , demand an express mention here . The reader who is familiar ...
... relation to my own early studies . The numerous obligations which the work is under to previous writers are most of them acknow- ledged as they occur . One or two , however , demand an express mention here . The reader who is familiar ...
Página xi
... relation to Psychology , should contain much which cannot be directly transferred to the pages of a work which advocates a strictly formal view of Logic , and which would rather contract than enlarge the limits assigned by Kant to the ...
... relation to Psychology , should contain much which cannot be directly transferred to the pages of a work which advocates a strictly formal view of Logic , and which would rather contract than enlarge the limits assigned by Kant to the ...
Página 6
... relation to these and similar questions , Logic is subordinate to Psychology . To Psychology we must look for the explanation and justification of the peculiar features of Logic . Logic , says one antagonist , furnishes no criterion of ...
... relation to these and similar questions , Logic is subordinate to Psychology . To Psychology we must look for the explanation and justification of the peculiar features of Logic . Logic , says one antagonist , furnishes no criterion of ...
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Términos y frases comunes
act of thought analytical judgments antecedent applicable Aristotle assertion attri attributes axioms cause character conceive conclusion consciousness consequence constitution contingent Contradiction copula definition Descartes determined distinct distinguished Edinburgh Review empirical equal existence experience fact faculties formal thinking former furnish Geometry given Hamilton Hegel Hence hypothesis hypothetical hypothetical syllogisms imagination immediate implies individual Induction inference Kant language laws of thought limits logician Logik Maine de Biran material matter ment mental Metaphysics moral nature necessary truth necessity notion object of intuition object of thought observed Organon perceived perception phenomena philosophy physical portion positive predicate premise present principle of causality Principle of Contradiction Principle of Identity priori proposition psychological pure thinking question racter reasoning regarded Reid relation representative rience sensation sense sensible shew shewn Sir William Hamilton space substance supposed syllogism term theory thing tion triangle true universal volition whole
Pasajes populares
Página 26 - I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing, to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Página 125 - The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Página 36 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there...
Página 72 - finite.' Therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call ' infinite.' No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say...
Página 317 - Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.
Página 61 - Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals.
Página 125 - It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance...
Página 27 - I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color.
Página 292 - If a straight line meet two straight lines, so as to make the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together less than two right angles...
Página 27 - It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree...