Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry Into the Psychological Character of Logical ProcessesWilliam Graham, 1851 - 320 páginas |
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Página 123
... Substance . All objects of This nomenclature is sanctioned by the authority of M. Royer - Collard . " Trois lois de la pensée concourent dans la perception . 1o . L'étendue et l'impénétrabilité ont un sujet auquel elles sont inhérentes ...
... Substance . All objects of This nomenclature is sanctioned by the authority of M. Royer - Collard . " Trois lois de la pensée concourent dans la perception . 1o . L'étendue et l'impénétrabilité ont un sujet auquel elles sont inhérentes ...
Página 124
... substance , the supposed support of perceptible attributes . " I do not argue , " he says , " against the existence of any one thing that we can appre- hend , either by sense or reflection . That the things * Called also the Principle ...
... substance , the supposed support of perceptible attributes . " I do not argue , " he says , " against the existence of any one thing that we can appre- hend , either by sense or reflection . That the things * Called also the Principle ...
Página 125
... substances . To this my answer is , that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense , for a combination of sensible qualities , such as extension , solidity , weight , and the like : this we cannot be accused of taking away ...
... substances . To this my answer is , that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense , for a combination of sensible qualities , such as extension , solidity , weight , and the like : this we cannot be accused of taking away ...
Página 126
... Substance , mentioned above . It is necessary to speak with diffidence on a point disputed by philosophers of such eminence ; but if there be any truth in the psychological dis- tinction between Thought and Intuition , noticed in my ...
... Substance , mentioned above . It is necessary to speak with diffidence on a point disputed by philosophers of such eminence ; but if there be any truth in the psychological dis- tinction between Thought and Intuition , noticed in my ...
Página 127
... substance and cause , or we must admit that , in m • distinctly conceive about them . It is true , we conceive a subject to which the attributes belong ; but of this subject , when its attributes are set aside , we have but an obscure ...
... substance and cause , or we must admit that , in m • distinctly conceive about them . It is true , we conceive a subject to which the attributes belong ; but of this subject , when its attributes are set aside , we have but an obscure ...
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Términos y frases comunes
act of thought analytical judgments antecedent applicable Aristotle assertion attri attributes axioms cause character conceive conclusion consciousness consequence constitution contingent Contradiction copula definition Descartes determined distinct distinguished Edinburgh Review empirical equal existence experience fact faculties formal thinking former furnish Geometry given Hamilton Hegel Hence hypothesis hypothetical hypothetical syllogisms imagination immediate implies individual Induction inference Kant language laws of thought limits logician Logik Maine de Biran material matter ment mental Metaphysics moral nature necessary truth necessity notion object of intuition object of thought observed Organon perceived perception phenomena philosophy physical portion positive predicate premise present principle of causality Principle of Contradiction Principle of Identity priori proposition psychological pure thinking question racter reasoning regarded Reid relation representative rience sensation sense sensible shew shewn Sir William Hamilton space substance supposed syllogism term theory thing tion triangle true universal volition whole
Pasajes populares
Página 26 - I find, indeed, I have a faculty of imagining, or representing, to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Página 125 - The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Página 36 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there...
Página 72 - finite.' Therefore there is no idea or conception of any thing we call ' infinite.' No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say...
Página 317 - Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.
Página 61 - Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals.
Página 125 - It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance...
Página 27 - I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color.
Página 292 - If a straight line meet two straight lines, so as to make the two interior angles on the same side of it taken together less than two right angles...
Página 27 - It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree...