joint tenant, or that he paid the entire purcnase price in consideration of her taking care of him and making a home for him. On the contrary, she claimed in her answer, and testified upon the hearing, that she actually paid one-half of the purchase price herself. Mr. Hale testified in probate court, in presence of defendant, that he bought the house and lot and paid $1,500 for it. It appears beyond dispute that on the 16th day of August, 1906, the day the deed was executed and the purchase price paid, Mr. Hale drew out of the State Savings Bank $800 and out of the Detroit Savings Bank $700. If, as Mrs. Harris testified, Mr. Hale was entirely competent to transact this business, it is somewhat strange that he should have testified that he paid $1,500 for the house and lot and have said nothing about her paying $700. It is also a strange coincidence that the books of the two banks should show that he drew out the precise sum mentioned. Whether the extra $100 over the consideration for the deed was for commissions, services, or expenses in connection with the transaction which he had agreed to pay, does not appear conclusively; but the record will support such an inference. Defendant testified that she got the money to pay her half of the purchase price from her daughter and her husband, who were indebted to her: "Q. When did you first loan her any money ? “A. I loaned her money when they bought their fast horse. "Q. When was that? ago. A. About four years ago; I guess over four years * * "Q. How did you know he had the money to buy this property? "A. I suppose he knew he had the money himself. "Q. And he bought it, did he not ? "A. I told him I could get the money I loaned Mrs. Morris; that I could get the money I loaned Mr. Morris' folks to pay for my half. "Q. What did he say? "A. He said he would pay for his half. "Q. Did he say where he would get it? "A. He said he would go to the bank and get it. *** "Q. After that day that you bought the property, did you know of his spending any money after that of any great size? "A. No, sir; I do not know what he did with his money; he went to different places around. "Q. You never heard of him buying anything that cost an item of $700 or $800 ? "A. No, sir; he said different persons wanted to hire money before she died." Defendant's daughter, Mrs. Morris, testified: "Q. Did your mother at that time have some means of her own? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. And what besides; had you and your husband any money of hers? "A. Yes, sir." The son-in-law, Morris, testified: "I also know that I had borrowed $250 of Mrs. Harris on one occasion and another time $200 and another time $150 or $200. I told my wife to give it to her when this property was bought. * ** Mrs. Harris sold a couple of farms, and I think this money I had was a part of what she received in pay, and she worked. I owe Mrs. Harris no money now. I gave her the money just before she moved there on Harrison avenue." This vague and conflicting testimony, unsupported by any written evidence whatever, and not in accordance with the usual practice in such transactions, in connection with the fact that Richard Hale drew the entire amount necessary out of the bank on the very day of the payment, that defendant, who, in our opinion, knew all about Richard Hale's transactions, and what he did with his money, was unable to account for his use of the extra $800, satisfies us that her testimony that she paid $700 of the purchase price should not be accepted as true. Defendant's fraudulent conduct in attempting to sustain this transaction as a joint and equal purchase justifies the in 169 MICH.-12. ference that she was not acting in good faith, and procured the insertion of her name in the deed by fraud and undue influence. The fourth and most important reason assigned by the court for the decree is based upon a mistake of fact. Defendant was liberally paid for everything she did for Richard Hale. The decree is reversed, and a decree may be entered in accordance with this opinion. MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred. BIRD, J., did not sit. GOLD v. DETROIT UNITED RAILWAY. 1. APPEAL AND ERROR-ASSIGNMENTS-DIRECTING VERDICT-SPECIFIC NATURE OF OBJECTION-SAVING QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW. An assignment of error that the court erred in not directing a verdict for defendant is too general. 2. TRIAL-POSTPONEMENT-WITNESSES-DISCRETION. Except in extreme cases, the exercise of the discretion of the trial court in refusing to delay a trial to enable defendant to procure additional witnesses will not be reviewed. 3. NEGLIGENCE-STREET RAILWAYS-LISTENING AT CROSSING. Upon undisputed evidence that plaintiff stopped, looked, and listened before attempting to drive across street car tracks in a city where the view was partly obstructed, there was no prejudicial error in advising the jury in the court's charge that he was not obliged to stop. 4. TRIAL VIEW-UNAUTHORIZED VISIT OF JUROR TO PREMISES. Where one of the jury, during the trial of a negligence case, visited the scene of the accident during recess and viewed the premises, and, on the court being informed of such misconduct, instructed the jury that knowledge so obtained should not be used, and that it was an improper proceeding, the appellate court will not grant a new trial which the trial judge denied, finding that defendant was not prejudiced. Error to Wayne; Murfin, J. Submitted January 24, 1912. (Docket No. 7.) Decided March 12, 1912. Case by Barnett Gold against the Detroit United Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. Corliss, Leete & Joslyn and Benjamin S. Pagel, for appellant. Friedman, Smilansky & Blumrosen, for appellee. On BLAIR, J. Plaintiff is a huckster, and at the time of the accident had been engaged in the business of selling vegetables in Detroit for several years. He used in his business a horse and wagon to transport his stock. the morning of July 22, 1909, he had been to the commission houses to buy his stock, and was starting on his rounds, when the accident which gives rise to this suit occurred. St. Antoine street is a well-known thoroughfare in Detroit, which runs in a northerly and southerly direction. Clinton street, another public thoroughfare, intersects St. Antoine at right angles. A car track on which defendant operates cars traverses the middle of Clinton street. The cars run in a westerly direction. Plaintiff was driving north close to the easterly curb on St. Antoine street, and his view towards the east along Clinton street (the direction from which the cars came) was obstructed by a three-story brick building, located on the southeasterly corner of the intersecting streets. Plaintiff testified that he knew of the existence of the car track on Clinton street, and that as he approached it he took the precaution to stop his horse and look for a car. When he stopped, his horse's head was 5 feet from the track. He further says that he saw no car coming, but, on account of the location of the said brick building, he could only see easterly 75 feet; that because he could see no car he thereupon proceeded to cross the tracks; and that as his horse got onto the track he first saw the car a few feet away, and coming very fast and without any warning signal. The car struck the rear of the horse and the front wheels of the wagon, injuring the driver and horse, and damaging the wagon. Plaintiff having secured a verdict and judgment, defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment. The first assignment of error, "for that the court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant," is too general to require its consideration. Jackson Bridge & Iron Co. v. Insurance Co., 122 Mich. 433 (81 N. W. 265); Wolfe v. Stack, 153 Mich. 445 (116 N. W. 1010); Canerdy v. Railway Co., 156 Mich. 211 (120 N. W. 582). The third and fourth assignments of error are based upon the refusal of the court to grant defendant time to obtain its principal witnesses. The application was made orally, after plaintiff had rested and defendant had taken the testimony of one witness. The matter of delaying a trial to enable a party to get his witnesses is one so peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, that we should not feel warranted in reviewing such discretion, except in a very extreme case, and we do not consider this to be such a case. The fifth assignment alleges that the court erred in charging the jury as follows: "He [plaintiff] is not bound, gentlemen of the jury, in the case of a street car crossing, to exercise the same care that we are compelled to exercise when approaching a steam railroad crossing. The rule in steam railroad cases generally is, not universally, but generally, that you must stop, look, and listen. Obviously that rule has no application to street cars. He is not obliged to stop, gentlemen, before he crosses the tracks; but he is obliged to bring to bear his faculties and his senses, as an ordinarily careful and prudent person would before he crosses a track, |