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stitute a part of speech or word! nor a part of thought! Animal wants are occasioned by certain involuntary sensations; and are wholly acts of instinct: words are voluntary articulations; the primary object of which is intellectual communication. A man, who was born dumb, and who has since been taught to articulate, is actuated by feelings of want and desire; the inferior creatures are influenced by wants and desires in common with men; and the inferior creatures are emphatically called dumb animals. But, let it be asked, who has ever accused the dumb man, or the inferior creature, of uttering a part of speech? Such a theorist asserts, also, that in naming a person, we can have no idea of him but in a state of being, acting, or suffering; therefore, he infers that the verb was antecedent to the substantive. Let it be retorted: what idea can I or any man have of the state of the being, acting, or suffering of any thing independently of something? None: because we can have no true conception of any mode or accidents, but we must conceive a SUBSTratum or suBJECT WHEREIN they are. To assert, therefore, that the verb is the original part of speech, i. e. that the verb is antecedent to the substantive, implies a contradiction. It is implying that a thing is before it is; which is a manifest absurdity: "Nam quod non est agere non potest; nec ipsa res esse potuit, antequam esset."+

66

22*

*

Bishop of Worcester and Locke.

+ Grotius.

CHAP. IV.

The nature of the verb-its being, action, &c.-time-preliminary elucidations deduced from the action and re-action of balls-metaphysical science recommended-verb the life of language, but not the cause of the existence of the substantive-atheistical philosophy-an exposition of its absurdities recommended, as subsidiary to the theory for unfolding the force and application of the verb.

LET
us next endeavour to unravel more fully the na-
ture of the verb. The moving ball. Moving is evidently
of the nature of an adjective; but it is of a nature different
from the adjectives red and hard. The red, hard ball.
The moving-red-hard-ball. Red and hard indicate two
of the qualities of the ball; but moving points out the
quality of its state. Let two of these balls be placed
upon the table. Let one of them be gently struck; the
relations before explained will be recognized. One is
the moving ball, the other is the remaining or resting
ball. Suppose the moving ball to be now destroyed ;
we perceive all its relations, which have been named,
to be likewise destroyed. The mind, however, reflects
upon its experience; and the memory dwells upon the
state of the remaining ball, object, or thing. The
mind remembers the expedient of adopting the op-
posite term, moving, to that of resting. But the mind.
perceives, that, in this instance, it can discover no oppo-
site term to that of remaining or resting; it wants the
substratum by which every mode or accident is said to be
or exist and something can have no relation to nothing.
The nomen, or name, moving ball, however, is stored up
in the memory. We now strike the remaining ball;
and discover the quality or state of moving in this to be
the same as that of the ball which is destroyed: we,
therefore, reasonably conclude, that what is true of this

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was also true of the other. The difference between this and the name, moving ball, is now more apparent. The one is nomen substantivim, and the other simply nomen. Suppose the ball substans, or remaining, to be at rest: we now introduce another ball, moving; this is perceived to strike the other. One is called the moving, the other the moved ball; but, in fact, each is both moved and moving; for motion has been given, and is still continued, to both.-Before, therefore, we can arrive at any tolerable notion of the action of a verb, we feel the necessity of ascending a few steps higher than mere dead matter will carry us. Our reflexions must be concentrated and exercised upon and about ourselves, our being, and existence. In performing this operation of the mind, we must be careful not to confound and blend appetite, passion, and intellect with LANGUAGE. Words and language are the vocal and articulated signs and transcriptions of our thoughts and ideas, by which we are enabled to communicate those thoughts and ideas to others. This is the true meaning and use of language or speech; than which there is no other meaning nor signification to be attached to the word. The verb may be called the life of language; but the life of language must not be confounded with the materials, the mechanism, or the progress of language, any more than the intellectual life of man must be confounded with the material part of man. The blood which is the supposed vehicle of life in an animal, cannot exert itself as that vehicle without the power of motion; the cause, therefore, of that power of motion may be considered as the immediate cause of the life of an animal. The cause of this power is God. "He is the one supreme and perfect Being-independent in his existence, infinite in his

wisdom, eternal in his duration-the Author of all power, the Source of all life, the cause of all motion.”* But the verb or life, as it has been called, of language, is not the cause of the existence of the substantive, or the substratum, any more than the life of man is the cause of his corporeal being: neither is the organization+ of matter or corporeal substance, the cause of life or motion in matter, any more than the construction of a sentence, or any part of it, is the cause of a verb, or life, as it has been called, in language. To assert otherwise than this respecting language, is, according to Dr. Hales, to agree with the doctrine of "ancient and modern professors of atheistical philosophy;" who represent "The faculty of articulate speech, or language, as the mere instinctive

Remarks on Scepticism, &c. by the Rev. T. Rennell, page 124.

An organ is an instrument. Organization, therefore, is nothing more than system of parts so constructed and arranged, as to cooperate to one common purpose. This orderly disposition of parts exists generally, though a particular part may be disturbed, after its subject has ceased to live. The ear is the organ of hearing, and its correspondence with the brain exists as much in the dead, as in the living body. Most of our knowledge, indeed, of this organization, or arrangement of parts, and how they co-operate and mutually support each other, has been derived from our observations upon the dead subject. Organization has been confounded with life, because without organization, life, or the continuance of active existence, is not to be found; and because when organization in some particular parts is disturbed, active existence ceases. But because no musical sounds can be produced without an instrument, and because if that instrument be disordered, those musical sounds cannot be elicited, no one would argue that a flute or a trumpet is a musical sound: The instrument may still remain, though not in a state of order sufficient to produce its effect; and general organization may exist, though from a deficiency in one particular part, life has been extinguished. The rupture or disturbance of one single part, though it may put a stop to the activity, yet it does not necessarily violate the arrangement of the thousands which compose the animal body.-Remarks on Scepticism, &c. pages 80 and 81.

expression of the wants and desires of a herd of associated savages, gradually invented for mutual convenience of communication, and established by mutual consent."*

To expose, therefore, the absurdities of atheistical and sceptical philosophy will promote our inquiries respecting the nature of the verb, and enable us to answer the question of Horne Tooke,+ or rather to distinguish the relation which the verb bears to the substantive. This exposition is reserved for the discussion of two separate chapters.

CHAP. V.

Grotius-Locke-Bichat-Morgan-Lawrence-Rennell-true philosophy-body-soul-leading faculties of the soul—passions—Aristotle-Cicero-three distinct faculties of the soul-the soul nevertheless undivided-metaphysical writers—their inaccurate definitions of the passions-lecturer of Trinity College, Dublin-Dr. Hutchesonno exciting reason previous to affection and instinct-excitement to the faculty of judging dependent on the will-Locke's definition of passion proved to be incorrect-appetite-affection--passions—definitions.

RES aliquas esse, quæ esse cœperint, sensu ipso et confessione omnium constat. Eæ autem res sibi non fuerunt causa ut essent: nam quod non est agere non potest; nec ipsa res esse potuit, antequam esset. Sequitur igitur, ut aliunde habuerint sui originem; quod non tantùm de illis rebus, quas ipsi aut conspicimus aut conspeximus, fatendum est; sed et de iis, unde illæ ortum habent; donec tandem ad aliquam causam perveniamus, quæ esse nunquam cœperit: quæque sit, ut loqui solemus, non contingenter, sed necessariò. Hoe

* Dr. HALES, D'Oyly and Mant's Bible.

"What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of a noun, constitutes a verb ?"

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