in subjects connected with himself, his fellow beings, and his God, the true, the only philosophical root and cause of all things, had this been the order of the study of Horne Tooke, no man whose philosophy and metaphysics are sound, will deny that there would have been a greater probability of the philologist's success in assigning to the verb what he termed "its peculiar differential circumstance:" he would probably have been enabled to assign to the verb its proper station in common with the rest of the parts of speech, and thus have separated it from its root.

It appears, however, clear, that the philosophy of Horne Tooke was not so humiliating to his species as that of some of his contemporaries, and others who have survived him. But in point of talent, it is almost a profanation of every sort of justice to compare this indi-, vidual with any of those persons who held the same doctrines in common with himself. While, therefore, it is to be acknowledged, that the author of the Diversions of Purley, was avowedly a friend to all the wild and destructive schemes of liberty which have since continued to poison and infest the minds of the ignorant, the wretched, and the depraved, still I contend, that the principles of Horne Tooke were not so degrading to human nature as those of certain of his contemporaries. Whatever may have been his notions of Revealed Religion, and however he may have promulgated them amongst the circle of his acquaintance,—as far as the individual circumstance extends of his not having in writing transmitted heretical opinions, thus far, I say, his reputation is not "damned to everlasting fame." In attributing to the noun the right of being called the primitive part of speech, he necessarily acknowledged the

declaration of the sacred writings on this point to be correct. I am not qualified to affirm, that he was pleased at this coincidence, or as some have supposed, that he was led to, and was strengthened in the opinion from a consideration of the controversy between the Bishop of Worcester and Locke, respecting innate ideas! For my own poor part, I cannot see what connexion subsists between the doctrines respecting innate ideas, and the question concerning the primitive part of speech. Horne Tooke was of opinion, that the noun was the primitive root of all the other parts of speech: and this opinion is undoubtedly supported by the authority of the well-known passage in the 2 chapter of Genesis :"And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field." But independently of this coincidence, as proving that the judgment of Horne Tooke was hardly so degraded as that of his party, we have tolerably good grounds for hoping, that feelings of conviction struck the mind of this philosopher during the latter period of his life: when he was led to burn his manuscript writings, and communicate to his friend, that "he was preparing for a long journey.'

* About a fortnight before the death of Horne Tooke, Mr. Whitwell, the architect, informed me of his friend's calling upon the author of "Erεa IITερóɛvrα, when he found him busily employed in burning his manuscript writings. These writings were of such number and magnitude as to occupy the whole of the morning before they were consumed. Having been asked what he was about,-after a pause of some time, Horne Tooke replied “I am preparing for a long journey." "This was accompanied with a manner so deeply impressive, that I shall never forget it," said the friend of Mr. Whitwell: he stated, that seve ral times during his stay he was obliged to retreat from the fire-place, in consequence of the heat which the blaze of the papers occasioned, and that the eye of Horne Tooke was alternately riveted on them and him, anxiously waiting the destruction of the writings, and seemingly fearful lest his friend should secrete any of them. It is supposed, that

But if it be considered strange for Horne Tooke to have affirmed, that verbs, as well as the other parts of speech, are nouns, and that a verb is something more than a noun; and that the title of verb was given to it on account of that distinguishing something more than mere nouns convey, it seems, to me, at least, equally strange that writers, who cannot be suspected for one moment of being sceptical in their opinions, should have broached theories in order to prove, that the verb, and not the noun, is the primitive or root of all the other parts of speech. It is perfectly unnecessary to enumerate the names of these writers, or to enter minutely into their arguments merely for the sake of confuting them. One of the objects of this Treatise will be secured, by stating my own reasons for believing, that the noun, and not the verb, is the original or primitive root, whence every other part of speech is derived.

For this purpose, and to form an adequate notion of language, and its rise and progress to the grammatical structure of a sentence, it seems requisite to contemplate the nature of man in particular situations; first in his infancy, and secondly in some selected instance of his state in riper years.

CHAP. II.

Faculties and powers of the inferior animals-those of mankind-the progressive state of man--the perceptive faculty of an infant, and that of other animals-their ends essentially different-instinct and intellect instinctive signs not analogous to language.

THE finger of nature operates on the senses of infants, in common with all animal bodies, by painful or plea

an unpublished volume of "Еea Пreрóevrα, or " Diversions of Purley,” perished in the flames.

surable sensations: and every animal capable of expressing sound, makes known the degree of his sensation by appropriate signs of consonance or dissonance. But the Creator has limited the faculties and powers of the inferior animals: he has attached to them peculiar instincts, by which they are enabled to execute, with exactness and precision, every work allotted to their natures; and a very short period perfects the end of their existence. The state of man is far different; destined for nobler purposes, his form and habits are progressive. Many of the instinctive powers common to other animals, are designedly withheld from him, and the free exercise of those which are intellectual is substituted in their stead. A larger portion of time is, therefore, requisite for the developement of the faculties of man. On his entrance into the world, he is more helpless than other animals: and tears and cries demonstrate both the imbecility of his nature, and the acuteness of his animal feeling. His first sensation is that of pain: but no sooner is he relieved, than he sinks almost into a state of apathy. At this period his being may be called mere animal life: his intellectual existence is but in embryo. Thus almost insensible, and altogether helpless, does he recline, till disease, corporal pain, or the sensations of hunger, again call him to action; when the fond caresses of a watchful parent yield to him nurture and support. If pain be the first sensation of an infant, it is equally true, that the incessant care of a mother will soon create in it even another feeling. While the child is hanging at her breast, ask the mother what her feelings are, what the sensations of her babe :—she will tell you they are those of pleasure and delight. The sympathetic glow of nature reverberates from each content and pleasure: and while the

infant sinks to slumber and repose, the mother breathes her joy, and sings forth hymns of praise.

The remarks of Bishop Butler conduce much to the purpose of this discussion, and are deeply philosophical. "Nature," says this learned prelate, "does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for a mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding and bodily strength, are not only arrived to gradually, but are also very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature age as an ideot. He would be in a manner distracted with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense; nor can one guess how long it would be before he would be familiarised to himself and the objects about him enough, even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether the natural information of his sight and hearing, would be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would render society insupportable, and the living in it unpracticable, were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which is learnt, would render a man as uncapable of society, as want of language would: or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employments of life, would render him uncapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. In these