A day was assigned for the discussion of the question, when Oris, the champion of the people, before the court and a crowded auditory, with a "tongue of flame and the inspiration of a seer," reasoned of justice, popular rights and liberty to come.

His argument convinced and restrained the court for a season, but its real triumph was in the sacred fire which it kindled in the hearts of the people, for although uttered more than fifteen years before the Declaration of Independence, it was nevertheless a most thrilling strain in the noble prelude of the great drama of the revolution. Hutch. Hist. Mass. Bay., 92; 4 Bancroft, 414; 2 John Adams Works, App. A.,

521.

It mattered not that the court, disregarding the law, subsequently granted the writs. The people were convinced of their illegality, and the use of them served to show a purpose to oppress and to prepare the minds of the colonists to resist it.

On the formation of the Constitution of the United States it was thought expedient to subject a power so liable to abuse to constitutional restraint. It was accordingly provided by the fourth article of the Amendments to the Constitution that:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."

SECTION VII.

REQUISITES OF SPECIAL WARRANTS.

1. The direction.

2. The name of the accused.

3. The offence, how described and supported.

4. The conclusion.

5. The signature and seal,

1. The direction. The warrant should be directed to some person or officer legally authorized to execute it. The executive officer of the court or magistrate from which the process issues is the most proper party to execute it. 1 Salk., 381; 1 Chit. Cr. L., 38; 2 Ld. Raym., 1192; 4 Bl. Com., 291.

It may be directed to any one of a class of officers without naming him, if the court or magistrate can lawfully command a member of such class, e. g., a justice's warrant may be directed "to any constable of," &c. 1 East P. C., 320; 1 Chit. Cr. L., 49; 6 Binn., 123.

A warrant to arrest, if there be no statutory limitation, may be directed to some indifferent person by name, who is no officer, but who thereby becomes authorized though not compelled to execute it. 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 13, sec. 27; 1 Ch. Cr. L., 38; 1 Hale P. C., 581; 2 Hale P. C., 110; 1 Salk., 347; 3 Wend., 350.

If it be directed to no one, but be generally to take the defendant to jail, it will be void and the prisoner will be discharged on habeas corpus. Rer v. Smith, 2 Str., 934; Russell v. Hubbard, 6 Barb. Sup. Ct., 654.

2. The name of the accused. The warrant must not be general, to apprehend all persons suspected; but must be specific to apprehend some particular individual, otherwise it will be void; and the reason is it is the duty of the court or magistrate and not of the executive officer to judge of the ground of suspicion. 4 Bl. Com., 291; 1 Hale P. C., 580; 1 Chit. Cr. L., 41; 2 Burr., 1766; 1 Bl. Rep., 555; 2 Wils., 151.

If the name of the person to be apprehended be unknown, there must be employed in the place of it some personal description by which he may be identified. 1 Ch. Cr. L., 39, 40; 1 Hale P. C., 577; The State v. Munson, Hall's Jour. Juris., 257; 1 Russ. Cr. L., 619.

If the name inserted be not the right one, or be fictitious merely, the arrest cannot be justified, even though the person arrested be the one intended; unless indeed, he is known as well by the name in the warrant as by his true name. Shadgett v. Clipson, 8 East, 328; 6 Cow., 456; 7 id., 332; 3 Wend., 350; 4 id., 555; 9 id., 320; 2 Taunt., 400; 1 Arch., 33, note 1; Hoye v. Bush, 1 M. & Gr., 775.

If blanks are left to be filled with the names after the warrant is delivered to the officer, the warrant will be void. 1 Ch. Cr. L., 39; 2 Hale P. C, 114; Fost., 312.

Names may, however, be inserted at any time before the warrant is delivered. 2 Leach, 929; The King v. Winwick, 8 T. R., 454; 1 East P. C., 324. It seems that the omission of the christian name will render the warrant void, though the accused was described ". Hood, of the parish of F., son of

Samuel Hood." Rex v. Hood, 1 Moody C. C., 281; see also Wells v. Jackson, 3 Mumford, 458.

3. Statement of the offence and how supported. It is a general rule that the offence must be stated with reasonable certainty and be supported by oath or affirmation.

In considering this rule, it is to be observed that the distinction, already noticed, between superior and inferior courts in respect to their judgments, applies also to their process; and that the process of the former is favored by certain legal presumptions of regularity which are not accorded to that of the latter.

I. Of the statement in process emanating from inferior courts, or from officers exercising a special statutory jurisdiction.

1. The offence must be stated with reasonable certainty. Bac. Abr., tit. Commitment, E.; Hale P. C., 94; 2 Inst., 52; 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 16, sec. 16.

In 1627 the judges of England, in answer to a question from the King, declared that: "Upon a habeas corpus, brought by one committed by the King, if the cause be not specially or generally returned, so as the court may take knowledge thereof, the party ought by the general rule to be discharged."

The court is to determine whether the cause of commitment and detainer be sufficient in law or not; and such certainty should therefore appear in the commitment as will enable the court to determine this question. For if the commitment be against law as being made by one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to be punished, the court are to discharge

him, and therefore the certainty of the commitment ought to appear; and the commitment is liable to the same objections where the cause is so loosely set forth, that the court cannot adjudge whether it were a reasonable ground of imprisonment or not. Impey's Shff., 522; Hale P. C., 584; Skin., 676, pl., 2; 12 Co., 130.

A warrant by a justice of the peace to apprehend a person "to answer such matters as shall be objected against him," without expressing the certainty of the crime, is contrary to law and void. 2 Inst., 591; Hale P. C., 577.

A commitment by the mayor of London, "for divers causes well known to the mayor," was held not good, for the commitment ought to show the cause of the imprisonment, so that the court might adjudge whether it was lawful or not. Boucher's case, Cro. Jac., 81.

In a commitment for felony it was necessary that the commitment should specify the species of felony, "as for felony for the death of J. S., or for burglary in breaking the house of J. S." The King v. Wilkes, 2 Wils., 158; 1 Ch. Cr. L., 111; Hale P. C., 122. It was not necessary to allege in the mittimus that the offence was "feloniously" committed. 1 Ch. Cr. L., 113.

In Rex v. Croker, 2 Chit., 138, the defendant was committed for embezzling bank notes. The warrant did not state that the act was done feloniously, and it was therefore claimed that the defendant was entitled to his discharge. But the court said: A commitment need not have the precision of an indict