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"In the case of Potter the charge is, that the prisoner had committed larceny without any facts or circumstances to show whether it was grand or petit larceny. In such a case, in favor of liberty, without more appearing from the depositions or examination, I should regard it as a charge of petit larceny and admit to bail. Potter should therefore have been bailed, but not released. The warrant of commitment is sufficiently certain. It is a great mistake to suppose that a warrant for apprehension or a warrant of commitment need contain any statement at all of the evidence on which it is founded or need enumerate any of the facts and circumstances accompanying the offence.

"There are several high authorities that it need not even contain a specification of the particular offence. But the better opinion as well as the general and approved practice, is that it should state the offence with convenient certainty; that it should not be for felony generally, but should contain the special nature of the felony."

In the case of The State v. Killett, 2 Bailey, 289, it appeared that the defendant was in custody under a warrant of commitment for "passing a counterfeit note knowing it to be such." It was objected that the offence was not sufficiently set forth in the war

rant.

EARLE, J. "The insufficiency of the form of the warrant in charging the offence cannot avail. It cannot be expected nor is it necessary that a magistrate in framing a warrant should state the offence with the same technical accuracy that is required in an indictment. It is sufficient if it appear on its face that an authority is given to arrest on some charge or on some statement of facts which in the judgment of the magistrate amounts to a charge of a criminal nature. The charge here is that the prisoner passed a counterfeit note knowing it to be such,' which is considered quite enough."

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In the case of The State v. Munson, Hall's Jour. Juris., 257, the warrant was as follows:

"Kent County ss: The State of Delaware to the sheriff or any constable of said county, greeting:

"Whereas James Kirbin, of the county of Kent, this day appeared before Mr. James Schee, one of the justices of the peace of the state of Delaware, in and for said county, on his oath did declare that on the 17 day of January, 1817, received two dollar bank note from young man on the Bank of Hagerstown, No. 7263, and dated Hagerstown, 27 April, 1814, having good cause to believe and doth believe that young man did feloniously pass the same to me so counterfeit and forged on the Bank of Hagerstown, and the said young man has this day been brought before me the said justice and have refused to find surety for his appearance at the next court of general quarter sessions of the peace and jail delivery, to be held at Dover for said county, to answer unto the above charge; these are therefore to command you," &c.

It was moved on habeas corpus to discharge the prisoner for the following reasons:

1st. He is not named in the commitment.

2d. He'

is not described so as to be identified. 3d. He is not charged with any crime or probable crime on oath. 4th. The commitment does not allege the crime was committed in this state.

The Chancellor, was of opinion that the 4th objection had no weight in it. The 3d he thought deserved consideration; but did not afford any ground for the discharge of the prisoner.

"It was urged," he said, "that the prisoner was not charged with any crime. The offence is awkwardly enough stated in the commitment; but it is clearly to be collected

that he is charged with passing a counterfeit note; and although the charge is informal, and he is not said to have passed the note knowing it to be counterfeit, yet that is the import of the charge. The justice used the word 'feloniously' improperly; but he has said that the young man did feloniously pass the note, so counterfeit and forged on the Bank of Hagerstown; and the whole shows that he is informally charged with passing a forged bank note, knowing it to be forged.

"A mistaken notion seems to prevail that any error or informality in a warrant of commitment makes it void, and entitles the party to a discharge without bail. The law is not so; neither is it reasonable or just that it should be so.

"It is not necessary that the offence should be described with the nicety and technical precision of an indictment, but that the prisoner should be charged with some offence, for it is enough if the commitment shows that an offence has been committed, not to discharge without bail.

"If all the certainty of an indictment were requisite in a commitment, scarcely any crime would be punished, for it would only be necessary for the party to refuse to give bail that he might be committed, and then on a writ of habeas corpus be discharged without bail. The King v. Judd, 2 T. R., 225; The King v. Despard, 7 T. R., 736; The King v. Marks, 3 East, 157.

"In this case the defendant is not charged with any felony, for it is not a felony to pass a counterfeit bank note; neither is he charged with any crime according to the act against forgery; but it appearing from the warrant of commitment that he is charged with an offence which is punishable by the laws of the land, he may be bailed, but for this reason he is not to be discharged. His crime, if he has committed any, is that of cheating, and like the case of Ford, he may be indicted for it at common law."

The first and second objections were then considered and sustained and the prisoner discharged.

In Georgia, in the case of The State v. Bundy, 2 Geo. Decis., 40, under the statute of December 22, 1808, which required the crime to be plainly and clearly set forth, together with the time and place when and where committed, a warrant of commitment before indictment was held defective, where the only description of the offence was "charged with having committed the offence of larceny." The court discharged the prisoner, the judge saying:

"I am of opinion the prisoner is entitled to her discharge upon the illegality apparent on the face of the warrant of commitment. It neither states the time nor place when or where the said offence was committed, nor the property of any person upon which said offence has been committed by the prisoner. These facts, I apprehend, must be stated on the face of the commitment in order to make it a legal one; and such would seem to be the clear spirit and intention of the act of the legislature passed 22d December, 1808."

The court in this case evidently considered the statement of the offence for "larceny" simply, as a fatal defect at common law. After indictment the warrant to arrest or commit the defendant may refer to the indictment and describe the offence for which he is indicted in general terms, as for arson, burglary or the like.

In the case of Brady v. Davis, 9 Geo. Rep., 73, it was held that a bench warrant to arrest and a warrant of commitment after indictment, are sufficient if they recite the fact of indictment and describe the offence generally. As when the warrant and mittimus stated the offence simply as a misdemeanor,

founded on the special presentment of the grand jury of Troup county. Neither stated the particular misdemeanor or the time and place when and where committed. These particulars, said the court, will be found in the presentment, and the object of the warrant is to bring in the accused to answer that.

The court might have added that the warrant in such a case was the procees of a superior court, and that it would be presumed that what the law required had been done.

II. Of process from a superior court of general jurisdiction.

The favorable presumptions extended to process issuing from courts of general jurisdictions, are very clearly and concisely stated in the case of Gosset v. Howard, 10 Q. B., 359, 452, cited in 1 Smith Lead. Cas., 5 ed., 821.

"The question arose on a warrant of the speaker of the House of Commons, which did not specify the cause for which it issued, and it was held by the Exchequer Chamber, reversing the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, that although the failure to set forth the cause of arrest would have been fatal, had the warrant been issued by an inferior court, yet that as it was the mandate of the Commons, it should be construed with the liberality shown to the proceedings of all superior courts and must consequently be regarded as valid, unless manifestly without jurisdiction. 'The validity of the warrant,' said Parke, in delivering the opinion of the court, depends mainly upon a preliminary point on what principle is the instrument to be construed? Is it to be examined with the strictness with which we look at the warrants of magistrates or others acting by special statutory authority, and out of the course of the common

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