the power which the law grants to schoolmasters and teachers with respect to the correction of their pupils. It is analogous to that which belongs to parents, and the authority of the teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental authority. One of the most sacred duties of parents is to train up and qualify their children for becoming useful and virtuous members of society. This duty cannot be effectually performed without the ability to command obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken diligence and to reform bad habits; and, to enable him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed with the power to administer moderate correction when he shall believe it to be just and necessary. The teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged in part with the performance of his duties, and in the exercise of these delegated duties is invested with his power. The law has not undertaken to prescribe stated punishments for particular offences, but has contented itself with the general grant of the power of moderate correction, and has confided the graduation of punishments, within the limits of this grant, to the discretion of the teacher.

*The line which separates moderate correction from immoderate punishment can only be ascertained by reference to general principles. The welfare of the child is the main purpose for which pain is permitted to be inflicted. Any punishment, therefore, which may seriously endanger life, limbs or health, or shall disfigure the child, or cause any other permanent injury, may be pronounced in itself immoderate, as not only being unnecessary for but inconsistent with the purpose for which correction is authorized. But

any correction, however severe, which produces temporary pain only, and no permanent ill, cannot be so pronounced, since it may have been necessary for the reformation of the child and does not injuriously affect its future welfare.

"We hold, therefore, that it may be laid down as a general rule, that teachers exceed the limits of their authority when they cause lasting mischief; but act within the limits of it when they inflict temporary pain only. When the correction administered is not in itself immoderate, and therefore beyond the authority of the teacher, its legality or illegality must depend entirely, we think, on the quo animo with which it was administered. Within the sphere of his authority, the master is the judge when correction is required, and of the degree of correction necessary; and like all others entrusted with a discretion, he cannot be made penally responsible for error of judgment, but only for wickedness of purpose. The best and the wisest of mortals are weak and erring creatures, and in the exercise of functions in which their judgment is to be the guide, cannot be rightfully required to engage for more than honesty of purpose and diligence of execution. His judgment must be presumed to be correct, because he is the judge, and also because of the difficulty of proving the offence or accumulation of offences that called for correction; of showing the peculiar temperament, disposition and habits of the individual corrected; and of exhibiting the various milder means that may have been ineffectually used before correction was resorted to.

"But the master may be punishable when he does not transcend the powers granted, if he grossly abuse

them. If he use his authority as a cover for malice, and, under the pretence of administering correction, gratify his own bad passions, the mask of the judge shall be taken off; and he will stand amenable to justice as an individual not invested with judicial power."

SECTION VIII.

LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF PRINCIPAL AND SPECIAL BAIL.

The relation of principal and bail is created where a party arrested or in prison on civil or criminal process procures sureties who undertake by bailbond or recognizance for his return or appearance at a place and on a day certain. 4 Inst., 178; 3 Black., 128; 4 id., 297.

A man's bail are looked upon as his gaolers, of his own choosing; and the person bailed is in the eye of the law, for many purposes, esteemed to be as much in the prison of the court by which he is bailed, as if he were in the actual custody of the proper gaoler. 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 15.

The term "bail" as used in this connection does not extend to all cases of suretyship. It imports a delivery of the person arrested or imprisoned out of public into private custody for safe keeping. Nor does it extend to all cases of imprisonment. It does not apply to the case of a "surety for the gaol liberties, which is not matter of record, but exists only in pais." Ex parte Bagley, 7 Cow., 472.

It is said it did not include the case of mainpernors at common law. 3 Black., 128. "Every bail,"

says Coke, 4 Inst., 179, "is mainprize (for those that are bail take the person bailed into their hands and custody), but every mainprize is not bail, because no man is bailed but he that is arrested, or in prison: for he that is not in custody or prison cannot be delivered out, as before it appeareth. But a man may be mainperned which never was in prison, and therefore mainprize is more large than bail."

"These words, 'mainpernors and bail," says Petersdorf, in his work on Bail, 7, "have been used indiscriminately without attending to the distinction, that bail have the power of imprisoning the principal, or surrendering him before the stipulated day of appearance; and that mainpernors can do nothing, but are barely and unconditionally sureties for his due attendance in court on the day mentioned in the writ. Bail are only sureties that the party will be answerable for the special matter for which they stipulated. Mainpernors are bound to produce him to answer all charges whatsoever."

The law relating to this distinction has become a matter rather of speculative curiosity than of practical interest. It is practically unknown with us, and the reasons assigned for it would seem to require the rejection of the distinction if the writ of mainprize was still in use.

This species of bailment is called a "living prison," 4 Inst., 178, and the bail have the power, of their own motion, to detain or surrender the principal. They are his keepers and are said to have him always in a string, which they may pull whenever they please, and render him in their discharge; and this

"because the court of justice doth deliver him unto them to be safely kept." 4 Inst., 178.

A doubt seems to be intimated in Ex parte Bagley, 7 Cow., 472, whether bail in a criminal case have power to surrender the principal. The case is briefly reported; but if the doubt be meant of the general rule it seems to be without foundation. 2 Hawk. P. C., 140; Com. Dig., tit. Bail, Q. 2; Petersdorf on Bail, 515; Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216.

The principal may be taken on Sunday. The dwelling-house ceases to be a castle to defend him, and if the door should not be opened the bail may break it down and drag him from his bed at midnight. Commonwealth v. Bricket, 8 Pick., 138.

This power of the bail is not limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the court before which the relation is contracted; but is at least coextensive with the limits of the state.

If, however, after the letting to bail, other rights attach against the principal, the right of the bail may be suspended until those are determined: As where a debtor is in the jail bounds in one district and an applicant there for the benefit of the insolvent debtor's act, he cannot be taken by his bail out of that district to be surrendered in another; nor will a habeas corpus be granted at the instance of the bail for that purpose. For the court, it was said, never grants a habeas corpus for an illegal purpose. And in such a case it would be an escape, would make sureties on the prison-bounds-bond liable; would prevent the prisoner from obtaining his discharge under the insolvent debtors' act where he