PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. WAYNE

Governing in the period before, during, and after a national election is not easy. A President's capacity to mobilize support for his policy goals declines. The motivation for practically every controversial decision he makes is suspect. Perceptions of the national interest, which are always difficult to separate from self-interest, become even more blurred. Long-term planning succumbs to short-term political considerations.

The behavior of Members of Congress is also affected. Those whose party does not control the White House become more unified in their opposition to the policies and pronouncements of the incumbent. Whatever bipartisanship there was is replaced by partisan posturing and voting.

Outside the government interest group leaders reiterate their goals, reminding offical Washington of their organizational muscle. The American public polarizes along partisan, issue, and ideological lines. And foreign governments give greater weight to the political implications of an administration's response.

Then the election occurs; a new President is chosen; and policy making becomes even more difficult. Hopes rest with the PresidentElect, but decisional responsibility remains with the incumbent, at least, for the next two and one-half months. Barring crises, this lame duck will be hard-pressed to generate support for any major policy decision. The danger is that even in crisis, he may not be able to do so, or just as harmful for a democratic society, that he may induce or exaggerate a crisis in order to generate support.

These are the problems that prompted the twentieth amendment and prompt the proposed constitutional change, Beginning the congressional term on November fifteenth and the presidential term on the twentieth would eliminate most of the lame duck period. It would get newly elected officials quickly into place and remove those who were defeated, retired, or appointed by the previous adminisCritical problems could be addressed. Political support could be mobilized. The bureaucracy could be given direction.

tration.

And there would be other benefits.

For a change there would be

news in the Thanksgiving to New Years interregnum. The inauguration might even occur in good weather.

It would be nice to think that a simple calendar change could produce such desirable results, that it could quickly transform

the judgment of the people into an operational government, providing stability and continuity, making national policy, building support, and implementing campaign promises. But alas--I doubt if it would. In fact, I fear it might aggravate the problem of transition.

The difficulties experienced by our national government during the election cycle and the inaugural period are not caused solely or even mainly by the election calendar. They result from the increasing personality orientation of partisan policies, from the increasing pluralism of the American polity, and from the increasing complexity of policy judgments.

Parties are not what they used to be. They are not as cohesive as they were two or three decades ago. Party leaders do not control nominations for national office as they did. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that we have a self-selection process today in which individuals compete for the legitimacy of a party label rather than the privilege of articulating and backing party positions. (More often than not, these positions are a consequence of who is in office and not the other way around.)

The victors are there because of their own skills and those of the campaign technocrats they hire. They owe their election to themselves (although the party label in many districts is still critical). They consider themselves free agents. They play to their own pied piper.

All of this has made presidential leadership and institutional cooperation harder to achieve. Party majorities do not easily convert into working majorities any longer. The system has become more personalized.

Their

And that's not all. It has also become more pluralistic. Interest groups have proliferated and professionalized. agendas compete for attention and adoption. Moreover, their increasingly single-issue orientation makes compromise more difficult.

Congress reflects this pluralism.

It has become a more responsive,

representative body. That is why it has such difficulty passing laws. Similarly, within the Executive Branch, there is greater receptivity to outside views. All of this makes a national interest harder to discern and coalition-formation more painstaking (and more necessary).

Rarely is a single

Policy has also become more complex. committee or single agency involved. There are more participants on the Hill, within the Executive Branch, even within the Presidency. Turf fights, informational disputes, conflicting advice, hamper policy making and implementation. It is difficult to

speak with a single voice, much less maintain continuity in policy

decisions.

Each of these problems has complicated the task of governing. None can be solved or would be improved in the long run by the proposed amendment. It is possible that the amendment would facilitate short-term decision making and consensus-building, but it would probably do so at the cost of a public and private debate among experts and without the careful consideration of multiple interests by the winning candidate and his principal aides.

It is obvious today that no President can govern alone. He needs a team of loyal but competent analysts and managers to inform and advise him, to protect his interests, and to help him achieve his policy goals. A shortened transition period of two and onehalf weeks would not be sufficient to review the qualifications of potential appointees, perform the required background checks and FBI clearances, and have the nominees confirmed by the Senate. Presidents might be tempted to depend increasingly on their campaign staff not only for White House positions but for department and agency heads as well--an awful prospect. The campaign may be a good time for measuring industry and loyalty but it is not the best time to assess the capacity of people to understand complex issues, balance competing viewpoints, or work with those who do not share the candidate's perspectives and goals.

Another possibility would be to operate a personnel office during the election period. The rigors of the campaign, however, would require that it function with a minimum of supervision by the nominee. Moreover, the back-biting among the campaign staff, party officials, and the personnel office would probably be fierce given the ambitions of those who desire appointment and criteria upon which appointments should be made.

A potential solution, at least for senior Cabinet officials, would be for the nominee to announce their names after nomination but before the general election campaign. Whether this would unify the party and/or broaden its electoral coalition is unclear. What is certain, however, is that political considerations would weigh heavily in the initial designation of the team. Any personal problems of any of the nominees would undoubtedly become issues in themselves, diverting the focus of the campaign. Personality factors would become an even more important influence on the vote. Of course, choosing department heads and getting them confirmed represents only a small number of the personnel decisions that need be made at the beginning of any presidential term. White House involvement in subCabinet appointments is necessary if the administration is to agree on an agenda and successfully get it adopted. A shortened time frame would complicate that involvement by senior presidential aides given the other priorities that demand their attention during these early months in office.

Had the Executive Branch not become so politicized, transitions could be accomplished more quickly, more cheaply, and more easily. Civil servants could educate new appointees, do their bidding, and carry on the necessary functions of government within the policy framework which the new President establishes. Lack of trust and more recently, tradition, now prevents the bureaucracy from providing continuity between administrations at the upper

echelons.

In our most recent transitions, large staffs, composed of campaign and partisan loyalists, study, plan, and plot the takeover of the government. Existing structures and personnel are

suspect. More often than not, a major objective of the change is to minimize the influence of the permanent government and their

clientele. If a new administration sees the government as the problem, they are not likely to place much faith in the people who were running it.

In addition to educating new appointees, transitions serve another purpose. They help reestablish relationships among institutions. The importance of liaison before and during the first months of a new administration cannot be underestimated. This is the time when campaign debts are due, when personnel requests threaten to overwhelm Congress, when the President appears to have all the perquisites, when the uncertainties of channels of communication and patterns of influence are greatest. Under the circumstances, small favors are apt to be remembered; later on, they are taken for granted.

The contrast between the Carter and Reagan efforts is striking. Whereas Carter's liaison representative was sent to Washington with a secretary and two college interns, Reagan's aide, an experienced liaison official during the Ford administration, had a team of eleven professionals all with Capital Hill experience. Both staffs were quickly inundated with phone calls, messages, and requests for appointments. The Carter transition office was unable to handle the avalanche. The Reagan office was able to do So. In addition, it provided the President-Elect with liaison during the lame-duck session, scheduled meetings for him in his preinaugural visits to Washington, and helped in the confirmation of his Cabinet. By beginning early, recognizing the legislature's needs, and effectively catering to them, the Reagan liaison operation during the transition got the new President off to a really good start with Congress. Such an effort could not have been achieved in two and one-half weeks.

A successful transition takes time. This time factor is accentuated by a new administration's need to make and implement its domestic policy agenda as quickly as possible. Unless Presidents take advantage of their honeymoon period, they will lose the benefits which the victory usually provides: popular good will, unified supporters, disarrayed opponents, and favorable media coverage. Since presidential influence tends to decline over the