time, with a fund which will endure for centuries, and which will augment with the growth of the nation, aiding the States in seasons of peace, and sustaining the general government in periods of war."

Knight, Poindexter, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles, Seymour, Silsbee, Sprague, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Wilkins-24.

NAYS.-Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buckner, Calhoun, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Rives, Robinson, Smith, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright-20.

"He could not yield his assent to the mode which this bill proposed to settle the agitated question of the public lands. In addition to several objections of a minor character, he had an insuperable objection to the leading principle of the bill, which proposed to distribute the proceeds of the lands among the States. He believed it to be both dangerous and unconstitutional. He could not assent to the principle, that Congress had a right to denationalize the public funds. He agreed that the objection was not so decided in case of the proceeds of lands, as in that of revenue collected from taxes or duties. The senator from Ohio had adduced evidence from the deed of cession, which certainly countenanced the idea that the proceeds of the lands might be subject to the distribution proposed in the bill; but he was far from being satisfied that the argument was solid or conclusive. If the principle of distribution could be confined to the proceeds of the lands, he would acknowledge that his objection to the principle would be

weakened.

sources.

"He dreaded the force of precedent, and he foresaw that the time would come when the example of the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands would be urged as a reason for distributing the revenue derived from other Nor would the argument be devoid of plausibility. If we, of the Atlantic States, insist that the revenue of the West, derived from lands, should be equally distributed among all the States, we must not be surprised if the interior States should, in like manner, insist to distribute the proceeds of the customs, the great source of revenue in the Atlantic States. Should such a movement be successful, it must be obvious to every one, who is the least acquainted with the workings of the human heart, and the nature of government, that nothing would more certainly endanger the existence of the Union. The revenue is the power of the State, and to distribute its revenue is to dissolve its power into its original elements."

Attempts were made to postpone the bill to the next session, which failed; and it passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 20.

YEAS.-Messrs. Bell, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson, Dudley, Ewing, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Holmes, Johnston,

of March, which, being the short session, was within twenty-four hours of the constitutional termination of the Congress, which was limited to the 3d-which falling this year on Sunday, the Congress would adjourn at midnight of the 2nd. Further efforts were made to postpone it, and upon the ground that, in a bill of that magnitude and novelty, the President was entitled to the full ten days for the consideration of it which the constitution allowed him, and he would have but half a day; for if passed that night it could only reach him in the forenoon of the next day-leaving him but half a day for his consideration of the measure, where the constitution allowed him ten; and that half day engrossed with all crowded business of an expiring session. The next evening, the President attended, as usual, in a room adjoining the Senate chamber, to be at hand to sign bills and make nominations. It was some hours in the night when the President sent for me, and withdrawing into the recess of a window, told me that he had a veto message ready on the land bill, but doubted about sending it in, lest there should not be a full Senate; and intimated his apprehension that Mr. Calhoun and some of his friends might be absent, and endanger the bill: and wished to consult me upon that point. I told him I would go and reconnoitre the chamber, and adjacent rooms; did so-found that Mr. Calhoun and his immediate friends were absent

returned and informed him, when he said he would keep the bill until the next session, and then return it with a fully considered message

his present one being brief, and not such as to show his views fully. I told him I thought he ought to do so—that such a measure ought not to be passed in the last hours of a session, in a thin Senate, and upon an imperfect view of his objections; and that the public good required it to be held up. It was so; and during the long vacation of nine months which intervened before the next session, the opposition presses

and orators kept the country filled with denunciations of the enormity of his conduct in "pocketing" the bill-as if it had been a case of "flat burglary," instead of being the exercise of a constitutional right, rendered most just and proper under the extraordinary circumstances which had attended the passage, and intended return of the bill. At the commencement of the ensuing session he returned the bill, with his well-considered objections, in an ample message, which, after going over a full history of the derivation of the lands, came to the following conclusions:

"1. That one of the fundamental principles, on which the confederation of the United States was originally based, was, that the waste lands of the West, within their limits, should be the common property of the United States.

"2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the States which claimed them, and the cessions were accepted, on the express condition that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other purpose what

soever.

common benefit of the several States, according to their respective and usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure?" The cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, in express terms, and all the rest impliedly, not only provide thus specifically the proportion, according to which each State shall profit by the proceeds of the land sales, but they proceed to declare that they shall be 'faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.' This is the fundamental law of the land, at this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union itself was erected.

"In the practice of the government, the proceeds of the public lands have not been set apart as a separate fund for the payment of the public debt, but have been, and are now, paid into the treasury, where they constitute a part of the aggregate of revenue, upon which the government draws, as well for its current expenditures as for payment of the public debt. In this manner, they have heretofore, and do now, lessen the general charge upon the people of the several States, in the exact proportions stipulated in the compacts.

"These general charges have been composed, not only of the public debt and the usual expenditures attending the civil and military administrations of the government, but of the amounts paid to the States, with which these compacts were formed; the amounts paid the Indians for their right of possession; the amounts

"These are the first principles of this whole subject, which, I think, cannot be contested by any one who examines the proceedings of the revolutionary Congress, the sessions of the several States, and the acts of Congress, under the new constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed upon the mind, let us proceed to examine how far the objects of the cessions have been completed, and see whether those compacts are not still obligatory upon the United States.

"The debt, for which these lands were pledged by Congress, may be considered as paid, and they are consequently released from that lien. But that pledge formed no part of the compacts with the States, or of the conditions upon which the cessions were made. It was a contract between new parties-between the United States and their creditors. Upon payment of the debt, the compacts remain in full force, and the obligation of the United States to dispose of the lands for the common benefit, is neither destroyed nor impaired. As they cannot now be executed in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is, in what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of for the

and the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks, &c., employed in preparing for market, and selling, the western domain. From the origin of the land system, down to the 30th September, 1832, the amount expended for all these purpose has been about $49,701,280 and the amount received from the sales, deducting payments on account of roads, &c., about $38,386,624. The revenue arising from the public lands, therefore, has not been sufficient to meet the general charges on the treasury, which have grown out of them, by about $11,314,656. Yet, in having been applied to lessen those charges, the conditions of the compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State has profited according to its usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure. The annual proceeds of land sales have increased, and the charges have diminished; so that, at a reduced price, those lands would now defray all current charges growing out of them, and save the treasury from further advances on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore, would be accomplished, as fully as it has hitherto been, by reducing the price, and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the proceeds into the treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in which the objects of the original compact can be attained, it may be considered, for all practical purposes, that it is one of their requirements.

"The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every one of the compacts by which the United States became possessed of their western domain, and treats the subject as if they never had existence, and as if the United States were the original and unconditional owners of all the public lands. The first section directs

"That, from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there shall be allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, over and above what each of the said States is entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between them, respectively, upon their admission into the Union and the United States, the sum of twelve and a half per centum upon the net amount of the sales of the public lands, which, subsequent to the day afosesaid, shall be made within the several limits of the said States; which said sum of twelve and a half per centum shall be applied to some object or objects of internal improvement or education, within the said States, under the direction of their several legislatures.'

"This twelve and a half per centum is to be taken out of the net proceeds of the land sales, before any apportionment is made; and the same seven States, which are first to receive this proportion, are also to receive their due proportion of the residue, according to the ratio of general distribution.

"Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy, in regard to this provision, what more need be said to demonstrate its objectionable character, than that it is in direct and undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the States, before a single cession was made; that it abrogates the condition upon which some of the States came into the Union; and that it sets at nought the terms of cession spread upon the face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the public land is held by the federal government?

"In the apportionment of the remaining seven eighths of the proceeds, this bill, in a manner equally undisguised, violates the conditions upon which the United States acquired title to the ceded lands. Abandoning altogether the ratio of distribution, according to the general charge and expenditure provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the federal representative population. Virginia, and other States, which ceded their lands upon the express condition that they should receive a benefit from their sales, in proportion to their part of the general charge, are, by the bill, allowed only a portion of seven eighths of their proceeds, and that not in the proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the ratio of their federal representative population.

"The constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it 'shall be so construed as to

prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State,' it virtually provides that these compacts, and the rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative power, which shall only make all 'needful rules and regulations' for carrying them into effect. All beyond this, would seem to be an assumption of undelegated power.

"These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to pay for that Union, without which, they plainly saw, it could not be preserved. It was not for territory or State power that our revolutionary fathers took up arms; it was for individual liberty, and the right of self-government. The expulsion, from the continent, of British armies and British power was to them a barren conquest, if, through the collisions of the redeemed States, the individual rights for which they fought should become the prey of petty military tyrannies established at home. To avert such consequences, and throw around liberty the shield of union, States, whose relative strength, at the time, gave them a preponderating power, magnanimously sacrificed domains which would have made them the rivals of empires, only stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of themselves and the other confederated States. This enlightened policy produced union, and has secured liberty. It has made our waste lands to swarm with a busy people, and added many powerful States to our confederation. As well for the fruits which these noble works of our ancestors have produced, as for the devotedness in which they originated, we should hesitate before we demolish them.

"But there are other principles asserted in the bill, which would have impelled me to withhold my signature, had I not seen in it a violation of the compacts by which the United States acquired title to a large portion of the public lands. It reasserts the principle contained in the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was compelled to withhold my consent, for reasons contained in my message of the 27th May, 1830, to the House of Representatives. The leading principle, then asserted, was, that Congress possesses no constitutional power to ap propriate any part of the moneys of the United States for objects of a local character within the States. That principle, I cannot be mistaken in supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American people, and all subsequent re flection has but satisfied me more thoroughly that the interests of our people, and the purity of our government, if not its existence, depend on its observance. The public lands are the common property of the United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a part of the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from,

and appropriate a portion of, this public revenue to certain States, providing expressly that it shall be applied to objects of internal improvement or education within those States,' and then proceeds to appropriate the balance to all the States, with the declaration that it shall be applied to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper.' The former appropriation is expressly for internal improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind of improvements, and, therefore, in express violation of the principle maintained in my objections to the turnpike road bill, above referred to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and gives the money to be applied to any local purpose whatsoever. It will not be denied, that, under the provisions of the bill, a portion of the money might have been applied to making the very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference, and must, of course, come within the scope of the same principle. If the money of the United States cannot be applied to local purposes through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended through the agency of the State governments.

"It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our revenue which could be speedily effected by Congress, without injury to the substantial interests of the couutry, there might be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the treasury; and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them over to the State governments, the more immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The principle and the object was, to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by them under a system whieh could not at once be abandoned; but even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to save the general government from grasping unlimited power over internal improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.

"But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire proceeds of one source of revenue, and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise the money for supporting the government, and meeting the general charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public lands a perpetual charge upon the treasury. It does not return to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the government by which they are not wanted; but compels the people to pay moneys into the treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for distribution to their

State governments. If this principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time, without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if a sufficient supply should be obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might complain, and, to put an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming any new principle, need go but one step further, and put the salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill.

"It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the States, will all political power be substantially concentrated. The State governments, if governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendaries and instruments of the central power.

"I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their State governments, and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control. They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their State governments, thus amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately deprive us of the blessings now derived from our happy union.

"However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the treasury should be returned to the people through their State governments, I cannot assent to the principle that a surplus may be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury among the States without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every State government and institution, as well as for making every