United States before the third auditor of the treasury. The defendants pleaded in abatement the pendency of a suit against them by the same plaintiff, and for the same cause of action, in the Superior Court of the County of New London, in the State of Connecticut, to which plea the plaintiff demurred. The demurrer was sustained, and the case was taken to the Supreme Court on this and other alleged errors, where the judgment of the court below was affirmed. "It is insisted by the defendant in error," says Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the opinion of the court, that the pendency of a prior suit in another jurisdiction is not a bar to a subsequent suit in the circuit court or in the court below, even though the two suits are for the same cause of action, and the court here concurs in that proposition." The court further says in this case that repeated attempts have been made to maintain the contrary of this proposition, but the weight of authority is the other way. Although the De Kalb Circuit Court is within this district, that court and this are in different jurisdictions. Demurrer sustained. -First Nat. Bank of Auburn v. Hazzard. United States District Court, District of Indiana.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.

May Term, 1879.

AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE-REVOCATION-DAMAGES.-1. A mutual agreement in writing to refer to certain specified referees is a contract binding on the parties to the same. For a breach of this contract damages may be recovered. 2. No set form of words is necessary to constitute a revocation. The intent is to govern. 3. The party revoking a submission, without good cause, is liable to the other party for damages arising from such revocation, including loss of time and trouble, expense of witnesses, reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses necessarily incurred. Opinion by APPLETON; C. J.-Call v. Hagar. CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGE SUBROGATION MISTAKE.-1. Equity may annul the cancellation of the record of a mortgage against a grantee whose deed is made subject to the mortgage," when the cancellation was made in ignorance of the existence of such deed. And this, too, even though the deed was duly recorded, if the junior mortgagee, who paid and caused the senior mortgage to be cancelled, was not guilty of culpable negligence in the premises. 2. When such subsequent mortgagee, ignorant of a prior deed, and bona fide relying upon his mortgage, pays the sum due on the senior mortgage for his own benefit, and allows it to be discharged and its registration cancelled, the cancellation and discharge may be annulled and he subrogated to the rights of the senior mortgagee. Opinion by VIRGIN, J.-Cobb v. Dyer. SLANDER-ACTIONABLE WORDS- AMENDMENT.1. To speak of and concerning the plaintiff, he has not been able to do any work for the last three or four years; that he was about dead with the bad disease, and that he died with it;" is not actionable. The words do not import a charge of having a loathsome or contagious disease, this being necessary in actions for such slanders. 2. Motions for amendments should be passed upon by the court at nisi prius. Amendments which do not appear to be for the same cause of action set out in the declaration are not allowable. 3. Where the words spoken, upon which the plaintiff relies, are proved, if there appears to be a variance between the allegations in the declaration and such word in the tense of the verb, or in some other particular,

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and still the judge can see that the cause of action is substantially the same, it will be competent for him to allow the necessary amendment to obviate the variance on such terms as he may deem just. Opinion by LIBBEY, J.-Bruce v. Soule.

ACTION ON MARINE POLICY-INVOICES AND BILLS OF LADING NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW Loss-DUTY OF AUDITOR AS TO EVIDENCE.-1. Invoices, bills of lading or protests are not admissible as evidence in a suit upon an insurance policy, to show the loss sustained by the person insured. The papers were not legal evidence. They were merely the statements of the plaintiffs themselves or of third persons. An invoice is usually a paper made out by the owner or shipper of the cargo. Lord Ellenborough (Dickerson v. Lodge, Stark. 226) said a bill of lading was "nothing more than the declaration of the captain." Lord Tenterden (Abb. Ship. 380 English paging) styles a protest ́ ́ a declaration or narrative by the master," and says 'it can not be received in evidence for the masters and owners, but may be received against him or them." Lord Kenyon entertained the same view. Christian v. Coombs, 2 Esp. 489. In Senat v. Porter, 7 T. R. 158, its admissibility was not regarded as "an arguable question." A ship's log (similar to a protest in character) is the only evidence to contradict a witness who has kept it. Rundle v. Beaumont, 4 Bing. 537; United States v. Gibert, 2 Sum. (C. C.) 19; Dickerson, J., in Stephenson v. Piscataquis F, & M. Ins. Co., 54 Maine, 73, speaking of a survey (a document of similar import) says, ''neither plaintiff nor defendant can use such a document in evidence without consent." 2. An auditor can not, on a hearing before him, receive anything but legal evidence. The rule is correctly stated in Oliver's Precedents (Account), that "their (auditors') report may be objected to, either on account of any mistake of the law, or any improper admission or rejection of evidence, or because they have taken into consideration matters not submitted to them." This accords with the practice observed in many cases. auditor can not decide the question of costs. Fisk v. Gray, 100 Mass. 191. Has no authority to disallow an item allowed by the pleadings. Snowling v. Plummer Granite Co. 108 Mass. 100. Could not allow a person to testify who was interested as bail of the party calling him. Newton v. Higgins, 2 Vt. 366. Nor allow an interested witness to testify, although the party Nor himself could. McConnell v. Pike, 3 Vt. 595. receive oral testimony of the contents of a paper that could be produced. Putnam v. Goodall, 31 N. H. 419. Depositions for defects should be objected to before auditor, or the objection is removed by afterwards using them in court. Gould v. Hawkes, 1 Allen, 170. If the evidence is immaterial and not prejudicial to the dissenting party, its wrongful admission is not sufficient to set an award aside. Kendrick v. Tarbell, 37 Vt. 512. Very many cases might be added. These, for illustration, will suffice. Opinion by PETERS, J.-Paine v. Maine Marine Ins. Co.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

December, 1879.

An

CRIMINAL LAW-COMPETENCY OF JUROR PREJUDICE.--Appellant was convicted of keeping a liquor saloon in a disorderly manner. At the trial, one of the jurors, upon his voire dire, gave the following answers to questions put to him: Do you think a man who is engaged in selling intoxicating liquor under a license is engaged in a legitimate business." An

swer. "I never thought it a legitimate business, although the law did grant it?" "Do you think a man engaged in the sale of liquor under a license is a moral man?" Answer: "I think not. I think him immoral." To a further question the juror answered that he had not such prejudice as would influence him in determining the cause; that he could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence. Held, that the juror was not competent to serve in the cause. He might have been put in a position by the evidence which would require him to either break the law or violate his moral sense. The law is to be administered on legal grounds only, and what the law authorizes it will not hold immoral. Reversed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Swigart v. State. CRIMINAL LAW-OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES.-Indictment and conviction for obtaining money and a promissory note under false pretenses. The indictment charged that the defendant procured the money and note from the prosecuting witness by representing that he was an officer and had a warrant for the arrest of said witness for forgery, and that on the payment to him of the money and note he would not arrest him, but would compromise and settle the matter, otherwise he would arrest and imprison him, etc. Held, that the false pretenses by which a thing of value is obtained to be criminal must be such as would deceive a person of ordinary sense, prudence and caution, and induce him to part with the thing obtained from him; that they must be made of some existing state of facts, for if made of facts to occur in the future, which may never exist, they will not be sufficient, however false and criminal they may be. In this case the pretense alleged is that defendant had the warrant and the power to arrest the witness, but would not arrest him if he would comply with his terms. If the pretense had been true, namely, that defendant was an officer and had the warrant, he could have lawfully arrested witness. Add to this the pretense that if he did not comply with his demands he would arrest him, and they were well calculated to deceive a person of ordinary sense, prudence and caution. 14 Wend. 546; 4 Hill, 9; 47 N. Y. 303; 17 Maine, 211; 31 Ind. 192: 56 Ind. 245; 64 Ind. 498. Affirmed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Perkins v. State. INDICTMENT FOR SELLING LIQUOR INFERENCE AS TO QUANTITY.-The indictment charged appellant with selling intoxicating liquors, to wit: "One gill to one Franklin Churchill." Appellant pleaded guilty and was fined. He appealed on the ground that the facts alleged in the indictment do not constitute an offense, WORDEN, J., says: "It is not unlawful to sell intoxicating liquor to a minor by a greater quantity than one quart at a time. Does the indictment show that the quantity sold by the appellant was less than a quart? It need not allege the specific quantity sold, if it show that the quantity was less than a quart. In this case the indictment does not allege that the quantity sold was less than a quart, nor that the defendant sold the gill and no more. The question is not whether the courts will take notice of the standards of measure, and therefore that a gill is less than a quart; but whether the courts will or can legally assume that because the appellant sold a gill he did not sell any more at the same time, and therefore that he committed an offense. This would be assuming what is not charged in the indictment and making out an offense by an unauthorized inference. It may be true that the appellant sold the gill of liquor, and yet he may not have been guilty of any offense, because the gill may have been but a part of a larger quantity sold. The fallacy of the contrary view lies in assuming that because appellant sold a gill, he did not sell a larger quantity at the same time. If the appel

lant had sold a gallon or a barrel he would have been guilty of no offense whatever; and yet it would be true that he sold a gill. 21 Ind. 160-276, 23 Pick. 275. Contrary to this doctrine are 4 Ind. 407; 23 Ind. 111-127. The indictment should show by its averments that the quantity of liquor sold was less than a quart and not leave the matter to rest upon inference or conjecture. Judgment reversed." - Arbintrode v. State.

SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.
January, 1880.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE-PRACTICE.-Where, on the trial of a case, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence, and then renders judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff for costs; and on the fifth day thereafter the plaintiff files a motion for a new trial, which motion was overruled by the court: Held, that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed; that in order to enable the Supreme Court to review the decision of the trial court on the demurrer it is necessary that a motion for a new trial should be made, and that it should be filed within three days after the decision of the trial court is rendered. Affirmed. Opinion PER CURIAM.-Gruble v. Ryus.

PRACTICE-AMENDMENT-ABUSE OF DISCRETION. -Where an action is commenced before a justice of the peace under ch. 113 of the Gen. Stats., both as a civil and a criminal action, and is afterwards carried through that court and the district court to the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the district court is reversed, because of the improper joinder of a civil with a criminal action, and the cause is then remanded to the district court for further proceeding, where the person who first instituted the action moves for leave to amend the bill of particulars so as virtually to dismiss the criminal branch of the action and leave the civil branch for further prosecution, with himself as the plaintiff, and the district court overrules the motion, and then on motion of the defendant dismisses the entire action: Held, that in view of the peculiar language of said statute which seemingly authorizes the joinder of such actions, the court should have permitted the amendment upon the payment of such proportion of costs already accrued as could reasonably be chargeable to the criminal branch of the case. Reversed. Opinion by VALLNTINE, J. All the justices concurring.-Fetter v. Manville.

NUISANCE-ABATEMENT-LACHES - UNREASONABLY DELAY.-In 1874 W & S constructed a flouring mill on Chisholm creek, in Sedgwick county, to be run by water; for the more efficient operation of the mill, they diverted one-half of the water of the Little Arkansas river to said creek by means of a dam about five feet high across the Little Arkansas, and a trench or race-course from said river to the creek; these improvements cost about $30,000. In the summer of 1875, the mill property was sold to T for $22,000, and he at once sold certain interests in the mill to others, and said owners then made additional improvements to the value of $7,000. In 1876, E&L became the sole owners of all the mill property. The dam has been washed out three times, and rebuilt each time. of the washouts occurred after the fall of 1876. The effect of this diversion of water on the river below the dam caused the accumulation of sand bars at the mouth of the river, by which the water becomes sluggish and grass grows in the river, which at times decays and is offensive to the smell, and also renders the water unfit for bathing purposes. One W has had

Two

since 1874 a residence and improvements on several acres of valuable land about five miles below the dam, upon the east bank of the Little Arkansas, one mile from its confluence with the Arkansas river, and within the limits of Wichita, W discovered in the summer of 1876 that the odor arising from the grass which accumulated and decayed in the river near his premises was exceedingly offensive to him and his family and injurious to his residence as a desirable home. He deferred making any active opposition to the diversion of water till March 14, 1878, when he commenced a suit to remove the dam, to fill up the trench or race course, and to stop the diversion of water from the Little Arkansas to Chisholm creek. Held, that having delayed so long in his legal opposition to the diversion of the water from the Little Arkansas, and the dam having been twice rebuilt after he had become fully acquainted with the consequences to him and his property of such diversion, he has deprived himself of the right to the interference of a court of equity, and his claim for equitable relief must be denied. Reversed. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. All the justices concurring.-Thomas v. Woodman.

DEMANDS IN PROBATE COURTS -ACTION UPON MERITS-DELAY IN EXHIBITION OF DEMANDS-LIMITATION OF REVIVOR:-1. A judgment against a deceased person is not a judgment against his administrator or against his estate until after it has been revived against his administrator, but is merely a demand against the estate. 2. Such a judgment can not be classified by the probate court until after it has been established against the administrator by revivor or otherwise. 3. The mere filing of such a judgment for classification and its classification by the probate court, do not amount to anything in law. 4. A suit against the obligors of an administrator's bond (including the administrator as one of the obligors), for an alleged breach of the bond, is not a suit against the administrator in his representative capacity, nor is it a suit against his intestate's estate, in any form or manner; nor is it a suit on any demand against the estate; and where the plaintiffs fail in such a suit because it is shown that there has been no breach of the bond, they do not fail "other than upon the merits." 5. Where a party fails to exhibit his demand against an estate for over three years after letters of administration have been granted (and he does not come within any of the exceptions), his claim is barred by sec. eightyone of the executors and administrator's act; and this includes claims founded upon judgments for money rendered against the deceased in his lifetime, which judgments have not been revived against the administrator. 6. Where a party holding a claim against an estate fails to commence proceedings in any court to establish it (by suit, revivor or otherwise) against the administrator for more than three years after the administrator has given bond and due notice of his appointment, such claim is barred by sec. 106 of executors and administrator's act; and this includes claims founded on judgments for money rendered against the deceased in his lifetime. 7. A notice of the appointment of an administrator is duly given in accordance with sec. twenty-nine of the executors and administrator's act, where it is published three consecutive times in a weekly newspaper published, and of general circulation in the county where the letters of administration are granted. 8. A judgment creditor holding a money judgment against a deceased person, can not revive it against the administrator of such deceased person against the will of such administrator, unless he does it within one year after the appointment and qualification of such administration. Civil Code, secs. 433, 439. Affirmed. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. All the justices concurring.-Tutt v. Scroggs.

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.

November-December, 1879.

NEGLIGENCE-MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-1. It is a general rule, applica-ble to all kinds of service, that a master who negligently fails to furnish his servant with safe machinery, means and appliances for doing the work required to be done, is liable for injuries to the servant caused by such negligence. 2. The common seaman in a vessel at sea is bound to submit to the judgment and discretion of the master, and obey his orders, in the management of the vessel and its repairs, especially in rough weather and cases of emergency; and the fact that the seaman, on receiving from the master an order otherwise lawful, and being imperatively commanded to perform it in a manner or by means which he regards as unnecessarily dangerous, does not refuse to so perform it, or undertake then and there to withdraw from the service, will not prevent his recovering for personal injuries caused by the master's fault. 3. The owners of a vessel, as well as the master, are liable for injuries caused by the negligence or unskilfulness of the master, provided the act be done within. the scope of his authority as such. Reversed. Opinion by ORTON, J.-Thompson v. Hermann.

PARTNERSHIP-PAYMENT - PRESUMPTION. - The taking, not as payment, of the individual note of onepartner for money loaned, though it may be evidence that the loan was not made to the firm, is not conclusive of that fact. 2. Where such individual note of one partner is taken for a loan made at the time to the firm, the presumption is that it was not taken as payment. A remark of Dixon, C. J., in Ford v. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 304, doubted, but distinguished. 3. The complaint avers, in substance, that on, etc., S, as partner in the then existing firm of W & S, borrowed from plaintiff, for and on account of and for the use of said firm, a certain sum, which loan was evidenced by a note for the amount signed by S, dated on the same day, and that the money so loaned was expended for the use of the firm. Held, that under these averments plaintiff may show that the money was loaned by him to and upon the credit of the firm. There is no admission that the note was taken in payment, and the complaint is good on demurrer. Opinion by TAYLOR, J.-Hoeflinger v. Wells.

EMINENT DOMAIN EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE-OPINION-INTEREST.-1. Under the circumstances of this case, held, that the whole of a certain statement, relied on by the respondent as admitted, must be considered as in evidence, or no part of it. 2. In an action for damages for the taking of part of plaintiff's block in a city for a railway, a witness for plaintiff who had acted for several years as his agent in looking after the block, had paid taxes, given leases and collected rents thereon, received offers to purchase, and was personally acquainted with the block, both before and after the taking, held competent to testify, not only to the value of the strip taken, but also to the depreciation in value of the remainder of the block, by reason of the taking for railway purposes. 3. A witness who had testified fully as to the actual value of the whole block, both before and after the taking, was asked what a particular front of said block was worth before the road was constructed. Held, that there was no error in excluding the question. 4. Plaintiff having proven title to the land to the water's edge, defendant introduced evidence that the land taken was not above the water's edge, but was made beyond it by means of a breakwater and cribs extending into the water. Held, that there was no error in permitting

plaintiff then to show that the breakwater and cribs were not built beyond the water's edge; the evidence being properly in rebuttal. 5. Where the jury being instructed that plaintiff, if he recovered, was entitled to interest, found his damages at a certain sum, it must be presumed that this included the interest; and a judgment taken for a larger sum, including intereson that named in the verdict, is reversed, with direct tions to grant a new trial unless plaintiff remit the excess. Reversed. Opinion by COLE, J.-Diedrichs v. Northwestern &c. R. Co.

LEASE STATUTE OF FRAUDS - TENANT FROM YEAR TO YEAR.-K attempted orally to lease premises to G for two years at a specified sum per year, payable at such times during the term as plaintiff should require;' and G went into possession under the lease, and remained in possession twenty months, paying the first year the specified rent therefor when demanded, and also paying at the same rate until the end of the next six months. Held, that though the lease was void by the statute of frauds, G became a tenant from year to year on the terms therein stipulated. Affirmed. Opinion by COLE, J.-Koplitz v. Gustavus.

KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.

December, 1879.

LARCENY - SEVERAL ARTICLES TAKEN AT SAME TIME CONSTITUTE BUT ONE OFFENSE EXTENT OF RULE.-1. Larceny is an offense against the public, and the offense is the same whether the property stolen belonged to one person or to several jointly, or to several persons, each owning distinct parcels. If a flock of sheep, of which A owns five, B five and C five, be feloniously asported by one and the same act, there are three trespasses, but only one larceny. It is therefore proper that the jury should, in determining the value of the property, in order to ascertain the grade of the offense, include in the estimate all the property stolen at the same time, whether it or to several persons. belong to one 2. But the property must be taken at the same time, and if the articles stolen were but 200 yards distant, it is the same as though they were two miles, and each act constitutes a distinct offense. Reversed. Opinion by COFER, J.-Nichols v. Com.

MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE MONEY DUE TO BENEFICIARY SUBJECT TO ATTACHMENT. - One J M was a member of a Masonic mutual life insurance company. By his death the defendant became entitled to receive from the company, on account of his father's membership, $100. This sum was attached in the hands of the company by the plaintiff. Without controverting the demand against him, or the grounds for attachment, the defendant claimed that his interest in the money could not be subjected to his debts because of sec. twelve of the company's charter, which reads as follows "No part of the stock or interest of any member, or his widow or children may have in said institution, shall be subject to any debt, liability or legal or equitable process against him or any of them." The court below adjudged in favor of the defendant. Held, error. Every holder of a policy is a member of the corporation, and as such has an interest in it in the character of a stockholder, and it is that interest and that alone which, in our opinion, is exempted from seizure for debt. The money due to the representatives of a deceased member is in no sense an interest "'in said institution." It is a debt due from it to them, not as shareholders, but as creditors. Reversed. Opinion by COFER, J.-Gieger v. McLin.

FIRE INSURANCE-WAIVER OF FORFEITURE BY DEMANDING PROOFS-FAILURE TO RETURN PREMIUM.1. A policy of insurance issued to S contained a condition that it should be void in the case of additional insurance without the consent of the company. The property being destroyed by fire the company wrote to their agent that S had made a claim on them, but that it was impossible to determine from the paper which he had sent in what particulars, as it did not even state that S held a policy in the company. The letter continued: "Be good enough to inform Mr. S that if he has any claim to make against this company under or by virtue of a policy of insurance, such claim must be made in strict accordance with the conditions of said policy, to which he is respectfully referred." Held, that this did not amount to a waiver by the company of the forfeiture. The act or conduct of the company, in order to operate as a waiver of its right to rely upon the breach as a release from liability, must be such that the insured might reasonably infer therefrom that the company did not mean to insist upon the forfeiture. The insured must have been misled to his prejudice, and if he is so misled by a reasonable and justifiable reliance upon the acts or conduct of the insurer, the waiver or estoppel attaches, whether it was so intended by the insurer or not. The case at bar is unlike the case where, during the continuance of the risk, the insurer is notified, even orally, of other insurance, and yet gives no notice to the insured that the insurer considers the contract of insurance at an end on account of such breach on the part of the insured. The case at bar is also unlike the case where the notice to the insurer comes afterthe loss, and specific exceptions are taken by the insurer to certain defects in the proof, without notice of intention to rely upon the forfeiture, and when the notice to the insured is accompanied by a request to incur onerous expense, which is in fact incurred, but is not essential to making out proof of claim in the ordinary form. Webster v. Phoenix, Ins. Co. 36 Wis. 71; Gans v. St. Paul, etc., Ins. Co. 43 Wis. 110; Kenton Ins. Co. v. Shea, 6 Bush. 171; Von Bories. v. United Life Ins. Co. 8 Bush, 136; Baer v. Phoenix Ins. Co.. 4 Bush, 244. 2. Neither does the fact that the company failed to return any portion of what is called the "unearned premium," preclude it from relying on the forfeiture. May on Ins. sec. 567; Flanders on Ins. p. 170. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HINES, J.-Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stevenson.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.

October, 1879.

WHEN WRIT OF PROHIBITION WILL BE GRANTED. -The writ of prohibition is a remedy provided by the common law to prevent the encroachment of jurisdiction. It is a proper remedy in cases where the court exceeds the bounds of its jurisdiction, or takes cogni- . zance of matters not arising within its jurisdiction. It can only be interposed in a clear case of excess of jurisdiction, and may lie to a part and not to thewhole. It simply goes to the excess of jurisdiction, and the application for the writ may be made by either the plaintiff or the defendant in the case, or if more than one, by either, where the excess of jurisdiction affects him. It can only be resorted to where other remedies are ineffectual to meet the exigencies of the case. It is a preventive rather than a remedial process, and can not, therefore, take the place of a writ of error, or other mode of review. It must also ap-

pear that the person applying for the writ has made application in vain for relief to the court against which the writ is asked. The writ is not granted as a matter of strict right, but rests on a sound judicial discretion, to be granted or not according to the peculiar circumstances of each particular case when presented. 8 Bacon's Ab. Title "Prohibition;" 3 Black. 111; Appo v. People, 20 N. Y. 531; People v. Seward, 7 Wend. 518; Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana, 21; Washburn v. Phillips, 2 Met. 299; Ex parte Hamilton, 51 Ala. 62; Blackburn, ex parte, 5 Pike, 22; High. on Inj. § § 773, 765. Writ denied. Opinion by MARSTON, J. -Hudson v. Judge of Superior Court.

11. Does the Missouri statute of limitations operate as a bar to a proceeding in equity where neither "the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, grantor or person under whom he claims,'' has been in the actual possession of the premises within ten years before the commencement of the action? The statute reads "seized or possessed." It is a well settled principle that the seisin follows the legal title, unless it has been interrupted by actual entry and adverse possession. M.

12. Under the laws of Iowa, is a railroad company -liable to the garnishment process? Where horses or cattle are being shipped by execution defendant from himself in Iowa to himself in Iowa is it exempt being a common carrier? W. H.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A new usury law which went into force in the State of New York on the first of this year is creating much confusion, and an effort looking to the abolishment of usury laws altogether is receiving a considerable support. The arguments pro and con the limitation of the right to contract for interest on money loaned are familiar, the opinion at the present day in this country at least being in favor of its modification or total abolition. New York is one of the few States where an out and out usury law is in force. The penalties of usury are already abolished in California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. They are abolished, except so far as the interest is concerned, in Alabama, Dakota, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin; and except so far as the excess over the legal rate is concerned in Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont and West Virginia.

"Straw bail," generally confined to justices' courts and the lower criminal courts, came very near invading the precincts of the Supreme Court of the United States at the present term. In Florida Central Railroad Co. v. Schutte, a motion to vacate a supersedeas on account of fraud in the approval of the bond was made and granted under the following circumstances. A lawyer, an entire stranger to the parties, was employed to procure within forty-eight hours sureties for the appellants to the amount of $100,000. For his services he was to receive six bonds of the appellate corporation of $1,000 each, which bonds at the time were of no marketable value. The sureties were soon procured and made lengthy and voluminous affidavits to the excellence of their financial conditions, and severally signed the bond. But these men of substance were really of this ilk. One, said to be a very wealthy man, was paid $125 for what he did. Another, the son of a former judge of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, received twelve dollars; another, a colored porter in a lawyer's office, ten dollars; another was paid ten dollars, and another was promised fifty dollars, but actually paid nothing. They were all irresponsible pecuniarily, and known to or suspected by the police of the city of New York as "purchasable sureties.'' The money to pay them for their fraudulent work was furnished by the president of the appellant company under the form of buying back one of the worthless bonds promised as a reward for what was done. After the bond was executed by the sureties thus obtained, the president of the appellant corporation was called in. He signed officially the name of the corporation and affixed the corporate seal, but did not see or ask to see any of the persons who had become bound with his company. Neither he nor any other person actually interested in the litigation became in any manner personally bound. With such a bond, procured in such a way, the president of the corporation presented himself at the last moment to the justice of the court who heard the cause in the circuit court, at his summer residence in Vermont, and asked that the bond be approved. On its presentation, the justice read and seemed to be impressed with the fullness and particularity of the justification.” He said, "This seems to be a good bond." The reply was "Yes, judge I believe it to be a very good bond." He then asked as to one of the