not be for an amount large enough to cover the judgment in the case. During the present term of the court were parties, who, by the judgment of Judge Krekel which was no doubt correct, were ordered to be put in custody for disobedience of the order of the court. What bond shall be given whereby they may be released from that custody? I have received a bond approved by Justice Miller and ordered to operate as a supersedeas bond. It operates as a supersedeas bond, and hence the order committing them ceases, and the plaintiff in the case, if necessary, must go upon the bond as a bail bond. That is a little different from what the profession has considered heretofore with regard to the matter. It involves serious inquiries, all of which will be before the Supreme Court of the United States. I want to explain these matters so that the parties may know that a supersedeas bond as against a mandamus need not be for a sum large enough to cover the amount of the judgment, because, I presume, Mr. Justice Miller's reasoning is, there is the whole property of the county, and you can enforce your judgment at any time. If they go up on the judgment they would have to give a bond equal in amount to the recovery had on the judgment, yet if they go up, not on the judgment, but on questions arising on the alternative or peremptory writs of mandamus.as to the power of the court, etc.,a bond sufficient to meet that question is all that is needed. That is the view I expect that he maintains with regard to these matters, and hence he has given a supersedeas bond in the Ralls County Case, whilst at common law the practice would have been very different. I believe that what he said in that case passed into some law journal:that whilst Judge Krekel was perfectly right if the common law rule pertained to that matter, yet he held sitting in Chambers on the Circuit that the rigid common law rules as to the power to grant supersedeas bonds do not obtain in this class of cases; and that is a point to be considered in the Supreme Court of the United States; his mandate is supreme for this court for the time being as entered in the Ralls and Frankdin County Cases. I mention this matter only that the parties connected with these matters may know this view, which must be determined ultimately by the Supreme Court that the common law rules pertaining to mandamus, as to the amount of the supersedeas bond, apply in these cases, practically, only as to costs, because the whole property of the county is there subject to the judgment. If the mandamus proceedings are held to be correct in the matter in the Supreme Court, that ends it. All who have read, as I suppose all the members of the profession have, anything concerning the doctrine of mandamus, know that the common law rule is entirely different; and Mr Justice Miller thinks these matters are excepted out of those rigid rules; and that I suppose has been the ground of his action; and he may probably be entirely correct in that matter, inasmuch as there is perfect security against the judgment as long as there is property enough in the county to respond to taxation, within the rules of law. And, therefore, when for various reasons it is desired to test the proceedings on mandamus, the individual shall not be deprived of the benefit of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States as to those matters, unless they give an individual bond to pay the debt of the county. It was presented in the Ralls County Case followed by this, and the Supreme Court must settle the practice when it is reached. I only make this explanation for the benefit of the bar; hence, that judgment being suspended, these county judges are entitled to the weight of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the matter. If that court says they ought to obey the orders of this court the arrest must go; if sthey say no it must fall.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Frank

lin County. United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Missouri, September Term, 1879.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

October-December, 1879.

COMMON CARRIER CANAL COMPANY NOT A.—A canal company is neither a common carrier nor an insurer of boats navigating the canal: its duty is to maintain and manage the canal that it may be used with reasonable safety and convenience by the public; the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care to this end is all that is demanded. It is not liable for an injury resulting from an unknown obstruction which could not be guarded against without the exercise of extraordinary or unreasonable care. Reversed. Opinion by STERRETT, J.-Pennsylvania Canal Co v. Burd. 36 Leg. Int. 480.

DAMAGES WHEN TOO REMOTE-LAW AND FACT. -In an action upon a promissory note the defendant offered to prove, as a set-off, that the plaintiff had agreed, upon a given consideration, to satisfy a judgment which he held against the defendant; that he had failed to do so, and that as a consequence the defendant had been unable to raise money upon his property, whereby he had suffered loss. Held, that the alleged damages were entirely too remote and speculative, and could not be properly set-off. Held, further, that the question of the remoteness or proximity of the damages to the cause which was alleged to have produced them for the court. Affirmed. Opinion PER CURIAM.-Sloan v. Chamberlain.

was

FIRE INSURANCE CONDITION IN POLICY AS TO EXPLOSIVE OILS.- A fire policy contained this condition: If the insured shall keep or have in any place or premises where this policy may apply, petroleum, naphtha, benzine, or keep, have or use camphene or spirit gas or any burning fluid or chemical oils, this policy shall be void." Small quantities of benzine, not exceeding a gallon at a time, were taken on the premises and used in cleaning machinery and boilers, and there was about a gallon of carbon oil on the premises used for the same purpose and for lighting. Held, that the condition of the policy was not violated. Reversed. Opinion by PAXSON, J.-Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION-WHAT CONSTITUTES - ENTRY OF Landlord to Make UNUSUAL REPAIRS WITHOUT Consent of THE TENANT.1. Any act of the landlord which deprives the tenant of that beneficial enjoyment of the premises to which he is entitled under the lease, will amount in law to an eviction and suspend the rent. 2. F leased certain premises from H, covenanting to make all alterations and repairs, except such ordinary repairs as would make the house tenantable, and to deliver possession at the end of the term in good condition, "reasonable wear and tear and accidents by fire excepted." There was no express obligation on the landlord to repair or rebuild in case of fire. The tenant was obliged by a fire to vacate the premises. The company in which the property was insured elected, under a provision of its policy, with the consent of H, but without consulting F, to repair, and their contractor took charge of the key and retained possession for several months. Held, that as the repairs were more than the usual and ordinary ones for which the landlord was liable, and were made without the consent of the tenant, it was an eviction and suspended the rent.

Affirmed. Opinion by PAXSON, J. Hoeveler v. Fleming. 8 W. N. 65.

SAVINGS BANKS-LIABILITY TO DEPOSITORS FOR MONEY PAID OUT OTHERWISE THAN ACCORDING TO PROVISION OF BY-LAWS FORGERY. 1. Depositors in a savings bank having a right to rely on the published by-laws as to the mode in which the money can be withdrawn. 2. The by-laws of a savings bank provided that in order to draw out money the pass-book must be presented at the bank, and that absent depositors could withdraw their deposits on their order or check properly witnessed. Held, that the bank was liable to the depositor for money paid on forged checks to one who had possession of the deposit-book by the consent of the depositor, which checks were not witnessed as required by the by-laws. Held, further, that whether the depositor was guilty of contributory negligence in parting with the custody of the pass-book was not a question in the case. Affirmed. Opinion PER CURIAM. - Peoples Sav. Bk. v. Cupps. 8 W. N. 67.

FIRE INSURANCE-CONDITION AS TO “SOLE, ENTIRE AND UNCONDITIONAL OWNERSHIP."—1. A policy of insurance on personalty containing a condition that if the interest of the assured be other than the entire, unconditional and sole ownership of the property, for the use and benefit of the assured, it must be so represented to the company and be so expressed in the written part of the policy, otherwise the policy shall be oid.' is not avoided by the fact that the assured executed to a third person, either prior or subsequent to the issuing of the policy, a bill of sale of the property in the nature of a chattel mortgage, to secure mozey advanced to the insured, it being agreed between the parties that the insured should retain the use and possession of the property as though such instrument had not been executed. Where the general right of property coupled with the exclusive possession remains in the assured, the existence of a special or qualified right in a third person, to whom the property was nominally assigned by the insured as security for a loan, is not a breach of such condition. Hill v. Cumberland Protection Co., 9 Sm. 474, and Insurance Co. v. Wilgus, 7 W. N 24. followed. 2. The socalled bill of sale was dated ten days prior to the date of the policy, but there was conflicting evidence whether it had been delivered prior or subsequent to the date of the policy. Held, that the evidence should have been submitted to the jury, and that it was error for the court to charge that the plaintiff could not recover. Reversed. Opinion by STERRETT, J.-Kronk v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

[Filed at Ottawa, Jan., 1880.]

NEGLIGENCE · DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK NOTICE BY CITY COUNCIL.-This action was brought by Matilda Pennington against the City of Aurora to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by falling in consequence of a defective sidewalk over which she was passing, On the trial in the court below, the plaintiff recovered a judgmeut, which was affirmed by the appellate court and defendant appeals to this court. It is objected that it was improper for the court below to admit in evidence the resolution of the common council instructing the street commissioners "to notify parties to repair sidewalks on South River street," which resolution the proof shows covers that point in the sidewalk where plaintiff was injured,

or

and to counteract the effect of the testimony defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that they have no right to presume from such acts on the part of the said city that it had actual notice that the sidewalk at the said place where said plaintiff received her alleged injury was out of repair, in an unsafe condition. SCOTT, J., says: "Neither in the admission of that testimony nor in the refusal to give the instruction asked was there any error. The evidence tended in some degree at least to show that the city authorities knew before the happening of the accident that the sidewalk at the point in controversy needed repairs. What it proved or tended to prove was of course for the jury to determine, and. it was not the province of the court to instruct as to its effect or as to what inference the jury might draw from it." Affirmed.-City of Aurora v. Pennington.

MECHANIC'S LIEN- CERTIFICATE OF ARCHITECT -CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES.-This was a suit by plaintiff to enforce a mechanic's lien. Judgment went for plaintiff in the court below, and from the decree rendered defendant appeals. Among other objections urged it is claimed by defendant that the court erred in admitting in evidence the final certificate of the architect. It is urged that this certificate is defective because it does not contain the word "specification, " and that the statement therein the building. being completed according to plans," omits, it is urged, a very important element. The force and effect of the certificate of the architect must be determined by the contract of the parties.

It will be observed that the contract does not require the architect to state in his certificate that the work. has been done according to plans and specifications, and the omission of that should in no manner impair its validity. Under the contract appellant was bound to pay at stated times upon the certificate of the architect certifying the amount. This court has held in a number of cases that where parties to a building contract agree that the superintendent shall pass upon the work and certify as to the payments to be made, his decision is binding unless fraud or mistake on his part shall be shown. 22 Ill. 53. No evidence was offered. tending to show fraud or mistake on the part of the architect, and as the certificate of the architect was conclusive between the parties the offered evidence to contradict the certificate was properly excluded." Affirmed.-Downey v. O'Donnell.

BILL IN EQUITY-PARTITION- TITLE UNDER TAX DEED. This was a proceeding commenced either by bill in equity or by petition to partition certain lands among parties alleged to be the owners in fee. It is alleged that one Gage claims title to a portion of the property under a tax deed. The circuit court found that petitioners were the owners of the property, and granted a partition. Gage appeals, and claims that the circuit court in a partition proceeding has no jurisdiction to investigate and determine what is termed the adverse title of defendant Gage to the property in question. SCOTT, J., says: "This, we think, is a misapprehension of our statute on this subject. Sec. 39, ch. 106. *It will be perceived it makes no difference whether this proceeding was commenced by bill or by petition. In either case the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court to investigate and determine conflicting titles to the property. The case of Henrichsen v. Hodgen, 67 Ill. 179, was for the partition of lands commenced by bill. It was objected that Henrichsen being in possession the proper remedy as to him was at law by an action of ejectment; but it was held that the court having obtained juris diction of the case for the purpose of partition might do complete justice between the parties and dispose of

the whole question of title between them. That case gave construction to the statute cited, and must be regarded as conclusive." Affirmed.-Gage v. Lightburn.

CRIMINAL LAW INDORSEMENT OF NAMES ON INDICTMENT.-The defendants were indicted and convicted in the court below of a riot. On the trial the State's attorney offered to examine one John S. Hallett, as a witness on behalf of the people, but the counsel for the defendant objected to his examination upon the ground that his name did not appear correctly indorsed on the indictment. Thereupon the State's attorney withdrew the witness and gave notice that he would call him afterwards-the indictment having the name of James S. Hallett instead of John S. Hallett indorsed: Subsequently the State's attorney again offered to examine said Hallett. The defendants objected upon the same ground as formerly, but the court overruled the objection. This ruling is assigned for error. SCHOLFIELD, J., says: There was no error in this. It has been the settled law of this State since the decision in Goodwin v. People, 3 Scam. 89, decided in 1841, that the prosecution 'is not confined to the list of witnesses indorsed on the indictment and furnished previous to the arraignment, but that the circuit court in the exercise of a sound discretion, and having a strict regard to the rights of the community and the prisoner. may permit such other witnesses to be examined as the justice of the case may seem to require.' 14 Ill. 433; 70 Ill. 171; 74 Ill. 144. It does not appear here that the defendants could have been surprised by the examination of this witness. There does not appear to have been any other person present of the name of Hallett at the time, place, when and where the transaction occurred; and it is apparent that the only mistake was in writing James instead of John in making the indorsement. It would, moreover, seem that the defendants by the delay before examining the witness after the notice was given that he would be examined had ample time within which to prepare to meet his evidence. At all events if this delay was not sufficient and the defendants were really taken by surprise by the examination of the witness, it devolved upon them to affirmatively show it, and that they have not attempted." Upon other grounds the decision of the lower court was reversed.-Sagg v. People.

MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-ADVERSE LEGAL TITLE, NOT UNDER THE MORTGAGE.-This was a bill in equity brought to foreclose a mortgage on certain property in Chicago. Appellant was made a party defendant to the bill under the allegation that he has or claims some interest in the mortgaged premises. Appellant put in an answer in which he set up an adverse legal title to a portion of the mortgaged premises by a tax deed, and expressly denied the allegation of the bill that his interest in the property was subject to the lien of the mortgage. A decree of foreclosure was rendered and defendant appeals. CRAIG, J., says: "It will be observed that the final decree rendered in the case bars and cuts off whatever title the appellant Gage had in and to the mortgaged premises, when it appears from the answer and the evidence that he did not claim title under the mortgagee or his grantee, but asserted an independent adverse title derived from a sale of the premises for the non-payment of taxes. The question is whether a court of equity, when a bill is filed to foreclose a mortgage, can take into consideration and pass upon adverse legal titles such as were set up by this defendant in his answer. It has always been supposed that a court of law was the proper forum in which to settle and determine adverse legal titles to real estate where all questions of fact in rela

tion thereto can be submitted to and determined by a Jury. We are aware of no authority holding that an ordinary bill of foreclosure forms an exception to this general rule of law. In a bill to foreclose a mortgage, not only the mortgagor but all persons claiming by, through or under him or under his chain of titie, are proper and necessary parties to the bill, but we have not been referred to a single authority which sustains the right of a complainant in such a case to bring in a party who claims adversely and have such adverse title passed upon and settled by decree. Indeed, we believe the authorities are all the other way. See 6 Paige, 637: Barbour on Parties, 493: 5 Leigh, 192; 4 Paige, 206; 6 Otto, 340; 6 N. Y. 82. Other authorities, where the same principle has been decided, might be cited, but we do not deem it necessary. Decree must be dismissed as to appellant." Reversed.Gage v. Perry.

--

NOTE MADE BY MARRIED WOMAN DELIVERYSTATUTORY POWERS. This was a suit originally brought in the Superior Court of Cook County by Martha J. Boardman upon a promissory note payable to her order, signed by D. S. Taylor and his wife, Esther E. Taylor, the defendants in this suit. A trial was had in a verdict and judgment against both defendants. The case was then taken to the appellate court, where the judgment was affirmed, and defendants bring the record here and ask for a reversal. The evidence shows that the consideration for the notes was the surrender by the plaintiff of certain notes against the Coan & Ten Breck Company; that the note was signed by the defendants and placed in the hands of one C. O. Ten Breck, and that the latter delivered it to the plaintiff. The superior court gave the following instructions for the plaintiff: "Even if the jury believe from the evidence that the note in question was signed by Mrs. Taylor before July 1, 1874, yet if the jury believe from the evidence that the note was delivered on or after July 1, 1874, to the plaintiff by the defendants, or any one for them, Mrs. Taylor is liable upon the note as well as her husband." SHELDON, J., says: "This instruction was wrong. By statute in force July 1, 1874, 'Contracts may be made and liabilities incurred by the wife and the same enforced against her to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried.' Rev. Stats. 1874, 576, § 6. Prior to July 1, 1874, Mrs. Taylor, being a married woman, had no power to give such a note. If it were made and delivered by her before that time it would be void. But if it were delivered by her after that time it would be valid, although she had signed it before that day. So it would be if it had after that time been delivered by some one for him under authority from her, given subsequent to that day, but not if so delivered in pursuance of authority from her given previous to July 1, 1874. Now the jury were authorized by this instruction to find this note to be a valid note against Mrs. Taylor, if after July 1, 1874, it had been delivered by Ten Breck to the plaintiff in pursuance of authority conferred on him by Mrs. Taylor before that date. But before that time Mrs. Taylor was totally incapacitated to give such a note or to give any binding authority to do any act essential to the making of the note, so that Ten Breck could not have been her authorized agent to deliver the note by virtue of any authority conferred by her previous to July 1, 1874. The delivery is the essentia thing in the execution of a note, it having no legal inception until it is delivered. We can not take the view which is urged that the note being in the control of the signers in July they might have recalled it, and not having done so and the delivery being in July, that the note is binding upon Mrs. Taylor, The signing of the note by her before July 1, 1874, was merely

null; it imposed no obligation and created no duty, and there was nothing for her to recall. She is not to be held liable by virtue of any thing done or said by her previous to July 1, 1874. There must have been some affirmative action on her part after that time to make the note of any legal effect, so far as she is concerned. This the instruction did not recognize. It was faulty in not requiring that the one who might have delivered the note for Mrs. Taylor had authority from her to do so." Reversed.—Taylor v. Board

man.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

January, 1880.

WILL-LIFE ESTATE OF WIDOW CONDITION IN RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE.-A will provided as follows: "To my beloved wife give and devise, in lieu of her interest in my lands, the farm on which we now reside, etc., "during her natural life, or so long as she may remain my widow." Held, that the wife took a life estate, and her subsequent marriage did not terminate the estate. By the will a life estate is first given, and this is attempted to be cut down by a condition in restraint of marriage. Affirmed. Opinion by WORDEN, J.-Coon v. Bean.

PLEADING CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT OR TORT.-A paragraph of complaint charged that on a certain date, at the request of defendant, plaintiff cut and hauled to the track of the defendant 300 cords of wood; that defendant agreed that if plaintiff would so deliver said wood it would without unreasonable deay measure the same and pay him therefor the sum of $2.25 per cord; that he delivered the wood but the defendant refused and failed to measure it and wholly neglected te measure it, and that the wood was destroyed by fire from sparks from defendant's locomotive through the carelessness and negligence of defendant and without fault of plaintiff, etc. Defendant answered that the alleged contract was void by the statute of frauds. The main question was whether the paragraph sounded in contract or in tort. WORDEN, J., said: "Standing alone and viewed without reference to the other pleadings it might be difficult to determine to which class of actions it belongs. The paragraph must be regarded as based upon the alleged contract and counting upon the alleged breach in refusing to measure the wood, or upon the alleged tort in negligently suffering the sparks to escape from the locomotive and destroy it. It must be one thing or the other and not a contraction of both. 61 Ind. 290. It must be held that the paragraph sounds in contract and not in tort. The doubt concerning it is removed by considering the other pleadings. The first and third paragraphs, which were withdrawn during the trial, were based upon contract with which a paragraph for a tort could not be joined. The defendant pleaded to the paragraph the statute of frauds, a matter entirely applicable to the paragraph if it be deemed as counting upon the contract, but wholly inapplicable if founded upon tort. The plaintiff neither demurred to the paragraph of answer nor moved to strike it out, but took issue upon it, thereby conceding its applicability to the paragraph. With issues thus formed, the plaintiff could recover only upon the alleged contract, and not upon mere proof of the tort. 64 Ind. 106. The court, however, charged the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on proof of the tort. This was radically

wrong." Judgment reversed. BIDDLE, J., dissenting.-Pittsburg &c. R. Co. v. Noel.

SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.

February Term, 1880.

DEFECTIVE ALLEGATIONS EVIDENCE PRACTICE.-1. Defective allegations in a petition may sometimes be cured by subsequent proceedings in the case, and held, that if there were any defective allegations in the petition in this case they were cured by the subsequent proceedings. 2. Where no objection is made to the introduction of evidence, no material error is committed by permitting its introduction. 3. A witness introduced to prove a conversation is not required to give the exact words of the conversation unless he can remember them. Where he can not remember the exact words he may give the substance of the conversation giving it as nearly in the exact words of the person using them as he possibly can. And where he attempts to give the conversation and does the best he can, his evidence is not to be excluded if he sufficiently remembers the conversation, so as to give the substance of it in any form. In such a case it must be received and considered for what it is worth. Affirmed. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. All the justices concurring.-Grandstoff v. Brown.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED — EVIDENCE-PRACTICE.-1. In an action by A against M for money had and received it is admitted on trial and found by the jury that M received the money and is responsible to A for its payment; but M claims that he is responsible only as the agent of A, or as a guarantor, while A claims that he is responsible as borrower; and the jury find that the money was received by M from A in accordance with the terms of a certain letter from A's agent to M, which letter contains among other things the following: "You to draw upon me as

you need the funds for this purpose, becoming responsible to me for the funds lent you on your drafts,'' and there is nothing in the letter showing that M was to receive the money in any other capacity than as above stated in the letter: Held, that, according to the terms of said letter, the money that was transferred thereunder from A to M, was "lent, and that M became responsible therefor as a borrower. 2. Where a jury renders a general verdict and makes special findings, and the special findings are inconsistent with each other, and some of them with the general verdict; and where the general verdict and some of the special findings are in favor of the defendant, and one of the special findings is in favor of the plaintiff, and the others would probably be so too, except for a probable misconstruction of a certain written instrument: Held, that the plaintiff should be granted a new trial upon hls motion. Reversed. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. All the justices concurring.-Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Mecklin.

MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRUST FUNDS-ASSIGNMENT-SET-OFF.-1. In 1872 B & Son made a general assignment to R for the benefit of their creditors. R was a member of the firm of R. D. & Co, then having a claim against B & Son. Renewal notes were executed by B & Son for this indebtedness, on August 6. 1873, payable thirty days after date. While the partnership of R D & Co. existed, certain portions of the trust fund were appropriated by R. D. & Co., with the consent of the assignee. Afterwards the firm dissolved and the renewal notes were transferred by indorsement by R D & Co. to D. a member of the late co

partnership. In 1876 D brought an action on the notes against B & Son to recover the amount due thereon. B & Son alleged in answer that the firm RD & Co., while the owner of the notes, with full knowlege of the trust, appropriated all the property assigned to R to their own use and benefit, and that the value of the said property was largely in excess of all their indebtedness, including the notes sued on; Held, a good defense to the notes in the possession of D, and if proved on the trial, plaintiff is not entitled to recover. 2. On the trial of the action, the court directed the jury to deduct the value of the property converted by R., D. & Co., over and above the sum R reported as received from his firm therefor, from the amount of the notes in dispute, and give the plaintiff a judgment for the balance; that if the value of the property in excess of the sum so reported by the assignee, exceeded the amount of the notes, then they were to find for the defendants: Held, error, as such excess should be distribute 1 pro rata among all the creditors of B & Son, after the costs, expenses and compensation in the execution of the trust had been paid or provided for, and only the pro rata share of such excess ought to have been deducted from the amounts of the notes. If such pro rata share of the excess is less than the notes, the plaintiff will be entitled to a verdict for the balance. If the pro rata share exceeds the notes, or if the actual value of the trust property converted by R., D. & Co., together with the proceeds of the other trust assets, exceeds all the debts of the defendants, including the notes, and the costs, expenses and commissions in the execution of the trust, the verdict will be for the defendants. Reversed. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. All the justices concurring. Dunlap v. Becker.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A verdict rendered by a jury in a divorce case in England a few weeks ago was certainly a singular one, and about as contradictory as a finding of fact by twelve jurors could well be. The gist of the charge was the adultery of the wife, the respondent, with the co-respondent. It appeared that the co-respondent, animated by motives of malice and revenge, wrote to the petitioner a series of letters bringing charges of daily recurring immorality between the respondent and himself. The petitioner was at last induced toact on these representations, whilst the respondent, under the influence of such accusation, cut her throat. Although her life had been spared she had: permanently injured her organs of speech, and was only able to give evidence at the trial. in a low whisper. At the trial, the co-respondent, though not compellable to give evidence, went into the box and affirmed his tale upon oath. The jury in answer to the question, "Do you find that the respondent has committed adultery with the corespondent?'' replied, "We do not." And, to the further question, "Do you find that the co-respondent has committed adultery with the respondent?" they replied, "We do." And while refusing the divorcethey assessed damages against the co-respondent at £1,000, having been instructed by the court that such a verdict would not be illogical or wrong." The Solicitors Journal explains the matter as follows: "The layman pronounces it incomprehensible; if the man has committed the offense his para mour must have committed the offense. Granted, but then our 'man of common sense' forgets that all questions of fact must be tried inter partes, and the evidence admissible on an issue depends upon the parties between whom that issue is tried. .The matters at issue in a divorce case are, first, has the respondent committed. adultery so as to entitle the husband to a divorce; and next, has the co-respondent committed adultery with the respondent so as to entitle the husband to damages? These questions are no doubt brought before the jury in a certain connection, but, as the judge said. in Stone v. Stone and Appleton, 3 Sw. & Tr. 608, 'they are distinct and must be kept distinct asif they were two separate causes tried by twoseparate juries.' The admissions of the co-respondent are not admissible in the case against the respondent, just as in Robinson v. Robinson and Lane, 1 Sw. & Tr. 362, it was held that the admissions of a respondent were not admissible in evidence against the co-respondont. The verdict in the issue against the co-respondent in the recent case appears to have depended wholly on his repeated statements, whether true or false, that he had committed the acts of adultery charged; but this evidence was inadmissible on the trial of the other issue. on which the jury have, in effect, found that the statements were untrue. The co-respondent has, therefore, the privilege of paying £1,000 for his statements; the husband retains his wife cleared of the imputation which the statements conveyed, and receives, in effect, £1,000 damages for the making of them."

When last fall the publication of the Revised Statutes was delayed for some time after their provisions had gone into effect, it was thought that something more than inconvenience would result from the fact that while the law had been changed in many particular, no one could tell exactly how it had been chang-