ture, were usually created by parol declaration, and trusts like uses, were averable at common law and might be declared by word of mouth without writing. He cites Chief Baron Gilbert, however, as reconciling most of the conflicting authorities, by saying, "at common law a use might have been raised by words. upon a conveyance that passed the possession by some solemn act, as a feoffment; but where there was no such act, then it seems a deed declaratory of the use was necessary; for as a feoffment might be made at common law by parol, so might the uses be declared by parol. But where a deed was neeessary for passing the estate itself, it was also requisite for the declaration of the uses. Thus a man could not covenant to stand seized to uses without a deed; but a bargain and sale by parol has raised a use." It is probable the weight of authority is in favor of this view; and such became the rule at an early day, though originally when the feoffment was the almost universal mode of conveyance, it was understood that no writing was necessary, there being but little writing in England in those early days, as we know from the history of her people.

In this view, the seventh section we take it is to be held as passed rather to settle this disputed question, than as furnishing reason for the inference that the law had been settled otherwise, and it required the statute to change it.

But passing from this to the question before us, we take it to be settled by the policy of our registration system.from its inception down to the present time, that creditors and innocent purchasers (that is, purchasers without notice) stand on the same footing as to all lands owned by their debtor; secs. 2074 and 2075 of our code embody these principles distinctly. The principle of the latter section as to all estates subject to execution or other proceeding for enforcing debts is, that they shall be subject to the claims of a creditor of the grantor, unless defeated by a conveyance or instrument in writing, proved or acknowledged, and noted for registration, or registered; and a bona fide purchaser who gets a conveyance first and has it registered, prevails over another less diligent.

If this be correct, we need hardly say that a purchaser from Love without notice, who paid his money and procured a conveyance in writing, and had the same registered, would get the title over a trust like this, even if it is conceded it is well declared by parol. See cases cited, King's Dig. vol. 4, sec. 11709, et seq. If this be so, on what principle a creditor can be made to stand lower than a purchaser, it would be difficult to

see.

But further the estate conveyed to Love,Lincoln paying the consideration, nothing more appearing, and as the conveyance stood on the register's books, on the facts stated, was an estate subject to execution at law, the judgment against Lincoln would be a lien on the land thus conveyed. 1 Hump. 491, and 6 Hump. 95-96. This being so, if the principle of these statutes is to be carried out, how can the creditor be overridden except by a conveyance, complying with the rule thus estab

lished? It is a legal estate subject to execution or other process by a creditor. It can only then, in fairness, be defeated by a conveyance, noted or registered as the statute requires. On what principle can we make a distinction in favor of a party claiming the beneficial interest? It is the assertion of an unregistered title against a creditor, whose rights are otherwise clear. To make this, however, stronger, suppose this land had been sold by valid contract to third party, and conveyed upon full price paid, but the deed had not been registered, there could be no doubt that the creditor would have taken it. Or suppose the conveyance had been to Love in trust, with all the trusts plainly expressed on the face of the deed, would not the same result have followed? If so, on what principle can a mere parol conveyance or creation of the trust stand higher than one in writing? There is no exception in the statute in favor of deeds with trusts and those without. There is nothing in reason or sound policy it seems to us that demands or permits such a distinction to be made. So that even conceding the trust might be such a one as could be enforced, as against Love, on the part of Mrs. Lincoln, to prevent a fraud, and on the ground of estoppel on his part to deny her right, yet as against a creditor she would still have a right unprotected, unless we can say under our registration system a parol conveyance or declaration of trust shall stand higher than the most formal instrument in writing, or even one supported ́in addition by a valuable consideration paid to the conveyor. This would be absurd.

Without presenting other considerations on this aspect we think these views conclusive of this case. We therefore hold the creditors have the right to enforce their claims for the reasons stated.

It is probable we could reach the same conclusion on another principle. It is settled that the declaration of trust by the grantor must be before or contemporaneous with the conveyance. Perry on Trusts, vol 1, sec. 77. It is also added by the same author that the grantor can not, after he has parted with the estate, charge it with any trust or incumbrance after such conveyance; and this is said to be the rule where parol trusts are allowed. We certainly see no evidence of a definite declaration of the trust in this case before or at the time of the conveyance to Love. It is shown that such was his purpose; but that such purpose was ever declared, we very much doubt from the whole evidence in this record. Certainly Love did not hear of it for some time after, as evidenced by his answer to the Schoonover Bill filed in 1865, where he says he was informed and believes it was so conveyed to him in trust; and then the instrument of 1864 would indicate that if he had ever known of the trust, it had passed out of his mind at that time, to say the least of it.

The result is that the decree of the chancellor is reversed, and a decree will be drawn in accord with this opinion.

Costs to be paid out of the fund arising from sale.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

October Term, 1879.

CORPORATIONS-CREDITORS BILL AGAINST DELINQUENT SUBSCRIBERS TO STOCK. The liability of a subscriber to the capital stock of a corporation is several and not joint, and he becomes a several debtor to the company as much so as if he had given his promissory note for the amount of his subscription, and a judgment creditor of an insolvent corporation is at liberty to proceed against one or more of delinquent subscribers to recover the amount of his debt without an account being taken of other indebtedness and without bringing in all the stockholdors for contribution. And a previous call need not be made though the subscription by its terms is to be paid "as called for by said company."-Hatch v. Dana. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Opinion by Mr. Justice STRONG. Decree affirmed. Reported in full 21 Alb. L. J. 470.

TRADE MARKS - LETTERS OF ALPHABET. - The manufacturer of goods has no right to the exclusive use as a trade mark of any words, letters, figures or symbols which have no relation to the origin or ownership of the goods, but are only meant to indicate their names or quality. And letters or figures which by the custom of traders or the declaration of the manufacturer of the goods to which they are attached are only used to denote quality, are incapable of exclusive appropriation, but are open to use by any one, like the adjectives of the language. Accordingly, where a manufacturer of cloth adopted as a mark to distinguish the best quality of its goods manufactured the letters "A CA," and to denote inferior qualities the letters "B," and "C," and "D" Held, that it could not claim the exclusive right to use the letters ACA" as a trade mark.-Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Opinion by Mr. Justice FIELD. Judgment affirmed.

SALE-DELIVERY-PERSONAL PROPERTY DELIVERED WHERE AGREED, TITLE, PASSES.-B had a contract for the sale to a railroad company of a specified quantity of wood which was to be delivered at the yard of the company at $5 per cord. Being indebted to the W bank he arranged to sell the wood he had collected for the purpose of filling the contract, some of which was in the yard of the company but not received by it, and some on the way thither, in payment of his indebtedness and a further advance. This arrangement was approved by the railroad company and carried out, B giving his note for the further sum advanced with interest. The bank also retained notes given by B for the former indebtedness. B delivered at the yard of the company an additional quantity of the wood and some of the wood was on the way thither when all of the wood was seized by defendant in error under attachments against the property of B. None of the wood had been actually received by the company. The notes of B had been taken more as memoranda than any thing else, and had not been surrendered to B, because he had not called at the bank for them. Held, that the transaction between the bank and B constituted a sale to the bank of all the wood which the latter delivered at the yard of the railroad company. Upon being deposited at that place with the intention or for the purpose of completing the sale the absolute title to the wood passed to the bank.

Nothing more remained to be done by the seller. He was not bound by the contract with the bank to deliver it to the railroad company but at its yard only. In legal contemplation it then came into the possession of the bank, and was thereafter subject to its control. It was no longer subject to be reached by the creditors of the seller, upon the mere ground that the title had not passed or a complete delivery made. The delivery in execution of the contract at a specified place not belonging to the seller was such a delivery as accorded with the nature of the property. When placed in the yard of the railroad company, in pursuance of the agreement, the acts of the parties united with the previous verbal contract, resulting in a consummated obligatory agreement, depriving the seller of all further control of the property, and putting it under the exclusive dominion of the buyer with a perfected title thereto. From that moment the indebtedness of the seller to the bank to the extent of the contract price of the wood actually delivered at the designated place was discharged, and the property was thenceforward at the risk of the buyer. Actual manual possession of the bank by its agents was, under the circumstances and regarding the nature of the property, both impracticable and unnecessary to a complete delivery. These conclusions are abundantly sustained by authority. Benjamin on Sales, book 1, pt. 2. p. 134; Hilliard on Sales, ch. 7. pp. 124-140; Browne on Statute of Frauds, ch. 15, p. 323.-Wyoming National Bank v. Dayton. In error to the Supreme Court of Wyoming Territory. Opinion by Mr. Justice HARLAN. Judgment reversed.

SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.

April, 1880.

TAXATION WHEN EQUITY WILL INTERFERE PRINTERS IMPLEMENTS TOOLS OF MECHANICS' WITHIN EXEMPTION LAW. - 1. To correct an irregular or erroneous tax, application must be made to the board of equalization, and equity will not interfere. But the court will nevertheless restrain a tax that is illegal, as where imposed under an unconstitutional law or levied without authority of law upon property that is exempt. 2. Sec. 797 of the Code, provides that "the farming utensils of any person who makes his livelihood by farming, and the tools of any mechanic not in either case to exceed three hundred dollars in value," are exempt from taxation. Held, that the term "tools" includes the press, types, imposing stones and other implements necessary for a printer to carry on his business. That the art of printing is a mechanical trade. and that a printer is a mechanic, can admit of no question. That the statute did not contemplate that the costly machinery now in use in large printing establishments, such as power presses operated by steam, should be exempt, is evident from the fact that the limit of exemption is fixed at $300; but that the ordinary hand press of a printer should be included in making up the amount of the exemption is just as evident as that the hand loom of a weaver. the bellows of a blacksmith, or the work bench of a carpenter should be held to be exempt under the statute. Reversed. Opinion by ROTHROCK, J.-Smith v. Osburn.

INSURANCE AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO EXTEND TIME FOR PAYMENT OF PREMIUM.-Action on policy of fire insurance for a portion of whose premium the company had taken the plaintiff's notes. The policy provided that if default was made in the payment of any installment of premium upon any premium

note for thirty days after due, the company should not be liable for any loss happening after that time and before payment. One of the plaintiffs's installments fell due Nov. 1, 1876, and was not then paid. It appeared that one K, an agent of the company, agreed with him, after the installment became due, to extend the time of payment until he (plaintiff) should receive a certain pension; that he received his pension March 8, 1877, and on the same day went to K's office to pay the installment due upon his insurance note, but did not find him, and the next day, about four o'clock in the afternoon the property insured was destroyed by fire. It appeared also that K's authority from the company extended only to receiving applications for insurance and collecting and transmitting premiums; he was not authorized to issue policies. Held, that K had no authority to extend the time and that the company was not liable. Reversed. Opinion by ADAMS, C. J. BECK, J., dissenting.Critchett v. American Ins. Co.

SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI.

April Term, 1880.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER-INDORSEMENTS-WARRANTY OF GENUINENESS.-1.The rule is well settled that an indorser warrants the genuineness of the indorsements on a bill of exchange and that he has a valid title to the paper, 2. Should it be ascertained, even after payment of the bill, that any of the indorsements are forged, the drawee can recover back from the person to whom he paid it, and so each preceding indorser may recover from the person who indorsed it to him. 3. The drawee is bound to know the signature of the drawer, but not of the indorser. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by GEORGE, C. J.-Williams v. Tishomingo Sav. Inst.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ALL WITNESSES WHOSE NAMES ON INDICTMENT NEED NOT BE EXAMINED. -The district attorney in the court below closed the case for the State without examining two witnesses whose names were marked as State's witnesses on the back of the indictment, and who were present at the trial: the accused moved the court to compel their introduction and examination by the State upon the ground that the testimony already delivered showed that they were present at the killing and under such circumstances it was the duty of the prosecution to put them on the stand. This motion was denied. Held, no error, the matter being one for the discretion of the court which would not be reversed except where it appeared that actual injustice had been done. There are several English cases decided at nisi prius which lay down the doctrine with more or less distinctiveness, that it is incumbent upon the crown, in a prosecution for a homicide, to produce every attainable witness who was present at the killing. The doctrine seems to have met the approval of the Supreme Court of Michigan in two cases, though when analyzed these are rather adjudications that it is not permissible for the prosecution to present an isolated part of the res gesto without a full development of all that occurred, than a declaration that it must examine all the witnesses who were present at the transaction. The doctrine is utterly repudiated and denied by the Supreme Court of North Carolina' who, though one of its most eminent members, Judge Ruffin, declared that it had neither principle nor practice to support it," and that it was the province of the solicitor and not of the court to determine who should be State's witnesses." We can find no other

adjudications on the subject, and no allusion to the doctrine in any American text books. We are not prepared to go to the length of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in holding that the court would have the right under no circumstances to compel the production by the State of the testimony of the eye witnesses of the homicide. If the prosecuting officer should content himself with proving the bare fact of killing by one who had witnessed that act only, resting his case upon the legal presumption of guilt thereby implied, and if it was made evident by the testimony produced that there were other witnesses present who saw the whole transaction, it would, we think, be always within the sound discretion of the court to compel their production by the State, if in attendance or easily attainable. Affirmed. Opinion by CHALMERS, J.-Morrow v. State.

CRIMINAL LAW JURY SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED AS TO PUNISHMENT, WHEN. The appellant was convicted of murder. The only question presented for the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction to the jury informing them that in case they failed to affix the penalty of imprisonment for life in the State penitentiary then it was the duty of the court to impose the penalty of death. Held, that this instruction should have been given, and its refusal was error. It is true that as to business transactions and civil conduct every man is presumed to know the law. This presumption we know in most instances to be false, and is indulged in only from a necessity which mainly arises from the impossibility of determining how much or how little of law any man knows, but this presumption is exactly to the contrary as to jurors, so far as it relates to principles of law applicable to the case before them, and about which the court is asked to charge them. As to these, they are presumed to know nothing, and to derive all their knowledge from the court. Reversed. Opinion by GEORGE. C. J. CHALMERS, J., dissenting: The jury have nothing to do with the punishment which the law affixes to a conviction of guilt, and the accused has no right to demand that the jury shall he instructed with regard to it. The runishment which the law affixes to the crime of murder in this State is death, and that punishment follows by operation of law upon a verdict of guilty. This punishment the jury may, if they elect so to do, commute into imprisonment for life. When they have been by the court instructed as to their prerogative in this regard, they have received all the information which the accused have the right to demand that they shall receive.- Walton v. State.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.

June, 1880.

A MARRIED WOMAN NOT LIABLE ON A CONTRACT FOR HER BENEFIT MADE WITH HER HUSBAND.-A married woman can not be sued for the value of a furnace put into her own house when the ownership of the house is known, but the work is done by her husband's order, and in reliance on his responsibility. Morrison v. Berry, 42 Mich.; Newcomb v. Andrews, 41 Mich. 518; Vanneman v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 39; Woodruff Iron Works v. Adams, 37 Conn. 233; Wright v. Hood, Wis- Opinion by GRAVES, J.-Holmes v. Bronson.

SHERIFF'S BOND-DEFAULT AS TAX-COLLECTOR. A coroner of Saginaw county, being designated to perform the duties of sheriff, qualified and gave the statutory bond required of the sheriff. Afterwards a

Liquor Tax Law was passed under which he was required to collect large assessments, and failing to pay over part of his collections, judgment was rendered against him and his sureties on his official bond. The sureties bring error. 1. Duties not yet existing and not germane to an office are not within the contemplation of sureties on the official bond, nor properly covered by their obligation. Gaussen v. United States, 97 U. S. 584; Converse v. United States, 21 How. 453; Com. v. Holmes, 25 Gratt. 771. 2. To bind the sureties the duties must plainly belong to the office. St. Louis v. Sickles, 52 Mo. 122; Mayor, etc. of Rahway v. Crowell, 11 Vroom, 207; Citizens' Loan Association. of Newark v. Nugent, Id. 215; Amherst Bank v. Root, 2 Met. 536; Kitson v. Julian, 30 E. L. & Eq. 326. 3. The collection of taxes by the sheriff is assumed to be a duty foreign to his position, by Comp. L., 1027, which provides for independent security for its performance. 4. A sheriff's duties relate to the execution of orders, judgments and process of courts; the preservation of the peace; the arrest and detention of persons charged with the commission of public offenses; the service of papers in actions, etc.; they are connected with the administration of justice and not with the collection of the revenue. People v. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286. 5. Sureties on an official bond are discharged when the duties and obligations of the office are essentially charged by statute and their risk increased. Pybus v. Gibbs, 88 E. C. L. 902; 38 E. L. & E. 57; Oswald v. Mayor of Berwick, 26 E. L. & E., 85. The imposition of new duties does not change the old office but invests the officer with a new office. Skillet v. Fletcher, L. R. 2 C. P. 469. Opinion by GRAVES, J. White v. East Saginaw.

MARRIED WOMAN'S PROMISSORY NOTE-AGENTS. -A married woman gave her note payable to a creditor of a firm in which her son was a partner, to be used as security, and without her knowledge her son gave the note in the creditor's agent and took back an assignment of the debt to her, which had been already executed. In a suit on the note she disputed the consideration. Held, 1. The omission to file an affidavit of non-execution of the note does not waive the defense of a want of capacity to make it except on a parcular consideration.. 2. In Michigan a married woman can not become personally liable on an executory promise unless it concerns her separate estate; and a note given for any other consideration is void. DeVries v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255; West v. Laraway. 28 Mich. 404; Emery v. Lord, 26 Mich. 431; Ross v. Walker, 31 Mich. 120; Jenne v. Marble, 37 Mich. 319; Kitchell v. Mudgett, Id. 81; Carley v. Fox, 38 Mich. 387: Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579; Russel v. Peoples Savings Bank, Id. 671; Gantz v. Toles, 40 Mich. 725. There is no presumption of the validity of such an undertaking, and a binding consideration must always be proved whether the note is negotiable or not, and probably so even if value is expressed, since her power to contract is only statutory and can not be extended beyond the constitutional and statutory limits. Powers v. Russell, 26 Mich. 179; Emery v. Lord, Id. 431; West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 454; Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579. 3. The disability of coverture is as much a protection against a bona fide holder as any other person (Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 79), but the original payee can not be a bona fide holder. Pickle v. Dow, Id. 91. 4. A married woman can not give her agent any power which she does not possess herself, and her agent can not bind her except concerning her separate property. Persons dealing with them must inquire into their powers. Opinion by CAMPBELL, J.-Kenton Insurance Co. of Kentucky v. McClellan.

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

May Term, 1880.

CRIMINAL LAW EVIDENCE OF ACCOMPLICE PROOF OF OTHER LARCENIES. Defendant was jointly indicted with one Arnott for grand larceny. A severance was ordered, and defendant pleaded not guilty. A nolle prosequi was entered as to Arnott, and he was used by the State as a witness against the defendant. On the trial, the State was permitted to prove other larcenies committed by defendant against the objection of defendant. The prosecuting attorney offered to read two other indictments against Arnott, which, upon inquiry by the court, he stated were also against defendant. He then stated that his object in offering them was to show that Arnott had not been wholly released from liability to punishment, to meet the insinuations of defendant's counsel that said witness was fully released in consideration that he would implicate and testify against defendant, and to show, also, that whatever might be the result of the case on trial, Arnott must still answer these indictments. The court permitted these indictments to be read. Held: 1. The testimony as to other larcenies by the defendant and Arnott at other times was inadmissible. 2. The indictments offered were inadmissible for the purposes stated, and were calculated to mislead the jury. The State had no right to show by indirection that defendant was under indictment for other offenses similar to the one for which he was then being tried. It was competent for the defendant to show that Arnott was jointly indicted with him as an accomplice, and had received immunity from that prosecution in consideration for his testimony against defendant, and there the inquiry on that subject should have been stopped. The extent of the inducement held out is not a proper subject of inquiry before the jury. Reversed and remanded. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-State v. Reavis.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE PLEA OF GUILTY UNDER PROMISE OR EXPECTATION OF LOWEST PUNISHMENT.-Defendant was indicted for breaking jail, under Rev. Stat., sec. 1455. The bill of exceptions was signed by bystanders and accompanied by affidavits as to its truth and an indorsement of facts by the special judge who tried the case. According to the affidavits, which the court adopts as less likely to err, it appears that the attorneys for defendant, immediately after the election of the special judge, and before he took his seat on the bench, had an interview with him, and were led to believe by his words and acts that if defendant would plead guilty the lowest punishment would be inflicted; that this understanding was communicated to defendant who consented to plead guilty; and that upon said plea the special judge sentenced defendant to two years in the penitentiary, the highest punishment for the offense charged. Accepting as true the statement of the special judge, the fact remained as stated in the affidavits, that the defendant made the plea of guilty under the belief that by so doing a punishment less severe than the maximum would be inflicted. Immediately upon the judgment being announced, and before it was recorded, the attorneys for defendant asked leave to withdraw the plea of guilty, which was refused, and the judgment entered as announced. Held, that in either view of the facts it would have better comported with the proper exercise of a sound judicial discretion had the special judge permitted the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and the substitution of the usual plea. 2 Archb. 334; 2 Hawk. P. C. 469; 2 Hale P. C. 225; 1 Bish. Crim. Prac. sec. 465; Davis v. State, 20 Ga. 674. Reversed and re

manded. Opinion by SHERWOOD, C. J.-State v. Stevens.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

QUERIES.

47. Does sec. 10, cap. 46, W. S. Mo.as to Divorce have reference to ex parte proceedings? See 26 Mo. 163. L. & E.

ANSWERS.

35. [10 Cent. L. J. 437.] A denial of the title and right of possession of the parties does put in issue their joint interest. No persons can be made parties to a suit at law, but those who have joint interests, and their interest must be of the same nature and character, or there will be a misjoinder of parties. Neither of the parties can recover without proof of the other's right of possession. Proof must be given of their joint possession or joint right of possession, otherwise there will be a material and fatal variance between the allegations and the evidence. B. B. BOONE.

Mobile, Ala.

36. [10 Cent. L. J. 437.] Judge Story (Eq. Juris. sec. 400), uses this language, "Whatever is sufficient to put a party upon inquiry, that is. whatever has a reasonable certainty as to time, place, circumstances and persons, is in equity held to be good notice to bind him," and in a note among other authorities he refers to Green v. Slayter, 4 Johns. Ch. 38, see also Coy v. Coy, 15 Minn. 119. In the light of these authorities as to what constitutes notice, we think that as D has knowledge of the deed from B to C, and that it conveys the same property that A attempts to convey to him, he, D, is chargeable with notice, and would not be justified in completing his purchase from A without ascertaining the character of the title that B, and B's grantee, C, have to the property. If D does complete the purchase from A without ascertaining the character of C's title and from whence it is derived, he, D, can not be protected against C, because in view of the authorities he is not an innocent purchaser without notice. B. B. BOONE. Mobile, Ala.

38. [10 Cent. L. J. 437.] We think the judgment is competent evidence. In Whitman v. Henneberry, 73 Ill. 109, 5 Cent. L. J. 167, it was held that where a court having jurisdiction, made a decree for the partition of the lands of a deceased owner, establishing who were the heirs of such owner, a purchaser of one of such heirs, in an action of ejectment brought by him against a stranger to the partition suit, is not bound to produce evidence of the heirship of his grantor outside of the decree, in the absence of proof to the contrary. It was also held that the doctrine that judgments and decrees are evidence only between the parties and their privies does not apply in such a case. B. B. BOONE. Mobile, Ala.

42. [10 Cent. L. J. 437.] In this case it seems that there was a mutual mistake among the parties as to their rights in the land. Nothing is clearer than the doctrine that a bargain founded in mutual mistake of the facts constituting the essence of a contract will avoid it, although made by innocent mistake. Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, C. C., 173; Glassell v. Thomas, 3 Leigh (Va.), 113; Hammond v. Allen, 2 Sum. C. C., 387. If both parties to a contract for the sale of land are under a mistake with regard to the vendor's title, which was supposed to be perfect, but proves void, a court of equity will relieve the grantee from the contract. Hadlock v. Williams, 10 Vt. 570. We think in the case stated by the querist that a court of equity would rescind the deeds made between the parties and remit them to their orig. inal rights under the will. B. B. BOONE. Mobile, Ala.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A very considerable alteration in the English law as to master and servant will be made by the bill just introduced by the Government, in fulfilment of the promise made at the beginning of this session of Parliament to present a law determining on a just principle the liabilities of employers for accidents sustained by workmen." The act modifies to a great extent the present law as to common employment. It provides that every workman, his wife, children, or legal representatives shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if he had not been a workman of, nor in the service of, the employer, nor engaged in the work, when any injury is caused to such workman in the five following ways: 1. By reason of defective works, machinery, plant, or stock connected with the business of the employer." As the law stands at present, both in England and America, a master would only be liable for injury happening to a servant from such a defect, if it were proved that this defect was brought to his knowledge. But the above clause would dispense with this necessity for showing a scienter by placing servants on the same level with third parties. Railroads would then become liable to compensate their servants who were injured in an accident caused by the breaking of an axletree, or a defect in the permanent way, as well as passengers. 2. "By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has superintendence entrusted to him." 3. "By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workman was bound to conform." 4. "By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the employer done or made in obedience to the rules or bye-laws of the employer." 5. "Or in obedience to instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the employer on that behalf." On the whole the new act comes very near making a master liable for the negligence of one servant in causing injury to a fellow servant.

It must always be a question of much importance to the bar, under what circumstances one who has been found guilty of debauching its privileges and has been removed from its ranks, may be restored to membership in the profession. We have witnessed in this State within a few weeks an application of this character made in a somewhat peculiar method. Two years ago, one Bowman was disbarred in this city for a series of breaches of trust and professional frauds which we are ready to believe have had few parallels in the history of the American bar. Recently he applied to the Supreme Court to be restored to the rolls, and his application was refused on the ground that the time within which, under our statute, the court could interfere at all, had not yet arrived. What we wish to call attention to here are simply some of the reasons which he presented to the court in support of his application. These were, a petition signed by a number of citizens who stated that they were familiar with the facts of the case, and believed that he ought to be restored to the bar, and a petition signed by a few members of the profession, personal friends even in adversity doubtless, to the same effect. So far as the applicant himself was concerned he expressed neither contrition for his past misconduct nor gave any assurance of reformation; he even maintained the propriety of the acts for which he had been disbarred. It must be plain to everyone that an application for re-admission to the bar is not in the nature of a petition for a pardon. A