bank clerk convicted of embezzlement might be released from prison because his punishment had been sufficient, but he would hardly be restored to his post without at least an acknowledgment of a change of opinion as to the morality of appropriating other peoples' money to his own use. A disbarred attorney asking to be re-admitted to the post that he has betrayed and disgraced, and unwilling to give any guarantee for his future conduct, can expect no different answer from the court than the bank thief to whom we have referred would be sure to receive from his former employer.

precedent required by the Governor before acting upon an application for pardon, and the Supreme Court may very properly in such cases follow the usage of the Executive.

RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE.

There must always be another difficulty in the way of re-admitting a disbarred attorney. This difficulty arises where the court to which the applicant presents himself has had but little personal knowledge of him, while the court in which he intends to practice, if admitted, may have lost all confidence in his honesty. An attorney, for instance, may have been struck from the rolls of the Circuit Court for dishonorable acts as one of its members. There may be jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to restore his name to the rolls, but it is plain that they can not grant him those necessary qualifications, without which the title of an officer of the court is a name and nothing more. That which is at the foundation of the privileges of an attorney-the mutual respect and confidence which exist not only between the courts and their officers, but between the officers themselves, cannot be granted by the highest tribunal in the land. The Supreme Court may clothe such a person with power to sign his name to papers, to appear for litigants, to address the court or the jury, but they can not compel the judge before whom he appears, to believe him, any more than they can compel his associates or his opponents to trust him. The spectacle, during a trial, of the opposing counsel calling upon him at every stage to verify his words by proof, or the judge requiring him to substantiate all his statements by the testimony of those whose word he is able to rely upon, would scarcely be edifying to the administration of justice; yet where an attorney has been convicted of betraying the interests of clients, and is, in the opinion of both bench and bar, devoid of common honesty, such a practice would not only be reasonable, but would be really the only safe one for the protection both of the court and the parties. As said by the court in ex parte Steinman, where an attorney had been removed from practice for a gross libel on one of the judges: "His voluntary act having wilfully disrupted the essential, mutual confidence between himself and the court, his continuance in his office could only tend to obstruct or embarrass the court in the discharge of its official duties.

we

BIGELOW'S BILLS AND NOTES.

The second edition of Mr. Bigelow's Cases on the Law of Bills, Notes and Checks is an improvement on the first. The entire work has been re-written and the notes are much enlarged. We find here collected and printed in full in one volume 160 cases on the subject; certainly a valuable collection to any lawyer examining any of the topics of the book. There seems to be a popular demand by the profession for works of this character, which enable a lawyer to carry into court under his arm all the cases which he may need, but which, otherwise, scattered through many volumes of reports, would encumber several tables. It contains over 700 pages and is handsomely printed and bound.

JARMAN ON WILLS.

Many a lawyer has found in the elaborate treatise o Mr. Jarman on Wills, invaluable aid in his investigation of questions arising in testamentary cases. All such who remain in active practice will be pleased to receive a new edition of that work, with full notes, bringing it down to the present time, and including the latest decisions. The announcement that two such editions were to be presented this year to the American bar, was received with some grains of doubt as to which of the two would prove the more complete and the more thoroughly acceptable. The first volume of the Jersey City edition, now before us, brings with it the evidence that great pains must be bestowed on the rival edition, in order to insure to it any discrimination in its favor by the bar. We certainly think the industry and faithfulness of Messrs. Randolph and Talcott, in annotating that part of Mr. Jarman's work included in his first thirteen chapters, are in the highest degree commendable. Our readers will understand how it is that the work, under this editorship, expands into three volumes, when the extent of the editorial work is mentioned. Nearly one-half of the matter in the present volume is of this class. The notes to chapter three on the Personal Disabilities of Testators, largely exceed the original chapter in exAmong them is one note of over fifty pages, containing a full summary of all the modern American and English cases on the subject of Unsoundness of Mind as a Disability. Another note of nearly equal length, added as an appendix to ch. 9, sec. 1, treats very fully of the American doctrine of Gifts to Charitable Uses. But we have not space to speak of all the

The Law of Bills, Notes and Checks, Illustrated by Leading Cases. By Melville M. Bigelow, Ph. D. Harvard, of the Boston Bar. Second Edition. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1880.

A Treatise on Wills, by Thomas Jarman, Esq. In Three Volumes. Vol. 1. Fifth American, from the Fourth London Edition, with Notes and References to American Decisions, by Jos. F. Randolph and Wm. Talcott, of the New Jersey Bar. Jersey City, N. J.: Fred. D. Linn & Co. 1880.

editorial work in detail. It appears on nearly every page, and seems to be so extensively distributed as to indicate that no branch of the subject has been overlooked.

If the same thorough work be bestowed upon the succeeding volumes, we think the bar will have a very complete view afforded of the American law upon the subject of Wills, according to the plan of Mr. Jarman's work, and running pari passu with the English law. We hope to have the opportunity to speak of these forthcoming volumes as they deserve. From the fact that two competing editions had been announced, we had feared an attempt on the part of the Jersey city editors to push the publication of their book with undue haste. at the expense of correctness; but we see no evidences of any such intention, upon the face of the book. It is clearly and handsomely printed, and elegantly bound, furnishing a comely addition to one's book shelves. The second volume of this edition of Jarman's treatise is promised for an early day, and its appearance may be looked for weekly.

NOTES.

-The real advantage of serving on a jury has been discovered by an individual in Ohio. At a recent meeting of the State Bar Association, a county judge in presenting a measure to improve the efficiency of the system for compelling citizens to perform jury duty, said that not long ago in his county a man presented himself with a request to be employed in jury work, citing as a reason that his physician had told him he must not use his mind, and it seemed to him that if he could get upon a jury he would have an excellent opportunity of giving his mind a rest.

-The meaning of "benefit of clergy" is not always understood even by lawyers, the interest in its investigation being historical rather than practical. Its origin may be traced to the regard which in former times was paid by the princes of Europe to the church, and the privileges which the clergy obtained as a consequence, one instance being exemption of places consecrated to religious purposes from arrest for crime, which led to the institution of sanctuaries; and also the exemption of clergymen in certain cases from criminal punishment by secular judges; from this came the benefit of clergy, the claim of the privilegium clericale. It was at first necessary that the prisoner should appear in his clerical habit and tonsure at trial; but in the course of time this was considered unnecessary, and the only proof required of the offender was his showing to the satisfaction of the court that he could read, a rare accomplishment, except among the clergy, previous to the fifteenth century. At length all persons who could read, whether clergymen or lay clerks (as they were called in some ancient statutes) were admitted to the benefit of clergy in all prosecutions for offenses to which the privilege extended. Sir Francis Palgrave, in his Merchant and Friar," gives a vivid picture of the proceeding that took place at these trials. A thief had been apprehended in Chepe, in the very act of cutting a purse from the girdle of Sir John de Stapleford, Vicar-General of the Bishop of Winchester, and he was condemned to be hung at Tyburn. "Louder and louder became the cries of the miserable culprit as he receded from the judges; and just when the sergeants were dragging him across the threshold, he clung to the pillar which divided the portal, shrieking with a voice of agony which pierced through the hall: 'I demand of Holv

Church the benefit of my clergy!' The thief was replaced at the bar. During the earlier portion of the proceedings the kind-hearted Vicar-General had evidently been much grieved and troubled by his enforced participation in the condemnation of the criminal. Stepping forward he now addressed the court, and entreated permission, in the absence of the proper ordinary, to try the validity of the claim. Producing his breviary, he held the pledge close to the eyes of the kneeling prisoner; he inclined his ear. The bloodless lips of the ghastly caitiff were seen to quiver. Legit ut Clericus,' instantly exclaimed the Vicar-General; and his declaration at once delivered the felon from death, though not from captivity."

In a recent case in New York, the Court of Common Pleas refused an order upon an execution debtor for an assignment of his seat in the Stock Exchange that it might be sold to satisfy the judgment. Van Hoesen, J., said: "A seat in the Exchange does not fall within any of the classes into which the subjects of property are divided. It is not capable of manual delivery or appropriation; it is not a domestic animal; nor an obligation; nor a product of labor or skill, nor a right created by statute. * The advantages of membership are very important and of great value to their possessors, and from that consideration an argument has been drawn that the seat to which they are incident may be sold by the officers of the court. There is no doubt that if membership in certain clubs were put up at auction a very large bonus could be realized by members disposed to retire. But few would contend that therefore the privileges of social enjoyment afforded by the Century, the Union or the Union League Club was property subject to legal process. A distinction has been drawn between membership in the Stock Exchange and membership in a social club, in view of the fact that the former was organized for business purposes and that a member on withdrawing is permitted to get back the money which he paid on acquiring his seat. I fail to see the force of this distinction. Whether the club be founded to aid business or to promote pleasure, the privilege of membership is attached to the person of the individual." The court referred to cases in which such a right might be reached. "There is no doubt if a seat be sold, the proceeds of the sale, after the payment of , claims due to members of the board, may be reached by proper process. This is the view of every court which has had occasion to express an opinion on the subject. It by no means follows, however, that the seat itself may be seized by the sheriff or taken possession of by a receiver. It may well be doubted if a seat in the Exchange be property. It is true that Mr. Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Hyde v. Wood, 4 Otto, 523, said that he thought it was property; but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in two carefully considered decisions, in which the decision of Mr. Justice Miller was thoroughly reviewed, came to the opposite conclusion." It may be added that views in opposition to those entertained in this case have been expressed by Choate, J., in the United States District Court at New York.

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, JUNE 25, 1880.

DIGEST AND INDEX.

ABATEMENT.

When death of husband abates action of ejectment for wife's land, 157.

Of action of breach of promise of marriage by marriage of parties, 32.

ABORTION.

No offense at common law if accomplished prior to quickening, 338.

ABSTRACTS OF TITLE.

[See NEGLIGENCE; TITLES.]

ACCOMPLICE.

[See CRIMINAL LAW AND PROcedure.] ACTION.

A passenger on a steamboat chartered for a picnic, undertook to sell refreshments on the boat, which the captain forbade, and put the articles in the baggage room. On arriving at the landing, on account of the crowd, the captain was unable to deliver her the articles, and she lost their sale. Held, that no action would lie, 440.

ADMINISTRATION.

[See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.] ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

[See LAW AND LAW REFORM.]

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW.

A floating dry dock is within jurisdiction of admiralty, 113.

Admiralty practice; appeal from the district to circuit court, 430.

ADOPTION.

Statute concerning, must be construed strictly, 434.

ADVERTISEMENT.

[See NOTICE.]

AGENCY.

Manager of public house has, per se, no authority to pledge employer's credit, 71. Employment of one to collect rents of building does not give him authority to employ engineer, 99. Where an agent buys goods, as an agent of an un; named principal, the liability of such principal to the seller for the price of the goods is not discharged by a bona fide payment to his agent, unless such payment is the result of misleading conduct on the part of the seller, 233.

Mere possession of note by party making demand is no proof of his agency, 296.

An agent of the owner to sell property can not be an agent for the purchaser to buy the same. But the rule does not apply where the agent acts as a middleman to bring the parties together, or acts for both with the knowledge and consent of both. Fritz v. Finnerty, 487.

One authorized to act as agent for another in selling property can not become the purchaser and receive commissions for effecting the sale, except with the previous consent of his principal. The same rule governs a purchasing agent. Id.

An agent to sell may become interested in the subjectmatter of the sale, after the transaction is complete and his duties as agent ended. Thus, where an agent to sell a mine had bonded the property and obtained a deposit to be forfeited upon the obligee's failing to complete the transaction: Held, that though not discharged from his duty to consummate the bargain, he could assume the character of purchaser from or agent for the grantee, pending the time for consummating the bargain, as rights and duties thus assumed would not conflict with those of the seller. Id.

ANSWER.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.]

APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE. Civil Cases.

Straw bail in the Supreme Court of the United States, 118.

Appeals in county bond cases; what amount of bond requisite, 193.

Where propositions of law were presented or refused below en bloc, if any one was correctly refused, there was no error, 217.

Criminal Cases.

Court may order new trial instead of directing judgment on facts found, 16.

In Illinois, writ of error in misdemeanor cases must be sued out to appellate not to Supreme Court, 216. That bill of exceptions is true in every particular will be presumed, 217.

The appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, exercisable by habeas corpus, extends to a case of imprisonment upon conviction and sentence in an inferior court of the United States, under and by virtue of an unconstitutional act of Conoress, whether this court has jurisdiction or not, 256. The jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court by habeas corpus, when not restrained by some special law, extends generally to imprisonment by inferior tribunals of the United States which have no jurisdiction of the cause, or whose proceedings are otherwise void and not merely erroneous; and such a case occurs when the proceedings are had under an unconstitutional act. Id.

But when the court below has jurisdiction of the cause, and the matter charged is indictable under a constitutional law, any error committed by the inferior court can only be reviewed by writ of error. Id. Where personal liberty is concerned, the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not conclusive, but the question of its authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus by a superior court having power to award the writ, 256.

Writ of error does not lie to review judgment on writ of habeas corpus, 257.

Verdict not supported by evidence; when Supreme Court will not interfere, 477.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Breach of a contract to arbitrate gives action, 114. Auditor can not, on hearing before him, receive anything but legal evidence, Ï14.

Time for obeying decree must be certain, 234. Decision of umpire; separate award, 418. ABBITRATORS.

[See ARBITRATION AND AWARD.]

ARSON.

Evidence in prosecutions for, 398.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

Aggravated assault on train of negro excursionists; severe punialment, 419.

Requisites of indictment for assault with intent to kill 432:

ASSESSMENTS.

[See TAXATION.] ASSIGNMENT.

For benefit of creditors by mortgagor in possession; action, 176.

For benefit of creditors; effect of Arkansas statute, 315. A parol, assignment of part of a lien debt, with the right of priority of satisfaction, is binding on the assignor, 377.

ATTACHMENT.

Priority between foreign assignment and local attachment, 94.

Remedy for damages resulting from attachment without inalice, 316.

A stage-coach is liable to attachment though the horses are hitched on, the passengers being not yet seated, or if it has reached its destination, though two passengers yet remain in it to be carried to their resi dences, 464.

Can exemplary damages be recovered for suing out attachment. Query (9 Cent. L. J. 460); answer, 77. ATTEMPTS.

Attempt to commit murder not punishable under United States laws, when, 233.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

See, also, LIENS; PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.]

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Continued. Contract to give attorney half of amount collected on two notes; if client collect the one, attorney may retain proceeds of other, 155.

Disbarment by court of attorney who, as editor, attacks court in his paper, 379.

Authority of attorney to sue, 431.

May court order solicitor to show his authority to file bill? Query, 158; answer, 238.

AUDITOR.

[See ARBITRATION AND AWARD.]

AWARD.

[See ARBITRATION AND AWARD.] BAILMENTS.

[See, also, CARRIERS; PLEdge.]

A State statute required the inspection of tobacco and the storing of it in the State tobacco warehouse for that purpose. While so stored the plaintiff's tobacco was destroyed by fire. In an action brought by special leave of the legislature, held that the State was not liable as bailee, 239.

BANKRUPTCY.

Conveyances by bankrupt when void as to creditors,

72.

Claim of surety barred by discharge, 96.

BANKS AND BANKING.

[See, also, CRIMINAL FRAUD.]

Bank bound to redeem half of torn bank bill presented to it, 45.

Recovery of money paid on altered check, 177. Liability to depositors for money paid out otherwise than according to by-laws, 195.

Power of National banks to guaranty notes, 356.
Deposit is made when check is handed in, 397.

Federal statutes as to suits against National banks apply only to transitory actions, 430.

BARRATRY.

What constitutes the offense, 460.

BENEFIT OF CLERGY.

The origin and meaning of, 500.

BEQUESTS.

[See WILLS.]

BILLS AND NOTES.

[See NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER.]

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

[See APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE.]

BILLS OF LADING.

[See CARRIERS.]

BLOOD STAINS.

[See CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.]

BOOK NOTICES.

Abbott's Law Dictionary, 119.

Bigelow's Bills and Notes, 499.

Browne on the Statute of Frauds, 380.

Bushbee's Criminal Digest, 319.

Clark's Criminal Law, 200.

Cooper's Daniell's Chancery Practice, 439.

Curtis, Judge, Life of, 179.

Daniell's Chancery Practice, 439.
Dassler's Kansas Digest, 319.

Election and Naturalization Laws, 240.

Evans on Agency, 19.

Ewell's Evans on Agency, 19.

Fisher's Digest, Vol. 2, 299; Vol. 3, 480.

Force's Harris' Criminal Law, 159.

Gary's Probate Law, 36.

66

66

Nebraska, Vol. 9, 299.

Oregon, Vol. 7, 459.

Stewart, N. J., Vol. 4, 139.

Texas, Vol. 50, 79.

Wisconsin, Vol. 47, 379.

Schouler on Bailments, 359.
Shirley's Dartmouth College Causes, 59.
Stephen on Evidence, 19.
Stevenson's School Law, 420.
Story's Equity Pleadings, 220.
Thompson on Negligence, 479.
Von Ihering's Struggle for Law, 36.
Wade on Retroactive Laws, 199.
Wells on Replevin, 439.

Wood's Mayne on Damages, 138.
BOOKS.

[See TRADE MARKS.] BONDS.

[See MUNICIPAL BONDS; SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY.] BOUNDARIES.

What is a party wall; remedy of owner excluded from use of party wall, 396.

BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

[See CONTRACTS.]

BROKERS.

[See AGENCY.]

BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS.

[See INTEREST.]

BURGLARY.

Indictment charging a breaking into a "store room" insufficient under statute making it an offense to break into a "store house," 76.

A stable is a "building" within the statute, 432. Ownership of property entered; variance, 432. BURIAL.

[See, also, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.]

The Ownership of a Corpse before Burial, 303, 325. CARRIERS.

[See COMMON CARRIERS.]

CHANCERY PRACTICE.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.]

CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.

[See WILLS.]

CHECK.

[See NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER.] CHINESE.

[See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.]

"CIVIL DAMAGE" LAWS.

A, an innkeeper, sold H liquor by reason whereof he became intoxicated and assaulted A: Held, that A could not recover against H for the assault, 239. Defendant responsible for acts of his servant in selling liquor, even where he has forbidden it, 278. Under Iowa statute seller of liquor and owner of premises may be joined in one action, 434. Either defendant is entitled to have a jury trial, as the question of the sale, the injury and consent of the owner are all legal questions, 434.

The lien under the law is established by statute and not by the court. The required facts being found, the lien follows as of course, 434.

CLUBS.

Inquiry into conduct of member and expulsion can only be after notice to him; injunction, 233.

COMMISSIONS.

[See AGENCY.]

COMMON CARRIERS.

Of Goods.

A canal company is not a common carrier 194. In an action against a railroad company for the loss of a case containing a portrait of the plaintiff's father, which was delivered to it for transportation, statements and letters of the defendant's freight agent made after their loss and in relation thereto are admissible and competent. Green v. Boston etc. R. Co., 207.

Upon the cross-examination of such agent, who was produced as a witness for the plaintiff, the question whether he had any authority to take such goods as this case contained" was rightly excluded. Id. A portrait is not an "article of great intrinsic or rep. resentative value," within the meaning of a freight contract requiring a representation of the value, and a special agreement for the transportation thereof. Id.

The true measure of damages for the loss of a family portrait having no market value is its actual value to its owner, and his testimony that he had no other portrait of the same person, would bear upon the question of its actual value to him, and would be competent. Id.

Evidence that the case, together with other household furniture filling two cars, was delivered to the defendants at Lawrence to be transported to Providence, whence it was to be carried by the Clyde Line to Philadelphia; that the two cars were received by the agents of the Clyde Line from the defendants "unopened and just as they were received from the North," and were kept carefully watched and guarded until the goods were transferred to the steamer, and that on unloading the cars it was found that the case was not in either car, would justify the jury in finding that the said portrait was lost while in the possession of the defendants. Id.

Bill of lading; refusal by master of vessel; action, 431. Goods to be Left "till Called for;" article from Law Times, 441.

A common carrier is as much bound to carry for another common carrier as he is for others. Therefore, a railroad company can not refuse to carry for an express company, nor to extend to its messengers and agents the facilities requisite to the prosecution of the express business. Dinsmore v. Nashville etc. R. Co., 468.

Of Passengers.

Police Duties of Common Carriers, 41.

Liability of common carriers of passengers, 56. Sleeping car companies are neither common carriers nor inn-keepers, but they are bound like other bailees to use ordinary care, which must be in proportion to the danger, and consequently greater in the night while the passenger is asleep than in the day time, Diehl v. Woodruff, 66.

The fact that articles or money lost or stolen from the passenger were carried by him about his person or under his personal supervision, does not exonerate the sleeping car company from the duty to use ordinary care in respect to them; but the right of recov ery is limited to such articles as it is usual and proper for a traveler to carry about his person, and to such a reasonable amount of money as it may be proper for him to carry for traveling expenses. Ibid. Railroad may prevent passenger from interrupting his trip without "stop over" check, 79.

A passenger purchased a ticket from W to D and return: and on his return journey from D to W went on to P, a station beyond, and refused to pay fare from W, to P, on the ground that a return ticket from P to D was the same price as a return ticket from W to D. Held, that as soon as the passenger arrived on his return journey at W the contract between him and the company was at an end, and he must pay the fare. Great Western R. Co. v. Pocock, 84, Liability of carrier for baggage, 397. Passenger on train of company having running pow ers over another line; liability for negligence of servant of latter, 416.

Railroad; negligence; ticket issued by another company; accident at other company's station; duty to provide safe means of alighting, 454. COMPOSITION.

A creditor agreeing verbally with his debtor and other creditors to join with the latter in executing a composition deed at a certain rate, and afterwards when the said deed had been executed by the other creditors, refusing to sign it, can recover of the debtor that proportion only of the debt fixed in the agree ment, 18.

The act of the Missouri Legislature creating the board of police commissioners for the city of St. Louis, which authorizes the president of the board, upon satisfactory information that there are any prohibited gaming tables or other gambling devices in the city of St. Louis, to issue his warrant for their seizure, and to cause the same to be publicly destroyed by burning or otherwise, is unconstitutional. Id. Constitutional right of citizens to bear arms, 45. Kentucky statute as to criminal procedure is unconstitutional, so far as it attempts to authorize, after jeopardy attaches, dismissal of an indictment for felony so that it may not operate as a bar to a future prosecution for the same offense, 55.

City ordinance forfeiting stock running at large unconstitutional, if question of forfeiture is not judicially determined, 73.

The code of Iowa (§ 3058) provides that the claimant or purchaser of any property, for the seizure or sale of which an indemnifying bond has been taken and retained by the officer, shall be barred of any action against the officer levying on the property, if the surety in the bond was good when it was taken. Held, unconstitutional, so far as it declares that the owner can not maintain an action for the recovery of the specific property against an officer who has levied thereon under an execution against another. Towle v. Mann, 126.

The Constitutionality of "Local Option" Laws, 203. A State statute which imposes a license tax upon all travelling merchants, agents, etc., who travel in the State and sell, or offer to sell, goods by sample or otherwise, to be delivered at a future time, without any discrimination against the goods or products of other States, does not violate the provisions of the Constitution of the United States forbidding the levying of imposts, or duties on imports, or conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce between the States, with respect to goods sold by such travelling agents or drummers, for their employers doing business in another State, to be shipped at a future day to the purchaser. In re Rudolph,

224.

The statute of West Virginia which denies to colored citizens the right and privilege of participating in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though qualified in all other respects, is a discrimination against that race forbidden by the. Fourteenth Amendment. It is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the race thus excluded, and is unconstitutional, since the constitution of juries is a very essential part of the protection which the trial by jury is intended to secure. Strauder v. State, 225.

Sec. 641 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that "when any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any State court, for any cause whatsoever against any person who is denied or can not enforce in the judicial tribunals of the State, or in the part of the State where such suit is or prosecution is pending, any right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, * ** such suit or prosecution may, upon the petition of such defendant, filed in said State court, at any time before the trial or final. hearing of the cause, stating the facts and verified by oath, be removed, for trial, into the next circuit court to be held in the district where it is pending,"" is constitutional. Id.