rations of a donor that he had made a gift is not sufficient without some proof of delivery, actual or constructive. It is not held nor intimated that the declaration of the donor is not admissible to establish the facts from which a delivery may be inferred. That such facts may be established by the declaration of the donor we do not doubt. The court further held that there was no delivery or acceptance of the gift, and that both are necessary. The authorities hold that the delivery may be actual or symbolical. In Grangiae v. Arden, 10 Johns. 292, a father bought a ticket in a lottery, which he declared he gave to his daughter, and wrote her name upon it. After the ticket had drawn a prize he declared that he had given the ticket to his child and that the prize money was hers. This was held sufficient to authorize a jury to infer all the formality requisite to a valid gift, and that the title to the money was complete and vested in the daughter. In Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 525, a debt contracted by the wife was held to be discharged as a gift causa mortis, by the husband destroying the bond, the evidence of the debt, and declaring that the money was hers. See also Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N. H. 238. In Hillebrant v. Brown, 6 Tex. 45; where the father branded certain cattle in his son's name, and recorded the brand, it was held sufficient to establish a symbolical delivery. The destruction of the notes, together with the repeated declarations of the deceased that she did not intend the defendant to pay the debt, constitute a sufficient delivery under the authorities cited. As the gift was for the benefit of the donee, and coupled with no condition, his acceptance of it, from all the circumstances proved, in the absence of any opposing testimony, must be presumed. Blasdel v. Locke, 52 N. H. 238, 244. The court further held that the gift was made by the donor in apprehension of death before morning, and that as she did not die there was a revocation of the gift. The evidence does not at all sustain the position that the gift was intended to be operative only in the event of the death of the donor before morning. Upon the contrary, the evidence clearly shows that the deceased desired to discharge the defendant from liability upon the notes, and that the destruction of the notes was made at the time in question because she feared that she might die before morning, and thus be prevented from discharging the defendant as she desired. Afterwards, and during her last sicknesss, and but a short time before her death, the deceased declared that she had destroyed the notes so that defendant would get the property and that she intended him to have it. There was not, we think, any revocation of the gift."

RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE.

RECENT REPORTS.

The sixty-eighth volume of the Missouri reports contains over one hundred cases, embraced, exclusive of index, in 665 pages. The opinions reported were all delivered at the October term of 1878; and the most important ones being already familiar to our readers through these columns, we refrain from referring to them at any length. So far as the reporter's and publishers' work are concerned it is a most satisfactory volume, the syllabi, statement of facts and arguments of counsel wherever given, being clear,

Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. Thomas K. Skinker, State Reporter, Vol. 68, Kansas City; Ramsey, Millett & Hudson, 1879.

concise and correct, and the paper, press work and binding being all that the profession can desire. We can not help thinking, however, that it would have been even more satisfactory had some half dozen cases been omitted altogether. Why should the bar be compelled to pay for printed report of a case which decides nothing new or disputed, and which will certainly never be cited again in any case? If the judges would exercise a reasonable discretion in selecting cases to be reported, there are few lawyers but what would be glad of it. If the reporter were invested with this right it would be still better, as there will always be a temptation for the judges to exhibit in print the records of their industry at the expense of the profession.

In the fiftieth volume of the Texas Supreme Court reports just issued we note the following decisions of general interest: Railroads may adopt regulations preventing passengers from interrupting their trip without obtaining a "stop over" check. Breen v. Texas etc. R. Co. 43. A bankers safe, even if inclosed within a vault the walls of which would have to be partially taken down to effect its removal, is a removable fixture. Moody v. Aiken, p. 65. For the negligence of a contractor in omitting to erect stock-guards and fences during the construction of the road, the railroad corporation is liable. Houston etc. R. Co. v. Meador, p. 77. A donee of an heir is not a person interested in the estate' within the statute permitting suits to set aside wills. Ransome v. Bearden, p. 119. In Houston etc. R. Co. v. Randall, the plaintiff, a brakeman on the defendant's road, sued the company for damages caused by a car running over his arm, which rendered it necessary to amputate it. He obtained a verdict of $12,000, which the Supreme Court refused to disturb. "The court," says Moore, C. J., "should not interfere merely because it thinks the verdict too large.'' Just six weeks ago we noticed the fortieth volume of Mr. Chaney's Michigan reports, and now another volume is on our table. It embraces the decisions of that State up to the end of October, 1879. Michigan bar may be regarded as peculiarly fortunate in being able to have the reports of their State supplied to them with such promptitude.

THE MAGAZINES.

The

The first number of the new series of the American Law Review contains articles on Trespass and Negligence, and Trustees as Tort Feasors, from the pens of O. W. Holmes, Jr., and A. G. Sedgwick. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Weld v. Walker, on the law of burial, is annotated by F. L. Wellman. A review of six books and notes of legal topics conclude its contents.-The first number of a magazine which will be of much service fo the criminal lawyer is just issued. It is called the Criminal Law Magazine, and is to be published bi-monthly at Jersey City, N. J. The contents of the initial number are a lengthy article of forty-five pages on Presum tions in Criminal Cases, by Francis Wharton; five cases reported in full and annotated, and a digest of recent criminal adjudications covering twenty pages. Its editors are Stewart Rapalje, of the New York bar, and Robert L. Lawrence, of the Jersey City bar. Freder

Oases argued and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of Texas during the Tyler term and part of the Galveston term, 1879. Reported by Terrell & Walker, Vol. 50, Houston; Horace J. Burke, 1879.

Cases decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan from June 3 to October 29, 1879. Henry A. Chaney, State Reporter. Vol. 41, Lansing; W. S. George & Co. 1879.

ick D. Linn & Co. are the publishers, to whom it is no greater compliment than they deserve to say that few magazines in the country present so handsome an appearance. We unhesitatingly recommend the work to the criminal practitioner. The Southern Law Review for December-January is as valuable as usual. Fraudulent Mortgages of Merchandise, by Leonard A. Jones; Concerning Insurance Agents, by James O. Pierce, and Injuries to Children and The Rule of Imputed Negligence, by Edwin G. Merriam, are the leading articles, and they are all well worth a careful study. The book reviews this month are sharp and aggressive.

NOTES.

-The length of the chancellor's 100t nas been more than once noted, why then should not the peculiarities of a chancellor's nose be recorded? "When I was a young man," says a writer in the Leisure Hour, my avocations led me frequently to Lincoln's Inn. I would drop occasionally in at the Chancery court, and have a look at Lord Brougham as he sat leaning backward, with his eyes closed, listening to the endless droning and drumming of the lawyers mouthing, or rather mumbling, their interminable pleas. At first sight his lordship appeared to be asleep, but a close inspection would show you that the muscles at the tip of his nose were in a state of rapid and continual agitation. There was no motion of the nostrils, not the least, but an unceasing vibration of the small muscles terminating the organ, reminding me strongly of a captive rabbit nosing at the wires of his hutch. Having once remarked it, I naturally looked for it at each opportunity, and never missed seeing it save when his lordship was visibly occupied with the business before him, either questioning counsel or witnesses or addressing the court. Of course he was not asleep as he lay back with closed eyes; indeed, it was well known that at such times he was wide awake, and thoroughly mastered the business in hand. Though his lordship's accomplishment, if it was one, is by no means common, it is not so rare as might be supposed, and I believe that many persons possess and exercise it without, so far as one can judge from observation alone, being concious of it.

-A rather uncommon suit is in progress in New York for $60,000 damages for injuries received from eating ham sold by the defendant in which trichinæ were present. The following defenses were set by the defendant which the plaintiff asked to have struck out, viz.: (1) That trichinosis results from eating uncooked animal food. (2) There was negligence in so eating uncooked animal food. (3) That ordinary cooking would have destroyed the trichninæ. (4) That no harm would result from eating cooked trichinosed food. (5) Trichinosis resulted from neglect in not preparing the food by heat. The motion of plaintiffs to strike out was based on the following grounds: That the defense is frivolous, as the food complained of is alleged in the complaint to have been smoked ham, while the answer refers to uncooked raw meat; that it was inconsistent with the first defense; that the court should take judicial notice of the latest discoverles in science; that raw, uncooked animal food will not produce trichinosis, but on the contrary is good and wholesome; that the use of raw animal food was universal, and has prevailed from time immemorial; that ordinary culinary operations will not destroy trichinæ spiralis; that eating trichinosed meats, even when the animals have all been destroyed, is a dangerous and disease-producing practice; that meats sold for

domestic use were presumed to be sound and wholesome, and that the purchaser was not bound to analyze, examine or otherwise inspect the same. Decision was reserved by the court.

-In his "Reminiscences of a Journalist," Charles Congdon relates two hitherto unpublished anecdotes of Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate. Mr. Webster was employed in a somewhat singular case and came to the author's town to argue it. A young man of fortune who had killed himself by hard drinking had before his death given a number of promissory notes, the payment of which was disputed by the executor, for whom Mr. Webster was retained. The trial created great public interest, and the court-room was crowded to repletion. "At the time of which I am writing, says the writer, he was the idol of the Massachusetts people. So my chance of getting into the court-room to hear his argument was limited; but his of getting in to make it, at one moment, did not seem to be much better. I was just behind him, and remember how I gazed with reverence at the two brass buttons upon the back of his blue coat. I recall nothing of his argument save one effective point which he made. A witness for the plaintiff, who was also a partner in the alleged conspiracy to defraud the maker of the notes, had been compelled to admit under Mr. Webster's rigorous cross-examination, that they had agreed to fling their chances together.' When he came to this point in his speech to the jury, the orator's eyes flashed, his nostrils dilated, while with a significant gesture and in a loud voice, he exclaimed: "They agreed to fling their chances together; and they would be flung together out of any court of justice in Christendom!'"' The other is of Rufus Choate's vehemence in oratory. He, Choate, was once opposing before a legislative committee, a project for giving the Boston and Providence Railway Company liberty to trespass upon the Common. Mr. Choate drew a beautiful picture of the beauties of that rus in urbe. "Here," he said, "when the vernal breezes blow, you may now walk with your wives and children, and drink in all the charms of reawaking nature. But grant the prayer of the petitioners, gentlemen, and what will you have? The scream of locomotives, the rattle of trains, the whirr of machinery-Stromboli, Vesuvius, Etna, Cotopaxi-hell itself, gentlemen!''

-The opinion is gaining ground in England that the appeal of the Tichborne claimant will be successful. A correspondent writes to this country as follows: "I have had a conversation on the subject with a gentleman connected with the solicitor's department of the treasury, and his impression is that if argued there is a great probability that the decision of the judges will be given in the claimant's favor, as it is held by many of the most eminent counsel practising at the criminal bar that it was an error in law to sentence the claimant to two separate terms of seven years' penal servitude each for substantially one and the same offense. Of course, if the decision is in the claimant's favor he will become entitled to be set at liberty on the expiration of his first term of seven which. years, I believe, with good conduct means only six years three months, and which term is on the point of expiring. Judah P. Benjamin has been retained to argue the case for the prisoner.-A subscriber in Fremont, Nebraska, writes: "As a curiosity of the confusion of a witness the following I think is up to the best. A husband in his application for divorce, at the present term of our court, testified that he was fifty years old; that his wife was thirty-eight years old, and that they were married forty-five years ago. The judge granted the divorce notwithstanding the discrepancy in the figures."

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, JANUARY 30, 1880.

THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF SHERIFFS

AND RECORDERS.

By the common law a sheriff must avoid mistakes in executing the process put in his hand at his peril. He can not plead excuses which might be available in other cases; for instance in the case of a bailee for hire. A mere

showing of due diligence will not discharge him. He must show something akin to that which would excuse a common carrier or an innkeeper-the act of God, or other circumstances which rendered it impossible for him to execute the required mandate. There are, no doubt, exceptions to this rule and variations of it, but in the view of the courts, public policy is best subserved by adhering to it strictly. Many cases might be stated illustrating the severity of this rule. A sheriff can not justify arresting a person under a writ in which he is not correctly named, although he was the person intended to be arrested, unless he was known by the name given in the writ as well as by his correct name. Neither can he justify a taking of the goods of C B under a writ against A B, although C B was really the person intended, unless C B appeared in the action and did not plead the misnomer in abatement. Courts seem to have settled upon the rule that unless the process directed to the sheriff or other officer on its face warranted the action taken under it, it will afford no justification to the

2

(1) In speaking of this officer Mr. Justice Cooley says: "In so far as he acts as a peace officer, individuals are concerned only that he shall commit no trespass upon their rights; but in the service of civil process he is charged with duties only to the parties to the proceedings. These he must perform at his peril; and although in many cases the duties are of great nicety, and require an investigation into the facts, and the exercise of sound judgment and discretion, yet he is looked upon as a ministerial officer merely, and is supposed to be capable of ascertaining beyond mistake what his duty is, and of performing it correctly. The law, therefore, does not excuse his errors, though he may have been led into them honestly while endeavoring to perform his duty." Cooley on Liability of Public Officers, p. 20.

(2) Shadgett v. Clipson, 8 East, 328; Griswold v. Sedgwick, 6 Cow. 456; Mead v. Haws, 7 Cow. 332; Scott v. Ely, 4 Wend. 555; Gurnsey v. Lovell, 6 Wend. 319.

(3) Cole v. Hindson, 6 Term Rep. 234.

Vol. 10-No. 5.

officer.1 Thus, where a marshal arrested Daniel S. Griswold under a writ directing the arrest of Samuel S. Griswold, an action for false imprisonment was sustained against the marshal, although it was admitted that Daniel S. Griswold was the person intended by the writ, and that the misnomer was a clerical error. 5

But the hardship of the sheriff's position. is that this rule does not work in his favor as well as against him. If a writ comes into his hands against John Smith, and there is more than one person of that name in his bailiwick, he must at his peril serve it upon the one intended. Thus, there were two Joseph Jarmains, father and son. A sheriff having an execution against Joseph Jarmain simply, without other description, levied upon the goods of the father. The judgment was, in point of fact, against the son. The sheriff was held liable in trespass. So, where the legislature had incorporated two banking companies by the same name, and a judgment was rendered against one of them, and there was nothing in the writ of fieri facias which issued to apprise the sheriff which one was intended, and he levied upon the wrong one, he was held liable."

6

Moreover in respect of the property which he has levied upon and taken into his custody, he is held to a higher degree of care than an ordinary bailee for hire. If it is taken from him by force, he must answer for it, for he might have called out the whole power of the county to preserve or recapture it. For like reasons a return of a rescue of the body of the defendant taken in execution, is not a good return." In Pennsylvania it has been de

(4) The writ," said Lord Ellenborough, "must speak for itself. We can not hear that instead of A B named in the writ it meant that the sheriff should arrest X Y." Scandover v. Warne, 2 Camp. 270.

(5) Griswold v. Sedgwick, 6 Cow. 456. So, where the warrant ran against Emeline Scott, and under it Evelina H. Scott was arrested and imprisoned, an action for false imprisonment was sustained against the justices issuing the warrant. Scott v. Ely, 4 Wend.

555.

(6) Jarmain v. Howard, 6 Man. & G. 827. (7) Hallowell Bank v. Hooper, 14 Mass. 181. (8) Sly v. Finch, Cro. Jac. 514 "But when he sayeth farther (in his return) that they are reduced out of his custody, the sheriff hath misdemeaned himself, and therefore he is chargeable." Ibid; per Doderidge, J., citing 33 Hen. VI, pl. 1, Dyer, 141.

(9) May v. Proby, Cro. Jac. 419; Bac. Abr. tit. "Rescue," E, 1; Com. Dig.. tit. "Rescous," D. 7.

clared, on other considerations and with forcible reasoning, that the liability of a sheriff, for the forthcoming of the goods levied on by him is similar to the liability of a common carrier, and for similar reasons he must answer for them, unless deprived of them by the act of God, sudden accident or the public enemy. 10 In Georgia a similar rule obtains. When a sheriff has collected money he must have it forthcoming unless prevented by inevitable accident. It is no defense that he deposited it in a solvent bank which afterwards failed." In the same State, where a sheriff collected money, and put it in a trunk under his bed, and it was stolen from him while he was asleep, he was held liable. 12 There is, however, authority for holding that the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the sheriff will discharge him from responsibility in case of the loss of goods attached on mesne process. 18 13 Some courts have applied the same rule in case of property taken on final process.14

12

The same is true of a recording officer in the recording of a deed. One of his clerks makes a material mistake, which results in damages to the grantee who left the deed to be recorded, and paid the statutory fee. The recorder will be answerable in damages to a person thus injured, although there may be great difficulty in determining what the damages will be. But the liability of the recorder is undoubtedly as fixed and inflexible as though, for the consideration of the fee

(10) Hartlieb v. McLane's Administrators, 44 Pa. St. 510. Compare Green v. Horn, 2 Pa. 167: Mitchell V. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. St. 187: Collins V. Terrell, 2 S. & M. 383; Garrett v. Hamblin, 11 S. & M. 219.

(11) Phillips v. Lamar, 27 Ga. 228. McDonald, J., in this case denies the doctrine of Brown v. Handford, 5 Hill, 591, where the sheriff delivered the property to a solvent receiptor, in whose hands it was casually burned, and was held not liable.

(12) Gilmore v. Moore, 30 Ga. 628.

(13) Snell v. Greenfield, 2 Swan, 344; Burke v. Trevitt, 1 Mason, 96, 100; Starr v. Moore, 3 McLean, 354; Moore v. Westervelt, 27 N. Y. 235; s. c., 21 N. Y. 103; Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180; Bridges v. Perry, 14 Vt. 262; Dorman v. Kane, 5 Allen, 38: Parrott v. Dearborn, 104 Mass. 104. Compare Jenner v. Joliffe, 6 Johns. 9; Sewall v. Mattoon, 9 Mass. 535; Tyler v. Ulmer, 12 Mass. 163.

(14) State v. Nelson, 1 Ind. 522; Stewart v. Nunemaker, 2 Ind. 47. This agrees with the view in Story on Bail. § 130, and Edw. on Bail. 59.

(15) This difficulty has been suggested, and several questions mooted by Mr. Justice Cooley in his work on Torts, p. 384.

paid him, he had entered into a written contract with the grantee to record the deed correctly; he will not be able to excuse himself by showing that he used the diligentia patres familias of the Roman law, which as Dr. Wharton learnedly shows is the true measure of liability in the case of bailees for hire.1 He is bound at his peril to see that the work is correctly done," though he is under no obligation to see to the validity of the instrument presented to him for record. 18 Carrying out this principle it has been held by an eminent judge at nisi prius, that the liability of a recorder of deeds for making a false certificate of search extends only to the person taking the certificate and paying the fee therefor, and does not extend to a subsequent purchaser, because there is no privity of contract between him and the subsequent purchaser. 19 But where a false certificate was given by the recorder to the agent of a money-lender who had been solicited to lend money on the property as to which the search for title was made, the recorder was liable to the money-lender, although the certificate was in fact made to the borrower who paid for it.

TITLES OF NEWSPAPERS AND BOOKS.— I

In investigating the law with reference to titles of books and newspapers, the first point which arises for consideration is this: Under what head are they to be placed; in what light are they to be discussed-are they to be treated, in short, as copyright or as trade-mark? This question is one which has given rise to some difference of language among judges, though we may, perhaps, be able to show that there was not much real divergence in opinion. All, however, have agreed that there is in a title a right capable of protection, and that right was distinctly asserted by ViceChancellor Stuart, in the well-known Bell's Life case, Clement v. Maddick, 1 Giff. 98, to be a right of property. The fact that protection is given to titles equally by those judges who take the one

(16) Whart. on Neg. §§ 435-478.

(17) The officer who makes the search stands, in reference to its correctness, in the attitude of an insurer, and his fee represents the premium." Agnew, J., in Commonwealth v. Harmer, 6 Phila. 92. Compare Schell v. Stein, 76 Pa. St. 398.

(18) In Ramsey v. Riley, 13 Ohio, 157, a declaration against a recorder for recording a forged instrument was held bad on demurrer, for want of an averment that the recorder knew it was forged.

(19) Commonwealth v. Harmer. 6 Phila. 90, per Agnew, J.

(20) Houseman v. Girard Mutual Building Assn., 81 Pa. St. 256.

view as by those who take the other renders it not very easy to determine the exact grounds on which they have severally proceeded. The most distinct manner in which the issue could be raised would probably be by an application to register a newspaper title as a trade-mark, but no such application appears to have come as yet before any English court for decision. In America, however, the question has arisen, and the newspaper title, Our Society, has been placed on the register of trade-marks. In upholding the correctness of this decision, the American writer, Mr. Browne, says, in his work on Trade-Marks: "It does not require any genius for one to call a newspaper by the name of sun, moon, or star. The name of a newspaper is a sign to arrest attention as it catches the eye. It points to something else. The heading is not offered for sale. Its office is simply to inform the public that the paper on which it is printed is the Herald, the Sun, or the Globe, as the case may be. The public care not a straw whether the heading be ornamental or plain; for the advantage in buying it is the intelligence, the editorials, the advertisements. The purchaser does not glance at the heading, the title, the name, except to be assured that he is getting the newspaper of his choice. He takes no delight in gazing upon the name or heading as a work of art. But the copyrighted article is the thing that is sold. The book, the map, the dramatic composition, the engraving, cut, photograph, etc., is the thing bought. The name of a newspaper is but the guide to the thing.' And farther on he says again: "A newspaper being a vendible article, is as much a matter of merchandize as any thing can be. It would not be bought unless it contained or bore an authenticating sign. That sign is its name. Each issue may be ephemeral, and be at once consumed, but the name, its emblem, is permanent and invariable, and is the stamp of genuineness." In short, the title of a newspaper is as much the label by which literary material of a certain quality and character is recognized as the triangle or the goat's head is the label by which beer or thread of a certain quality and character is recognized. And if this is so, with regard to the title of a newspaper, it does not appear that any difference exists in the case of the title of any other book; for although the title of a newspaper in great circulation is more continuously under the eyes of the public, the title of a book, especially of one like The Christian Year," which passes through many editions, is brought more or less frequently under their notice, and conveys a definite idea of the character of the work which it designates. The title is the index to the nature of the contents, just as is the mark on a bale of cotton goods or a packet of

tea.

And how stand the authorities on the point? Lord Cottenham, in Spottiswoode v. Clark, 2 Ph. 154, seems to have thought that the title-page of an almanac was quite a different thing from a trade-mark, but the reasoning by which he supported that view was not conclusive. What he says is, "Take a piece of steel; the mark of

the mannfacturer from whom it comes is the only indication to the eye of the customer of the quality of the article. So it is of blacking, or any other article of manufacture the particular quality of which is not discernible to the eye. But these cases are quite different from the present case, in which, if you are deceived at all, it is not by the eye." Lord Cottenham appears to have only had present to his mind the physical appearance of the mark to the eye; but that is not the true mode of testing the similarity of trade marks, as was shown by Lord Cranworth in Seixo v. Provezende, 14 W. R. 357, L. R. 1 Ch. 192, in which he pointed out that the matter did not depend solely on the appearance of the marks to the eye, but on the name which the goods had acquired in the market by reason of the mark which they bore, and that it was not necessary to constitute an infringement that persons should be deceived who saw the marks placed side by side. The fact, therefore, that the question of infringement of the title-page in Spottiswoode v. Clarke had to be determined on grounds irrespective of the actual appearance to the eye, did not distinguish that case from one of ordinary trade-mark.

The question next came before Lord Hatherly, when vice-chancellor, in the case of Correspondent Newspaper Company v. Saunders, 13 W. R. 804, 11 Jur. N. S, 540, where the publishers of The Correspondent newspaper sought to restrain the defendant from publishing another paper under the name of The Public Correspondent, and the vicechancellor, after holding that registration of a newspaper was of no avail without actual publication, went on to express a doubt whether in any case registration would protect the title of the paper as being included in the copyright. The doubt then expressed had three years later become a settled conviction, for in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Chancery in the Sporting Life case, Kelly v. Hutton, 16 W. R. 1182, L. R. 3 Ch. 703, Lord Hatherly, then lord justice, said distinctly: "It appears to us that there is nothing analogous to copyright in the name of a newspaper." But although, not satisfied with merely denying the existence of copyright in the title, his lordship went so far as to deny that there was even any analogy between the two, he went on to assert that the proprietor had a right to prevent any other person from adopting the same .name for any other similar publication.

But if the name is to be protected, and yet not as copyright, under what other head can it be protected than under that of trade-mark? The right of the "proprietor" of a title, to use Lord Hatherley's phrase in Kelly v. Hutton, is not a mere right to protection against fraud; it is a right of property. Clement v. Maddick, Bradbury v. Beeton, 18 W. R. 33, 39 L. J. Ch. 57; and the language of Lord Eldon in Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, and of Lord Cottenham in Spottiswood v. Clarke, is no longer applicable now that the doctrine of trade-marks (thanks principally to Lord Westbury) is more clearly understood. As a trade-mark the magazine title Belgravia was treated by the lords justices in Maxwell v. Hogg,