mately admissible, and for that purpose all the facts and circumstances of the transaction out of which the contract arose, including the situation and relation of the parties, may be shown. The purpose of all such evidence is to ascertain in what sense the parties themselves used the ambiguous terms in the writing which sets forth their contract. Stoops v. Smith, 100 Mass. 63-65. (2) Offers of compromise to pay a sum of money by way of compromise, as a general rule, are not admissible against the party making the offer, but if admitted it is clear that the offer is open to explanation, no matter whether it was by letter or by oral communication. Gerrish v. Sweetser, 4 Pick. 376; Bridge Co. v. Granger, 4 Conn. 142, 148; Stranahan v. East Haddam, 11 Id. 507, 514. In reference to rule first mentioned, the court remarks: Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the language of a valid written instrument, by which is meant that the language employed by the parties making it, and no other, must be used in ascertaining its meaning. Argument to support that proposition is unnecessary, and yet it is universally admitted that it may be read in view of the subject-matter and the attendant circumstances, in order more perfectly to understand the meaning and intent of the parties. 1 Greenl. Ev. (12th ed.) § 277. Written instruments as used in the rule, says Taylor, include not only records, deeds. wills and other instruments required by statute or by the common law to be in writing, but every document which contains the terms of a contract between different parties. Text writers everywhere support that rule, but Taylor admits that the rule will not strictly apply to certain less formal documents, of which he gives several examples. 2 Taylor's Ev. (6th ed.) 988. Extrinsic evidence, it may be admitted, is not admissible in expounding written contracts to prove that other terms were agreed to, which are not expressed in the writing, or that the parties had other intentions than those to be inferred from it; still it is competent, said Shaw, C. J., to offer parol evidence to prove facts and circumstances respecting the relations of the parties, the nature, quality and condition of the property which constitutes the subject-matter respecting which it was made. Knight v. Worsted Co., 2 Cush. 271-283. In respect to offers of compromise it is said, that by all or nearly all the cases the rule as established is not that an admission made during or in consequence of an effort to compromise is inadmissible, but that an offer to do something by the way of compromise, as to pay sums of money, allow certain prices, deliver certain property, or make certain deductions, and the like, shall be excluded. These can not be called admissions, as they were made to avoid controversy and to save the expenses of vexatious litigation. Decided cases may be found where it is said that the evidence is admissible unless the offer made was stated to be without prejudice, but the rule in general, both in England and the United States, is that the offer will be presumed to have been made without prejudice if it was plainly an offer of compromise. Lofts v. Hudson, 2 M. & R. 481-484; Phil. Ev. 5th Am. ed. 427, note 124; 1 Greenl.-West v. Smith. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut. Opinion by Mr. Justice CLIFFORD. Judgment affirmed. 21 Alb. L. J. 33.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS.

October-December, 1879.

OFFICIAL BONDS-WHEN CONDITIONS NOT BINDING.-1. Where an officer is required by his superior, colore officii, to give a bond with stipulations or provisions in the conditions thereof not required by statute, the bond is void in toto. Bradley v. United States, 10 Pet. 343: United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 115; Hawes v. Merchant, 1 Cur. 140; Churchill v. Perkins, 5 Mass. 541. 2. The parties to an official bond for the safe keeping or accounting for public money are not liable for the loss of the same when such loss is caused by the act of God or the public enemy. 3. The performance of an express contract is not excused by reason of anything accruing after the contrac', but in the case of a condition in a bond to do a thing, performance is excused when prevented by the law or an overruling necessity. United States v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 337. United States v. Humason. United States Circuit Court, District of Oregon. From unpublished opinion of DEADY, J.

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BANK CHECK-HOLDER OF, HAS NO CLAIM AGAINST DRAWEE PRIORITY BETWEEN FOREIGN ASSIGNMENT AND LOCAL ATTACHMENT.-A bank in Missouri sold to plaintiff for value a draft, wherein it directed a bank in New York, where it had a deposit, to pay to the order of plaintiff a sum less than the sum on deposit. Before the draft was presented for payment the Missouri bank made an assignment for creditors in Missouri, in which was included its deposit in New York. Payment of the draft being refused, plaintiff brought action in New York against the Missouri bank and attached the deposit. In an equitable action against the two banks and the assignee to have the deposit charged with the payment of plaintiff's claim: Held, 1, that the New York bank could not be charged as a debtor to the plaintiff, and an action on the draft could not be maintained against it; 2, that the assignment being valid, and prior in time to the attachment, transferred to the assignee the title to the deposit as against plaintiff's claim.-Rosenthal v. Mastin Bank. United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York. Opinion by BLATCHFORD, J. 21 Alb. L. J. 27.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES SECOND REMOVAL AFTER CAUSE REMANDED TO STATE COURT CONSTRUC TION OF FEDERAL STATUTE RELATING THERETO.-1. In au action brought in a State court a petition and bond for removal to the Federal circuit court under the act of 1875 was filed by defendant March 17th. The State court thereupon made an order for the removal. The record was not filed in time in the circuit court, but was filed three days after the time had expired, namely, on the 10th of April, On the 24th of May the circuit court for that cause remanded the case back to the State court. On June 2d defendant again filed a petition and bond for removal in the State court, and that court again ordered a removal. The record was on this occasion filed in due time. On a motion by plaintiff to remand: Held, (1) that it not being possible to try the case in the State court on account of the first order of removal before the first term of that court after it was remanded, which was the June term, the second petition for removal was in time under the act of 1875; (2) but that defendant having failed by neglect to perfect the first order of removal to allow the subsequext one would result in delay of the cause to the presumed prejudice of the plaintiff, and on that account defendant would be considered to have waived his right of removal. 2. The

second edition of the U. S. Rev. Stats. authorized by act of March 2, 1877, is the revised statutes as enacted June 22, 1874, with all amendments made between December 1, 1873, and March 4, 1877, and its publication does not affect any act passed after December 1, 1873. The act of March 3, 1875, relating to the removal of causes is still in force. 3. In opposing the motion for remanding the case after the first removal, defendant's attorney made affidavit that the failure to file the record in time had occurred through his inadvertence, but did not state facts from which the court could see that there was inadvertence or accident: Held, (1)that the affidavit was not sufficient to excuse the defendant and authorize the circuit court to retain jurisdiction, and (2) that the order of the court on that motion would not be reviewed.-McLean v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York. Opinion by BLATCHFORD. J. 21 Alb. L. J. 47.

NATIONAL BANKS RIGHT TO SUE IN FEDERAL COURT.-There is no law authorizing National banks to bring suit in a Federal court outside of their own districts and without regard to the amount in controtroversy. FOSTER, J. (full opinion]: The plaintiff is a National bank duly organized under the act of Congress of June 3, 1864 (U. S. Stat. vol. 13, p. 99), and is established and doing business at the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri. It brings this action against the defendant, who is a citizen of the State of Kansas, to recover the sum of $138.51 with interest from August 10, 1878, at 10 per cent. per annum, for so much money collected by defendant for the use and benefit of plaintiff. The defendant maintains that the plaintiff being a National bank established out of this judicial district this court has no jurisdiction. The question is one upon which I have found no adjudicated case, and we have to look to the several acts of Congress to determine the point at issue. Involving as it does the right of National banks to sue in the Federal courts out of the district in which they are established, the question presented is an interesting one. The amount in controversy in this case being less than $500, that alone would defeat the jurisdiction, unless there is some law authorizing National banks to sue in the Federal courts out of the district where they are established, and without regard to the sum in controversy. Sec. 59 of the act of 1863, commonly known as the "Currency Act" (U. S. Stat. vol. 12, p. 681), reads as follows: That suits, actions and proceedings by and against any association under this act, may be had in any circuit, district or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established." The act of June 3, 1864 (sec. 57 U. S. Stat. 13, 116), re-enacts this section, omitting the words "by and" so it in terms only authorized proceedings in said courts against such associations and not by them. But the Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 506, held that the omission of these words was accidental and not intentional, so the law remained in that rcspect as it was originally enacted. When the revision of the United States statutes was had this section was dropped from the Currency Act, title "National Banks," and was placed under the title "Judiciary," and there read as follows: "The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: Tenth. Of all suits by or against any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under any law providing for National banking associations." United States Rev. Stat. pp. 110, 111. It will be seen that this provision is in substance the same as that continued in the currency act before mentioned, and very clearly limits the jurisdiction to suits by or against banking associations established in the

district where the court is held, and that jurisdiction in no way depends upon the amount in controversy. There is but one other provision of the law touching this question, and that is found in the Revised Statutes, second edition. p. 994, under the title of National Banks, and among the enumerated powers conferred on these banks is the following "To sue and to be sued, complain and defend in any court of law and equity as fully as natural persons." This provision is copied verbatim from the currency act of 1863 and 1864. There is nothing in this enactment conferring any special jurisdiction on the Federal courts in cases where National banks are parties. But these banks are placed on an equal footing with natural persons in all courts of law and equity. Now in the case of natural persons the citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy in actions of this nature, are both material and are the controlling elements to jurisdiction in this court. I need not decide or discuss the question whether a National bank organized under the laws of Congress and established in the State of Missouri is a citizen of that State under the rule recognizing corporations organized under the laws of a State as citizens of that State, for the purpose of suing and being sued in the Federal courts. Even if the affirmative of that proposition could be maintained, there would still be a want of jurisdiction in this case as the amount in controversy is not sufficient; and on that ground this case must be dismissed and the costs paid by defendant refunded to him.-St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Brinkman. United States Circuit Court, District of Kansas.

SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.

December, 1879.

MORTGAGE LIEN-EXECUTION LIEN-PRIORITIES. -1. The lien of a judgment or an execution levy is only upon the actual interest of the judgment-debtor in real estate, and does not, except in cases where the doctrine of estoppel applies, extend to interests, which by the record are apparently. but are not in fact, vested in him. 2. The lien of a mortgage unrecorded at the date of a judgment but recorded before the sale upon an execution issued thereon, is prior to the lien of the judgment, and the purchaser buys with constructive notice of the mortgage. Affirmed. Opinion by BREWER, J. All the justices concurring.-Holden v. Garrett.

CONTRACT-DATE OF PAYMENT-STATUTE OF LIMITATION.-1. Where services are performed under a single and entire contract, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, payment is not due until the services are fully performed and the contract completed. 2. If pending such a contract the party employed to render the services dies, the statute of limitations does not begin to run on the claim for compensation, until by the appointment of an administrator or executor, there is some one authorized to collect and receive the compensation. Affirmed. Opinion by BREWER, J. All the justices concurring.-Carney v. Havens.

ESTOPPEL-TRIAL OF RIGHT OF PROPERTY-RETURN OF OFFICER COSTS.-1. Where a constable, holding an execution, issued in the case of L v. F, levies on certain personal property as the property of F, and F and B afterwards give to the constable a redelivery bond, admitting in such bond that the property belongs to F, and by reason of such bond the constable allows F to retake possession of the property; Held, that the constable receives said bond merely as

a "security for his own indemnity," and that F and B are afterwards estopped from denying that the property belongs to F. 2. A suit for the trial of the right of property, under chap. 164 of the laws of 1872, p. 333, may be brought in the township where the property is found and situated. 3. The judgment in such a suit is generally not conclusive; and in this case, where the constable seized the property, had no notice of the judgment until after he returned the execution, and no order was ever served upon him, directing him to restore the property to the claimant (as provided by sec. 2 of said chapter 164, of the laws of 1872), the judgment is not conclusive either in his favor or against him. 4. A return of an officer on final process is generally conclusive as against the officer, and is conclusive in this case. 5. In an action by L against a constable and his sureties on the official bond of the constable, where the breach alleged was the failure of the constable to properly serve an execution in the case of L v. F: Held, that a cause of action set forth in the defendant's answer, that L owed the constable $20 for constable fees which accrued in the original cause of L v. F, is a proper subject of set-off. Modified. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. All the justices concurring.-Sponenberger v. Lemerk.

DISCHARGING JURORS - DEMAND FOR WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS.-1. It is not substantial error for the district court to discharge a juror during the time the jury are being impaneled, although the juror may be discharged for an insufficient reason, where an unexceptionable jury is afterwards obtained, and where the party complaining has not exhausted his peremptory challenges. Following Stout v. Hyatt, 13 Kas. 232. 2. The statute of Kansas with reference to giving and refusing instructions in civil cases, and reducing the same to writing, is a copy of the statute of Indiana upon the same subject; and prior to the adoption of the statute in Kansas, the Supreme Court of Indiana construed their statute, holding that where a party desires that only written instructions shall be given to the jury, the party so desiring must make the request therefor within such reasonable time before the charge is to be given, that the court may have sufficient time to prepare such written instructions, and that such reasonable time for making the request is generally at or before the close of the evidence, and that a request made only about five minutes before the conclusion of the argument is made too late; therefore, following the rule that, "where one State adopts a law from another, the judicial construction given to the statute in the State where it originated follows it to the State of its adoption" (4 Kas. 364), and following the Indiana decisions: Held, that where the request is made during the concluding argument, and not within time to permit the court to reduce all its instructions to writing before being called upon to charge the jury, the court does not err, in giving to the jury orally such of its instructions as it did not have time to reduce to writing. Affirmed. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. All the justices concurring.-Atchison. etc. R. Co. v. Franklin.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSA

CHUSETTS.

September, 1879.

PROMISSORY NOTE-NEGOTIABILITY.—In an action by the indorsee of a promissory note against the administrator of the maker, it appeared that upon the left-hand margin thereof, in the same hand writing as

the body of the note and its signature, the following words: "Given as collateral security with agreement," had been written. Held, that said words formed part of the contract, and as there might be a contingency, to wit, the performance of the undertaking to which this is collateral, in which it might not be payable, that the note was not negotiable. Opinion by LORD, J.-Costello v. Crowell.

LIBEL-PLEADING JUSTIFICATION- EVIDENCE.— A declaration in an action for libel alleged that the defendant made and published and caused to be filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court in and for the County of Suffolk, a false and malicious libel concerning the plaintiff, and therein falsely and maliciously charged the plaintiff with the crime of murder in the following words, and well knew that said McLaughlin (naming the plaintiff), "caused to beput to death, immediately after its birth, an illegitiimate child born to him" (meaning the plaintiff), "by one Sarah Clark, of said Newton." The answer was in these words, "if the plaintiff shall prove that he ever filed or published, or caused to be published, said paper * then the defendant says the same was and is true." Held, that the answer alleged that the facts stated in the declaration were true, and that evidence tending to prove the truth thereof should have been admitted. Opinion by LORD, J.-McLaughlin v. Cowley.

*

TORT-DEFECTIVE HIGHWAY.-In an action of tort to recover for injuries occasioned by a defect in a highway, the plaintiff offered to show that a "Hyatt's patent cover," made in part of glass and partly of iron, formed a portion of the surface of the sidewalk, and had been so changed by wear as to be smooth and slippery, and that she stepped on it, slipped, wholly by reason of its smoothness, and fell and was hurt. The case having been reserved for the consideration of the full court, it was held, that it could not be said as matter of law that smoothness and slipperiness of a sidewalk resulting from the condition of the surface of the material of which the walk is made, and not dependent on nor resulting from atmospheric influence, may not render the walk so unsafe and inconvenient for travelers thereon as to be defective and out of repairs within the meaning of the statute. Opinion by SOULE, J.-Cromarty v. Boston.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY BANKRUPTCY — DISCHARGE. The plaintiff and the defendants, T & B, were, prior to October 6, 1858, co-partners under the name of H T & Co. On that day the plaintiff sold his interest in the firm to the defendant D, and the three defendants executed to him a bond conditioned to pay all the debts of the late firm of HT & Co., and to save the plaintiff harmless by reason thereof. In 1861 a creditor of said firm sued and recovered a judgment against all the members thereof, including the plaintiff, a portion of which the plaintiff was obliged to pay.. In an action on said bond to recover the amount thus paid, with interest, and the expense of defending said suit, T alone defended and set up in bar of the action his discharge in bankruptcy granted to him May 11, 1868. Held, that as between themselves in equity the defendant became the principal debtor, and the plaintiff was his surety, and that under United States Rev. Stats., § § 5068, 5070, the plaintiff's claim was barred by the discharge. Held, further, that the expenses of defending said suit being necessary and consequential to the plaintiff's claim were also barred. Van Sandau v. Corsbie, 3 B. & Ald. 13. Opinion by MORTON, J.Fisher v. Tifft.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

November, 1879.

GRAVEL ROADS-PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS.-An act authorizing the construction of plank, macadamized and gravel roads, provides as follows: "The directors of any company that may be formed under the provisions of this act, shall be liable in their individual property for any debt they may contract in the name of the company, over and above the solvent stock of such company." Held, that this provision is in the nature of a penalty, and must be strictly construed, and that it subjects only the directors who may contract a debt over and above the solvent stock of their company to the penalty specified, and the directors who object and protest against such contract are not individually liable. Nor need such protest be in writing or recorded in the books of the company.Schofield v. Henderson.

PLEADING-PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS.-Where a party has joined as plaintiff in an action, and as such will be as much bound and concluded, and the rights of the defendant be as fully protected by the judgment as if he had been made a party defendant, it is not necessary that he should have been made a defendant in the suit. Where A conveyed all his property to B, the latter agreeing to pay all of A's debts out of the proceeds of such property, A is a proper party plaintiff in a suit by one of his creditors against B to enforce such contract. He has an interest in the subject matter of the action within the meaning of section seventeen of the code. - Durham v. Hall.

MANDATE DISCRETIONARY OR JUDICIAL ACT.Application for a writ of mandate against the auditor of the State to compel the publication of the annual statements of foreign insurance companies in the Indianapolis News. The statute requiring the publication of such statements provides that the auditor shall cause a copy of such annual statements to be published in the two leading daily newspapers of the State having the largest general circulation therein. Held, that a writ of mandate will lie to compel the performance of such an act which the law specially enjoins but the act must be ministerial or executive; the writ will not lie to compel the performance of a judicial or discretionary act. Where the act is specially enjoined by the law, but the manner of performing it is discretionary or involves judicial action, the writ will lie to compel the performance of the act, but will not lie to compel its performance in any particular manner. The writ will not lie in any case where the party who seeks it has any other adequate legal remedy. The appellant does not seek to compel the auditor to act under the law according to his discretion and judgment, which he could do if the auditor had refused to act, but seeks to compel him to act in a particular manner. This he can not do. 39 Barb. 651; 34 Ind. 471; 45 Ind. 501; 50 Ind. 251; 63 Ind. 497; 18 Wend. 79. Affirmed.-Holliday v. Henderson. DECEDENTS' ESTATES-FINAL SETTLEMENT-COLLATERAL ATTACK.-The final settlement contemplated by the statute, has reference to the ultimate completion of the business of the trust created by the issuance of letters of administration, and to the final order based upon such completion of the business of the trust which takes the estate out of court, and not to the last report of an outgoing executor or administrator, where he resigns before his trust has been fully performed, taking himself, and not the estate, out of court. All ex parte orders, however made, in the settlement of an estate previous to the order of final settlement, are regarded as but prime facie correct and may be set

aside, corrected or modified, in a summary way, by proper proceedings, at any time before final settlement. 59 Ind. 123. Such orders are regarded as interlocutory in their character, and so long as they remain in force, constitute adjudications of the matter to which they properly relate in the same manner as ordinary judgments in a court of record, and can not be attacked collaterally in a suit upon the executor's or administrator's bond. If attacked it must be by some direct proceeding in the court having control over them. 47 Ind. 98; 10 Peck, 75; 20 Ohio, 310; 4 Day,.. 215; 23 Mo. 95; 26 Ill. 180. Reversed.-Parsons v.. Milford.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
January 20, 1880.

RAILROAD-DAMAGE TO ABUTTING OWNER-LIM- ITATION.-A railroad company, in laying its track in a public street, in pursuance of authority from the proper officers of the municipal corporation, necessarily lengthened a bridge across such street and extend. ed the approaches to the bridge along the street in which it was situated, by which means the grade was raised in front of A's residence, to her injury. A's premises did not abut upon the street in which the track was laid, but were near thereto; Held, that the case is governed by the twelfth section of the general. act of 1852, relating to corporations, as amended in 1857 (54 O. L. 133), and hence the action was barred in two years from the completion of the work. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial. Opinion by OKEY, J.-Columbus etc. R. Co. v. Mowatt.

ACTION FOR PURCHASE MONEY OF REAL ESTATEPARTIES-COVENANT AGAINST INCUMBRANCES.-1. In an action to recover the purchase money of real estate, the right of the vendee, under section 557 of the code, as amended April 18, 1870 (67 O. L. 116), to make any person claiming an adverse interest a party, exists only where there has been a breach of the covenants of his deed. 2. Where a deed of conveyance describes the lands intended to be conveyed as extending to the center of a street, as to be extended," and refers to a plat on which the street is traced, the grant is subject to the street, and the subsequent use of such. street as a public highway does not constitute a breach of covenants against incumbrances or of general warranty. Judgment against Diehl affirmed and the judgment against the City of Cincinnati reversed, and action dismissed as against the city. Opinion by McILVAINE, J.-City of Cincinnati v. Brachman.

5. A, with others, caused real property to be conveyed to B in trust, with authority in B to sell the same and to pay over to B and others the proceeds; after which, and before the sale of the property, A died intestate and administration was duly granted upon his estate. A was indebted at the time of his death, and left no personal property and no other real property. Can A's interest in this property be subjected to the payment of his debts by any proceedings in the probate court? Or is this trust property equitable assets to be reached only in a court of equity? Please give authorities. R. S. S.

Albany, Oregon.

6. On the 1st of January, 1877, A as principal and B as his surety executed to C a promissory note for $1,000, due twelve months after date, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum after maturity. At the time of the execution of note C knew A was prinpal and B his surety. On the 1st of January, 1878, C, without the knowledge or consent of the surety, upon a good and valuable consideration paid him by the principal, agreed with the principal to extend the time of payment of the note from year to year, from that time, and did extend the time until the 10th of January, 1880, when he instituted suit on the note against principal an surety. Query. Was there an agreement to extend for a defint time? Is the surety discharged? B.

7. Can a city under charter levy and collect an ad valorem tax on merchants stock of goods, and at the same time levy and collect from the merchant a license tax equal to or greater in amount than the ad valorem tax collected. The power conferred by the charter on the city council in revenue matters is as follows: The city council shall have power by ordinance to provide for the assessment of all property within the corporate limits of said city, real and personal. The city council shall have power to license and tax merchants, etc. R.

ANSWERS.

50. [9 Cent. L. J. 500] A mortgage acknowledged before a notary, who at the same time is a stockholder in the company to whom the mortgage is given, is not in any event void for that reason. It is good as beetween the parties. Dussaume v. Burnett, 5 Iowa, 103; Beaman v. Whitney, 20 Me. 413; Caldwell v. Head, 17 Mo. 561; Hampton v. Stevens, 10 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 107. Whether the acknowledgment would be valid, so as to admit the paper to record, would doubtless depend upon the question. "Is the stockholder a party to the mortgage?" If so, clearly the acknowledgment is void. Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Wilson v. Traer, 20 Iowa 231; 1 Shep Touch. 9. Again is the act of taking an acknowledgment judicial or merely ministerial? If the former, the notary would be disqualified. If the latter, inhibitur. It was held ministerial in Lynch v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422; Kimball v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 674. If a judicial act, even relationship to the notary of the stockholder, would make his certificate void. In re Dodge etc. Co. 14 Hun, 440. I do not think such an acknowledgment would be valid in Missouri. Sherburne, N. Y. D. L. A.

CURRENT TOPICS.

In a presentment made by a United States Grand Jury in the Federal Court at New York last month attention was called to the fact that the National Government has never made any just and proper provision by law for either the temporary or permanent confinement, safe keeping and treatment of the persons who are annually arrested and convicted under the criminal statutes of the United States." The presentment denounced "the dangerous practice of 'farming out' the Nation's prisoners among the different State prisons and penitentiaries." Among the arguments urged against this is that the reformation of United States prisoners is utterly impossible so long as the present system of classing and associating them in prison life with burglars, thieves, assassins and murderers, constantly drafted from the dark and fertile ways of vice, is carried on, and they become confirmed criminals." The jury expressed the belief that a National jail and prison centrally located could be economically conducted, and be made a source of considerable income, and advises that such National prison should be of the graded character, that is to say, there should be a separation of persons convicted of light misdemeanors and young offenders from the older criminals and those convicted of aggravated crimes. These suggestions seem exceedingly appropriate at the present time, when the State prisons are so overcrowded that in some instances criminals have to be released by the score on account of want of prison accomodations; and deserve the attention of the present Congress.

The case of Scribner v. Stoddart, decided on a preliminary motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the 23d ult., raises an interesting question in the law of copyright. The case briefly is this: Messrs. Black & Co., are the publishers of the ninth edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica now being issued in Scotland, and the defendants are an American firm engaged in reprinting and selling the work in this country. The plaintiffs are the owners of copyrights on certain articles written and copyrighted here which they had licensed the Messrs. Black to reprint in their Encyclopædia. The defendants are reprinting and about to sell the Scotch work, American articles and all, and an injunction was therefore asked restraining them from so doing. Butler, J., refused a preliminary injunetion on the ground that to grant it would damage the defendants greatly, the book being ready for publication, while the loss which the plaintiffs would sustain until the final hearing would be small. This view of weighing the relative damage to be sustained by both parties from the granting or refusal of an injunction is frequently decisive with the courts, and the decision of the learned judge could not, therefore, be criticised with any purpose had he confined himself to these reasons for his judgment. But in the report of his decision (8 W. N. 64), we find him giving expression to these further grounds in support of his ruling. "The defendant' said he is not to be looked upon simply in the light of an ordinary wrong-doer. This is not an ordinary case. At the time he commenced this publication, there was nothing unlawful in what he did. To reproduce a foreign publication is not wrong. There may be differences of opinion about the morality of republishing here a work which is copyrighted abroad, but the public policy of this country, as respects the subject, is in favor of such republication. It is supposed to have an influence