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Obstructing is employed by a United States marshal, although such custoprocess or assaulting

dian is not a sworn deputy. So also if an officer, who, holdofficer ing a writ of attachment, in good faith attaches the property

of B, having reasonable grounds to believe that it belongs to A, is resisted or obstructed by B. Aliter if the officer acts in bad faith. United States v. McDonald, 8 Biss. 439. If a client and his attorney enter into a conspiracy to resist an officer in the performance of his duties, both are guilty. Threats and acts intended to terrify, or calculated to have that effect on a prudent and reasonable officer, are enough, though they do not hinder him from executing his process. United States v. Smith, 1 Dillon, 212, 27 Fed. Cas. 1161. It is no offense to obstruct or resist an officer who is acting without, or in excess of, his authority (United States v. Fears, 3 Woods, 510, 25 Fed. Cas. 1053); as if he attempts to execute a writ of habere facias possessionem after the return day. United States v. Slaymaker, 4 Wash. C. C. 169, 27 Fed. Cas. 1127. It is no defense to an indictment for forcibly obstructing or impeding an officer of customs in the discharge of his duties that the object of the defendant was personal chastisement, if he knew the officer to be engaged in the discharge of his duties. United States v. Keen, 5 Mason, 453, 26 Fed. Cas. 693.

A deputy marshal of the United States is an officer of the United States within this section to serve process. United States v. Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatch. 425, 28 Fed. Cas. 193; United States v. Martin, 17 F. R. 150. And so is the keeper of a State jail to whose custody a person is committed by legal process issued by a Federal court or judicial officer. United States v. Martin, 17 F. R. 150. The production of the commission of a deputy marshal, and proof that he was in the performance of the duties of his office, raises a presumption that he had been sworn as required, and authorizes a finding to that effect in the absence of other proof. United States v. Hudson, 1 Haskell, 527, 26 Fed. Cas. 406

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This section includes every species of legal process, whether Obstructing
issued by the court in session or by a judge or magistrate process or

assaulting
acting in that capacity out of court in the execution of the officer
laws of the United States. United States v. Lukins, 3 Wash.
C. C. 335. If a warrant is legal so far as the marshal and
those who act under him are concerned, it is to be obeyed by
everybody, and no one has a right to resist it. United States
v. Tinklepaugh, supra.

See further, as to legal process,
United States v. Martin, supra.

An indictment must distinctly state and charge the following
facts: (1) That a legal process, warrant, writ, rule, or order
was issued by a court of the United States; (2) that such legal
process, &c., after the same was issued, was in the hands of
some officer of the United States for service who had authority
by the laws thereof to serve the same; (3) that after such legal
process, &c., was in the hands of such officer for service, some
one knowingly and willfully obstructed, resisted, or opposed
him in serving or attempting to serve or execute the same.
United States v. Tinklepaugh, supra. It must be averred that
the process which the defendant resisted was legal. A com-
missioner empowered to issue process, under 9 St. 462, must
be such an one as is particularly described therein, and an
averment that the warrant resisted was issued by a commis-
sioner is not good. The facts constituting the due issue must
be recited. The absence of an averment showing that the
commissioner who issued the warrant was thereto authorized
cannot be aided by referring to the court records. United
States v. Stowell, 2 Curtis, 153, 27 Fed. Cas. 1350. As to the
manner of resistance, it is enough to aver that the defendant
did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully obstruct, resist, and
oppose the officer. When the description of the execution
which the officer was attempting to serve shows that it was in
force, an averment to that effect is unnecessary. The process
need not be set out. United States v. Hudson, supra. A
State judge who in bad faith and without authority releases

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Obstructing a United States prisoner on habeas corpus violates this secprocess or assaulting

tion. United States v. Doss, 11 Am. Leg. Reg. N. s. 320, 25 officer

Fed. Cas. 891. Taking deserters from a deputy marshal while he is acting as agent for a British consul is no offense

hereunder. United States v. Kelly, 108 F. R. 538. Rescuing, SECTION 141. Whoever shall rescue or attempt to rescue, etc., pris- from the custody of any officer or person lawfully assisting him, oner ; con

any person arrested upon a warrant or other process issued cealing

under the provisions of any law of the United States, or shall, from arrest directly or indirectly, aid, abet, or assist any person so ar

rested to escape from the custody of such officer or other person, or shall harbor or conceal any person for whose arrest a warrant or process has been so issued, so as to prevent his discovery and arrest, after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has been issued for the apprehension of such person, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both,

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. $ 5516, but is

greatly enlarged. Rescue at SECTION 142. Whoever, by force, shall set at liberty or executions

rescue any person found guilty in any court of the United States of any capital crime, while going to execution or during execution, shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than twenty-five years.

This section is taken from U.S. Rev. Sts. $ 5400. The words “in any court of the United States” are inserted, and the

death penalty is changed to a fine and imprisonment. Rescue of SECTION 143. Whoever, by force, shall set at liberty or prisoner

rescue any person who, before conviction, stands committed for any capital crime; or whoever, by force, shall set at liberty or rescue any person committed for or convicted of any offense other than capital, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars and imprisoned not more than one year.

This section is the same as U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5401, except that the words "against the United States” are omitted.

It was held an offense within this section to rescue and set at liberty an Indian woman arrested by the Indian police on the Umatilla reservation on a charge of adultery, and com- Rescue of mitted to jail for trial before the "court of Indian offenses.” prisoner United States v. Clapox, 35 F. R. 575.

SECTION 144. Whoever, by force, shall rescue or attempt Rescue of to rescue, from the custody of any marshal or his officers, the dead body dead body of an executed offender, while it is being conveyed of executed to a place of dissection, as provided by section three hundred offender and thirty-one hereof, or by force shall rescue or attempt to rescue such body from the place where it has been deposited for dissection in pursuance of that section, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. $ 5402. The phraseology is slightly changed and the words “or both” are added.

SECTION 145. Whoever shall, under a threat of informing, Extortion or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation by informer of any law of the United States, demand or receive any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. $ 5484. The words “law of the United States” are substituted for "internal revenue law," and the words “demand or" are inserted before “receive.

Sexton v. California, 189 U. S. 319, 324, 47 L. ed. 833. An indictment alleging that the defendant received money “under a threat of informing and as a consideration for informing” is not bad for duplicity. It is not necessary to state what particular offense against the internal revenue law the defendant claimed the other party had committed. The offense is a misdemeanor. It is not necessary to charge the intent, although it is a necessary element of the offense United States v. Fero, 18 F. R. 901.

SECTION 146. Whoever, having knowledge of the actual Misprision commission of the crime of murder or other felony cognizable of felony

Misprision by the courts of the United States, conceals and does not as of felony soon as may be disclose and make known the same to some one

of the judges or other persons in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5390. The words “cognizable by the courts of the United States” are substituted for the places where the crime may be committed and the words “or both” are added at the end.

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