officer

Obstructing is employed by a United States marshal, although such custoprocess or dian is not a sworn deputy. So also if an officer, who, holdassaulting ing a writ of attachment, in good faith attaches the property of B, having reasonable grounds to believe that it belongs to A, is resisted or obstructed by B. Aliter if the officer acts in bad faith. United States v. McDonald, 8 Biss. 439. If a client and his attorney enter into a conspiracy to resist an officer in the performance of his duties, both are guilty. Threats and acts intended to terrify, or calculated to have that effect on a prudent and reasonable officer, are enough, though they do not hinder him from executing his process. United States v. Smith, 1 Dillon, 212, 27 Fed. Cas. 1161. It is no offense to obstruct or resist an officer who is acting without, or in excess of, his authority (United States v. Fears, 3 Woods, 510, 25 Fed. Cas. 1053); as if he attempts to execute a writ of habere facias possessionem after the return day. United States v. Slaymaker, 4 Wash. C. C. 169, 27 Fed. Cas. 1127. It is no defense to an indictment for forcibly obstructing or impeding an officer of customs in the discharge of his duties that the object of the defendant was personal chastisement, if he knew the officer to be engaged in the discharge of his duties. United States v. Keen, 5 Mason, 453, 26 Fed. Cas. 693.

A deputy marshal of the United States is an officer of the United States within this section to serve process. United States v. Tinklepaugh, 3 Blatch. 425, 28 Fed. Cas. 193; United States v. Martin, 17 F. R. 150. And so is the keeper of a State jail to whose custody a person is committed by legal process issued by a Federal court or judicial officer. United States v. Martin, 17 F. R. 150. The production of the commission of a deputy marshal, and proof that he was in the performance of the duties of his office, raises a presumption that he had been sworn as required, and authorizes a finding to that effect in the absence of other proof. United States v. Hudson, 1 Haskell, 527, 26 Fed. Cas. 406.

This section includes every species of legal process, whether Obstructing issued by the court in session or by a judge or magistrate process or assaulting acting in that capacity out of court in the execution of the officer laws of the United States. United States v. Lukins, 3 Wash. C. C. 335. If a warrant is legal so far as the marshal and those who act under him are concerned, it is to be obeyed by everybody, and no one has a right to resist it. United States v. Tinklepaugh, supra. See further, as to legal process,

United States v. Martin, supra.

An indictment must distinctly state and charge the following facts: (1) That a legal process, warrant, writ, rule, or order was issued by a court of the United States; (2) that such legal process, &c., after the same was issued, was in the hands of some officer of the United States for service who had authority by the laws thereof to serve the same; (3) that after such legal process, &c., was in the hands of such officer for service, some one knowingly and willfully obstructed, resisted, or opposed him in serving or attempting to serve or execute the same. United States v. Tinklepaugh, supra. It must be averred that the process which the defendant resisted was legal. A commissioner empowered to issue process, under 9 St. 462, must be such an one as is particularly described therein, and an averment that the warrant resisted was issued by a commissioner is not good. The facts constituting the due issue must be recited. The absence of an averment showing that the commissioner who issued the warrant was thereto authorized cannot be aided by referring to the court records. United States v. Stowell, 2 Curtis, 153, 27 Fed. Cas. 1350. As to the manner of resistance, it is enough to aver that the defendant did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully obstruct, resist, and oppose the officer. When the description of the execution which the officer was attempting to serve shows that it was in force, an averment to that effect is unnecessary. The process need not be set out. United States v. Hudson, supra. A State judge who in bad faith and without authority releases

process or

assaulting

officer

Obstructing a United States prisoner on habeas corpus violates this section. United States v. Doss, 11 Am. Leg. Reg. N. s. 320, 25 Fed. Cas. 891. Taking deserters from a deputy marshal while he is acting as agent for a British consul is no offense hereunder. United States v. Kelly, 108 F. R. 538.

Rescuing, etc., prisoner; concealing person

from arrest

Rescue at executions

Rescue of prisoner

SECTION 141. Whoever shall rescue or attempt to rescue, from the custody of any officer or person lawfully assisting him, any person arrested upon a warrant or other process issued under the provisions of any law of the United States, or shall, directly or indirectly, aid, abet, or assist any person so arrested to escape from the custody of such officer or other person, or shall harbor or conceal any person for whose arrest a warrant or process has been so issued, so as to prevent his discovery and arrest, after notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant or process has been issued for the apprehension of such person, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5516, but is greatly enlarged.

SECTION 142. Whoever, by force, shall set at liberty or rescue any person found guilty in any court of the United States of any capital crime, while going to execution or during execution, shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than twenty-five years.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5400. The words "in any court of the United States" are inserted, and the death penalty is changed to a fine and imprisonment.

SECTION 143. Whoever, by force, shall set at liberty or rescue any person who, before conviction, stands committed for any capital crime; or whoever, by force, shall set at liberty or rescue any person committed for or convicted of any offense other than capital, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars and imprisoned not more than one year.

This section is the same as U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5401, except that the words "against the United States" are omitted.

It was held an offense within this section to rescue and set at liberty an Indian woman arrested by the Indian police on

the Umatilla reservation on a charge of adultery, and com- Rescue of prisoner mitted to jail for trial before the "court of Indian offenses." United States v. Clapox, 35 F. R. 575.

SECTION 144. Whoever, by force, shall rescue or attempt Rescue of to rescue, from the custody of any marshal or his officers, the dead body dead body of an executed offender, while it is being conveyed of executed to a place of dissection, as provided by section three hundred offender and thirty-one hereof, or by force shall rescue or attempt to rescue such body from the place where it has been deposited for dissection in pursuance of that section, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5402. The phraseology is slightly changed and the words "or both" are added.

SECTION 145. Whoever shall, under a threat of informing, Extortion or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation by informer of any law of the United States, demand or receive any money

or other valuable thing, shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5484. The words "law of the United States" are substituted for "internal revenue law," and the words "demand or" are inserted before "receive."

Sexton v. California, 189 U. S. 319, 324, 47 L. ed. 833. An indictment alleging that the defendant received money "under a threat of informing and as a consideration for informing" is not bad for duplicity. It is not necessary to state what particular offense against the internal revenue law the defendant claimed the other party had committed. The offense is a misdemeanor. It is not necessary to charge the intent, although it is a necessary element of the offense United States v. Fero, 18 F. R. 901.

SECTION 146. Whoever, having knowledge of the actual Misprision commission of the crime of murder or other felony cognizable of felony

Misprision by the courts of the United States, conceals and does not as of felony soon as may be disclose and make known the same to some one of the judges or other persons in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

This section is taken from U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5390. The words "cognizable by the courts of the United States" are substituted for the places where the crime may be committed and the words "or both" are added at the end.