Conspiracy to injure, etc., persons in the exercise of civil rights CHAPTER THREE OFFENSES AGAINST THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE AND SECTION 19. Conspiracy to injure, etc., 20. Depriving citizens of civil 21. Conspiring to prevent officer 23. Intimidation of voters by SECTION officers, etc., of Army or Navy 24. Officers of Army or Navy 25. Officers, etc., of Army or SECTION 19. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. This section is the same as U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5508. The United States court has no jurisdiction under the Thirteenth Amendment or §§ 1978, 1979, 5508, 5510, Revised Statutes, of a charge of conspiracy made and carried out in a State to prevent citizens of African descent, because of their race and color, from making or carrying out contracts and agreements to labor. Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 65. See United States v. Powell, 212 Id. 564, 53 L. ed. 653, 151 F. R. 648; Ex parte Riggins, 134 Id. 404. This statute is constitutional. Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. Conspiracy 458, 44 L. ed. 1150; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 Id. 651, etc., persons to injure, 28 L. ed. 274; United States v. Waddell, 5 McCrary, 155, in the exer16 F. R. 221, 112 U. S. 76, 28 L. ed. 673. The exercise by cise of civil a citizen of the United States of the right to make a homestead entry upon unoccupied public lands, which is conferred by Rev. Sts. § 2289, is the exercise of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States within the meaning of this section. United States v. Waddell, supra. As to whether the offenses defined in this section should be prosecuted by information or indictment, quære, Id. That they should be prosecuted by indictment, see United States v. Butler, 4 Hughes, 512, 25 Fed. Cas. 226. The right to vote for members of the Congress of the United States is not derived merely from the Constitution and laws of the State in which they are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 45 L. ed. 84; Ex parte Yarbrough, supra. It is the right of every private citizen of the United States to inform a marshal of the United States, or his deputy, of a violation of the internal revenue laws of the United States; this right is secured to the citizen by the Constitution of the United States; and a conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate him in the free exercise or enjoyment of this right, or because of his having exercised it, is punishable under this section. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 39 L. ed. 1080. A citizen of the United States, in the custody of a United States marshal under a lawful commitment to answer for an offense against the United States, has the right to be protected by the United States against lawless violence; this right is a right secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and a conspiracy to injure or oppress him in its free exercise or enjoyment is punishable under this section. Logan v. United States, rights to injure, etc., persons in the exercise of civil rights Conspiracy 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429, 45 F. R. 872. "There can be no doubt that section 5508 is an exercise of the legislative function warranted by section 2 of the thirteenth amendment. It was enacted in view of that amendment and the right undertaken to be protected by it is undoubtedly a right secured by the amendment." Smith v. United States, 157 F. R. 721, 724. A conspiracy to deprive any citizen of such right is indictable under this section. Id. And it is not necessary to aver any overt act, and any averment in such an indictment of acts done must necessarily be referred to the charge of conspiracy as describing or particularizing such charge. Id. An indictment which charges the accused in the language of this section and which by way of further particularizing avers that such right was the right to the free exercise and enjoyment of freedom from involuntary servitude and slavery, and that the conspiracy was to be effected by arresting, imprisoning, guarding, and compelling him by threats and intimidation to work and labor against his will for the defendants, sufficiently describes the offense, and need not exclude the defendants from the operation of the exception in the thirteenth constitutional amendment by an averment that such person was not held in servitude as a punishment for crime. Id. Federal courts have no jurisdiction to punish a conspiracy to oppress and intimidate a citizen of the United States to prevent him from exercising the right to establish a miners' union in a state, in the furtherance of which defendants were alleged to have assaulted such citizen, with intent to murder him by shooting at him with a pistol; such offense being entirely within the jurisdiction of the State courts. United States v. Moore, 129 F. R. 630; United States v. Eberhart, 127 Id. 254. As to an indictment held to be bad as indefinite, see McKenna v. United States, Id. 88. See also as to form of indictment Davis v. United States, 107 F. R. 753; United States v. Davis, 103 Id. 457; Haynes v. United States, 101 Id. to injure, etc., persons in the exercise of civil rights 817. It was held in United States v. Morris, 125 Id. 322, that Conspiracy a conspiracy between two or more persons to prevent negro citizens from exercising the right to lease and cultivate land, because they are negroes, is a conspiracy within the meaning of this section. See Peonage Cases, 123 F. R. 671. This section will not sustain an indictment for conspiracy to prevent a citizen from voting at a purely state or municipal election because of his race or color. Karem v. United States, 121 F. R. 250. The word "citizen" is here used in its political sense, with the same meaning which it has in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and not as being synonymous with "resident," "inhabitant," or "person." Baldwin v. Frank, 120 U. S. 678, 30 L. ed. 766. To constitute the offense, the wrong must be done to one who is a citizen in that sense. Though the word "citizen" does not occur in the second clause of the section, there is nothing to indicate that any other than a citizen was meant. Id. See further on this section United States v. Mason, 213 U. S. 115, 53 L. ed. 725; Rakes v. United States, 212 Id. 55, 53 L. ed. 401; Riggins v. United States, 199 Id. 547, 50 L. ed. 303; West v. Louisiana, 194 Id. 258, 266, 48 L. ed. 965; In re Lancaster, 137 Id. 393, 34 L. ed. 713, 44 F. R. 885; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 32 L. ed. 274; Davis v. United States, 107 F. R. 753; Mullen v. United States, 106 Id. 892; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394, 1 Woods, 21, 15 Fed. Cas. 649; United States v. Patterson, 55 F. R. 605, 638; United States v. Patrick, 53 Id. 356, 54 Id. 338; United States v. Sanges, 48 Id. 78; Re Baldwin, 27 Id. 187, 193; Le Grand v. United States, 12 Id. 577, 3 Cr. L. Mag. 713; United States v. De Grieff, 16 Blatch. 20, 27, 25 Fed. Cas. 799; United States v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; United States v. Butler, 1 Hughes, 457, 25 Fed. Cas. 213; United States v. Mitchell, 1 Hughes, 439, 26 Fed. Cas. 1283. Depriving citizens of civil rights under color of state laws SECTION 20. Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. This section is the same as U. S. Rev. Sts. § 5510. "This law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified. In the Revised Statutes, it is true, a very important clause, to wit, the words 'any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding,' which gave the declaratory section its point and effect, are omitted; but the penal part, by which the declaration is enforced, and which is really the effective part of the law, retains the reference to State laws, by making the penalty apply only to those who should subject parties to a deprivation of their rights under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, etc., of any State or Territory: thus preserving the corrective character of the legislation." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 16, 27 L. ed. 835. See Re Parrott, 1 F. R. 481, 520. In a prosecution under this section for depriving a colored child of the right to attend public schools, in order to warrant a conviction, it must be made to appear that the defendant excluded such child under some color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom of the State, and because of the color of the child. And the fact that he so acted under the advice of counsel, is no defense. The recovery of damages in a civil action for depriving the child of such rights is not a bar to a prosecution therefor under this section. United States v. Buntin, 10F. R. 730. It must appear that the conspiracy was against the persons |