We pass by the fact that the defendants first took a license from the patentee, and under it and under his directions erected substantially the same apparatus which they are yet using. Receiving what they regarded as additional light, they refused to continue the payment of a royalty, and put the complainant to his legal remedy. It is our opinion that the patent is for a process, that it is a valid patent, and that the defendants infringe it. We have considered the case entirely upon its merits. It is unnecessary to bestow much discussion upon the technical objections that have been raised. They have not been pressed in the argument, and are probably not seriously relied on. One of them is, that no replication was filed in the case. To this it may be answered, that the parties have throughout treated the case as though it were regularly at issue. The various stipulations into which they have entered, with regard to the admission of evidence to be heard on the trial of the cause, are totally inconsistent with the idea that the case was to be heard merely on bill and answer. Another objection is, that the patent was dated more than six months prior to the filing of the application for it. But under the law then in force (1854) with regard to the antedating of patents where a foreign patent had been obtained, this was admissible. The sixth section of the act of March 3, 1839, entitled "An Act in addition to an act to promote the progress of the useful arts," expressly declared "that no person shall be debarred from receiving a patent for any invention or discovery . . . by reason of the same having been patented in a foreign country more than six months prior to his application: Provided, that the same shall not have been introduced into public and common use in the United States prior to the application for such patent: And provided also, that in all cases every such patent shall be limited to the term of fourteen years from the date or publication of such foreign letters-patent." Now, we know by the proceedings on the application in this case that the attention of the Commissioner of Patents was expressly called to the fact of the issuing of the English patent, and that the question of the date of the patent in suit was submitted to and considered by him. Under the laws then in force, he determined that the patent ought to be antedated as of the date of the English patent. It must be presumed that his decision was right according to the facts of the case, at least until the contrary is shown; and nothing has been shown to the contrary by any evidence in the cause to which our attention has been called. The decree of the Circuit Court will be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion; and it is So ordered. INDEX. ACCOUNTING. See Assignment, 2; Practice, 9. ACCOUNTS WITH THE UNITED STATES, SETTLEMENT of. See Court of Claims, 1; Evidence, 8. ADMINISTRATOR. See Evidence, 10. ADMIRALTY. 1. The courts of the United States, as courts of admiralty, have not exclusive jurisdiction of suits in personam, growing out of collisions between vessels while navigating the Ohio River. Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 118. 2. A small schooner, having no watch on deck, was, in a very dark night, lying at anchor inside the Delaware Breakwater, when vessels were constantly arriving for shelter from an approaching storm. Among them was one well manned, which, in proceeding to a proper anchorage, without any fault cf either omission or commission on her part, collided with and sunk the schooner. If a sufficient watch had been on the deck of the latter, the collision might have been avoided. Held, that the vessel was not liable. The "Clara," 200. 3. At about ten o'clock in the forenoon, when the weather was clear and fine, a steamship and a schooner were on the ocean. The schooner, having seen the steamship when six or seven miles away, kept steadily on her course. The steamer saw the schooner when three miles off, and from that time until a collision between them occurred both vessels were sailing on courses which crossed each other, so as to involve risk of collision. Held, that under the circumstances it was the duty of the steamship to keep out of the way of the schooner, and the latter having held her course, the former is liable for the damages occasioned by the collision. The "Benefactor," 214. 4. The ruling in The Abbotsford (98 U. S. 440), that under the act of Feb. 16, 1875 (18 Stat. 315), the finding of facts by the Circuit Court in admiralty cases is conclusive, and that only rulings upon questions of law can be reviewed by bill of exceptions, reaffirmed. Id. AGENT. See Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, 3. ALABAMA. See Constitutional Law, 11, 12; Damages; Municipal Bonds, 4-6. AMENDMENT. See Municipal Corporations, 5, 6. APPEAL. 1. An appeal will be dismissed when it appears from the record, taken as 2. Gra . Blanchard (97 U. S. 564) reaffirmed. Id. 3. An appeal is the only mode by which the appellate jurisdiction of this 4. A proceeding in the court below for contempt cannot be re-examined 5. A bond is not sufficient for the purposes of either an appeal to this 6. The Circuit Court in a foreclosure suit appointed a receiver of the rents 7. Where no security having been taken at the time of entering an order - ARGOLS OR CRUDE TARTAR. See Customs Duties, 1. ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY. tion to. See Bankruptcy; Stock, Subscrip- Where a bankrupt has fraudulently conveyed his property, his assignees ASSIGNMENT. See Claims against the United States; Set-off. 1. The assignment of a judgment, and of all bonds and instruments |