leave A. for B. as advertised, for the conveyance of any person who regularly applies for a ticket and tenders the proper fare, although part of the line of railway belongs to a different company; such publication will also render the company liable for damages occasioned to the plaintiff by the representation, if such train do not in fact run; Denton v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., 5 E. & B. 800; 25 L. J., Q. B. 129; or if there be not room in the train for the plaintiff to whom the company have issued a ticket. Gt. N. Ry. Co. v. Hawcroft, 21 L. J., Q. B. 178. Where the time-tables state that "every attention will be paid to insure punctuality so far as it is practicable; but the departure or arrival of the trains will not be guaranteed, nor will the company hold themselves responsible for delay or any consequences arising therefrom," there is a contract to use due attention to keep the times specified as far as reasonably possible, having regard to all the circumstances. Le Blanche v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1 C. P. D. 286, C. A.

A passenger who has taken a ticket for a journey on the defendant's railway, under a condition to show and deliver it up when required, and on failure to do so to pay the fare from the station whence the train originally started, could not on failure to produce the ticket to the company's servants lawfully be removed by them from the carriage in which he is travelling. Butler v. Manchester, &c. Ry. Co., 21 Q. B. Ď. 207, C. A. And now see Regulation of Railways Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 57, s. 5. If the company justify their breach of a contract to carry on the ground that the passenger has not complied with the conditions of a bye-law, they must show that they have strictly observed the bye-law on their part. Jennings v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., ante, p. 623.

An allegation that an omnibus plies between D. and C. is not supported by evidence which shows that the omnibus, though running from D. to C., yet starts from a point beyond D. and runs to a point beyond C. Marshall v. Matson, 15 L. T., N. S. 514, Bramwell, B.

There does not appear to be any obligation, apart from contract, on a passenger carrier to receive passengers, even though there is adequate accommodation. But see 2 Kent, Com. 601, contra. The point was not decided in Benett v. Peninsular, &c. Steam Boat Co., 6 C. B. 775. Even if there be such obligation, special circumstances might warrant the rejection of a passenger; as misconduct, refusal to comply with reasonable regulations, over-loading, &c. Kent, supra.

Passenger ships on voyages beyond Europe are regulated by stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 119, which particularly applies to the transport of emigrants beyond seas. This Act has been amended by 26 & 27 Vict. c. 51. See also 35 & 36 Vict. c. 73, s. 5, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 88, s. 54.

Damages.] If in consequence of the wrongful delay or erroneous information of the carrier, a passenger is reasonably obliged to hire another conveyance, or stop a night on the road, the expenses may be recovered; but the jury cannot give general damages for consequent derangement or loss of business, trouble, or inconvenience. Gt. N. Ry. Co. v. Hawcroft ; Denton v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., cited ante, p. 624; Hamlin v. Gt. N. Ry. Co., 1 H. & N. 408; 26 L. J., Ex. 20. See Woodger v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., L. R., 2 C. P. 318, ante, p. 621. To determine whether the expenditure so incurred by the plaintiff is reasonable, one test is to consider whether a person in the position of the plaintiff would have been likely to incur it if the delay had been occasioned by his own fault and not by that of the company. Le Blanche v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 1 C. P. D. 286, 313, C. A., per Mellish, L. J. In this case the cost of a special train hired by the plaintiff was held not recoverable. Where a railway company instead of

conveying the plaintiff to the station to which she had booked, turned her out on a wet night, where she could get no accommodation or conveyance, and in consequence she had to walk four miles home, whereby she was made ill and was hindered in her business, it was held that she was entitled to recover damages for the inconvenience she suffered; but not for the illness or its consequences, as these were too remote. Hobbs v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R., 10 Q. B. 111. See, however, as to these damages being too remote, the observations in McMahon v. Field, 7 Q. B. D. 591, C. A.

Passengers' luggage.] As respects a passenger's personal luggage given into the care of the company for carriage, under their control, it seems that a carrier of passengers is liable to the ordinary obligations of common carriers, though there may be no distinct contract for it. 2 Kent, Com. 600; Richards v. L. Brighton & S. C. Ry. Co., infra; Macrow v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., L. R., 6 Q. B. 612, 618, per cur.; Cohen v. S. E. Ry. Co., 2 Ex. D. 253, 259, per Mellish, L. J.; Bunch v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., 13 Ap. Ca. 31, D. P. In respect, however, of luggage which a railway passenger by his request takes in the carriage with him, the company are not liable as insurers for loss occasioned by the passenger's own default. Talley v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., L. R., 6 C. P. 44; Bunch v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., supra, disapproving of Bergheim v. Gt. E. Ry. Co., 3 C. P. D. 221, C. A. But the company are bound, at the request of the passenger, to take charge of his personal luggage, and to convey it at their own risk. Munster v. S. E. Ry. Co., 4 C. B., N. S. 676; 27 L. J., C. P. 308. Where the company provides servants, to assist passengers to discharge their luggage on arrival, the liability of the company continues until the servants have done their duty; therefore, where a passenger took articles with him into a railway carriage, and on getting out put them in charge of a railway porter to carry to a cab for him, it was held that the company's duty as carriers continued until they were placed in a cab. Richards v. L. Brighton & S. C. Ry. Co., 7 C. B. 839; Williams, J., dubitante. So, where the plaintiff held his bag in his hand and delivered it to a porter on the platform to take to a cab. Butcher v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co., 16 C. B. 13; 24 L. J., C. P. 137. So where on departure luggage is given to a porter to be placed in the carriage with the passenger, the liability of the company as carriers continues until it is placed there; Bunch v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., 17 Q. B. D. 215, C. A.; 13 Ap. Ca. 31, D. P.; secus, where it has been given to a porter to take care of while the passenger's journey is suspended at his request. S. C. The company's duty is to have luggage given into their care, for carriage under their control, ready at the usual place of delivery till the passenger can, in the exercise of due diligence, call and receive it; the passenger's duty is to do so in a reasonable time. Patscheidner v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., 3 Ex. D. 153. But when the luggage has once been delivered to the passenger, the liability of the company ceases, although he afterwards left it in the care of the company's porter and it was lost. Hodkinson v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 14 Q. B. D. 228.

As to the right to sue for loss of luggage of a passenger when his ticket has been taken by another person, see Marshall v. York and Newcastle Ry. Co.; Martin v. Gt. Indian Peninsular Ry. Co., ante, p. 623; where see also the principle to be deduced from these cases.

A carrier of passengers is liable only for the personal luggage of the passenger, and not for merchandize; and where a passenger by a railway carries merchandize as personal luggage, the company is not liable for the loss unless it be carried openly, so that its nature is obvious and no

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objection has been made by the company's servants. Gt. N. Ry. Co. v. Shepherd, 8 Exch. 30; 21 L. J., Ex. 114, 286. In this last case there was no special contract, nor any limit imposed by the company's regulations except as to weight. If a passenger who knows that by the regulations of the company he is only entitled to take personal luggage, take merchandize without notice to the company, he cannot afterwards claim to be compensated in respect of its loss; but if the company choose to take merchandize as luggage it does not lie in their mouth, if an article be lost, to say it is exempt from liability on the ground of the article being merchandize and not luggage. S. C.; Cahill v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 13 C. B., N. S. 818; 31 L. J., C. P. 271, Ex. Ch.; Belfast & Ballymena Ry. Co. v. Keys, 9 H. L. C. 556. The mere fact that a packet looks like merchandize and is marked glass, is not enough to fix the company with knowledge that it is in fact merchandize, and so to make them responsible. S. CC. "Personal or ordinary luggage" means that class of articles which are ordinarily or usually carried by passengers as their luggage. Hudston v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R., 4 Q. B. 336; Macrow v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., L. R., 6 Q. B. 612. Sketches and drawings carried by an artist among his personal luggage are not within the term "ordinary luggage" of a certain weight, usually carried free of charge on railways; Mytton v. Midland Ry. Co., 4 H. & N. 615; 28 L. J., Ex. 385; nor are title deeds and money for use in certain causes in which the plaintiff was engaged as a solicitor; Phelps v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 19 C. B., N. S. 321; 34 L. J., C. P. 259; nor bedding for the use of the plaintiff's household when he shall have provided himself with a home. Macrow v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., supra. Where a servant takes as his ordinary luggage that of his master, the latter cannot sue for loss of it. Becher v. Gt. E. Ry. Co., L. R., 5 Q. B. 241.

The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, s. 7, and the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, s. 16, apply to passengers' luggage. Cohen v. S. E. Ry. Co., 1 Ex. D. 217; 2 Ex. D. 253, C. A., overruling Stewart v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., 3 H. & C. 135; 33 L. J., Ex. 199, vide ante, p. 615. If a passenger take a ticket for carriage at a fare below the ordinary rate on condition that he take no luggage, he must pay for any luggage he takes, although the private Act of the company allows passengers to take a fixed amount. Rumsey v. N. E. Ry. Co., 14 C. B., Ñ. S. 641; 32 L. J., C. P. 244.

The plaintiff, on arriving by a railway at the terminus, deposited her bag, value 201., in the cloak-room, and paid 2d., and received a ticket for it, on the back of which was printed, "The company will not be responsible for any package exceeding the value of 101."; it was held that the company were not liable for its loss, though caused by their negligence, as the plaintiff was bound by the condition. Van Toll v. S. E. Ry. Co., 12 C. B., N. S. 75; 31 L. J., C. P. 241; Harris v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., 1 Q. B. D. 515. Where the depositor knows generally that there are conditions on the back of the ticket, but does not know what they are, he is bound by the conditions. S. C.; Parker v. S. E. Ry. Co., 2 C. P. D. 416, C. A. If he knew that there was writing on the ticket, but did not know or believe it contained conditions, the question for the jury is whether the defendants have done what was reasonably sufficient to give him notice of the conditions. S. C. But if he did not know there was

any writing on the ticket, he is not bound by the conditions. S. C.; Henderson v. Stevenson, 2 H. L. Sc. 470, ante, p. 623. See further, Burke v. S. E. Ry. Co., 5 C. P. D. 1, cited ante, p. 623, and Watkins v. Rymill, 10 Q. B. D. 178. The condition protects the company from liability not only for loss, but for delay in delivering it, at least where the delay is

caused by no wilful act or default of the company, and without their privity or knowledge. Pepper v. S. E. Ry. Co., 17 L. T., N. S. 469, H. T. 1868, Q. B. See further ante, pp. 603, 604, 623.

ACTIONS AGAINST COMMON INNKEEPERS.

This, like the action against carriers, may be treated as founded on tort or on contract. It is generally an action ex contractu for some breach of the contract, express or implied, which the innkeeper has entered into, or professes to be ready to enter into, with his guest, in relation to his personal entertainment. The action for refusing to receive a guest is founded on tort.

An innkeeper at common law is answerable for the safe keeping of the goods of a guest; Calye's case, 8 Rep. 32; 1 Smith's Lead. Ca.; but it is only in respect of the goods of a guest that he is so liable. Strauss v. County Hotel, &c. Co., 12 Q. B. D. 27. Loss of a guest's goods is primâ facie evidence of liability on the part of the innkeeper. Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164; 2 Kent, Com. 592; Story on Bailments, ss. 470-1; Morgan v. Ravey, infra. He may be exonerated by the negligence of the guest. Thus, where money is lost, the ostentatious display of it in a public room at an inn, and leaving it there in an insecure box, is evidence of negligence conducing to the loss. Armistead v. Wilde, 17 Q. B. 261; 20 L. J., Q. B. 524. So where the guest has taken the goods into his own custody, and leaves the door of the room unlocked. Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306. The omission by the guest to leave valuable articles with the innkeeper, or to fasten his bedroom door at night, is not necessarily such negligence. Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 265; 30 L. J., Ex. 131. The question for a jury will be whether the loss would or would not have happened if the guest had used the ordinary care that may reasonably be expected from a prudent man. Cashill v. Wright, 6 E. & B. 891; Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co., L. R., 6 C. P. 515. It is not enough to ask if the guest had been " grossly negligent.' The obligation of the innkeeper extends to the horses and carriages of the guest. Calye's case, supra; Jones v. Tyler, 1 Ad. & E. 522; Bather v. Day, 2 H. & C. 14; 32 L. J., Ex. 171. Where the guest, intending to return, had gone, leaving his horse, and, after the day of his intended return, his horse was injured by being driven in a carriage by the innkeeper's servant, it was held that the innkeeper was liable as such for the injury. S. C. But he is not liable for the injury to a horse by a kick from another horse if negligence in him and his servants is disproved. Dawson v. Chamney, supra. As to the care he is bound to exercise towards the goods of his guest of which he retains possession by virtue of his lien, see Angus v. McLachlan, 23 Ch. D. 330. The real innkeeper is the person liable, and not a manager in whose name the licences have been taken out. Dixon v. Birch, L. R., 8 Ex. 135.

By 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, s. 1, no innkeeper shall be liable to make good to any guest any loss or injury to property brought to the inn (not being a horse or other live animal, or any gear appertaining thereto, or any carriage), to a greater amount than 301., except in the following cases: (1) Where the property shall have been stolen, lost, or injured, through the wilful act, default, or neglect of the innkeeper or any servant in his employ; (2) Where the property shall have been deposited expressly for safe custody with the innkeeper. Provided that, in case of such deposit,

the innkeeper may require as a condition to his liability that the property be deposited in a box or other receptacle, fastened and sealed by the person depositing the same. By sect. 2, if an innkeeper shall refuse to receive for safe custody any property of his guest, or if the guest shall, through any default of the innkeeper, be unable to deposit his property, the innkeeper shall not be entitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of such property. By sect. 3, every innkeeper is to cause at least one copy of sect. 1 of the Act, printed in plain type, to be exhibited in a conspicuous part of the hall or entrance of his inn, and is to be entitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of such property only as shall be brought to his inn while such copy is so exhibited. By sect. 4, "inn" means any hotel, inn, tavern, public-house, or other place of refreshment, the keeper of which is by law responsible for the property of his guest; "innkeeper means the keeper of any such place.

It has been held that "wilful" in sect. 1, ante, p. 627, and supra, must be read with "act" only, and not also with "fault or neglect.” Squire v. Wheeler, 16 L. T., N. S. 93, Byles, J. A material error in the copy exhibited under sect. 3 will exclude the innkeeper from the protection of the statute, e. g., where the copy omits the word “act" in sect. 1 (1). Spice v. Bacon, 2 Ex. D. 463, C. A.

An innkeeper by the common law is bound to receive travellers who present themselves as guests, if he have accommodation. R. v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213; Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 484, per Holt, C. J.; White's case, 2 Dyer, 158. See Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 276. He is, however, at liberty to set up an inn for the reception of particular classes of people, and is then only bound to do what he publicly professes to do in this respect. See per Parke, B., in Johnson v. Midland Ry. Co., 4 Exch. 371, 373. An innkeeper is not bound to receive persons who are not travellers. R. v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445; R. v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136. Keepers of coffee-houses and taverns (not professing to lodge their guests) are not common innkeepers; S. C.; nor are the keepers of lodging or boarding houses, for these do not profess to entertain and lodge all travellers; see cases cited 2 Kent, Com. 595-6; and Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & A. 283. If, however, they did so profess, they would be in the same position as a common innkeeper. S. C. As to the right of an innkeeper to refuse a guest because he is accompanied by dogs, see R. v. Rymer, supra.

The lien of innkeepers is treated of hereafter under Action for conversion of goods.

DEFENCES IN ACTIONS ON SIMPLE CONTRACTS.

In no part of the system of pleading have the J. Acts, and the Rules promulgated under them, produced a greater revolution than with reference to the manner in which defences are to be raised.

All pleas and defences in abatement are abolished; Rules, 1883, O. xxi. r. 20; and all such defences as could formerly have been set up, in actions of contract, by reason of the non-joinder or misjoinder of parties have also been swept away by Rules, 1883, O. xvi. rr. 1, 4, 11, ante, pp. 90, 91, and any objection arising from any misjoinder or non-joinder will be remedied by the extensive powers of amendment given for this purpose by r. 11, vide ante, p. 91. The principal rules which govern the present system of pleading are contained in O. xix., and will be found ante, pp. 301 et seq.