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thoughts, or perceptions, these last will be suggested in consequence of such association. This is the exclusive and universal law of Association.

Existence of Law, when established.

Law, as we have seen, is an idea of Reason. Like all such ideas, it sustains to phenomena the relation of logical antecedent. The phenomena being given, the law is necessarily affirmed, as the condition of their explanation. Each particular law also sustains this same relation to the particular facts explained by it. In the light of such law, it will be seen, that all such facts can be accounted for, on the supposition of its existence and operation, and that they can be accounted for on no other supposition conceivable by us. It thus bears the characteristic of all other ideas of Reason, to wit, universality and necessity.

The present Hypothesis, when established as the Law of Asso

ciation.

To establish the hypothesis under consideration, as the law of Association, two conditions must be fulfilled :

It must be shown, in the first place, that all phenomena referred to the commonly admitted laws, can be accounted for on this hypothesis.

It must be shown with equal clearness, in the second place, that there are facts of Association which cannot be accounted for by these laws, but which admit of a ready explanation on this hypothesis, and upon none other conceivable by us. These positions being established, the Judgment affirms the hypothesis, as the exclusive and universal law of Association.

We are now prepared to take up the question, whether there are many, or but one law of Association, and whether the hypothesis under consideration is that law?

A priori Argument.

It will be admitted, on a moment's reflection, that there is a very strong a priori probability in favor of the supposition, that the facts of Association are controlled by one law, instead of many. The opposite position supposes a departure, in this single instance, from what we find true of all other classes of facts which lie within and around us in the uni

verse.

The phenomena of attraction, in the material universe, for example, are many, and endlessly diversified. Yet they are all controlled by one law. Why should we suppose the phenomena of Association to be an exception? Should we not expect, in the ultimate analysis of facts, to find unity amidst diversity here, as well as everywhere else? This argument is adduced as of weight, simply in favor of the supposition of one instead of many laws, and not at all in favor of any one hypothesis, in distinction from another. Any one principle, which would lay claim to the prerogative of universal law, must fulfill the conditions above presented. We are now prepared for a direct investigation of the question, whether the hypothesis under consideration fulfills these conditions.

All the Phenomena referred to the commonly received Laws, can be explained on this Hypothesis.

That many of the phenomena of Association can be accounted for, in consistency with the commonly admitted laws, will be denied by no person of reflection. That objects which resemble each other, that those which have been perceived at the same time or place, that sustain to each other the relation of contrast, or cause and effect, do mutually suggest each other, is undeniable. But do such phenomena necessarily suppose the existence of a plurality of laws? May they not all be referred to one, and that the one under consideration? Those of resemblance, obviously may. The same is true of those which sustain to each other the relations of contiguity of time and place, and of cause and effect. For they undeniably have existed with the same feeling or states of mind. The only phenomena which present the appearance of difficulty, are those of Contrast. That a giant and a dwarf resemble each other in but few particulars, and that they stand in striking contrast to each other, is readily admitted; but that, as objects of perception, or recollection, they may have co-existed with the same feelings, or states of mind, and as causes also of the same, I as fully believe, as I do that the conception of a hero and a lion have co-existed in a similar manner. A giant and a dwarf are strongly contrasted, but each, as striking departures, though in different directions, from the common stature, may have co-existed with similar feelings of wonder or surprise, and as common

causes of the same; and this may be the only reason why one suggests the other. In conversing upon this subject on a particular occasion, an individual present remarked, that he recollected having, at a particular time, seen a dwarf. A giant, which he had previously seen, was not suggested at all, but another dwarf whom he had before met with. I at once asked the speaker, if the giant referred to was not a familiar acquaintance of his. He replied that he was. This fact readily accounted for the phenomena of Association, presented by him. Familiarity had destroyed the feeling of strangeness, which had formerly co-existed with the preception or recollection of the giant. The same feeling, howeve, co-existing with the perception of the two dwarfs, the perception of one would of course suggest the other. In the same manner, all the phenomena of Contrast may be reduced to the hypothesis before us.

Phenomena exist which can be accounted for on this, and on no other Hypothesis.

1. Those falling under the relation of Analogy.-But how can we account for those associations which fall under the relation of analogy? A hero and a lion sustain no relation of external resemblance, by which one would suggest the other. Equally removed are they from the relations of contiguity, cause and effect, or contrast. But as causes of similar feelings, or states of mind, the conceptions of them have co-existed in the mind, in connection with such states; and this, I believe, is the only reason that can be assigned, why the contemplation of one suggests the other.

Milton's account of the fight of Abdiel and Satan, may present a striking illustration of the principle under consideration:

"So saying, a noble stroke he lifted high,

Which hung not, but so swift with tempest fell
On the proud crest of Satan, that no sight,
Nor motion of swift thought, less could his shield,
Such ruin intercept. Ten paces huge

He back recoiled; the tenth on bended knee
His massy spear upstay'd; as if on earth
Winds under ground, or waters forcing way,
Sidelong had push'd a mountain from his seat,
Half sunk with all his pines."

Now, why did the conception of Satan, thus smitten down, suggest to the mind of Milton that of a mountain pushed from his seat? The only answer that can be given is, that the contemplation of each induces similar feeling or states of mind. So of all the phenomena of association, falling under the relation of analogy. Suppose, further, that an individual relates to a number of men some incident of a sublime, beautiful, heroic, horrid, or ludicrous character. How happens it that each hearer instantly recollects almost every incident of a similar character, which he has ever met with? These incidents resemble each other in one particular only, and sustain no other relation to each other than this: they have, as objects of perception or contemplation, existed in the mind as causes of similar feelings to those awakened by the incident under consideration. The hypothesis before us is the only one conceivable, which accounts for such phenomena.

2. Phenomena of Dreaming.-The phenomena of dreaming can readily be accounted for on this hypothesis, and, as I conceive, upon no other. In consequence of peculiar attitudes of the body, or states of the physical or mental system, certain feelings are awakened in the mind. Those objects of thought or perception, which have formerly co-existed. with similar feelings, are consequently suggested; and these are judged to be the causes of existing feelings. A sick man, for example, with a bottle of hot water at his feet, dreamed that he was walking upon the crater of Ætna, and that this was the cause of the burning sensation which he felt. He had formerly felt similar sensations when walking upon the crater of Vesuvius, and had just been reading of a traveller's walking upon the crater of Etna. These facts fully account for his dream. In a similar manner, all the phenomena of dreaming may be accounted for. But can they be accounted for by the common laws of Association? I answer, no.

3. Phenomena of Somnambulism.-Some of the phenomena of somnambulism here deserve an attentive consideration. It is well known that somnambulists frequently pass from a state of wakefulness to that of sleep, and vice versa, very suddenly; and that in each change, there is an entire oblivion of what passed in the preceding state; while the train of thought, or the employment left, when passing from the present state, is, on returning to that state, instantly resumed, at the very point where it was left. Sentences left half fin

ished, when passing out of one state, are completed as soon as the individual enters upon the same state again. How manifest, from such phenomena, is the fact, that the universal law of suggestion is based upon similarity of states or feelings.

Facts connected with particular Diseases.

There are many facts connected with particular diseases, which more fully confirm and illustrate the principle which I am endeavoring to establish. Take, as a specimen, the two following cases stated by Dr. Abercrombie, in his Intellectual Philosophy. I give them in the words of the author.

"Another very remarkable modification of this affection is referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by Major Elliot, professor of Mathematics in the United States' Military Academy at West Point. The patient was a young lady of cultivated mind, and the affection began with an attack of somnolency, which was protracted several hours beyond the usual time. When she came out of it, she was found to have lost every kind of acquired knowledge. She immediately began to apply herself to the first elements of education, and was making considerable progress, when, after several months, she was seized with a second fit of somnolency. She was now at once restored to all the knowledge which she possessed before the first attack, but without the least recollection of anything that had taken place during the interval. After another interval she had a third attack of somnolency, which left her in the same state as after the first. In this manner she suffered these alternate conditions

for a period of four years, with the very remarkable circumstance that during the one state she retained all her original knowledge; but during the other, that only which she had acquired since the first attack. During the healthy interval, for example, she was remarkable for the beauty of her penmanship, but during the paroxysm wrote a poor, awkward hand. Persons introduced to her during the paroxysm she recognized only in a subsequent paroxysm, but not in the interval; and persons whom she had seen for the first time during the healthy interval, she did not recognize during the attack."

"Dr. Prichard mentions a lady who was liable to sudden attacks of delirium, which, after continuing for various

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