periods, went off suddenly, leaving her at once perfectly rational. The attack was often so sudden that it commenced while she was engaged in interesting conversation, and on such occasions it happened, that on her recovery from the state of delirium she instantly recurred to the conversation she had been engaged in at the time of the attack, though she had never referred to it during the continuance of the affection. To such a degree was this carried, that she would even complete an unfinished sentence. During the subsequent paroxysm, again, she would pursue the train of ideas which had occupied her mind in the former. Mr. Combe also mentions a porter, who in a state of intoxication left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober could not recollect what he had done with it. But the next time he got drunk, he recollected where he left it, and went and recovered it."

Here are manifest and striking facts of Association. On the commonly received laws of the associating principle, they cannot be explained at all. On the hypothesis under consideration, however, they admit of a most ready explanation. How can they be explained on any other hypothesis?

I will adduce another fact taken from the same author. "A case has been related to me of a boy, who at the age of four received a fracture of the skull, for which he underwent the operation of trepan. He was at the time in a state of perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recollection either of the accident or the operation. At the age of fifteen, during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a correct description of the operation, and the persons who were present at it, with their dress, and other minute particulars. He had never been observed to allude to it before, and no means were known by which he could have acquired the circumstances which he mentioned."

But one explanation can be given of such a remarkable fact. During the interval between the surgical operation and the sickness referred to, the feelings existing in connection with operation had never been revived, and from the peculiarity of the feelings could not have been. During this sickness, in consequence of the action of the fever upon the brain and skull, these feelings were revived. consequence was, that the circumstances attending their existence were recalled. No other hypothesis can explain such facts.

The

This Hypothesis established and illustrated, by reflecting upon the facts of Association.

Every true explanation of the facts of Consciousness, will, as soon as it is understood, be confirmed in the conviction of every one who understands it, as he subsequently reflects on what passes in the interior of his own mind. This is, in a special manner true of the hypothesis under consideration. Every person who understands it, subsequently finds its truth confirmed and illustrated by his own reflections upon the facts of Association,as they fall under the eye of his Consciousness.

Argument summarily stated.

The argument in support of the principle of Association under consideration may be summarily stated, in the following propositions.

1. It is known to exist as a law of Association, in certain cases-in all instances of Association founded on the relations of analogy. No other reason can be assigned why the conception of a hero, for example, suggests that of the lion, but the fact that they have each co-existed with similar feelings, and as causes of such feelings.

2. All the phenomena, explicableby the commonly received laws of Association, admit of an equally ready and consistent explanation, upon the hypothesis before us.

3. All other phenomena, which cannot be explained by the commonly received laws, admit also of a ready explanation, when referred to the above hypothesis.

4. No other hypothesis yet known, explains all the phenomena of Association.

We are at liberty then to assume, that the hypothesis with which we started, ceases to be a hypothesis. It may be regarded as the law of Association.

Explanatory Remarks.

To understand fully the operation of the associating principle, two circumstances pertaining to it demand special

attention.

The first is the fact, that when a deep impression has been made upon the mind by any thought or perception, the

feeling excited may not only be revived by some subsequent thought or perception, but those feelings may afterwards recur spontaneously, without any other apparent cause, than the well-known mental tendency to return to states in which our minds have previously existed. When we have listened to an enchanting musical performance, for example, who has not months subsequent to the event, felt, in the depths of the inner being, the spontaneous movements of the cords of melody, which were so powerfully swept on the occasion referred to, and which, at once, bring the whole past scene into distinct remembrance? The law of Association is this. When any feeling which has co-existed with any past intellectual state is revived, whether that revival is spontaneous, or is occasioned by some present thought or perception, that state will recur again, as a consequence of the revival of this feeling.

The second remark is this. The feeling which has coexisted with any former intellectual state, need not be wholly, but only partially revived, in order to occasion the recurrence of that state. Let some present occurrence, produce feelings of joy, wonder, surprise, or regret, for example. Should any subsequent event excite these feelings in only a very slight degree, the former occurrence would thereby, be suggested. This is a universal characteristic of the action of the principle of Association.

Reasons why different Objects excite similar Feelings in our Minds.

The law of associations has been stated and illustrated. We are now prepared for another important inquiry, to wit, On what principle is it that different objects, or rather thoughts and perceptions, excite similar feelings in our minds, and thus mutually suggest each other? The following may be specified as the most important reasons why different objects excite such feelings.

1. In consequence of natural resemblance between the objects themselves. That objects naturally alike should excite similar feelings, is a necessary consequence of personal identity. Such objects do not suggest one another, because they are alike, but because, that being alike, they excite similar feelings. The principle of association in such instances, is the same as in all others.

2. Objects excite similar feelings, and thus mutually suggest each other, in consequence of similarity of relations to the original principles of our nature. Sweetness, beauty, and harmony, as mere objects of sense, are totally unlike. But they may and do sustain such a relation to the original principles of our nature, as to induce similar states of mind. Consequently, the perception of one may suggest that of the other. Thus the origin of figurative language, such as sweet or beautiful sounds, admits of a ready explanation. Also the sublime comparisons of poetry and oratory, founded upon the relations of analogy. An Indian orator, speaking of the American revolution, said, "That it was like the whirlwind, which tears up the trees, and tosses to and fro the leaves, till we cannot tell from whence they come, or whither they will fall. At length the Great Spirit spoke to the whirlwind, and it was still." Says another, whose age numbered more than one hundred years: "I am the aged hemlock. The winds of an hundred winters have whistled through my branches, and I am dead at the top.” "And I heard," says the sacred writer, "as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluiah; for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth." Milton, speaking of the breaking up of the counsel of Pandemonium, says:

"Their rising all at once, was at the sound

Of thunder heard remote."

An aged soldier, in one of the tragedies, says of himself:

“For I have fought when few alive remained,
And none unscathed; when but few remained,
Thus marred and mangled-as belike you've seen
O' summer's night, around the evening lamp,
Some scorched moths, wingless, and half consumed,
Just feebly crawling o'er their heaps of dead."

How different, as mere objects of sense, are all the things compared together in the above quotations. But sustaining a common relation to the original laws of the mind, they induce similar feelings or states of mind. Consequently, the apprehension of one, suggests that of the other.

3. Objects co-exist with, and excite similar feelings, in consequence of a perceived relation between the objects themselves; such, for example, as the relations of cause and ef

fect-parent and child, &c. Why it is that the feelings excited by one of these objects are transferred to the other as soon as the relation between them is perceived, we cannot tell. All that we can say is, that such is the constitution of our minds, that when two objects are known to sustain such relations to each other, they will, in all ordinary circumstances, excite similar feelings, and the idea of one will, consequently, suggest that of the other.

4. Objects co-exist with similar feelings in consequence of mere accidental association. Whenever the mind has been brought, from any cause whatever, into any particular state, the accidental perception of any object, or suggestion of any thought, however foreign to the cause of the present state, will so modify that state, that the new object will ever after sustain an entirely new relation to the Sensibility of our nature. To the present state of the mind, thus modified, it sustains the relation of a cause. Consequently, its subsequent presence as an object of perception, or of conception, will excite, in a greater or less degree, that state, and will of course recall the objects which formerly co-existed with the same state. Thus the same object may, at different periods of our lives, be associated with entirely different, and even opposite states of mind, and states of mind totally different from what they are naturally adapted to produce. Thus of course they may, and will recall entirely different objects to our remembrance. In many instances, we find it wholly impossible to account for the change which has taken place in the effect of particular objects upon our Sensibility, and consequently upon our train of associations; so gradual, and accidental, has been the transfer of the object from one state of feeling to another.

Application of the Principles above illustrated.

The law of Association which has been confirmed and illustrated, has many and very important applications. To a few of these, special attention is invited, as we conclude the present Chapter.

Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in respect to the Laws of Association.

We are now prepared to state distinctly the ground of the mistake of philosophers, pertaining to the laws of Association. Because objects sustaining certain relations to each