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true with the vicious. Every object of thought and perception is brought into such a relation to their Minds, as to generate thoughts and feelings which tend only to develop and confirm existing tendencies to corruption. This law of selfperpetuation which virtue and vice respectively possess, is found in the associating principle. In a Mind which has long been the cage of impure thoughts and feelings, those feelings at last come to be associated with all objects of thought, and thus the entire current of thought and feeling is turned into an impure channel.

There are no limits to the application of the associating principle, as above illustrated. Its importance in mental science will be appreciated as it is understood in its endlessly diversified applications.

CHAPTER X.

MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.

Terms defined.

MEMORY and Recollection are treated by philosophers only as important departments of the principle of Association. This, as we shall see, is demanded by sound philosophical analysis. The two terms above named are often used interchangeably, and never distinguished but by the following circumstances. In the process denominated Memory, notions, or conceptions of facts and events, are spontaneously recalled to the Mind. In that called Recollection, these Intellectual states are recalled by an effort of Will.

States of Mind entering into and connected with these Pro

cesses.

There are three distinct mental operations connected with each of these processes of Mind.

1. Some feeling or state of Mind which has formerly coexisted with the perception or apprehension of the object recalled a feeling or state spontaneously recurring, or revived by some object of present thought, perception, or sensation.

2. A simple apprehension of the object or event itselfan apprehension attended with no belief or judgment whatever pertaining to the object.

3. A recurrence, in thought, of the circumstances of time and place connected with the perception or apprehension of the object.

The above statement verified.

That objects of Memory and Recollection are not recalled

directly and immediately, but are suggested, in the manner above described, is obvious from two considerations.

1. From universal Consciousness. Those who are least accustomed to analyze the operations of their own minds, as well as philosophers, have noticed this fact. Hence the common affirmations: "This reminds me of," or "This suggests to my mind such and such occurrences," clearly showing, not merely that such events are suggested, but that the subjects of them are conscious of it.

2. When we wish to recollect any events, or in the common phrase, to recall them, we do not attempt to do this directly, but by directing the attention to various objects, at present before the Mind, that they may suggest those which we wish to recall. Memory and Recollection are, in this respect, subject to precisely the same law, and the law which governs each is the same which governs the entire phenomena of Association. The above remark is so obviously true, that philosophers, as stated above, almost universally treat of these subjects in the same connection, Memory being considered only as one department of Association.

Principle on which Objects are remembered with Ease and Distinctness.

Taking this position for granted, or as having been already proved, it will follow, as a necessary consequence, that the ease and distinctness with which any objects or events will be recalled to the Mind, will always be proportioned to the depth and intensity of the impressions formerly received from them, and with the number of objects and events with which such impressions have heretofore co-existed, or may hereafter co-exist. This conclusion we also find to be confirmed by universal experience. When you hear the declaration, "Such and such events I shall never forget," suppose you ask the reason for such an affirmation. The answer will invariably be, "It made such a deep IMPRESSION upon my Mind." On the other hand, if a person is asked for the reason why he recalls with such difficulty any particular event, he will uniformly answer, "It made such a feeble impression upon my Mind." Assuming that the state of the Sensibility is the regulating principle of suggestion, the fact is self-evident, that the ease with which any particular event will be recalled, depends not only upon the depth and intensity of the impression which it formerly made, but upon the

number of objects or events with which such impression may have co-existed, and shall hereafter co-exist.

Deep and distinct Impressions, on what conditioned.

One inquiry, of no small importance in mental science, here claims our attention, to wit, the circumstances under which impressions received from objects of thought or perception are rendered deep and distinct. Among these I notice the three following, as the most important:

1. Attention. In former Chapters it has been shown that attention is the condition of distinct perception, both in respect to the phenomena of Sense and Consciousness. In walking, for example, we do not remember the particular acts of volition, which directed each particular step. Yet we know that we must have been conscious of such acts. The eye runs carelessly over a particular landscape, and nothing but the most general outline is remembered, while we know that each particular part must have been seen by us. For the want of attention, however, these objects were not distinctly perceived. Of course no distinct and vivid impression was made upon the Mind, and consequently they are not remembered. The manner in which attention influences Memory is two-fold. It not only impresses deeply and distinctly on the Mind particular scenes, each taken as a whole, but all the parts of such scenes. Hence the whole of such scenes will be recalled by the perception or sugges tion of any particular part, which may be met with in other scenes. That Memory, however, does not depend primarily upon attention, but on the impression made by objects of attention, is evident from the fact, that the ease with which any particular event is recalled, is not proportioned to the degree of attention devoted to it, but to the vividness of the impression received from it.

2. The impression made upon the mind by a particular event, and consequently the ease with which it will be remembered, depends upon the circumstances in which the event occurred-circumstances external to the Mind; such for example, as its occurrence at a time and place unexpected, in connection with other events deeply interesting to us, &c.

3. The impression which events make on the Mind, depends upon the state of the Mind itself, when they occur. Offices of kindness, when we little need them, make a com

paratively slight impression upon the Mind. They are accordingly forgotten with comparative ease. But the stranger who watched over us when we were sick, in a strange land, we never forget, for the obvious reason that such occurrences are deeply impressed upon the Mind. Who is not aware that the impression made upon the Mind in reading a book, listening to a discourse, or witnessing any scene, and consequently the ease and distinctness with which they are recalled, depends greatly upon the state of Mind at the time?

Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in different Individuals.

Assuming the principle, that those things of which we have formed distinct conceptions, and which have deeply moved and affected our Sensibility, will be easily and distinctly remembered, the diverse kinds of Memory, as they appear in different individuals, may be readily explained.

Philosophic Memory.

The philosopher is, above all things, interested in universal truths and general principles, and in facts which illustrate such truths and principles. With names, and minor circumstances of time and place, he has little or no interest. These, of course, he seldom recalls; while general principles and facts connected with, and illustrative of general principles, he never forgets. Here we have the peculiarities of what may be called Philosophical Memory.

Local Memory.

With general principles, however, the mass of men are very little interested. Events, as mere events, with all their circumstances of time, place, &c., are the things which chiefly interest them. In such cases, general principles, if understood at all, will readily pass from the Mind, while facts and events, with all their adventitious circumstances, will leave their permanent impress upon it. Here we have the characteristics of what is called Local Memory.

Artificial Memory.

The third and only other kind of Memory which it is necessary to notice, is called Artificial Memory, a method of connecting things easily remembered with those which are recalled with greater difficulty, that the latter may be recalled

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