SECONDARY IDEAS OF REASON.

In former Chapters it has been shown, that Reason sustains this relation to the faculties of Sense and Consciousness: It gives the logical antecedents of phenomena affirmed by these faculties. Thus, on the perception of phenomena, we have the ideas of time, space, substance, personal identity, and

cause.

Now Reason sustains a relation to the Understanding precisely similar to that which it sustains to Sense and Consciousness. It gives the logical antecedents of notions and conceptions, as well as of primary intuitions. The idea of right and wrong, of obligation, is not the logical antecedent of mere phenomena given by Sense and Consciousness. Before obligation can be conceived of or affirmed, the notion or conception, not of mere phenomena, but of an agent possessed of certain powers, and sustaining certain relations to other agents, must be developed in the Intelligence. The idea of obligation, then, is not the logical antecedent of phenomena affirmed by Sense and Consciousness, but of notions given by the Understanding. These considerations fully establish the propriety of the distinction between ideas of Reason as primary and secondary. The former are the logical antecedents of phenomena given by the primary contingent faculties. The latter sustain the same relation to those of the secondary faculties. The distinction here made seems hitherto, as far as my knowledge extends, to have escaped the notice of the analyzers of the human Intelligence. Its reality and importance to a correct understanding of the operations of the human Mind will appear manifest as we proceed with our analysis of the secondary ideas of Reason. An exposition of all the ideas comprehended under this class will not be attempted. All that will be attempted will be the induction and elucidation of a sufficient number of particulars to serve as lights to the philosophic inquirer, in his researches in the domain of mental science.

IDEA OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

Of the Secondary ideas of Reason, that which claims the first, and more special attention, is the one mentioned above, that of right or wrong, together with those dependent upon it, or necessarily connected with it.

This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed.

It is an undeniable fact, that in the presence of certain actions, the human mind characterizes them as good or bad, right or wrong; that the mind affirms to itself, that one class of the actions ought, and the other ought not to be performed; that when we have performed certain actions, we deserve reward, and that when we have performed others, we deserve punishment; and that when this takes place, there is moral order, and when it does not, there is moral disorder. Such judgments are passed alike by all mankind, the old and the young, the learned and the ignorant, the savage and the civilized. Should it be said, that mankind differ in different circumstances in their judgment of the moral qualities of actions; I reply:

1. This objection itself implies the universality of moral distinctions. As men may differ in referring particular effects to particular causes, while all agree in the judgment, that every event must have a cause, so it is with moral distinctions. Men may not always attribute the same moral qualities to the same actions; yet they universally agree in this, that our actions are either right or wrong.

2. But when we refer to intentions, in which alone the moral quality of actions consists, we find a more extensive agreement among men than is generally supposed. A man wills the good of an individual possessed of moral excellence. Where is the intelligent being in existence who does or can regard such an act as any other than virtuous ? Who is not aware, that men always justify wrong actions, if at all, by a reference to their intentions, showing by such reference, that in their judgment of the great law of love, all agree.

3. Vicious actions are seldom regarded as virtuous. Men may persuade themselves that it is not wrong to perform such actions, but never that they are bound to do them, or deserve a reward for having done them.

4. When an intention. morally right is submitted to the contemplation of mankind, all agree in adınitting it as virtuous and meritorious. Thus the sacred writer speaks of himself and associates, as through a "manifestation of the truth, commending themselves to every man's conscience." This could not have been the case, had not the consciences of all men been in fixed correlation to the moral law. The idea of right and wrong, then, is universal.

Idea of Right and Wrong necessary.

It is also necessary. When the Intelligence affirms an action or intention to be right or wrong, it is impossible even to conceive of it, as possessed of the opposite character. We can no more form such a conception, than we can conceive of the annihilation of space. It has the same claim to the characteristics of universality and necessity, that any other idea has.

Ideas dependent on that of Right and Wrong.

A moment's reflection will convince us, that the idea of right and wrong is the foundation of that of obligation; and this again, of that of merit or demerit; and this last of that of reward and punishment. When men would justify the bestowment of reward, or the infliction of punishment, they always refer to the merit or demerit of the individual. This judgment is sustained by a reference to the obligation of the same individual, and his obligations are shown by a reference to the idea of right and wrong. Such facts clearly indicate the relation of these ideas, the one to the other.

Chronological Antecedent to the Idea of Right and Wrong, &c.

It has already been remarked, that the ideas under consideration are the logical antecedents, not of the phenomena of the primary contingent faculties, but of Understanding-conceptions. Before we can conceive of ourselves as subjects of moral obligation, we must be conscious of the possession of certain powers, and of existence in certain relations to other beings. This knowledge is the chronological antecedent of the ideas of right and wrong, while these ideas sustain to the facts of Consciousness the relation of logical antecedents. The question now is, What are the elements of moral agency, necessarily pre-supposed, as the condition of the existence of the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, &c., in our minds? They are the following.

1. Power to know ourselves together with our relations. 2. The actual perception of such relations.

3. Power to act, or to refuse to act, in harmony with these relations.

That the ideas of right and wrong sustain to such conceptions the relation of logical antecedent, is evident from the following considerations:

1. When we conceive of a being possessed of these powers, and existing in such relations, we necessarily affirm obligations of him. An intelligent being is revealed to me, as possessed of capacity for virtue or vice, together with susceptibilities for happiness or misery. I have a consciousness of the power to will his virtue and happiness, or his vice and misery. I instantly affirm myself under obligation to will the former instead of the latter. No other conceptions are necessary to the existence of this affirmation. These facts also being postulated, obligation must be affirmed. We can no more conceive it right to will the evil instead of the good, or, that we are not under obligation to will the latter, than we can conceive of the annihilation of space.

2. If any of these elements are not postulated, obligation can not be conceived of, nor affirmed. If we deny of a creature intelligence to perceive his relations to other beings, we cannot conceive of him as under obligation to them. Whatever degree of intelligence be attributed to him, this involves, in our apprehensions, no obligation to one act of Will instead of another, in the absence of all power to put forth the required, instead of the prohibited act. Suppose a creature has any degree of intelligence whatever. This creates no obligation to locomotion, in the absence of corresponding power. Suppose the mind located in a body totally destitute of the power of locomotion. Would the existence of intelligence create obligation to locomotion? Certainly not Such would be the response of universal Mind. Now the power to will is just as distinct from the Intelligence, as that of locomotion is. Hence, intelligence, of whatever kind or degree, can no more create obligation to one than the other, in the absence of corresponding power. To the conception of an agent, then, possessed of intelligence to know his relations, and power to act, or refuse to act, in harmony with those relations, the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, &c., sustain the relation of logical antecedents.

IDEA OF FITNESS.

Every person who has attentively noticed the operations of his own mind, must have observed, that under certain circumstances, certain actions, or certain states of mind, appeared to him fit and proper. When asked to give a reason for such judgments, no other account can be given, than a

simple reference to the nature of the thing itself, and to the circumstances supposed. For illustration, take the following passage of Scripture: "It was meet that we should make merry and be glad; for this thy brother was dead, and is alive again; and was lost, and is found." Suppose that father to have been required to give a reason for the judgment, that under the circumstances supposed, joy and merriment were fit or proper. What answer could he have given? No other answer than for the judgment, that no phenomena exist without a cause. In both instances, the mind knows absolutely that its judgments are, and must be true. No other reason for their truth, however, can be given, than this: The circumstances being given, they are self-affirmed.

This Idea synonymous with Right and Wrong, &c.

Now the idea of fitness, when applied to moral relations, is identical with that of right and wrong. It is the foundation of the idea of merit and demerit; and consequently of that of reward and punishment.

When

It is also identical with the idea of moral order. it is asked, Why is that state in which virtue is rewarded and vice punished, regarded as a state of moral order? no other reason can be assigned than this: Such a state is fit and proper.

IDEA OF THE USEFUL, OR THE GOOD.

Whenever we conceive of a creature capable of pleasure or pain, happiness or misery, we necessarily conceive of a state in which all the capacities of such a creature for pleasure and happiness are perfectly filled. This state we designate by the term good, a term sometimes used in another sense, as synonymous with that of right. Whatever tends to fill out the measure of pleasure and happiness, we designate by the general term, useful.

The ideas of the useful and the good, above defined, give birth to all the varied forms of human industry, such as agriculture, the mechanic arts, commerce, &c. All are moving on to the realization of one great leading idea, the filling up of the capacities of man for pleasure and happiness.

The Summum Bonum.

There is one idea of Reason, expressed by the words, the