great good, the summum bonum, and the rò naλóv, about which philosphers have long disputed, and in respect to which, they have been about equally divided in opinion. The question may be thus put: When we think of ourselves, or of the universe at large, what is that state to which our nature is correlated, or preferable to any other, actual or conceivable ?

Some have placed the great good in happiness merely. To this position, however, we find that our nature is not exclusively correlated. If happiness were the only thing to which our nature is correlated, as in itself most to be desired; if happiness exists, we should be totally indifferent in respect to the means, or conditions of its existence. We are not pleased, but pained at the thought, for example, that perfect happiness should be associated with great wicked

ness.

Others, in departing from this idea, have placed the great good, in virtue. To this position, also, we find that our nature is not correlated. If virtue is the only thing that the Mind regards as good, it would be indifferent in respect to the condition in which it should exist; whether, for example, the virtuous agent were happy or miserable. We are pained, on the other hand, at the thought, that virtuous beings should not be happy. Happiness our Intelligence affirms to be the right of the pure and the virtuous.

The true solution is, no doubt, to be found in the blending of the two above given, or, as Cousin expresses it, “In the connection and harmony of virtue and happiness, as merited by it." If we conceive of a state of perfect virtue, associated with perfect happiness, this conception contains a realization of our idea of the summum bonum. Every department of our nature is correlated to that idea. We can conceive of no state so much to be desired as this. Nor can we perceive any element in this state to which the laws of our being do not fully respond.

RELATIONS OF THE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND WRONG AND OF THE USEFUL TO EACH OTHER.

We have seen above, that the ideas of right and wrong are the foundation of obligation, and this of merit and demerit, &c. The question has long been agitated among philosophers, whether there is any idea that sustains a similar relation to that of right and wrong, and of obliga

tion. By some it is maintained, that this is not an ultimate idea of Reason, but that it has its foundation in another, to wit, that of the useful. This question I regard as of such fundamental importance in mental and moral philosophy both, that I shall enter into a discussion somewhat protracted of it. The question, then, is, What is the foundation of moral obligation? Is utility this ground?

This purely a Psychological Question.

The object of mental philosophy, it should be borne in .mind, is to explain human nature. When the Intelligence, for example, makes particular affirmations, the object of this science is, to ascertain the reasons in view of which such affirmations are made.

It is admitted by all, that in the presence of certain actions, the Mind does, as a matter of fact, affirm its obligation to perform them. The question, and the only question, for the philosopher to solve here is, What is the element or elements, in view of which this affirmation is made? The Utilitarian affirms that the perceived utility of the action, or its perceived tendency to promote happiness, is the only element in the action, and the only circumstance connected with it, in view of which obligation to perform it is, or can be affirmed. In view of nothing else, if this theory is true, can such affirmation be made. Now, as every one will perceive at once, the question whether this theory is true, is exclusively a psychological question. It can be truly answered, only by an appeal to Consciousness.

The theory under consideration is also given as a universal theory. If obligation is, in any instance, affirmed in view of any other consideration, this theory falls to the ground.

Further, if the Utilitarian, as is sometimes done, assumes the position, that PERCEIVED tendency is not the sole reason, why obligation is, in all instances affirmed, while it is in fact the only element which gives existence to obligation, his theory, instead of explaining the human Intelligence, convicts it of fundamental error, inasmuch as it asserts, that the Intelligence affirms obligation in view of considerations, which do not give existence to obligation. Having thus convicted the Intelligence of fundamental error, how is he afterwards, through the same Intelligence, to find out the truth? Now at this point, we join issue with the Utilita

rian. We assert, that his theory does not correctly explain the human Intelligence, relatively to the question under consideration, and is therefore wrong. To show this we will inquire,

Nature of Virtue.

In the first place, What is virtue? I answer, virtue is not a phenomenon of the Intelligence or Sensibility, but of the Will. As a phenomenon of Will, it must consist in right willing. This is a definition sufficiently explicit for the present argument. Should any one feel disposed to question the statement, that virtue consists exclusively in right willing, he will not deny, that it is in part, at least, found here. This is all that is requisite to the present argument. The question then to be settled is this. Is obligation to will in a given direction always affirmed, and affirmed exclusively, in view of the perceived tendency of thus willing?

Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility.

While virtue is, in this discussion, postulated as a phenomenon of the Will, happiness, on the other hand, is a phenomenon, neither of the Intelligence, nor Will, but of the Sensibility exclusively. This no one will deny.

Relation of Willing to Happiness.

Now the tendency of willing of every kind, to promote happiness, or its opposite, depends entirely upon the correlation between the nature of the Will and Sensibility. To understand, in this respect, the nature of willing, that is, its tendency to promote happiness, or its opposite, this correlation must be known. How can such knowledge be obtained? By experience only. This is self-evident. Prior to experience, I know not even that I have a Sensibility. Much less, if possible, can I know, prior to experience, the adaptation of any cause whatever, as for example, willing in one direction or another, in view of affirmed obligation, to produce in the Sensibility, happiness or misery.

Conclusion necessarily resulting from the Facts above stated.

Now as I can know from experience only, the tendency of willing, in one way or the other, in view of affirmed obligation, to promote happiness or misery, it is demonstrably evident, that obligation must, in all instances, be in the

first case affirmed, in total ignorance of such tendency. It must be affirmed, in view of other considerations exclusively. Perceived tendency, or utility, therefore, is not the exclusive reason in view of which obligation is affirmed. It is not the element which enters at all into original and primary affirmations of this nature. Utility, then, is not the exclusive ground of right.

Argument Expanded.

The above argument is as susceptible of absolute demonstration, as any proposition in mathematics. To show this, let A represent a moral action, B its results, the results which A tends to produce. As A is the cause of B, the relation of A as cause to B as effect, must be learned exclusively from experience. For the same reason, A must be, in the mind, the chronological antecedent of B. Now as A is willing in view of affirmed obligation, it implies two things, obligation affirmed, and action or willing, in view of it. Let C then represent the former, that is, obligation affirmed, and D the latter, or willing in view of such affirmation. Now C must have been in the mind prior to D, because D is action or willing in view of C. But B is known subsequently to the existence of D, the former being an effect of the latter, an effect learned by experience alone. Now as D is known prior to B, much more must C have been known and affirmed prior to all knowledge of B. Because C is affirmed prior to the existence even of D, which is the chronological antecedent of B. Obligation, therefore, is in all instances, first affirmed in view of totally different considerations than the perceived tendency of action in view of such affirmation, and the theory of the Utilitarian falls to the ground.

Additional Considerations.

The nature of willing may be contemplated and known in another and different point of light still, not in relation to the phenomena of the Sensibility, but of the Intelligence. A mountain, we will suppose, is before the mind. Prior to experience, we cannot know, but that such is the correlation between our Wills and the mountain, that willing its removal to a certain place will cause its removal. In total ignorance

of this relation, we may conceive of the removal of the mountain, and know what would be the effects of such an event, and understand perfectly what it is to will it. Our

knowledge of the nature of willing in this respect, cannot be increased or diminished, by our knowledge of the tendency of willing in the other respect above mentioned. Now the question arises, whether, in total ignorance of the tendency of Willing to produce this result, the Intelligence may not affirm, and affirm absolutely, that it is proper or improper, right or wrong, for us to will the removal of the mountain? Suppose we know, that the removal of the mountain would occasion the death of a thousand individuals; but we do not know at all, whether our willing it has any tendency to produce the result. Would not the Intelligence under such circumstances affirm absolutely our obligation not to will the removal of the mountain? Who does not know, that it would make this affirmation? Obligation to right willing is therefore affirmed, in view of considerations entirely distinct and separate from the perceived tendencies of thus willing to promote happiness.

Argument stated in View of another Example.

God, we will suppose, is present to the contemplation of a rational being as capable of an infinite amount of happiness or misery. Before we can know whether willing God's happiness or misery has any tendency to produce the one or the other, we must understand the correlation between the nature of our Will and the divine Sensibility. In total absence of this knowledge, however, we can understand perfectly the nature of willing in another respect, that is, what it is, to will the infinite happiness, instead of misery of God. Now in total ignorance of the tendency of willing, to produce the result, and in view exclusively of its nature, in the other respect named, may not the Intelligence affirm absolutely the obligation of the creature referred to, to will the infinite happiness, instead of the infinite misery of God? If so (and who will deny, that the Intelligence would, under the circumstances supposed, make the affirmation under consideration), we have demonstrative evidence, that utility, or the perceived tendency of right willing, is not the reason in view of which obligation thus to will, is affirmed.

To bring this question to a final issue, let us suppose the being of God present, in the sense above explained, to the contemplation of one of his rational offspring, and that no other creature but this exists. In view of the divine capacities, this creature affirms absolutely his obligation to will