God's infinite happiness, instead of his misery. In view of God's infinite excellence he affirms his obligation to love him. Now the question is, in view of the nature of willing, In which of the senses above named has this affirmation been made? In answering this question I remark, that the happiness of God may be assumed as an infinite quantity, incapable of any increase or diminution from any finite cause; or it may be assumed as a finite quantity, capable of increase or diminution from such a cause. Or (the only remaining supposition conceivable) the mind may be in doubt which of the above positions is true. Of these positions, the first, as I suppose, is the general impression of the race, and it certainly accords with the Bible.

Now, in whichsoever of these states the mind is, it affirms with equal absoluteness its obligation to will the infinite happiness, instead of misery, of God. When it holds that the happiness of God cannot be increased or diminished by any act of any finite will, still it affirms its obligation to will the infinite happiness of God, instead of his infinite misery. Now an affirmation made in the absence of a certain element cannot be based upon that element.

Further, the thing which this creature affirms himself bound to will, under the circumstances supposed, is the infinite happiness of God. Now it is demonstrably evident, that our willing cannot have any tendency to produce this result, a cause in its nature finite, having no tendency to produce an effect that is infinite. The utmost that can be said of the tendency of willing is, that it is adapted to effect the happiness of God in a finite degree. Now is it in view of such a result that we affirm our obligation to will a result that is infinite? Willing an infinite good derives, in our judgment, all its obligation from the perceived tendency of such willing to produce a finite good. Such is the doctrine of Utility.

Result of the Discussion thus far.

The result of the discussion thus far, is this. The perceived adaptation of willing the infinite happiness of God to promote that end, cannot be the reason of the affirmation that we are bound to will his infinite happiness,

1. Because this affirmation is, as a matter of fact, made with the most perfect absoluteness, in the full belief that such willing has no tendency to effect his happiness at all.

2. Because that this affirmation is made with equal absoluteness, while the mind is in perfect suspense in respect to the fact whether our willing has any tendency to affect at all the happiness of God.

3. Suppose we adopt the conclusion that our willing has such tendency, this conclusion we can adopt only as the result of a process of reasoning. Before we have arrived at this result, the above affirmation was made with perfect absoluteness, and could not, therefore, have been based upon such conclusion.

4. When this conclusion is arrived at, the absoluteness of the affirmation under consideration is neither increased nor diminished.

5. To suppose that the obligation to will the infinite happiness of God is based upon the perceived tendency of thus willing to affect his happiness in a finite degree, is to abandon entirely the position that intentions, or what a man wills, determines moral character.

Other important Considerations.

Other considerations, bearing upon this point, now demand our consideration.

1. No one is conscious of a reference at all to the tendency of our willing to affect the happiness of God, as the ground of the affirmation that we ought to will it.

2. When this tendency is pointed out and proved to exist, no one recognizes it as the reason of the affirmation under consideration.

3. No one who attempts to assign to others the reason why they are bound to love God, or to will his happiness, ever assigns this as the reason. Assuming the position, on the other hand, that we affirm ourselves bound to love God, or to will his happiness, for the sole and exclusive reason that the character of God is intrinsically excellent, and that his happiness is a thing in itself of infinite value; this assumption I affirm to be correct.

1. Because universal Consciousness affirms its truth.

2. When this fact is pointed out, universal Reason responds to it, as the real ground of the affirmation under consideration, and as an all-sufficient ground.

3. This fact is invariably referred to, when we attempt to convince others of their obligation to love God, or to will his happiness, and of their guilt in not doing it.

4. Upon this ground Utilitarians, as well as others, found their affirmations of obligation to will what is right, whenever their theory is not distinctly before their minds.

5. The more perfectly the mind is abstracted from all considerations but the simple relation of willing to what is intrinsic in the object presented, the more distinct and vivid will be the affirmations of Reason in respect to the moral character of our determinations. Of this every one is con

scious.

The above Argument of universal Application.

The argument thus far has been based mainly upon one example, willing the happiness instead of the misery of God. It will readily be perceived, however, that this example is of universal application in respect to all duties which, as creatures, we owe to God. If obligation to will God's happiness is not based upon perceived tendencies of willing it, to produce that result, no more surely can obligation to love him, submit to his authority, or be grateful for his mercies, be based upon perceived tendencies of yielding to such claims to produce the same result.

Obligation not affirmed in view of the subjective Tendencies of Right or Wrong Willing.

Suppose the Utilitarian shifts his ground, and assumes the position that we affirm our obligation to will the happiness of God, or to love him, in view of the perceived tendencies of such willing to advance our own or the happiness of others. I reply,

1. That, as shown above, obligation must have been perceived, affirmed, and complied with, or transgressed, prior to the perception of any such tendencies. Such perceptions, therefore, cannot have been the basis of such affirmations.

2. The testimony of universal Consciousness is opposed to this supposition. When we affirm our obligation to love God, for example, nothing is further from our views than the thought, that this affirmation is based upon the perceived tendencies to make us happy.

3. No person ever assigns this as the reason why we are bound to will the happiness of God.

Another General Consideration.

I have one consideration further, of a general nature, in

favor of the position which I am endeavoring to establish. It is this. The more perfectly a man is emancipated from the belief of the doctrine of utility, the more perfectly he is "rooted and grounded" in the belief of the opposite doctrine, the more sacred in his estimation does right, does duty appear. As proof of this assertion I appeal to the consciousness of those who have had experience of the influence of this belief upon their minds. That error should have such an influence is the strongest anomaly in the history of human nature. "That which maketh manifest is light," and nothing, surely, but light can sanctify duty in our estimation.

Once more, according to the showing of Utilitarians themselves, the tendency of willing, as, for example, the happiness of God, is a consideration, in view of which, it is impossible for us to will. Now that fact in view of which it is impossible for me to act, is a fact in view of which I cannot affirm my obligation to act. On the other system, the very consideration, in view of which we affirm our obligation to will what is right, is the very consideration in view of which alone, as all admit, right willing is possible.

Mutable Actions.

The way is now prepared to consider a class of actions denominated Mutable. Here, at first thought, it would appear that utility must be the ground of right. For example, the parent says to his child, "You must not strike your brother or sister ;" and the reason assigned for this prohibition is, "because it will hurt." Now this prohibited act is composed of two elements. 1. The physical part, or the motion of the hand. 2. The volition or act of the Will, as willing such motion. The real meaning of the prohibition is, "You shall not will this motion of your hand.” The reason of the prohibition, and consequently the ground of obligation to comply, is the perceived connection between the motion and the well-being of the person exposed to its effects. Now here also it is demonstrably evident that utility is not the ground of the right. For the obligation to avoid willing arises from the perceived connection between the motion under consideration and its effects, and not from the perceived connection between willing and the motion itself. Because, when we suppose all such connection between willing and the motion destroyed, the obligation of the subject to to avoid willing such motion remains equally sacred. The

connection between willing and its effects is accidental. The character of willing, however, remains the same, whether this connection exists or not. This principle is of universal application. Whenever we are bound to will any end, we affirm ourselves under obligation to will every means which we judge adapted to secure that end. In neither instance is our obligation to will affirmed in view of the perceived connection between our willing and the object willed; but on account of what is intrinsic in the object itself.

I here close this protracted discussion of the relations between the ideas of obligation, and of the useful. It is not intended to be denied that perceived tendency is a ground of obligation, but that it is the exclusive ground. Less than I have said upon this subject, I could not have said, and satisfied my own mind. We will now proceed to the analysis of other ideas of Reason.

IDEAS OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

Ideas defined.

These ideas, like those of right and wrong, are opposites. The elements entering into one, are excluded from the other. The question is, What are the characteristics which separate and distinguish one of these ideas from the other? In an

swer,

I would remark, that they represent two entirely distinct and opposite relations, which may be supposed to exist between an antecedent and its consequent. The first is this: The antecedent being given, but one consequent is possible, and that must arise. This relation we designate by the term necessity. The second relation is, The antecedent being given, either of two or more consequents are possible, and consequently, when any one does arise, either of the others might arise in its stead.

These Ideas Universal and Necessary.

These ideas have the characteristics of absolute universality and necessity. Every antecedent and consequent, actual and conceivable, must fall under one or other of the relations which they represent. These ideas have nothing to do with the nature of antecedents and consequents. They simply and exclusively represent the relations existing between them. As representing such relations, they must bear the fundamental characteristics of all other ideas of Reason, inas