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favor of the position which I am endeavoring to establish. It is this. The more perfectly a man is emancipated from the belief of the doctrine of utility, the more perfectly he is "rooted and grounded” in the belief of the opposite doctrine, the more sacred in his estimation does right, does duty appear. As proof of this assertion I appeal to the consciousness of those who have had experience of the influence of this belief upon their minds. That error should have such an influence is the strongest anomaly in the history of human @nature. « That which maketh manifest is light,” and nothing, surely, but light can sanctify duty in our estimation.
Once more, according to the showing of Utilitarians themselves, the tendency of willing, as, for example, the happiness of God, is a consideration, in view of which, it is impossible for us to will. Now that fact in view of which it is impossible for me to act, is a fact in view of which I cannot affirm my obligation to act. On the other system, the very consideration, in view of which we affirm our obligation to will what is right, is the very consideration in view of which alone, as all admit, right willing is possible. :
Mutable Actions. * The way is now prepared to consider a class of actions denominated Mutable. Here, at first thought, it would ap- ' pear that utility must be the ground of right. For example, the parent says to his child, “You must not strike your brother or sister ;” and the reason assigned for this prohibition is, “because it will hurt.” Now this prohibited act is composed of two elements. 1. The physical part, or the motion of the hand. 2. The volition or act of the Will, as willing such motion. The real meaning of the prohibition is, “ You shall not will this motion of your hand." The reason of the prohibition, and consequently the ground of obligation to comply, is the perceived connection between the motion and the well-being of the person exposed to its effects. Now here also it is demonstrably evident that utility is not the ground of the right. For the obligation to avoid willing arises from the perceived connection between the motion under consideration and its effects, and not from the perceived connection between willing and the motion itself. Because, when we suppose all such connection between will. ing and the motion destroyed, the obligation of the subject to to avoid willing such motion remains equally sacred. The
connection between willing and its effects is accidental. The character of willing, however, remains the same, whether this connection exists or not. This principle is of universal application. Whenever we are bound to will any end, we affirm ourselves under obligation to will every means which we judge adapted to secure that end. In neither instance is our obligation to will affirmed in view of the perceived connection between our willing and the object willed; but on account of what is intrinsic in the object itself.
I here close this protracted discussion of the relations between the ideas of obligation, and of the useful. It is not intended to be denied that perceived tendency is a ground of obligation, but that it is the exclusive ground. Less than I have said upon this subject, I could not have said, and satisfied my own mind. We will now proceed to the analysis of other ideas of Reason.
IDEAS OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
Ideas defined. These ideas, like those of right and wrong, are opposites. The elements entering into one, are excluded from the other. The question is, What are the characteristics which separate and distinguish one of these ideas from the other? În answer, I would remark, that they represent two entirely distinct and opposite relations, which may be supposed to exist between an antecedent and its consequent. The first is this : The antecedent being given, but one consequent is possible, and that must arise. This relation we designate by the term necessity. The second relation is, The antecedent being given, either of two or more consequents are possible, and consequently, when any one does arise, either of the others might arise in its stead.
These Ideas Universal and Necessary. These ideas have the characteristics of absolute universality and necessity. Every antecedent and consequent, actual and conceivable, must fall under one or other of the relations which they represent. These ideas have nothing to do with the nature of antecedents and consequents. They simply and exclusively represent the relations existing between them. As representing such relations, they must bear the fundamental characteristics of all other ideas of Reason, inas
much as no other relation, differing in kind from either of these, and not included in one or the other of them, is even conceivable.
Idea of Liberty realized only in the Action of the Will.
The relation between all antecedents and consequents, with the exception of motives and acts of Will, are conceived by the Intelligence as necessary. If the idea of Liberty is not realized in the action of the Will, it exists in the Intelligence without an object, or any element in any object corresponding to it, in the universe. .
Chronological Antecedents of these Ideas. No idea of Reason does or can exist in the Mind, without the appearance of some phenomena, through which it is revealed. The existence of the idea of Liberty can be accounted for only on the supposition of the appearance in Consciousness of the element of Liberty in the action of the Will. In all other phenomena of which the Mind is conscious, the element of necessity appears.' The appearance of these phenomena, then, are the chronological antecedents of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
IDEA OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME.
Opinions of Philosophers. All men agree in pronouncing some objects beautiful, and some sublime, and others the opposite. . By many philosophers, the beautiful and sublime are contemplated as simple emotions. Some suppose, that all objects are to the Mind originally alike in this respect, that they are unadapted to awaken any such emotions in the Mind, and that these feelings come to be connected with particular objects by accidental association. Pleasing emotions are from some cause awakened in the mind. While in this state, we perceive, we will suppose, a rose. These emotions are thus associated with that object, so that when it is perceived again, they re-appear. Hence, not because the rose is in itself more beautiful than any other object, but on account of the feelings thus associated with it, it is ever after regarded as beautiful. Now to this theory there exists this insuperable objection. Accidental association can never account for the absolute universality of judgment which exists among mankind, in respect to par
ticular objects. Why, for example, do all the world agree in in pronouncing the rose and lily more beautiful than the poppy or sun-flower ? Accidents never produce perfect uniformity.
Others suppose, that there are in the mind ideas of Reason represented by the terms beautiful and sublime, and that objects are referred to one or the other, as they present corresponding characteristics. I will now present certain considerations designed to show, that this last is the true conception.
Considerations indicating the existence in the Mind of Ideas of Reason, designated by the terms Beautiful and Sublime.
One fact which has a very important bearing upon this question, strikes the mind at first view. It is this: No human form or countenance is regarded by any person as perfect. How can this fact be accounted for, except on the supposition, that every such judgment is based upon a comparison of the external object, with an idea more perfect, existing in the mind itself?
Again, the ancient sculptors and painters, when they attempted to give to the world, what áll men would alike regard as the forms of perfect beauty, copied after no one liv. ing model; but took from all the forms of beauty in the world around them, those parts which were most beautiful, and froin these combined new forms more beautiful than any realities actually existing. Does not this show, that they were endeavoring to realize, not the forms of beauty actually existing in the universe around them, but an idea in their own minds more perfect than these forms ?
With this supposition also, and with this only, consists the fact, that the pleasure derived from the contemplation of certain forms of beauty is permanent, and becomes more intense, the more intimate and protracted our acquaintance with them; while the pleasure derived from the contemplation of other forms ceases on a protracted and intimate acquaintance. The reason of this obviously is, that the first-mentioned forms correspond very nearly, in all their parts, to the ideal in the mind. An intimate acquaintance with the others, however, gives us a knowledge of their defects, and in time destroys the pleasure which we felt when those defects were not perceived.
I will present one other consideration bearing upon the subject, which I regard as perfectly decisive. The particular elements which mark objects as beautiful or sublime, do in fact correspond with fundamental ideas. In respect to the sublime, all agree in fixing upon the Infinite as the chief source of emotions of sublimity. In finite objects one element only is correlated to these emotions, that of vastness.
The characteristics of the beautiful are determinate form, regularity, uniformity, and variety. A waving, instead of a crooked line, a line realizing the ideas of uniformity and variety, has universally been fixed upon, as the line of beauty and grace. Now that which proceeds according to fundamental ideas, must be itself the representative of such ideas.
Objection to the Universality of these Ideas. An objection to the principle above elucidated, to wit, the different standards of beauty adopted by different nations, and by the same nations, at different periods, has sometimes been adduced. In reply, the following considerations are presented as deserving special attention :
1. It may be questioned whether the savage when he paints and and tattoes his form, and the civilized person when he adorns his with the ornaments of civilized society, are endeavoring to realize the same idea. The one may be aiming to realize the idea of the beautiful, and the other (the savage), that of the terrible. The same holds true of architecture. The prominent idea in the Grecian style is the beautiful. That in the Gothic is the grand, the solemn, the sublime. The former and the latter then, had not different standards of beauty. They were aiming to realize different ideas.
2. While the idea may exist alike in all minds, the ideal, that is, the form in which the idea shall be embodied, may exist in different minds, and among mankind at different periods, in different development. Consequently the forms in which they will embody the idea will be various.
3. In contemplating particular forms of beauty, in which many defects of course exist along with the beautiful, these may be mistaken for the particular features which are the source of the pleasurable emotions felt under these circumstances. These defects then will be copied instead of the actual beauties.
4. But in the midst of all this apparent variety, there is a more general agreement than is commonly supposed; an