shall have in a future state, of thousands of things, which now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted Reason having got some glimpse of, we, in the dark, grope after.' I accept this statement, let it be consistent or not with the general system of Locke. I hold likewise that the highest degree of knowledge is intuitive knowledge. This knowledge, in many cases, for example, in regard to time, space, personal identity, the infinite, all substantial existences, as also, the good and the beautiful, has, you know, this peculiarity, that it is not grounded upon the Senses nor upon the Consciousness, but upon the Reason, which, without the intervention of any reasoning, attains its objects and conceives them with certainty. Now, it is an attribute inherent in the Reason to believe in itself: and from hence comes faith. If, then, Intuitive Reason is above Inductive and Demonstrative Reason, the faith of Reason in itself in intuition, is purer and more elevated than in induction and demonstration. Recollect, likewise, that the truths intuitively discovered by Reason are not arbitrary, but necessary; that they are not relative, but absolute. The authority of Reason is absolute: it is then a characteristic of the faith attached to Reason, like Reason absolute. These are the admirable characteristics of Reason, and of the faith of Reason in itself.

"This is not all. When we come to interrogate Reason about itself, to inquire into its own principle, and the source of that absolute authority which characterizes it, we are forced to recognize that this Reason is not ours, not constituted by us. It is not in our power; it is not in the power of our Will to cause the Reason to give us such or such a truth, or not to give us them. Independent of our will, Reason intervenes, and, when certain conditions are fulfilled, gives us, I might say imposes upon us, these truths. The Reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not in ourselves, and in no way can it be confounded with our personality. Reason is impersonal. Whence, then, comes this wonderful guest within us, and what is the principle of this Reason which enlightens us, without belonging to us? This principle is God, the first and the last of everything. Now, when the faith of Reason in itself is attached to its principle, when it knows that it comes from God, it increases not merely in degree, but in nature, by as much, so to say, as the eternal substance is superior to the finite substance in

which it makes its appearance. Thus comes a redoubled faith in the truths revealed by the Supreme Reason in the shadows of time, and in the limitations of our weakness.

“See, then, Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its principle. Now this mode or state of Reason which hears itself, and takes itself as the echo of God on the earth, with the particular and extraordinary characteristics connected with it, is what is called Enthusiasm. The word sufficiently explains the thing: Enthusiasm [ɛos εv uv] is the spirit of God within us; it is immediate intuition, opposed to induction and demonstration; it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior development of reflection; it is the apperception of the highest truths by Reason in its greatest independence both of the serses and of our personality. Enthusiasm in its highest degree, in its crisis, so to say, belongs only to particular individuals, and to them only in particular circumstances; but in its lowest degree, Enthusiasm is as much a fact as any thing else, a fact sufficiently common, pertaining not to any particular theory, or individual, or epoch, but to human nature, in all men, in all conditions, and almost at every hour. It is Enthusiasm which produces spontaneous convictions and resolutions, in little as in great, in the hero, and in the feeblest woman. Enthusiasm is the poetic spirit in everything; and the poetic spirit, thanks to God, does not belong exclusively to poets. It has been given to all men in some degree, more or less pure, more or less elevated; it appears above all, in particular men, and in particular moments of the life of such men, who are the poets by eminence. It is Enthusiasm, likewise, which produces religions, for every religion supposes two things: 1. That the truths which it proclaims are absolute truths; 2. That it proclaims them in the name of God himself who reveals them to it."

It requires a great philosopher to conceive of a great absurdity, and to give a professed demonstration of that absurdity by a great paralogism. In all these respects, I give it as my sober judgment, that the above passage is almost unequalled among the absurdities and paralogisms of modern times. What are the conclusions to which we are conducted in this strange rhapsody? They are the following: 1. Reason is in us, but belongs not to us. It constitutes no part of our personality. It is not a faculty of the soul, like the Understanding and Judgment, but is a light in the soul. 2. Reason

is God, "the spirit of God within us." 3. In its own eyes Reason is God, "is divine in its principle."

What are the arguments by which these dogmas are affirmed to be proven? The following:

1. Knowledge by Reason is "intuitive knowledge." "Without the intervention of any reasoning, it attains its objects and conceives them with certainty." This peculiarity, I remark, Reason possesses only in common with Sense and Consciousness, with this advantage on their part, that intuitions through these faculties are prior, in the order of time, to any through Reason. If for such a consideration Reason is to be deified, and deemed no part of ourselves, much more should Sense and Consciousness.

2. "Truths intuitively discovered by Reason, are not arbitrary, but necessary; they are not relative, but absolute." Now what a leap in logic is that, to go from such a premise to the conclusion, that therefore Reason is God, "the spirit of God in us," and no part of ourselves. Cousin himself, in another place, has fully demonstrated the fallacy of his own conclusions here. He has laid it down as a fundamental principle in mental philosophy, that the fact of knowledge of any kind in man, implies in him corresponding powers of knowledge. He himself affirms, that we do know by direct intuition, truths, absolute, universal, and necessary. The knowledge of such truths belongs to us, just as much as knowledge of any other kind, and implies in us corresponding powers. If we had not the power to know such truths, the knowledge of them would never belong to us as phenomena of our Intelligence. Now the faculty by which, when certain conditions are fulfilled, we know such truths, is Reason, a faculty which belongs as much to us as any other functions of our Intelligence, and is no more impersonal than any of them.

4. His fourth and last argument is this, "Reason is not constituted by us. It is not in our power; it is not in the power of our Will to cause Reason to give us such or such a truth, or not to give us them," &c. In view of such a consideration, hear the philosopher exclaim, "See, then, Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its principle." The man that, in such a premise, can see any such conclusion, must throw away his Reason, and see without his eyes. Reason, instead of deifying itself, and then falling upon its knees to worship its own image, exclaims,

"for my single self,

I had as lief not be, as live to be in awe
Of such a thing as I myself."

No, Reason is too noble, too truthful a faculty to perform such an act of self-apotheosis. Reason stands in awe of nothing but the Infinite, which it apprehends, without ever confounding itself with that which it knows, adores, and worships.

He also whom Reason reveals, has said, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me." The man who deifies Reason, and gets upon his knees before that, is, in "Reason's eye," as well as in the light of inspiration, a heathen, as much as the man who worships devils.

In the paragraph above cited, Cousin himself furnishes us with a full demonstration of the fallacy of all his reasonings here. Reason, he (6 says, when certain conditions are fulfilled, gives us-I may say, imposes upon us-those truths." Now if Reason was really divine, God in us, knowledge through Reason would be unconditioned, as it is in God. Must the Divine Intelligence, as is true with ours, first perceive phenomena, before the Divine Reason can apprehend the idea of substance, space, time, &c. ? Certainly not. We have Reason just as we have Free Will, because “ we are made in the image of God." Yet Reason in us is not God, any more than Free Will is. Reason, too, has a sphere in the human Intelligence-a sphere which marks it as a function of that Intelligence, just as much as any other faculty, and as impersonal in no other sense than all other intellectual functions are.

Transcendentalism.

Every one is surprised that, because, when certain intellectual faculties have given, by direct intuition, phenomena, another faculty should then give us the logical antecedents of such phenomena, philosophers should hence conclude, that this last faculty is God-is no part of our Intelligence, but the "spirit of God in us." Yet upon just such paralogisms is the entire fabric of German Transcendental Pantheism founded. When philosophers discover any power in nature before unrecognized, they are very apt to worship it as a God. Kant developed Reason as a function of the Intelligence-a function which philosophers had before failed to recognize. Germany at once raised the cry, "The gods

have come down to us." "Great is Reason." "God in us. "There is no God but Reason, and Reason is everything. Everything, therefore, is God. Sorry am I to record the fact, that the great high priest of philosophy in France "has brought oxen and garlands" to do sacrifice to this new divinity.

Reason, in what sense impersonal.

From what has been said above, one thing is perfectly evident, to wit, in Reason we are impersonal in the same and in no other sense, than we are in the exercise of all other intellectual faculties. What Cousin has said in respect to the action of Reason being independent of our Wills, is equally applicable to every intellectual faculty. "It is not in the power of our Will," he says, "to cause Reason to give us such or such a truth, or not to give us them." Nor is it in the power of our Will to cause Sense or Consciousness to give us such or such phenomena, or the Understanding or Judgment to give such or such notions or affirmations, or not to give them, when certain conditions are fulfilled. In one department of the Intelligence, we are impersonal in the same sense, and for the same reason, that we are in another.

Reason, in what sense identical in all Men.

From the fact that, in all men, Reason gives precisely the same truths, it has been inferred that Reason does not exist subjectively in us, as other intellectual faculties do. It is like the atmosphere, it is said, which is in the lungs of all, but subjective to none. So Reason is a light in all, but a function of the Intelligence of none. Now it by no means follows from the fact, that the same phenomena appear in all men, that, therefore, the power to perceive such truth, is subjective in none. The same phenomena appear in all, because the power to which they are to be referred is in all of precisely the same nature. Reason in all men is alike, in the same sense that powers which produce precisely similar phenomena are in their nature one.