tradiction to each other. The intuitions of Consciousness, for example, can never be in contradiction to those of Sense, inasmuch as the exclusive office of the former, under such circumstances, is to give to the mind itself, what the latter faculty has affirmed of its object. For similar reasons intuitions a priori can never contradict the empirical of either class, because a logical antecedent can never, from the nature of the case, be contradictory to that to which it sustains such a relation. How can the idea of time be in opposition to that of succession, or that of space to that of body, or the idea of phenomena be opposed to that of substance or cause? Nor can an a priori or empirical intuition be in opposition to another of the same class. The idea of substance, for example, cannot be in opposition to that of space, time, or cause; nor can the phenomena of extension be opposed to those of resistance or color. The same holds true in all other instances.

Different Intuition Faculties cannot contradict each other. From the above principles the conclusion is irresistible, that the affirmations of no one faculty of intuition can be opposed to the other intuitions of the same faculty; nor can the intuitions of one faculty be opposed to the intuitions of another. For the same reasons it might be shown that, the affirmations of the primary and secondary faculties cannot be opposed to each other. These conclusions are so self-evident, that no remarks in confirmation are deemed requisite.

The logical Consequents of no one Intuition can be in Opposition to any primary Intuition, nor to the logical Consequents of the same.

Another conclusion is equally self-evident, to wit, That the logical consequents of no one intuition can be in opposition to any primary intuition, or to the logical consequents of the same. As the ideas of time, space, substance, cause, and of the infinite cannot be in contradiction to one another, nor to the intuitions of phenomena, so the logical consequents of any one of these ideas cannot be in contradiction to any other of these intuitions, or to the logical consequents of the same. If the ideas of substance and space, for example, are not contradictory to each other, how can the logical consequents of one contradict the other idea, or its logical consequents? So in all other instances.

Error of Kant and Coleridge.

We are now fully prepared to appreciate the theory of Kant, Coleridge, and the Transcendental school, generally, pertaining to the external world, or as Coleridge expresses it pertaining to the "presumption that there exist things without us." All these philosophers acknowledge, in the first instance, that through the faculty of Sense we have intuitions of the qualities of external material substances, and that by means of such intuitions together with the ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c., the Intelligence gives us the external universe as a real existence. They then profess to find other intuitions of Reason, from which the necessary conclusion is, that "the things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them." In other words, the logical consequents of one class of intuitions given by the Intelligence, are in opposition to other intuitions of the same Intelligence, and to the logical consequents of the same. Thus one series of intuitions devours others, together with all their consequents. The procedure of the Intelligence, according to this theory, very much resembles that of the serpent in the fable, who seizing his tail in his mouth finally succeeded in burying his entire body so completely in his own stomach, that it became wholly invisible. From the Intelligence in the first instance, proceed intuitions empirical and a priori, from which most logically result the apprehension, and knowledge of a vast and glorious universe of real existences. From the profound depths of the same Intelligence, then, there proceed other intuitions through which the entire and before conceived substantial system of knowledge

"Is melted into air, into thin air:

And like the baseless fabric of a vision,
The cloud-cap'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,j
Yea, all that it inherit, are dissolved;
And like an unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a wreck behind."

And after these

Most sublime philosophy that, surely! voracious intuitions have devoured all others that were before them, together with their consequents, "themselves still being so ill-favored that it cannot be known that they have eaten anything," it would be easy to find others by which these, in their turn, would be devoured, and so on

interminably. Indeed this is the necessary procedure of the Intelligence, according to the system under consideration. For if, as their system maintains, all other objects of knowledge are not what we take them to be," we must of necessity conclude, that their system of philosophy is not what we or they take it to be. For the system itself is given by an Intelligence, which, as they maintain, does not give things as they are, or as this same Intelligence "takes them

to be."

On what then does this whole theory rest? On baseless assumptions, and nothing else. Coleridge, directly acknowledges that his theory does rest upon assumptions. The same is true, however, he says, of the opposite theory. This is freely admitted, with this difference, however: His theory rests upon assumptions which are not affirmed as true by the Intelligence. The theory which gives us "things without us," rests upon assumptions affirmed as true by the Intelligence. There is a wide difference between a theory resting upon assumptions in opposition to intuitions, and one resting upon assumptions in harmony with such intuitions.

SECONDARY FACULTIES.

We are now prepared for a consideration of the secondary faculties or functions of the Intelligence.

Understanding.

After intuitions, the next class of phenomena which strikes our attention is notions, or Understanding-conceptions. Such notions are of two classes-those which pertain to individuals, and those which represent classes of individuals, or notions, particular and general. All such phenomena are found, on analysis, to be composed of intuitions given by the primary faculties. Now the act of combining intuitions into notions, particular and general, reveals an entirely new function of the Intelligence, a function not implied in the operation of either of the intuitive faculties, nor in all combined. This intellecual function we denominate the Understanding.

The Judgment.

As soon as an Understanding-conception appears on the the theatre of Consciousness, an intellectual process entirely

new succeeds, a process by which, under the influence of the ideas of resemblance and difference, the particular elements which enter into the conception are separated from one another, and each contemplated apart by itself. Here we have what is called the process of abstraction. When also one notion present in the Intelligence, suggests another of a similar character, by a similar process, to the one last stated, the qualities common to the two are separated. These the Understanding then combines into a general notion, a notion representing a class or classes of individuals. This notion being given by the process under consideration, the particular conceptions referred to, are subsumed, or classed under the general. Now this process differs entirely from the action of the notion-forming power. To combine intuitions into notions, particular and general, and in view of the ideas of resemblance and difference, to separate the elements of a given conception from one another, or in view of the same ideas, to separate the elements common to two or more conceptions, and finally when the Understanding has combined the elements thus separated into a general notion, to subsume the particular under the general, are intellectual processes certainly entirely distinct from each other. The power to abstract and classify is not implied in the power simply to combine intuitions into notions, either particular or general. This function of the Intelligence, the power which separates things that differ, and ranges together under some common designation those that are alike, we denominate the Judgment. This is the faculty also chiefly employed in processes of reasoning. Reason furnishes principles, the Understanding terms, and the Judgment affirms, in the light of the principles of Reason, the agreement, or disagreement of the terms. If the student will attentively reflect upon what is passing in his own mind, he will clearly recognize the distinction above made between the Understanding and Judgment. Who ever confounds the formation of a conception of an object, with that action of the Intelligence which judges that such and such elements in the conception resemble, or are unlike each other? Who ever confounded the formation of general notions, such as are designated by the terms man, horse, &c., with that action of the Intelligence which affirms of individuals, This is a man; that is a horse? Such intellectual operations differ not in degree, but in kind, and suppose two functions of the Intelligence entirely distinct from each other.

The Associating Principle.

That principle of the Intelligence by which the presence of one thought in the mind recalls another which has formerly existed there, is so manifestly distinct from all other intellectual functions, that no philosopher has ever confounded it with any of them. As the object of the present recapitulation is to give the grounds of the distinctions made in this Treatise between the different intellectual faculties, a simple allusion to the principle of Association is all that is requisite in this department of our subject. It remains only to speak of the

are.

Imagination.

A reference to a distinction made in a preceding Chapter, between the ideas of Reason, as primary and secondary, will enable us to explain very distinctly our own conception of the nature of this function of the Intelligence. With the former class of ideas, such as those of time, space, substance, and cause, objects exist in full and perfect harmony. The sphere of the Understanding, therefore, is actualities as they With most of the secondary ideas of Reason, however, such as those of the right, the just, the good, the beautiful, the grand, and sublime, relalities may or may not exist in correspondence. Now we find a power of the Intelligence which is perpetually laboring to combine, in thought, the endlessly diversified elements of objects given by the other faculties into harmony with those ideas last named, especially those of the beautiful, the grand, and sublime. This function of the Intelligence we denominate the Imagination. The Ideal generated by this faculty, incomparably superior as it is to what the Understanding conceives in the sphere of realities, finds an external embodiment in poetry, sculpture, painting, and in all the varied endowments of art. The peculiar sphere, as well as phenomena of the Imagination thus clearly distinguish it from all other intellectual faculties.

Such is the classification of the intellectual faculties presented in this Treatise. Of two things pertaining to it, the author himself is fully pursuaded-That the distinction here made between the intellectual faculties is real, being sustained by fundamental phenomena-and that the classification is complete, inasmuch as there is no intellectual operation actual or conceivable which may not be resolved into the appropriate action of one or more of these faculties.