CHAPTER XIV.

SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE.

HAVING Completed our analysis of the intellectual powers, other important questions pertaining to the action of the Intelligence next demand our attention. We are all aware, that objects of observation and reflection are distinctly apprehended on one condition only, to wit, that we give attention to them. But we observe and reflect upon that, and that only, which has been given in the Intelligence prior to all acts of attention. When we give attention, it is to some definite thing, as this or that particular object. Now the object must have been given prior to the act of attention; else the direction of the act would be wholly indefinite, and without respect, to any particular object. The inquiry which will occupy our attention in the present Chapter is this: What is the state of the Intelligence, what are the characteristics of its affirmations relative to objects of knowledge, prior to observation and reflection? and what are the relations of such affirmations to the state of the Intelligence, in observation and reflection? The former we denominate the spontaneous, and the latter the reflective developments of the Intelligence.

General Characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge, and of our Knowledge of the same.

Before proceeding further, I would invite special attention to two or three preliminary observations :

1. All objects of thought are finite or infinite, and each of these bears the respective characteristics of contingency or necessity.

2. All finite substances comprehend ourselves, and that

which is not ourselves. The infinite sustains the relation to each of unconditioned and absolute cause.

3. Consequently, all our knowledge consists in apprehending the nature of the finite and of the infinite, together with the relations of the finite to the finite, and of the finite to the infinite. The Intelligence can never go beyond these; because these comprehend all possible existences, and all the modes and relations of existence.

Distinct Apprehension conditioned on Attention.

But these things, as I have remarked, we distinctly know only on one condition-that we attend to them; in other words, observe and reflect upon them. Yet they must, in some sense, have been apprehended before observation and reflection, because the objects of observation and reflection must have been previously given in Sense, Consciousness, or Reason.

Spontaneous Development of the Intelligence.

The question again returns upon us, What is the state of the Intelligence, as developed, previous to attention, i. e. previous to observation and reflection? To attend, to observe, and reflect, are acts of the Will, directing the action of the Intelligence. But, as before observed, the objects must have been in some sense apprehended previous to attention. For when we will to attend to anything, the act implies that the thing itself was in some sense in the mind, as an object of thought. How came this thought here? Certain conditions are requisite to its existence. But when these conditions are fulfilled, how does this thought arise? I answer, by a spontaneous action of the Intelligence, a spontaneity previous to all acts of the Will.. "When Intelligence manifested itself for the first time," says Cousin, to whom I am indebted for almost everything I now say, "it is evident that its manifestation could not have been a voluntary act. It manifested itself, nevertheless, and you possess a consciousness of it, more or less vivid. Endeavor to take your thought unawares, in the act of thinking without having wished to think ; and you will find yourself at that point which the Intelligence takes as its point of departure; and thus you may at the present moment observe, with more or less accuracy, that which did occur, and must necessarily have occurred, in the first act of your Intelligence, at a time which is no more, and

which can never return." Now what is contained in this primitive intuition, this spontaneity of human intelligence? All that will subsequently be found in observation and reflection; but, as Cousin observes, "If all is there, all is there on certain conditions."

Characteristics of this Spontaneity.

The next inquiry demanding attention is the characteristics of this spontaneity. The most important are the two following:

1. It is in all instances a positive affirmation, and not a negation. "To think," says Cousin, "is to affirm. The first affirmation into which nothing of volition has entered, and by consequence, nothing of reflection, cannot be an affirmation mingled with negation; for our first acts are not denials. It must therefore have been an affirmation without negation, an instinctive perception of truth, an entirely instinctive development of thought."

2. The other characteristic of this primitive intuition is, that although it contains all that is subsequently found in observation and reflection, it contains them obscurely. In observation and reflection, and there only, all things are distinct, because that there, and there only, do we find not only affirmations, but negations.

Characteristics illustrated.

I have said, that in this primitive spontaneity there is contained all that is subsequently found in observation and reflection, but somewhat obscurely. Consequently, there was a time when indeed mind was, and the universe also; but to itself, as an object of knowledge, neither the mind, nor the universe, nor God existed. At the next moment, by a spontaneous development of the Intelligence, the mind was revealed to itself. At the same moment that which is not itself, and the cause of itself, and of that which it perceived as not itself, was also revealed. In other words, the mind apprehends but obscurely the finite and the infinite, with a mysterious consciousness of the relation of the one to the other. "We do not commence," says Cousin, again, "with seeking ourselves, for this would imply that we already know that we exist, but on a certain day, at a certain hour, at a certain moment, a moment solemn in existence-without having sought ourselves, we find ourselves; thought, in its

instinctive development, discloses to us that we are; we affirm our existence with profound assurance-with an assurance unmingled with any negation whatsoever. We perceive our existence, but we do not discern, with all the distinctness of Reflection, our proper character, which is that of being limited and bounded; we do not precisely distinguish ourselves from the world, nor do we precisely discern the character of this world; and besides these, we perceive the existence of something different from those, to which natu rally and instinctively we refer both ourselves and the world; we distinguish all this, but without very strictly discriminating between its component parts. Intelligence, in developing itself, perceives all that is; but it is not able to perceive it in a reflective, distinct, and negative manner; and although it perceives it with perfect assurance, it perceives it somewhat confusedly." Again-" Spontaneous and instinctive thought enters upon its functions by virtue of its own nature; and first of all, it gives us ourselves, the world, and God; the world and ourselves, with boundaries confusedly perceived, and God, without bound,-the whole in a synthesis, in which clear and obscure ideas are mingled together."

But while these truths are thus revealed and affirmed, they are not, I repeat, clearly, but confusedly apprehended. The nature of the self, and of the not-self which was the immediate object of perception, together with that of the cause of each, was not distinctly given. Yet all were given, and given in such a manner, that observation and reflection would separate the one from the other, and render each distinct and palpable to the mind. But the basis of observation and reflection is given in this primitive spontaneity. Observation and reflection may separate these elements, and determine their relative characteristics; but they can add no new element to the composition, unless it be themselves as facts of Consciousness, which, as facts, must also be first given in the manner above referred to.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Some additional remarks, designed to elucidate still further the subject before us, are here required.

Categories of Spontaneous and Reflective Reason.

I begin with noticing the distinction between the categories

of spontaneous and reflective Reason, and with such illustrations as will enable us to distinguish them. The categories of the reflective Reason are all abstract, universal, and necessary. Those of spontaneous Reason, are necessary, but concrete, and particular. With this difference, they are identical. In other words, the categories of spontaneous Reason, are those of reflective Reason in a concrete and particular form. For example, the principle of causality, as a category of the reflective Reason, is this: Every event must have a cause-a truth, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now this principle, as a category of spontaneous Reason, is this: This particular event, this particular sensation, for example, must have a cause. The principle of space, as a category of reflective Reason, is, Body supposes space. a category of spontaneous Reason it is, This particular body is somewhere, or in space. Thus by determining the categories of reflective Reason, we can readily determine those of spontaneous Reason. For the former are the latter in a necessary, to be sure, but concrete and particular form.

As

Relation of Observation and Reflection to this original Spontaneity.

The relation of observation and reflection to the original spontaneity of the Intelligence, next claims attention. Their exclusive object is to determine the nature, character, and relations of that, the reality of which has been previously affirmed. With the reality itself they have nothing to do. For example, what has reflection to do with determining the question whether I really exist, or not, the very truth which must be assumed as the basis of all reflection? Reflection may determine my nature and character, but my existence must be first affirmed, and then assumed, before reflection becomes possible. The same remarks apply equally to external existences. Observation and reflection may determine their character, but never their reality. Hence the reason of the universal inquiry in respect to external objects, which inquiry is, not whether this particular object EXISTS; but what are its nature, character, and relations; the reality of the object being necessarily assumed as the ground of all such inquiries. Observation and reflection, then, assume an entirely wrong direction when we attempt by them to determine the reality of our own existence, or of the existence of the external world, or of that to which we necessarily refer ourselves,