mountain becomes an object of perception. Under the influence of the associating principle, the first notion is recalled. The Judgment, as these perceptions are present on the theatre of Consciousness, separates the elements common to the two. The Understanding now combines these common elements into a new conception, under which the Judgment subsumes the two particulars. On the perception of a third mountain, the general notion, in a manner like that just described, undergoes a new modification, by which it embraces those elements only common to the three particulars, while each particular is again classed under the general. Thus the process goes on, till the notion under consideration assumes its most general form. This is the process by which general notions are, in all instances formed, a process so particularly elucidated in a former Chapter, that nothing further need be said upon it here.

Abstract Notions.

We will now consider the origin and genesis of abstract notions such as are designated by such such terms as redness, sweetness. These are distinguished from general notions, and also from necessary and universal ideas, by this characteristic. They designate some single quality of particular substances without reference to those substances.

To form general notions, more than one object must be given. To form abstract notions but one is required. Example: This apple is red. When we have separated the quality designated by the term red, from the subject to which it belongs, we then have the abstract notion designated by the term redness. The same holds in all other instances.

Universal and Necessary Ideas.

In explaining the origin and genesis of universal and necessary ideas, in their abstract and universal form, we will take as the basis of our explanation and illustration the principle of causality, to wit: Every event has a cause.

It is admitted, that originally, this principle is not given in this form. What is given? Some particular event, and the affirmation of the Reason, This particular event had a cause. It is also admitted and affirmed, that the universal principle is not here, as is true of contingent general principles, given by the succession of particulars. For if you suppose the

event repeated a thousand or a million times, all that you have in each instance is the particular event, and the particular affirmation, This event had a cause. How then shall

we account for the formation of the idea or principle under consideration? Let us recur to the individual fact above alluded to the fact composed of two parts; the empirical and. absolute parts. We will leave out of view the idea of succession, and confine ourselves to the one fact before us.

By immediate abstraction let us suppose the separation of the empirical, and the disengagement of the necessary and absolute. We then have the pure idea of the absolute and necessary. This idea thus developed we find it impossible not to apply to all cases, real or supposed. We have then, and in this manner, the universal, necessary, and absolute idea or principle.

This process might perhaps be more distinctly explained by a reference to the ideas of body and space. These ideas are not originally given in their present simple abstract form. They are given in such proportions as this: This particular body is somewhere, or in space. Here you have the empirical part, body, and the necessary and absolute part, space. Separate the two, and you have the contingent idea of body, and the necessary and absolute idea of space. Hence the principle, universal, necessary, and absolute: Body supposes space.

Error of Cousin.

I have now a word to say upon a favorite principle of Cousin, that most necessary ideas, such as the idea of time, cause, &c., have their origin in Reflection, and what he calls a sentiment of the Will. The first succession of which we are conscious, he says, is some act of the Will, for the reason that we perceive nothing only on the condition that we attend to it, and the condition of attention is the Will. To this I reply: It is admitted that we know nothing, i. e. have a distinct knowledge of nothing, only on the condition of attention, and that the condition of attention is the Will. But from this it does not follow, that the act of attention is the first thing of which we are conscious. It may be some feeling or thought, it being impossible for us to become distinctly conscious of the act of attention, till we attend to that. Equally false is his conclusion that the consciousness of our own proper causalty precedes any conception of the principle

of causality. We are not conscious of our Will as a cause, but of the acts of the Will as mere phenomena. Succession within and without is nothing but succession. The first phenomenon that is observed by the mind, whether it is within or without us, develops the principle of causalty, or we can ⚫never account for its existence in the mind.

CHAPTER XVI.

LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.

Investigation and Reasoning distinguished.

ONE department of inquiry of great importance still remains. When we have done with this, our inquiries in regard to the intellectual powers will have closed, only as far as we may find their operations combined with that of the other faculties or susceptibilities of the mind.

The department to which I refer, is the employment of these powers in what is called a process of Investigation and Reasoning. These processes, though intimately connected, are entirely distinct, and should be carefully distinguished the one from the other. In the former process our exclusive object is the discovery of truth. In the latter, the object equally exclusive is, to prove the truth already discovered. Your attention in the present Chapter will be directed to the first process. Our inquiry is, What are the laws which govern the mind, or ought to govern the mind, in a process of Investigation of truth?

Substances, how known.

All substances are revealed to us by their respective phenomena. Their existence, not only, but their nature, character, and powers, are revealed to us in this manner, and this manner exclusively. The induction of phenomena therefore lies at the basis of all our investigations pertaining to sub

stances.

Induction of Phenomena, for what Purposes made.

There are four purposes entirely distinct, for which an induction of phenomena is made:

1. For the purpose of discovering the nature, characteristics, and powers of some particular substance.

2. For the purpose of classification, into genera and species.

3. For the purpose of discovering some general fact, or order of sequence.

4. For the purpose of discovering universal laws, in conformity to which the action of substances is subordinated.

Now the principles which should guide us in the induc-tion of phenomena depend upon the object we have in view in such induction.

Induction pertaining to particular Substances.

In the induction of phenomena for the purposes of determining the characteristics, and powers of some particular substance, the following principles are of fundamental importance in guiding our investigations.

1. In marking the phenomena which appear, or the characteristics of particular phenomena, omit none which do exist, and suppose none which do not exist.

2. In determining the particular powers of the substance in the light of phenomena thus classified and characterized, undeviatingly adhere to the following principles. Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics alike, suppose similar powers. Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics unlike, suppose dissimilar powers. In strict conformity to those principles, an attempt has been made, in a preceding part of the present Treatise, to determine, among other things, the different functions of the human Intelligence. Whether the effort has been successful, time will determine.

Induction for purposes of Classification into Genera and Spe

cies.

In the induction of phenomena for the purposes of classification into genera and species, the following principles should be strictly adhered to:

1. Fix definitely and distinctly upon the principle of classification, whatever it may be.

2. With a rigid regard to principle, range with the given class every object, whatever its diversities in other respects, which bears the characteristic mark.

3. Strictly exclude from the class, every individual in which the characteristic mark is wanting.

The correctness and apparently easy application of the above principles are so obvious, that it would seem, that every