its truth, and when strong motives impel him to deny it, especially if it is false, then we recognize ourselves as obligated to believe his statements without reference to his moral character at all.

3. Another circumstance which tends strongly to corroborate the statements of a witness is this: When the facts affirmed lie along the line of our own experience in similar circumstances. This, however, is not a safe principle to rely upon, in the absence of other circumstances of strong corroboration. Villains often throw their statements into harmony with experience, for the purpose of covering their dark designs.

4. When, though new, they accord with the known powers of the agent to whom they are ascribed.

5. When these facts stand connected with the development of laws and properties in the agent, before unknown.

Under such circumstances, the further removed from experience the facts are, the greater probability of their being true. Because the greater probability that they would, if not true, have been unknown to the witness.

Concurrent Testimony.

The confidence which we repose in the affirmations of a witness is greatly strengthened by the concurrent testimony of other individuals. Here the following circumstances should be especially taken into the account:

1. When each witness possesses all the marks of credibility above referred to.

2. When there is an entire concurrence in their statements, or a concurrence in respect to all material facts.

3. When the characters of the several witnesses are widely different, as friends and enemies, &c., and who of course must be influenced by widely different motives, and even by those directly the opposite; especially when their characters, motives, and relations to the subject are so different as to preclude the supposition of a collusion between the wit

nesses.

4. When one witness states facts omitted by others, and when all the statements together make up a complete account of the whole transaction.

5. When there are apparent contradictions between the statements of the witnesses, which a more enlarged acquaintance with the whole subject fully reconciles. Such occur

rences in testimony preclude the supposition of collusion, and present each individual as an independent, honest witness in the case.

6. Coincidences often occur in the statements of witnesses which, from the nature of the case, are manifestly undesigned. When such occurrences attend the testimony of various individuals, all affirming the same great leading facts, they tend strongly to confirm the testimony given. This principle is most beautifully illustrated by Dr. Paley, in his Hora Pauline-a work deserving more attention than almost anything else the Doctor ever wrote.

Great care and sound judgment are requisite in the application of the principles above stated. When they are fulfilled in the case of testimony pertaining to any subject, it would be the height of presumption and moral depravity in us not to act upon it as true. Infinite interests may be safely based upon the validity of such testimony. We are often necessitated to decide and act, however, in the absence of testimony thus full and complete, and often upon testimony failing in many respects of the marks of credibility above laid down. To discern between the valid and the invalid to determine correctly when to trust and when to withhold confidence, requires stern integrity of heart, and a Judgment, "by reason of use exercised," to distinguish the true from the false.

CHAPTER XVII.

REASONING.

THE distinction between Reasoning and Investigation was made plain in the last Chapter. The former process has nothing to do with the discovery of truth. Its exclusive object is the establishment of truth already discovered. It belongs to Intellectual Philosophy to develop the law of Reasoning-that is, to develop those laws which control the action of the Intelligence, when drawing conclusions from premises laid down.

The Syllogism the universal Form of Reasoning.

I will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by the following quotation from Whately's Logic:

"In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of argument, either for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted." Again: "In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will be found that every conclusion is deduced in reality from two other propositions (thence called premises), for though one of them may be, and commonly is suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admitted; as may be made evident by supposing the denial of the supposed premise, which will at once invalidate the argument."

Hence this author affirms, in opposition to the opinion of some on the subject, that the syllogistic is not a particular kind of reasoning, as distinguished from moral or inductive reasoning, for example; but the sole and universal process.

The above Principle verified.

That this author is correct in the principle above stated, a very few considerations will render evident.

That all reasoning, purely demonstrative, is strictly conformed to the law of the syllogism, none will deny. As an example and illustration of this kind of reasoning, we may take the following: Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. A and B are each equal to C. Therefore they are equal to one another. The major premise, in all such processes, is either an intuition of Reason, or some proposition previously demonstrated,

But inductive Reasoning has by some been supposed to be an exception, because that, in the syllogism, we go from the general to the particular; whereas, in the inductive process, we reason from the particular to the general. This objection, if valid, would equally exclude almost the entire mass of demonstrative reasoning. Here also we do in reality go from the particular to the universal—that is, the minor premise is particular. This objection assumes also what is not true of the syllogism-that is, that in all instances, in the syllogistic form, we reason from the general to the particular. All reasoning is strictly conformed to the laws of the syllogism, wherein a conclusion is legitimately drawn from two premises, a major and a minor. In induction, as well as everywhere else, these two premises appear, the major being almost universally suppressed. In no form of reasoning legitimately conducted is the conclusion more extensive than the major premise. When we reason from the particular to the general, we always do it under the assumption (and this assumption is the suppressed major) that what is true of the particular, is also true of the class to which the individual belongs.

Forms in which the Major Premise appears.

There are three forms in which what is called the major premise, that which asserts the universal or general fact, is expressed; a circumstance which has led others to suppose that there are three kinds of reasoning, of which the syllogism is one. These forms are the categorical, in which the general fact is directly affirmed or denied the hypothetical, in which the general principle is hypothetically affirmed or denied, as in the proposition, If A is B, C is D-and the

disjunctive, in which a fact is affirmed to attach to some one of a given number, without determining which, as in the proposition A is either in C or D.

The categorical we have already considered. It remains to consider the last two. Now a moment's reflection will convince us, that a hypothetical premise is nothing but a universal put into the form of a particular. The proposition, for example, If Cæsar was an usurper he deserved death, is nothing more than the universal proposition, All usurpers deserve death, expressed in a concrete and particular form. The same holds in respect to all propositions of a similar character. A hypothetical proposition is nothing but a general or universal principle hypothesized in respect to a particular case.

A careful analysis will show that a disjunctive proposition, also, is in reality nothing but a general, or universal proposition, expressed in a concrete and particular form. When, for example, we say, A is either in B or C; it is not in B, therefore it is in C, we find, on analysis, that the first premise contains a universal principle, expressed in a concrete and particular form. The principle is this-when an element must exist in connection with some one of a given class, to prove that it does not attach to some one or more of the members, is to prove that it does belong to those, be they one or more, that remain. The syllogism, therefore, might be thus expressed: If C is not in one of the two, it is in the other. It is not in one, to wit, B. Therefore it is in C. The syllogism then is not a particular form of reasoning, but the universal and exclusive form.

Principles which lie at the Basis of all Conclusions from a Process of Reasoning.

All conclusions in a process of reasoning are, of course, either affirmative, as A is B, or negative, as A is not B. Such conclusions rest upon two distinct and opposite principles, on which all reasoning, legitimately conducted, rests.

1. All terms which agree with one and the same term, agree with one another.

2. All terms which agree with a particular term, differ from all others which disagree with the same term.

Remarks upon these Principles.

On the former principle all affirmative, and on the latter