object, an object postulated as external to the self, in order that the I may know itself in the act of perceiving something which to itself, that is, to the philosopher (since, as Coleridge remarks, none but philosophers who have a peculiar philosophical talent can descend to such depths), is both itself and not itself. In thus seeing ourselves in all things, and finding all things in ourselves, we at length, as streams in the ocean from whence they came, lose ourselves and all things in the Infinite and Absolute. The Infinite projects itself into the finite in order to know itself in producing and perceiving the finite. The finite loses itself again in the Infinite, as bubbles in the ocean from which, for a moment, they appear as separate, without being in reality distinct existences. God is the sole reality, creation the mirror in which he sees himself, by an act of self-projection in the finite. This is the Pantheistic System, which resulted as the "natural daughter" from the philosophy of Kant. I do not say, that I have made myself understood, in the hints above given, of this strange philosophy. How can that be rendered intelligible which its great expounder affirms can never be symbolized by words, which must be thought in order to be understood, which can be thought only by the peculiarly gifted, and to these has no other claims to truth, than that it is thought? Enough, however, will be understood to lay the foundation for an appreciation of the remarks which will follow an exposé of the System of Hegel. All things in the world of mind are progressive. This is especially true in philosophy. The founder of a new system seldom perceives the results of his own fundamental principles. It remains with his disciples to consummate, in successive generations, what he has begun. With Hegel remains the honor of consummating the philosophy of Kant, by systematizing the logical consequents of the principles of the venerable sage of Königsburg." Each great light in philosophy, who succeeded Kant, saw, in the system of his predecessor, assumptions in direct opposition to the fundamental principles which all acknowledged as true; to wit, the total invalidity of all ideas and principles of Reason, for things in themselves, and each endeavored to form a system in harmony with that principle; but each had, in some form or other, introduced into his system, as a fundamental element, the opposite principle. Hegel found, in the system of Schelling, the very element on account of which the latter had rejected the system of Fichte, and Fichte had rejected that of Kant. In the system of Schelling, the reality of the Infinite and Absolute, as a substantial existence, entered as a fundamental element. But this was an admission of the validity of one class of the ideas of Reason, that of substance and attribute, not only for experience, but for things in themselves. But if the validity of these ideas be admitted in this form, then that of those of cause and effect, succession and time, body and space, must also be admitted in the same form. For all these ideas, as we have before remarked, have the same identical claim to validity for things in themselves, that any one of them has. If the validity of one be admitted, that of all the rest must be. This Hegel saw. He saw, too, in the systems of all his predecessors, some one idea of Reason at least, assumed as valid for things in themselves, and not, as required by the assumption which all held in common, as the mere law of thought. As, therefore, Fichte, to escape this difficulty, had taken away an object, admitted as real in the system of Kant; and Schelling, to escape similar difficulties, had taken away all subjects but one, admitted in the system of his predecessor, and had resolved all realities into one substance, the Infinite and Absolute; so Hegel, to escape the difficulties common to the systems of all his predecessors, took away subjects of every kind, even the Infinite and Absolute, and resolved all realities into pure thought, without a subject. Thought without cause, object, or subject, is the system of Hegel. Hegel is to Kant what Condillac is to Locke. Each is the true exponent of the logical consequences of the fundamental principles of his master. The natural progress of the school of Locke is, through materialism into Atheism. The natural progress of the system of Kant is, first to universal Spiritualism, then to Pantheism, and then to absolute. nihilism, as consummated in the school of Hegel. This result follows as a logical consequent of the assumption, that ideas of Reason are invalid for things in themselves. For no system but that of Hegel can be found which does not, in some form or other, assume the validity of some one or more of these ideas, that of substance and attribute especially. Of the philosophy now under consideration, one of its author's own countrymen has well observed, that "Hegel's philoso phy is nothing in itself and by itself, nor was its author in himself, but beside himself." One thing is quite certain, that neither himself, nor his followers, ever, in reality, believed his own system. Whatever else they held, there was one thing which none of them ever doubted, to wit, that Hegel was a most profound thinker. He was no thinker at all, if his own system be true. As the profoundest thinker of the sons of earth, his disciples now worship him; and they worship him not as a great thought, but as a real, substantial existence, often comparing him with the Son of God, and giving the superiority to the former. REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEMS ABOVE PRESENTED. Each of the systems above described has difficulties peculiar to itself, and all have others in common with each; difficulties perfectly subversive of the systems which involve them. Difficulties in the System of Kant. The system of Kant could account for the commencement of knowledge, or for the beginning of the action of the faculty of cognition. It admitted of two realities, the subject, the knowing faculty, and the unknown cause of the action of that faculty. Without the admission of two such realities, Kant maintained that we cannot account for the faculty of cognition being called into exercise. In this way he could account for the faculty of cognition being called into exercise. accounted for it, however, on an assumption of the validity of ideas of Reason, for things in themselves, to wit, that of cause and effect. This assumption, as we have seen, is in direct opposition to the fundamental principles of his philosophy. He Further, the entire system of Kant is built upon the assumption, that knowledge has a real beginning, and real progress. But this admits and affirms the reality of time, as something in itself, a principle fundamentally denied in the philosophy of Kant. Thus the entire analysis of the human Intelligence given by him, is based upon the assumption which his philosophy denies, and which he, in his Critick of Pure Reason, page 41, denies, as really true, that human cognitions have real beginning and progress. The entire system of Kant also presents us with the strangest paralogism ever met with in the history of philoso phy. His system rests on the formal assumption, that the Intelligence gives us nothing whatever as it is in itself. He then persuades himself, and endeavors to persuade the world, that by this very Intelligence, he has discovered and proclaimed the real form of the procedure of the Intelligence in all cognitions. Now, if the Intelligence, as this philosophy affirms, gives us nothing as it is in itself, then all philosophy becomes the perfection of absurdity. No wonder, then, that the disciples of Kant soon saw, that his whole system presented a rude mass of palpable contradictions; and while they themselves retained the fundamental assumption on which the whole building rested, they fled from the crumbling fabric, to build up others equally foundationless, and, like their predecessors, doomed to fall by their own weight. Difficulties inherent in the Systems of Fichte and Schelling. By taking away all external existences, Fichte and Schelling escaped one difficulty involved in the system of Kant; at least, they escaped it in the particular form in which it there presented itself. It remains to be seen whether they have perfected a system free from difficulties similar to those met with in that of their great master and predecessor, or free from difficulties less self-destructive. We have seen above, that each of their systems involved a contradiction of the fundamental principle common to them all. There are other difficulties, of a character peculiar to these systems, to which special attention is now invited. One of the difficulties, to which I refer, relates to the commencement of the action of the Intelligence according to the fundamental principles of these systems. In taking away the external cause, it becomes evident, at once, that knowledge could not, in the first instance, begin with an affirmation of the Intelligence. This would be inconceivable. It would be to suppose the Intelligence to begin to act without a cause for its action. The first movement of the mind, therefore, must be found somewhere else. Where should this movement occur? It must be an act of the Will, postulating the assumption, I am I, according to Fichte, and, I am, according to Schelling. Now such an act, without a prior act of the Intelligence, is absolutely inconceivable and inexplicable, by any of the known laws of mind. Acts of Will, in any direction, without an antecedent affirmation of the Intelligence presenting an object towards which the Will may act, are inexplicable and inconceivable. Thus, in the failure of the fundamental assumption, the entire systems built upon that assumption fall, of course. I will now notice a fundamental assumption, peculiar to the system of Schelling, and adopted from him, probably, by Coleridge. I will give the assumption in the language of the latter philosopher: "Des Cartes, speaking as a naturalist, and in imitation of Archimedes, said, Give me matter and motion, and I will construct you the universe. We must of course understand him to have meant: I will render the construction of the universe intelligible. In the same sense the transcendental philosopher says, Grant me a nature having two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences, with the whole system of their representations, to rise up before you. Every other science pre-supposes Intelligence as already existing and complete. The philosopher contemplates it in its growth, and, as it were, represents its history to the mind, from its birth to its maturity." Again, "It is equally clear, that two equal forces acting in opposite directions, both being finite, and each distinguished from the other by its direction only, must neutralize or reduce each other to inaction. Now the transcendental philosophy demands, first, that two forces should be conceived which counteract each other by their essential nature; not only in consequence of the accidental direction of each, but as prior to all direction, nay, as the primary forces from which the conditions of all possible directions are derivative and deducible: secondly, that these forces should be assumed to be both alike infinite, both alike indestructible. The problem will then be to discover the result or product of two such forces, as distinguished from the result of those forces which are finite, and derive their difference solely from the circumstance of these directions. When we have formed a scheme or outline of these two different kinds of force, and of their different results by the process of discursive reasoning, it will then remain for us to elevate the Thesis from notional to actual, by contemplating intuitively this one power, with its two inherent, indestructible, yet counteracting forces, and the results or generations to which their interpenetration gives existence, in the living principle, and in the process of our own self-conscious ness. Now in the name of the universal Intelligence, we may ask ; and we may ask it at the risk of being told that the "philosophic |