Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

not fully satisfactory to the mind. If the question in respect to the Divine existence is not settled to the full satisfaction of the mind, the proof pertaining to each particular attribute will be in a corresponding degree unsatisfactory, and a feeling of uncertainty, in respect to that which the mind really knows with more certainty than almost anything else, a feeling somewhat at least bordering on scepticism, will creep over the mind, in relation to the whole system. Now there are, as it appears to me, three prominent errors of method in the prevailing treatises on theology, in respect to the subject before us.

The first is the fact, as stated above, that the Divine existence is not recognized as a truth already known and affirmed by the human Intelligence, and that the only proper method of demonstration of that truth, is by a method purely psychological, that is, by falling back upon the conviction itself, and finding the real facts on which it truly rests, in the depths of the Intelligence. When the Intelligence has affirmed any truth with profound conviction on any subject, the only real demonstration of that truth which can be presented to the mind, is to throw into distinct visibility, the real facts in view of which the reality of the truth was affirmed. Now theologians, instead of recognizing this fact in respect to theology, have gone beyond the circle of the mind's convictions, to find some facts in the external world from which, as a logical consequent, the truth of the Divine existence would follow. The mind of course returns from its researches more unsatisfied than when, from the centre of real illumination, it wandered abroad in search of light.

Another error which I repeat here, is not recognizing the two distinct and prominent forms in which the idea of God is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit: God the unconditioned and absolute cause, and God the Infinite and Perfect. Hence considerations perfectly demonstrative of the validity of the idea in one form, but which are without force in reference to the other, are adduced without discrimination of their real bearing. The Mind perceiving that the argument has no real weight to prove the existence of God in the form in which it expects it to prove it, assumes that it has no real bearing upon the subject, and thus becomes dissatisfied with the whole argument on the subject. This is a natural consequence. Hence many a student in theology has had occasion to confess that he never doubted the reality

of the Divine existence, till he turned to the arguments adduced in books and the theological recitation room to prove it.

The other error is in attempting to deduce the evidence of the infinity and perfection of God from the extent and laws of the world of Matter, instead of that of Mind. On this point I have already said so much that I shall not enlarge here.

2. The second, and the great error of method, in the common (so called) systems of theology, is an almost, if not quite, total want of scientific development. I know of no professed system of theology, the mode of presentation and development of which accords with any proper conception of a system of truth, much less with a true definition of real science. There is and can be no real system where there are not one or more great central truths or principles which impart unity and harmony to the whole. There is and can be

no such thing as a system evolved in such a manner as to realize the idea of science, in which the relations and properties of a given subject are not systematically evolved in the light of fundamental ideas.

Now where is the system of theology that is developed in any degree of conformity to the idea of system or science as above announced, or to any other proper definition of the idea of a system scientifically expressed? I know of no such system. What is the mode of procedure in such systems? The first thing proposed is to prove the existence of God. The next step is to take up each particular attribute, and by a separate course of argument, prove that such attribute is to be affirmed of him. Now this can be shown in a moment to be a most unphilosophical procedure.

In the first place, if the proposition first proved, to wit, God exists, does not in itself involve a real demonstration of the reality of his particular attributes, the proposition absolutely amounts to nothing; for it is a demonstration of the existence of a God without attributes—that is, the existence of no God at all. For a God without attributes is, in fact, no God.

If, on the other hand, the demonstration of the proposition, God exists, does involve in itself a corresponding proof of his particular attributes, then the only proper subsequent scientific procedure is, to evolve analytically each particular attribute as involved in the proposition already demonstrated.

To attempt in any other form, by a separate course of argumentation, a subsequent demonstration of each particular attribute, is a most unphilosophical and unscientific procedure a procedure which really, as shown above, nullifies all that went before.

Further, when the proposition, God exists, is proposed as a subject of demonstration, the first thing to be done is to define the terms used, especially the term God. Now if this term is not so defined as to involve his particular attributes, the term means nothing, and the demonstration is null and void. If the term is so defined as to evolve the particular attributes, then, when the proposition, God exists, has been demonstrated, the reality of each attribute is involved in the demonstration, and the only subsequent procedure really philosophic, scientific, and reasonable, is to evolve each particular attribute as thus involved in what has already been proven. To attempt, by a separate course of argumentation, to demonstrate the reality of any particular attribute, is to confess the futility of the previous demonstration. In fact, if the common procedure is the correct one, we have not proved that God, according to any proper definition of the term, exists, till we have presented a formal demonstration of the reality of each particular attribute. For a God destitute of any essential attribute is not God.

In proving the proposition, God exists, according to the two forms above stated, to wit, God the unconditioned and absolute cause, and God the Infinite and Perfect, we have done what every demonstration should do—that is, demonstrated a proposition which involves every particular attribute, and which has given us a great central position, from which the entire system of theology may receive a purely scientific development. The whole sphere of vision becomes as luminous as heavenly light.

3. The third general defect that I notice in the common systems of theology, is the total unsatisfactoriness of the arguments adduced to prove the reality of particular attributes. Suppose we have fully satisfied our minds of the validity of the two forms of the idea of God presented in this Chapter. Our attention is turned to a particular attribute. We see at once that we must affirm this attribute of God, or deny of him the prerogative of unconditioned and absolute cause, or impute to him finiteness and imperfection. The reality of the attribute as a characteristic of God, thus

becomes demonstrably evident. In affirming the attribute of him, every department of our nature is satisfied. The demands of the logical department are fully met. The scientific and philosophical ideas also receive a most full and delightful realization.

On the other hand, let us suppose, that having proved the proposition, God exists, we attempt, by a new and separate course of argumentation, to prove the reality of some particular attribute-the Divine omnipotence, for example. What should we naturally expect from such a procedure? Just what, in fact, we shall find-arguments perfectly unsatisfactory and inconclusive. The nature of the argument, as presented in a system of natural theology, may be thus stated, and these present the strongest arguments that can be met with:

1. The fact and the extent of creation.

2. The fact that God now sustains and governs the universe, particularly the physical.

Now, here are effects undeniably finite. From them it is argued, that their cause must be infinite, a palpable violation of a fundamental principle of logic, a principle universally admitted, to wit, that no legitimate conclusion is more extensive than the premises from which it is deduced. Hence it is, that the Mind does not and cannot perceive any force in the argument; and as this is the best that can be adduced in the same direction, a feeling of dissatisfaction and doubt arises in respect to all arguments to prove the divine Infinity and Perfection.

When the testimony of Inspiration is adduced in confirmation of such arguments, the feeling of dissatisfaction experienced in the presence of the first attaches to that of the second, and the result very probably is, that feelings more allied to scepticism than joyful confidence and faith, creep over the mind, and it may be, mar its peace and purity.

4. I mention one other difficulty. According to the common method of developing truth in theology, we have no proper tests which we can apply to determine the question, whether any particular attribute shall be affirmed of God, or the particular form in which it shall be affirmed. If we assume the idea of God as the unconditioned and absolute cause, and God the Infinite and Perfect, as the great central idea about which the entire system of truth pertaining to God, his character and government, is to re

volve, and in the light of which each particular truth is to be explained, we have a plain and sure test, a standard to which we can apply in all cases in determining what attributes and characteristics we shall affirm or deny of God, and the light in which we shall affirm or deny them. The great question to be asked in each instance is, Must we affirm this particular attribute, and must we affirm it in this or that particular form, or either deny of God his prerogative, as the cause unconditioned and absolute, or assert of him finiteness or imperfection?

But according to the common methods of theologizing, when we take up any particular attribute, we have nothing in what has gone before, or in what is to follow, to which we can appeal as a standard or test, to determine what attributes, or what forms of particular attributes, we are to affirm or deny of God. The entire system of theology is thus rendered vague and indefinite, and the truth makes no deep and palpable impression upon the mind. No other result can follow from such a method of evolving the truths of theology.

Use of the common Treatises on Natural Theology.

The question is often asked, Of what real utility are the common treatises on natural theology-such, for example, as that one so celebrated of Dr. Paley? To me such treatises appear really worse than useless, if presented as grounds of proof of the existence of God, particularly as the Infinite and Perfect. How many persons have said, "I never doubted the reality of the Divine existence, till I sought for a proof of it in Paley's Natural Theology." If, on the other hand, such works are referred to, as sources of beautiful and striking illustrations of the "handiwork of God," thus awaking in us a sense of the Divine wisdom and glory, they may be read with great interest and profit. This, as I conceive, is their appropriate, and only appropriate use.

CONCLUSION.

I must here take my leave, for the present, of the inquirer after truth in this field of vast and solemn thought and contemplation. If we were never to return to it again, to renew our researches, I should part with him with the deepest regret. If, however, the inquirer has become imbued with

« AnteriorContinuar »