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tion, on account of the distinctness and correctness with which the subject is there presented.

"Consciousness," he says, "is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is common, universal, and spontaneous Consciousness.

"This definition may appear to some an identical proposition-the mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows emotions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels, and wills. Therefore, we would say further:

"By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not, if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but the mind knowing itself in these."

In the above definitions the subject is presented with such distinctness, and correctness, that I shall attempt no particular definition of my own. In the exercise of Consciousness, we are not only aware of some mental state, or exercise, but we know ourselves, in that state, as the subjects of it. In every exercise of thought, feeling, and willing, we not only know what these states are, but know ourselves in them, as exercising or pursuing them, and as the subjects of them. Hence all mental phenomena, as given in Consciousness, are expressed in propositions like the following ;-I think, I feel, I will;-the mental phenomena being given, together with the self, the I, as the subject of them.

In every act of Self-Consciousness, also, three terms are given; the particular phenomenon, the I, or self, as its subject, and something not ourselves, as its object, or cause. In Consciousness, we find ourselves, and all external objects, as distinct from ourselves.

A remark, which I deem of special importance to make here, is this. In Consciousness, we not only know mental phenomena as they are, but what is in reality implied in such knowledge, we know also the fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of such phenomena. If we could merely know, by Consciousness, mental phenomena, and not also their distinguishing characteristics, we could never classify and arrange such phenomena as the basis of important con

clusions in the science of Mind. Whatever intelligent affirmations we can make respecting ourselves, as beings capable of thinking, feeling, and willing, we must affirm, on the exclu sive authority of the characteristics of such phenomena, characteristics perceived and affirmed by Consciousness.

Self-Consciousness conditioned on Reason, but not a function of Reason.

The exercise of Self-Consciousness, contemplated as a particular form or determination of Simple Consciousness, is conditioned on the prior exercise of the Reason. It is by Reason, as we have already seen, that we know that phenomenon supposes substance, or a subject, and that each particular phenomenon supposes a particular subject. But for Reason, therefore, whatever mental phenomena might be given in Consciousness, we could not know, that, for such phenomena, any subject whatever is supposed. Simple Consciousness gives us mental phenomena. Self-Consciousness, a particular form, or determination of the former, connects such phenomena with the subject, the reality of which Reason has affirmed, and connects them in the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. While, therefore, Self-Consciousness is conditioned on the Reason, the former, as a function of the Intelligence, is clearly distinguishable from the latter. This is further evident from a single consideration. Reason is the organ of à priori, that is, universal and necessary truths. This is its exclusive sphere. All the affirmations of Consciousness, even in the form called Self-Consciousness, bear the characteristics of contingency. A sound philosophy, therefore, will not fail, as philosophers sometimes have done, to distinguish these different functions of the Intelligence from each other.

Natural, or spontaneous, and philosophical, or reflective Consciousness.

Consciousness, in its simple spontaneous form, is common to all mankind, in the natural development of their Intelligence. In the language of Cousin, it is, "in all men a natural process." Every individual is accustomed to use the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c. All persons are accustomed, also, to speak of themselves, as conscious of particular states, or exercises of mind. This shows, that they not only are conscious of their mental exercises, but also are

aware of the function of the Intelligence exercised under such circumstances. All men, also, in the spontaneous developments of Consciousness, clearly distinguish themselves as subjects of mental phenomena, from all external causes, or objects of the same. They may not be able technically to express this distinction with the clearness and definiteness that a philosopher would. They may not be able to understand at first, the meaning of the terms he would employ to express that distinction. Still it is, to them, a no less palpable reality, than to him.

Now Consciousness, which is thus seen to be," in all men, a natural process, some," in the language of the philosopher above named, "elevate this natural process to the degree of an art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second Consciousness—a free re-production of the first; and as Consciousness gives all men an idea of what is passing in them, so reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge of everything which falls under the eye of Consciousness." Reflection, or philosophic Consciousness, is simple or natural Consciousness directed by the Will, in the act of careful attention to the phenomena of our own minds. As natural Consciousness is one of the characteristics which distinguishes man from the brute, so philosophic Consciousness is the characteristic which distinguishes the mental philosopher from the rest of mankind.

The above remarks may be illustrated by a reference to two common forms of observation in respect to external material substances. The phenomena of such substances all. mankind alike notice, and to some degree reason about. It is the natural philosopher, however, who attentively observes these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their fundamental characteristics, as the basis of philosophic classification, generalization, &c. The same holds true in respect to the two forms of Consciousness under consideration. Mental phenomena all men are conscious of, and all men, to a greater or less degree, are accustomed to reason about. The philosopher, however, by laborious efforts of self reflection, most critically attends to these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their characteristics, classifying and arranging them according to philosophic principles, and thus determining the powers and laws of mental operations. In simple Consciousness, we have a knowledge of whatever passes in our minds. In reflection, we have the same phenomena

classified and generalized, according to fundamental characteristics thus perceived and affirmed.

Process of classification and generalization in Reflection, illustrated

I will now present a short illustration of this process, for the purpose of elucidating the proper method of questioning Consciousness, although in so doing I shall allude to a mental process of a secondary character, hereafter to be explained. The mind perceives, we will suppose, some object, an external material substance, denominated body. With the perception there arises the conception of the object as existing somewhere-in space. The proposition, this body exists somewhere, or in space, falls under the eye of Consciousness. It is taken up by reflection, and by the process of abstraction, hereafter to be described, the two elements constituting the proposition are separated from each other. Thus the mind obtains two distinct ideas, that of body and space. These two ideas are now separately considered and marked with their respective characteristics of contingency and necessity. Again, some event is perceived. With this perception arises the conviction that it had a cause. The proposition, this event had a cause, falls under the eye of Consciousness. It also is taken up by reflection, and by the process above described, two new ideas, that of event and causation, marked by their respective characteristics of contingency and necessity, are obtained. These two ideas now being in the mind, by the laws of association, the other two, above referred to, are suggested and ranged with them in two distinct classes, as contingent and necessary ideas. Here we have the process of classification. Now on a further examination of the particular ideas comprehended under either of the above classes, some new characteristic common to them all, may be discovered; as, for example, all contingent ideas may be found also to have the characteristic of relative. This becomes a general fact, and we have it in the process of generalization. The Intelligence now takes up these phenomena, originally given by Consciousness, and then analyzed, arranged, and generalized by reflection, and gives us the powers and susceptibilities of the Mind, as indicated by these phenomena, &c.

Functions of Consciousness.

Such are the nature and functions of Consciousness, together with the knowledge derived through it.

1. In its original spontaneity, it gives us all the phenomena of the mind.

2. In connection with the Reason, it gives us ourselves as the subjects of these phenomena, and as distinguished from all existences around us, perceived or apprehended.

3. In reflection it gives the same phenomena, analyzed, arranged, and generalized.

4. From these data, the Intelligence gives us the nature, faculties, susceptibilities, and laws of mental operation, indicated by these phenomena.

Necessity of relying implicitly upon the testimony of Con

sciousness.

In the Introduction, a proof of the possibility of mental philosophy, as a science, was attempted. On this point I shall add nothing more here. I will make a few remarks upon the necessity of relying with implicit confidence upon the testimony of Consciousness, as the basis of all conclusions pertaining to the science of Mind. The great reason, as I suppose, why many individuals are prejudiced against mental philosophy, as a peculiarly difficult, obscure, and uncertain science, is a secret distrust of the validity of the facts which lie at the basis of the science; in other words, in the credibility of the witness through whom the facts are obtained. In respect to physical science, no such distrust is felt. Mankind generally rest with implicit confidence in the validity of Sense, with regard to external, material substances. With equal assurance do they, consequently, rest on any conclusions legitimately drawn from such phenomena respecting the nature and laws of the substances revealed in those phenomena. Now, why should we not repose the same faith in the validity of the testimony of Consciousness, in respect to those phenomena which constitute the basis of an infinitely more important science, the knowledge of Mind, that we do in our senses in respect to external, material phenomena ? Of these two sciences, that which is by far of the highest concernment to us, we should not suppose would rest upon the most uncertain basis. If we look also at the real facts of the case, can any one tell us, or even conceive of the

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