Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

accord to time and space a necessary reality, as laws of sensible intuition, that is, of external perception, and to deny all reality of them, as realities in themselves.

2. Relation of the Ideas of Time and Space to Phenomena.

Another error of this philosopher consists in representing the ideas of time and space as laws of sensible intuition, that is, of external perception, and not as categories of the Understanding. They are, Kant maintains, the "forms of the phenomena of external Sense, or the aspects in which those phenomena present themselves to our Senses." They not only determine the forms of phenomena, but alone render perception possible to us. Now a moment's reflection will convince us that these ideas have no relation whatever to perception, external or internal, but exist in us exclusively as laws of the Understanding, or notion-forming power.

In the first place, these ideas, instead of existing in the mind prior to, and thus determining the form of phenomena, are chronologically, as we have seen, developed in the Intelligence subsequent to phenomena, external and internal. We must first perceive extension, for example, and thus form a notion of something extended, before we can conceive of space in which such objects exist. It is not, therefore, as this philosopher maintains, through the idea of space that objects present themselves to us, in perception, as extended. On the other hand, without the perception of extension, the idea of space, as the place of the object perceived, would not be developed at all. The same illustration holds equally in regard to time. This idea does not first exist in the mind, and then determine our perception of events, as simultaneous or successive. The prior perception of succession, on the other hand, developes the idea. Perception, in all forms and degrees, exists wholly independent of the ideas of time and space. The mistake of Kant, in this case, consists in putting the antecedent for the consequent.

Equally manifest is it, on the other hand, that these ideas do not give form to perception, but, as laws of thought, determine the characteristics of perceptions or notions. When we perceive or think of phenomena, and of substances also, then, as the ideas of time and space are developed, we put the inquiries, Where? when? how long? &c., in respect to them. We do not perceive, but conceive or think

of objects, as in time and space. The ideas of time and space are, therefore, categories, not of Sense, but of the Understanding.

II.-Identity and Diversity, Resemblance and Difference.

An essential element of our ideas of substance, is that of identity and diversity. As the relation between substances and their phenomena is that of necessity, a necessary law of conceptions, or of notions, is that substances are as their phenomena. Hence the two great necessary laws which determine our notions of substances, to wit, similar phenomena, suppose similar substances; dissimilar phenomena suppose dissimilar substances. Under the categories of Identity and Diversity, Resemblance and Difference, all classification, as we shall see, in a subsequent chapter, proceeds. The conception of the likeness or unlikeness of an object to something else, enters, as an essential element, into all our notions of it. Perhaps some might be inclined to place the above ideas under a category hereafter to be considered-that of Relation. They are no less distinct from it, however, than either of those next to be mentioned.

III.—The idea of a Whole, as including its Parts, or Parts in reference to the Whole.

Every notion pertains to its object as a whole, including parts, or as a part relatively to a whole. This is a universal and necessary law of all Understanding-conceptions, or notions. Thus, when we conceive of the Mind, we necessarily conceive of it as a whole, including the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will; or we think of some department of mental operation relatively to the whole Mind. If we would form a notion of any material substance, any body, the same holds true in a more specific and special sense. Body, as given in all Understanding-conceptions, or notions, is a whole, a compound, constituted of simple parts.

KANT'S ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

According to this philosopher, all transcendental ideas, that is, all the necessary elements of our notions of substances around us, involve palpable contradictions. Two distinct and opposite propositions are susceptible of equal and absolute demonstration from these ideas. For example, the two

following propositions, which are perfectly contradictory to each other, are equally susceptible of demonstration.

1. "Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists everywhere nothing but the simple, or that which is compounded of it."

2. "No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists not anywhere therein anything simple." The amount of the proof of the first, which he denominates the Thesis, is this: If the compound is not made up of simple parts, then, if all composition were done away in thought, no compound part could remain; and as there is, in that case, none simple, nothing would remain, and, consequently, no compound would be given.

His proof of the second, denominated Anti-Thesis, is, that the simple, whatever it may be, must occupy space, and therefore be made up of parts existing externally to each other, and consequently compounded. The conception of the simple, which is not a compound of something which is itself compounded, is a contradiction, and of course an impossible conception. No simple, therefore, does or can exist. From the contradictions necessarily involved in the Thesis and Anti-Thesis above given, each of which, from the nature of Understanding-conceptions, he affirms, is susceptible of equal and absolute demonstration, he infers, as demonstrably evident, the non-reality of all material existences, such as we conceive of them; inasmuch as the supposition of their real existence involves contradictions perfectly synonymous with the affirmation, that the same thing, at the same time, may be and not be. In reply, I remark,

1. That the proposition, that that which is compounded must be made up of simple parts, is an intuition of Reason, and therefore incapable of demonstration, in the same sense that all other intuitions are. We may show, as in the Thesis above given, that the opposite proposition involves a contradiction, and that is all.

2. The conception of the simple is a pure idea of Reason, and not an Understanding-conception at all. The compound only is an object of perception, and consequently of Understanding-conceptions. All bodies, therefore, as the Underderstanding forms notions of them, must be compounded. Not so with the simple, as given by the Reason.

3. In his Anti-Thesis, Kant assumes the idea of the simple as an Understanding-conception, which, of course,

involves the idea of composition, and hence his boasted demonstration is nothing but a singular paralogism. If we assume that the idea of the simple is a notion, that is, that it is complex and not simple, then we have the contradictions presented by Kant in his Thesis and Anti-Thesis. Take away this assumption, and the contradictions wholly disappear. I believe that it can be shown that all the antinomies of pure Reason, as given by this philosopher, involve paralogisms similar to the one under consideration.

IV. The Category of Quantity.

Whenever we contemplate a notion which lies under any term whatever, we find that it always does and must refer to some one object, to a number or multitude of objects, or to a total race or class of objects. For example, the term man may be used to designate some one individual, or a plurality of men, or the total race of men. This is what is meant by the logical quantity of a notion or conception, and presents us with the category of Quantity-with its subcatagories, Unity, Plurality, and Totality. Under the first, we have the notion of an individual. Under the second, that of a number of individuals. Under the last, we have a multitude of individuals classed together as a total race, on the ground of common qualities. Whenever we inquire after the extent or logical quantity of any term, or of that of the notion which lies under that term, we ask in which of the senses above named is it to be taken?

The Category of Quantity distinct from that previously

considered.

At first thought, the category of Quantity may be regarded as identical with that previously considered. The ideas of whole and of parts, however, are correlative ideas. It is not so with those of unity and totality. A class supposes individuals; but the individual does not necessarily suppose a class. Totality, as distinguished from individuality, is distinct from a whole as distinguished from parts.

V.-Of Quality.

To complete and perfect our notions of substances, a fundamental inquiry arises, to wit, what is this substance? When we would answer the question pertaining to the nature of the object, but one thing is considered-the qualities of

the object. As it is a necessary intuition of Reason, that substance supposes quality, and that substances are as their qualities, hence arises the category of Quality.

In all distinct notions of an object, certain qualities are positively affirmed, others denied, and others affirmed in a limited degree, of the object. Thus, in our notions of an individual, for example, distinguished intellectual powers may be affirmed, prudence denied, and courage affirmed in a limited degree. This principle is observed when we would describe an object to others, for the purpose of conveying distinct conceptions of it to their minds. We designate the positive qualities which appear in it. We deny other qualities of it, which might appear, but do not. We then designate others which might appear in all its parts, or in a certain degree of perfection, but which appear only in a limited. degree. Thus the category of Quality presents itself in three forms, or sub-categories, those of Affirmation, Negation, and Limitation. When an object has been placed in the light of all these, then our notions of its nature are full and distinct.

VI.-Of Relation.

Another form in which objects are given to us in notions, or Understanding-conceptions, is their relations to other objects. According to Kant, the category of Relation also developes itself in three forms. When two objects are brought together for the purpose of comparing them with each other, we consider the question, what qualities inhere in one which do not in the other? Here we have the first sub-category of Relation, that of Inherence. Each substance is thus contemplated in its relations to its distinctive attributes or qualities.

Objects also are contemplated relatively to their powers of affecting other objects and determining their states, or their susceptibilities of being affected by such objects. The metals, for example, are conceived of, as susceptible of fusion from heat, and caloric as possessed of the power of producing such effects in metals. In the one case, we give our notions of the powers of substances, and in the other of their susceptibilities. Two substances also may be compared relatively to their powers and susceptibilities. Thus we have the relation, or sub-category of causality and dependence.

A third relation is that of reciprocity, denominated by

« AnteriorContinuar »