Kant the sub-category of Community. When objects, for example, mutually attract or repel each other, this relationship differs entirely from that of cause and effect. All objects in the universe around are, in some form or other, thus correlated to each other. The relation of employer and agent falls under the principle under consideration.

Such is the category of Relation. When we have contemplated objects till we know them, in the light of their comparative qualities, or attributes--in reference to their powers of affecting other objects, or of being affected by them and as they mutually and reciprocally affect each other, then our notions are complete, as far as the idea of relation is concerned.

VII.-Of Modality.

Every Understanding-conception respects its object, as a possible or impossible-a real or unreal existence-and as existing of necessity or contingently. These ideas enter, as necessary elements, into all our notions, and constitute what is denominated the modality of Understanding-conceptions. Suppose I convey the conception I have of some object, to any individual. He will naturally and necessarily inquire, Can such a thing be? Is it a reality? Does it exist of necessity, or contingently?

VIII. The Idea of Law.

When we have formed our notions of objects, in the light of the preceding principles, another inquiry of great importance arises, to wit, according to what law, or laws, do those powers act? The forms in which the nomological idea, as it is denominated by Prof. Tappan, developes itself are various, according to the nature of the objects to which it pertains, and the point of view in which the object is contemplated. Still, as a necessary element, it enters into, and determines the character of, all our notions of substances within and around us. When we come to speak of the Reason again, this idea, together with the conditions of its development, and the varied forms in which it appears will be the object of special remark. I deemed it important to simply refer to it here, on account of its omnipresent influence, in determining the character of all our Understanding-conceptions.

Such are the elements which enter into all our notions, or Understanding-conceptions. That the above analysis pre

sent us with real elements of such phenomena, there can be no doubt. But whether that analysis is complete, will be ascertained in the more perfect developments of mental science.

Conceptions as distinguished from Notions.

Conception, as commonly defined by philosophers, is a past perception recalled in Memory or Recollection. It is rather, as it appears to me, the recalling of the notion formed of the object when perceived. Perceptions may be renewed but not recalled. The conceptions of individuals will vary, as the notions which they formed of objects when perceived. The terms notion and conception are often used as synonymous.

A Fact often attending Perception.

It is a fact with which all are familiar, that when we unexpectedly meet an object before unknown to us, but which, in certain particulars, resembles one well known, we seem for a time to see the latter with perfect distinctness, The reason of this phenomenon I suppose to be this. Under such circumstances, the notion we have of the known object is recalled with such vividness, that it almost exclusively occupies the attention of the mind.

Mistake of Mr. Stewart.

According to this philosopher, in all conceptions, the absent object is, in the first instance, always believed to be present, as an object of direct perception. Universal consciousness affirms the error of such a dogma. The mistake of Mr. S. arose, as I suppose, from his definition of conception, that is, that it is a past perception recalled. If this were true, I do not see but we must, not only at first, but at all times, regard the object of our conception, as directly present.

Notions and Conceptions characterized as complete or incomplete, true or false.

In the former part of this Chapter, we have contemplated the elements, contingent and necessary, which enter into all Understanding-conceptions. It now remains to consider these phenomena in their relation to their objects. All Understanding-conceptions pertain to their objects, in

two important relations, as complete or incomplete, or as true or false.

Such conception is complete, when it represents all the elements really existing in the object. It is incomplete, when it fails to do this. Absolute completeness characterizes probably none of our conceptions.

An Understanding-conception is true, when it represents completely or incompletely, and attributes to the object, the real elements of the object, and nothing else. It is false, when it attributes to the object unreal elements, or denies of it what is real.

Two facts are obviously true from the above definitions. 1. A conception may be incomplete; and yet true, it being true when it attributes to the object nothing but what is real. Or a notion might be complete, and yet, in a certain sense, false; as it might attribute to the object all that is real, and something not real. 2. Conceptions may be wholly true, or wholly false; or partly true, and partly false. That is, they may attribute to their objects nothing but what is real, or nothing that is real; or they may attribute to them some things real, and some not real. Unmingled error seldom characterizes any of our conceptions.

Mistake of Coleridge in respect to the Understanding.

Coleridge defines the Understanding, as the "faculty of judging according to Sense," a definition which he copied from Kant and other German philosophers. According to such philosophers, the Understanding pertains only to external material substances. It has nothing to do with the subjective, with Mind.

Now this is a great error in philosophy. As a matter of fact, we form notions and conceptions of Mind as really as we do of anything not ourselves. Notions subjective as really exist, in Consciousness, as those which are objective. Nor can any reasons be assigned, why we should attribute the formation of the latter to one faculty of the Intelligence, and that of the former to another. The appropriate sphere of the Understanding is evidently. limited only by the Finite. Reason alone pertains to the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Universal. All other realities fall within the range of the Understanding.

CHAPTER VIII.

FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.

Abstraction.

ALL our notions, or Understanding-conceptions, are, as we have seen, complex, constituted of elements furnished by the primary faculties, Sense, Consciousness, and Reason. To make an abstraction of a notion is, in thought, on the ground of the ideas of resemblance and difference, to separate these elements from one another, giving special attention to some one, or more, or each of them in particular. Into our conceptions of body, for example, the elements of form, solidity, color, &c., enter. Now in the light of the ideas of resemblance and difference, the Intelligence perceives at once, that the element of solidity differs from that of form, and that of color from either of the others. In thought, therefore, either of these elements may be so separated from all of the rest, that it shall be the object of special observation. Thus our conceptions of each element of the object, and consequently our notions of the entire object, may become more or less distinct and complete.

Abstract Notions, what, and how formed?

When the Intelligence, in the sense above explained, makes abstraction of a particular element of an object or conception, it may, ever after, conceive and speak of that element without reference to the particular object from which it was abstracted. Then we have what is denominated an abstract notion, such as is designated by the terms redness, sweetness, hardness, &c.

General Notions, how formed.

Originally all Understanding-conceptions are particular.

From these, all notions, abstract and general, are formed. How is the general evolved from the particular? Let us suppose that, in conformity to the process above described, the Intellect has formed notions of two particular objects, mountains, for example. These two notions lie together under the eye of Consciousness. In the light of the idea of ⚫ resemblance and difference, the mind at once perceives that there are certain elements common to the two. Abstraction is made of these elements, and a third notion is formed, embracing them alone. Here is the first appearance of a general notion. When a third mountain is perceived, and a notion formed of that, the general notion undergoes a new modification, and now embraces those elements only common to the three. Thus the process of abstraction goes on, till the general notion pertains to those elements only common to all mountains. This same process takes place in all instances in which general notions are evolved from particular ones.

CLASSIFICATION.

The process of classification can now be readily explained. We will refer back to the case when two particular notions were in the mind, and the general was evolved from them. As soon as the notion last named appears, the two particulars are subsumed or classed under it. In the same manner every particular previously perceived is arranged under the general, in all the successive modifications which it subsequently undergoes.

Forms of Classification.

There are three distinct points of view from which objects are classified.

1. In view of general resemblances, they are classed, on the ground of common qualities, under general notions, such as man, animals, &c.

2. In view of some one quality without reference to resemblance in any other particular, they are classed under notions purely abstract, such as redness, whiteness, &c. We often class objects together, as white, hard, sweet, &c., without reference to their relations, in any other particulars.

3. Objects are classed together, in view of their correspondence to pure rational conceptions, such as a circle, square, right and wrong, &c.