judgment. So also when the Understanding combines the elements given by the primary faculties into notions, particular and general, that is one thing. When the Intelligence classes an individual under a general notion, in the affirmation, this is a man, an animal, &c.—that is quite another thing, an intellectual process entirely distinct from the formation of notions. In this last process we conceive, that is, combine intuitions. In the former, we judge.

As the function of the Intelligence by which we form notions is called the Understanding, so that by which we judge, that is, abstract, classify, and generalize, is denominated the Judgment.

Distinction between the Understanding and Judgment verified.

A single additional consideration will fully verify the distinction above made between the Understanding and Judgment. We often meet with individuals in whom the Understanding is strongly developed, and embraces a wide range of objects. Yet the same individuals may be almost totally wanting in respect to the faculty of Judgment. They conceive distinctly and vividly of objects presented, yet make no important discriminations between them. They will read a book, for example, and give a full and distinct account of what it contains, and yet appear to be none the wiser for what they know. They, as is commonly said of them, appear to know everything, and yet can make little use of their knowledge. They form notions of objects just as they present themselves, without making important discriminations between them. This is owing to the fact that the Understanding, which simply knows objects as they appear, is exercised, while the Judgment, which separates things that differ, and ranges together those that agree, and then abstracts, classifies, and generalizes our conceptions, or rather the objects of thought, is wanting or inactive.

On the other hand we meet with individuals who, with a very limited acquaintance with particular objects, yet possess a great amount of what is called practical wisdom. Their information is limited, yet what they know is analyzed, classified, and generalized. In other words, in such individuals the faculty of Judgment is fully developed.

Such considerations clearly show that the function of the Intelligence denominated Understanding is one thing, while that of the Judgment is quite another. With the facts upon

which the distinction under consideration is based, all men are familiar. They recognize readily the distinction between information and knowledge, between conceiving of objects, and in this sense knowing them, and making important discriminations between them. In short, the basis for the distinction between the Understanding and Judgment is laid in facts recognized by all men.

Observations of Kant.

The remarks of Kant upon the subject under consideration are so much to the point, that I will present one or two quotations from his Critick on the faculty of Judgment. "If the Understanding," he says, "in general be explained as the faculty of rules, the faculty of Judgment is that of subsuming under rules; that is to say, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule." Again: "The faculty of Judgment is a particular talent, which is not to be taught, but only exercised; and this, consequently, is the specialty of the so-called motherwit, the want of which no schooling can supply; for although this may offer to, and, as it were, graft upon a limited Understanding, rules in abundance borrowed from another mind, still the faculty of availing himself correctly of these must belong to the hearer himself: and no rule which we could prescribe to him with this intention is, under the deficiency of such a natural gift, secure from misuse. A physician, therefore, a judge, or politician, may have many excellent pathological, judicial, or political rules in his head, to such a degree that he himself may become therein a profound teacher, and yet in the application of them will easily make a mistake, either because he is deficient in natural Judgment (although not in Understanding), and certainly see the general in abstracto, but cannot distinguish whether a case in concreta, fall under it, or from this cause, that he has not sufficiently been trained by examples and real business to this judgment."

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Two characteristics, entirely distinct and opposite, of different individuals of distinguished minds, may very properly be alluded to here, as illustrating and confirming the distinction between the Understanding and Judgment above made. We often meet with individuals, public speakers, for example, distinguished for strong and vivid conceptions of whatever subject their minds are occupied with. Yet one of their

discourses shadowing forth some bold and grand conception, will contain elements manifestly contradictory to those contained in a prior discourse of a similar character. Yet the speaker himself appears wholly insensible of such contradiction. He contradicts himself, without at all being sensible of the fact. A bold and strong conception with such a mind is, of course, true, together with all the elements embraced in it.

The productions of other minds are distinguished not only for logical and scientific arrangement, but for the consistency and harmony of the elements introduced into one discourse with those introduced into others. Such individuals seldom, to use a phrase commonly applied in such cases, cross their own tracks, and if they do this at any time, they will perceive it quite as soon as others.

How shall we account for such diversities? The answer is, that in the first instance, the Understanding, and frequently the Imagination, are strongly developed, while there is a deficiency of Judgment. In the latter cases, there is a strong development of the faculty last named. Now, phenomena so diverse and opposite necessarily suppose faculties fundamentally distinct from each other.

Relations of the Understanding and Judgment.

Having shown the distinction between these faculties, it now remains, in the conclusion of the present Chapter, to show the relations between them. The Judgment pre-supposes the Understanding. The former can analyze, abstract, classify, and generalize only what is furnished by the latter. Understanding might exist without Judgment; but the latter cannot exist, or rather cannot act, without the former.

The Understanding also not only precedes, but succeeds the action of the Judgment. When the Judgment has abstracted, analyzed, classified, and generalized objects of the Understanding, the latter faculty then combines into its conceptions of such objects all the discriminations of the former faculty pertaining to them. When, for example, we have passed a judgment upon any individual, affirming that he belongs to a particular cl 3, that judgment, ever after, enters as an essential element into our conceptions of him. This is universally true of all judgments and notions.

CHAPTER IX.

ASSOCIATION.

Term defined.

"THAT one thought is often suggested to the mind by another, and that the sight of one external object often recalls former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are facts," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, "which are perfectly familiar, even to those who are least disposed to speculate concerning the principles of our nature." This is what is meant by the term Association. It is that principle of our minds by which past thoughts and states are recalled, and revived, through the influence of present perceptions, thoughts and feelings. This law of the human mind was denominated by the old philosophers, "Association of ideas." By Dr. Brown it was denominated "Suggestion." By others, it is designated by the simple term, Association.

Term Association, why preferred.

I prefer the latter term to either of the former, because it alone expresses all the phenomena which require consideration, when treating of the subject before us. We find by experience, that not only thoughts and events are associated, but thoughts, events, and feelings also. The term Association of ideas, can be properly applied to ideas only. The same is true of Suggestion. An idea or event cannot properly be said to suggest feelings. Thoughts and events may be said to revive feelings; and feelings may be said to suggest thoughts and events. Association is the term, and the only term, which can properly be applied to all these different classes of phenomena.

The Associating Principle not without law.

Although the Mind is so constituted, that certain states

follow certain other states, these phenomena, as philosophers have long since observed, not only do not follow each other at random, but are known to follow some one or more fixed law or laws. To ascertain and illustrate the operation of these laws, has been considered one of the great problems in Intellectual Philosophy; and has accordingly occupied a conspicuous place in almost every treatise upon the science. Mr. Hume, I believe, was the first philosopher who attempted to settle definitely the number of these laws. According to this philosopher, they are all reduced to three: Resemblance, Cause and Effect, and Contiguity in time and place. Others have since added that of Contrast.

Law of Association stated and defined.

Dr. Brown is the first, and the only philosopher that I have met with, who has suggested the inquiry, whether all the laws of Association may not be reduced to one common principle, or law. The question, however, he barely suggests, without attempting to illustrate, or confirm it. I will give the passage to which I refer, as it will afford an opportunity to develop the principle which I shall endeavor to illustrate, and establish, as the great and only law of Association: "All Suggestions," [Associations,] 66 as I conceive, may, if our analysis be sufficiently minute, be found to depend on prior co-existence, or at least on such immediate proximity as is itself, very probably, a modification of coexistence. For this very nice reduction, however, we must take in the influence of the emotions, and other feelings, that are different from ideas; as when one object suggests an analogous object, by the influence of an emotion or sentiment, which each may have separately produced before, and which is therefore common to both." The author appears, as you will readily perceive, to use the term co-existence, in two senses, to wit: when two ideas have existed in the mind, or two objects have been perceived by it at the same time, and when they have existed in connection with similar states of mind, which states are consequently common to them both. Now, the proposition which I shall endeavor to illustrate and establish, is this, that all the phenomena of Association may be reduced to this last-mentioned principle, co-EXISTENCE with the same, or similar feelings, or states of mind. If any perception, or thought, induces feelings similar to those which have co-existed with other