debts which he may have been compelled to pay in consequence of that decision of the same supreme court, which declares those laws, also, to be violations of the federal compact. It is certainly not quite so reasonable as it would be, to pretend that all who have hitherto been debarred by the operation of the grant to Livingston and Fulton, from the use of patent inventions and coasting licences, have just claims to compensation, out of the state treasury, or the profits of the monopoly. Albany, March 12, 1824. OPINION OF THE Supreme Court of the United States, ON THE STEAM-BOAT CASE, Delivered by Chief Justice MARSHALL, March 2, 1824. THIS is a writ of error to a decree of the highest court of law or equity in the State of New-York, affirming a decree pronounced by the Chancellor of that State. The Legislature of New-York has enacted several laws for the purpose of securing to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of that state, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years, which has not yet expired; and has authorised the Chancellor to award an injunction, restraining any person whatever from navigating those waters with boats of that description. This bill was filed by Aaron Ogden, claiming as assignee of Livingston and Fulton, suggesting that Thomas Gibbons, the plaintiff in error, was in possession of two steam-boats, the Stoudinger and Bellona, which were actually employed in running between New-York and Elizabethtown in New-Jersey, in violation of the exclusive privilege conferred on the plaintiff, and praying an injunction to restrain the said Gibbons from using the said boats, or any others propelled by fire or steam, in navigating the waters within the territory of New-York. The injunction having been awarded, the answer of Gibbons was filed, in which he stated that the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed, according to the act of Congress, to carry on the coasting trade of the United States; and insisted on his right, in virtue of that license, to navigate the waters between Elizabethtown and New-York, the acts of the Legislature of New-Yok notwithstanding. The Chancellor perpetuated the injunction, being of opinion that the acts conferring the privilege were not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, and were valid. This decree was affirmed, in the court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors, which is the highest tribunal before which the cause could be carried in the state. The plaintiff in error contends that this decree is erroneous, because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains, are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States. They are said to be repugnant 1st. To that clause in the constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce. 2d. To that which authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The state of New-York maintains the constitutionality of these laws; and their Legislature, their Council of Revision, and their Judges, have repeatedly concurred in this opinion. It is supported by great names, by names which have all the titles to consideration that virtue, intelligence, and office, can bestow. No tribunal can approach the decision of this question, without feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which is sustained by such authority; but it is the province of this court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly; and the Judges must exercise, in the examination of the subject, that understanding which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that independence which the people of the United States expect from this department of the government. As preliminary to the very able discussions of the Constitution, which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situation of these states anterior to its formation. It has been said, that they were sovereign; were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government-when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, dePated to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character, in which the states appear, underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected. This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people of their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution Which gives countenance in this rule ? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, congress is authorized "to make all laws which stall be necessary and proper" for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they con- ` tend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which, the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent, then we cannot preceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor if retained by himself, or, which ca enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investmen of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agens, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred. The words are "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navi gation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more: It is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter. If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen; yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government— has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce" to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late. If the opinion that "commerce," as the word is used in the constitution, comprehends navigation also, require any additional confirmation, that additional confirmation is, we think, furnished by the words of the instrument itself. It is a rule of construction acknowledged by all, that the exceptions from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from a granted power that which was not grante that which the words of the grant could not comprehend. If, then there are in the constitution, plain exceptions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, it is proof that those who made these exceptions, and prescribed these inhibitions, understood the power to which they applied as being granted. The 9th section of the 1st article declares, that " no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one state over those of another." This clause cannot be understood as applicable to those laws only which are passed for purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied to commercial regulations; and the most obvious preference which can be given to one port over another in regulating commerce, relates to navigation. But the subsequent part of the sentence is still more explicit. It is, "nor shall vessels bound to or from one |