corrupt nature; because it is not as probable that all men should sin as that one man should—the odds against it being as a million, or rather ten thousand millions, to one. Either, therefore, we must allow that mankind are more inclined to evil than to good, or we must maintain a supposition so highly improbable as comes very near a flat impossibility.

And thus much you yourself cannot but allow: "The reasoning may hold good where all circumstances agree to make the probability equal with regard to every individual in this supposed million." And how can the probability be other than equal, if every individual be as wise and as good as Adam? "But be it equal or no," you say, "the case is not to be estimated by the laws of equal probability, but of infection. For when sin is once entered into a body of men it goes on, not according to the laws of chance" (is this precisely the same with equal probability ?), "but the laws, as I may say, of infection." But how came sin to enter into a body of men? That is the very question. Supposing, first, a body of sinners, sin "may assume the nature of a contagion." But the difficulty lies against supposing any body of sinners at all. You say, indeed, "One sinner produces another, as the serpent drew in Eve: the first sin and sinner being like a 'little leaven which leavens the whole lump."" All this I can understand, supposing our nature is inclined to evil. But if not, why does not one good man produce another, as naturally as one sinner produces another? And why does not righteousness spread as fast and as wide among mankind as wickedness? Why does not this "leaven leaven the whole lump" as frequently, as readily, and as thoroughly as the other? These laws of infection, so called, will therefore stand you in no stead. For, to bring the matter still more to a point, suppose Adam and Eve newly infected by sin; they had then none to infect, having no child. Afterward they repented, and found mercy. Then Cain was born. Now, surely, neither Adam nor Eve would infect him, having suffered so severely for their own sin; which, therefore, they must needs guard him against. How, then, came he to be a sinner? "O, by his own choice; as Seth was righteous." Well, afterward, both wicked Cain and good Seth begat sons and daughters.

Now, was it not just as probable one should infect his children with goodness as the other with wickedness? How came, then, Cain to transmit vice any more than Seth to transmit virtue? If you say, "Seth did transmit virtue; his posterity was virtuous

until they mixed with the vicious offspring of Cain," I answer, (1) How does that appear? How do you prove that all the posterity of Seth were virtuous? But (2) if they were, why did not this mixture amend the vicious rather than corrupt the vir tuous? If our nature is equally inclined to virtue and vice, vice is no more contagious than virtue. How, then, came it totally to prevail over virtue, so that "all flesh had corrupted themselves before the Lord?" Contagion and infection are nothing to the purpose; seeing they might propagate good as well as evil.

Let us go one step farther. Eight persons only were saved from the general deluge. We have reason to believe four, at least, of these were persons truly virtuous.

How, then, came vice to have a majority again among the new inhabitants of the earth? Had the nature of man been inclined to neither, virtue must certainly have had as many votaries as vice. Nay, suppose man a reasonable creature, and supposing virtue to be agreeable to the highest reason, according to all the rules of probability the majority of mankind must in every age have been on the side of virtue.

8. Some have reckoned up a large catalogue of the instances of divine goodness, and would make this as evident a proof that mankind stands in the favor of God, as all the other instances are of a universal degeneracy of man and the anger of God against them. But it is easy to reply. The goodness of God may incline him to bestow a thousand bounties upon criminals; but his justice and goodness will not suffer him to inflict misery in such a universal manner where there has been no sin to deserve it either in parents or children.

You answer: "There is more than enough sin among mankind to deserve all the sufferings God inflicts upon them. And the Scriptures represent those sufferings as disciplinary, for correction and reformation." What, all the sufferings of all mankind? This can in no wise be allowed. Where do the Scriptures say that all sufferings, those of infants in particular, are purely disciplinary, and intended only "for correction and reformation?" Neither can this be reconciled to matter of fact. How did the sufferings of Grecian or Roman infants tend to their correction and reformation? Neither do they tend to the correction or reformation of their parents, or of any other persons under heaven. And even as to adults: if suffering is a proof of universal sin, and universal sin could not take place unless men were naturally prone to evil, then the present sufferings of mankind are a clear and strong evidence that their nature is prone to evil.

9. Notwithstanding all God's provision for the good of man, still the Scripture represents men while they are in their fallen state as destitute of God's favor, and without hope.

You answer: "How can men be destitute of God's favor when he has vouchsafed them a Redeemer?" By destitute of God's favor we mean children of wrath, objects of God's displeasure; and, because they were so, the Redeemer was given to reconcile them to God by his own blood; but, notwithstanding this, while we and they were in our fallen state we were all objects of God's displeasure.

"But how can they be without hope when he hath given them the hope of eternal life?'" All men who are not born again, born of God, are without hope at this day. God, indeed, "hath given," but they have not accepted, "the hope of eternal life." Hence the bulk of mankind are still as void of this hope as are the beasts that perish. And so (the Scripture declares) are all men by nature, whatever difference grace may make. "By nature" "children of wrath, without hope, without God in the

all are world."

10. Doth that man write the sincere sense of his own mind and conscience who charges the expression, "Adam was on trial for us all," with this inference, "That we are none of us in a state of trial now, but Adam alone was upon trial for us all." We have owned and granted that men are now in a state of trial, but this is upon the foot of the new covenant.

You answer: "What can be more evident than that, according to this scheme, Adam alone was to be upon trial for us all, and that none of Adam's posterity are upon personal trial?" Do you not see the ambiguity in the word alone? Or do you see and dissemble it? Dr. Watts supposes that Adam alone—that is, this single person-was on trial for all men. Does it follow from hence that Adam alone—that is, no other person-was ever in a state of trial? Again, if no person but Adam was put on trial for all men, will it follow, "No person but Adam was upon trial at all?" It is really hard to think that here you cere sense of your own mind and conscience." You go on: "He supposes all mankind are still under the original covenant with Adam, according to which he alone was upon trial for us all, and none of his posterity are upon personal trial." He does not suppose any man to be so under that covenant as to supersede his being upon personal trial. Yourself add: "I knew he owned we are upon personal trial, and that all mankind are now under the covenant of grace; but how

speak the sin

can either of these consist with the scheme ?" Both of them consist with it perfectly well. (1) Adam alone, or single, was, in some sense, on trial for all mankind, according to the tenor of the old covenant, "Do this and live." (2) Adam fell, and hereby the sentence of death came on him and all his posterity. (3) The new covenant was given, whereby all mankind were put into a state of personal trial; yet still (4) death, the penalty of the old covenant, came (more or less) on all mankind. Now, all this is well consistent with itself, as well as with the tenor of Scripture.

11. Mankind is represented as one collective body in several verses of the fifth chapter to the Romans.

You answer: "St. Paul always distinguishes between Adam and all men, his posterity, and does not consider Adam with all men as one creature."

What then? This does not prove that he does not represent mankind (Adam's posterity) as one collective body.

12. All that is contained in the blessing given to Noah is consistent with the curse which came on all men by the first sin. But that curse is not consistent with the original blessing which was given to Adam.

You answer: "The blessing given to Noah was the very same which was given to Adam." This is palpably false. The blessing which was given to Adam included, (1) Freedom from pain and death. (2) Dominion over the whole brute creation. But that given to Noah did not include either. Yet you affirm, "It is renewed to Noah, without any manner of alteration, after pain and death were introduced into the world." And do pain and death, then, make no manner of alteration?

13. The dominion of the brutes given to Adam was not given to Noah.

You answer: "Our killing and feeding upon them is the highest instance of dominion over them." It is no instance of it at all. I may shoot a bear and then eat him; yet I have no dominion unless it be over his carcass.

THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

(Written August 19, 1757.)

BECAUSE of the unspeakable importance of thoroughly understanding this great foundation of all revealed religion, I subjoin an extract (from Mr. Boston's Fourfold State of Man) relating both to the original and the present state of man:

"God made man upright.' By man we are to understand our first parents, the archetypal pair, the root of mankind. This man was made right (agreeable to the nature of God whose work is perfect) without any imperfection, corruption, or prin ciple of corruption in his body or soul. He was made upright—that is, straight with the will and law of God, without any irregularity in his soul. God made him thus: he did not first make him and then make him righteous; but in the very making of him he made him righteous; righteousness was concreated with him. With the same breath that God breathed into him a living soul he breathed into him a righteous soul.

"This righteousness was the conformity of all the faculties and powers of his soul to the moral law, which implied three things:

“First. His understanding was a lamp of light. He was made after God's image, and consequently could not want knowledge, which is a part thereof. And a perfect knowledge of the law was necessary to fit him for universal obedience, seeing no obedience can be according to the law, unless it proceed from a sense of the command of God requiring it. It is true, Adam had not the law writ on tables of stone; but it was written upon his mind. God impressed it upon his soul, and made him a law to himself, as the remains of it even among the heathens testify. And seeing man was made to be the mouth of the creation, to glorify God in his works, we have grounds to believe he had an exquisite knowledge of the works of God. We have a proof of this in his giving names to the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air, and these such as express their nature: 'Whatsoever Adam called every living thing, that was the name thereof.' And the dominion which God gave him over the creatures, soberly to use them according to his will (still in subordination to the will of God), implies a knowledge of their natures.

'Secondly. His will lay straight with the will of God. There was no corruption in his will, no bent or inclination to evil; for that is sin properly so-called, and, therefore, inconsistent with that uprightness with which it is expressly said he was endued at his creation. The will of man was then naturally inclined to God and goodness, though mutably. It was disposed by its original make to follow the Creator's will, as the shadow does the body. It was not left in an equal balance to good and evil; for then he had not been upright, or conform to the law; which no more can allow the creature not to be inclined to God as his end than it can allow man to be a god to himself.

“Thirdly. His affections were regular, pure, and holy. All his passions, yea, all his sensitive motions and inclinations, were subordinate to his reason and will, which lay straight with the will of God. They were all, therefore, pure from all defilement, free from all disorder or distemper; because in all their motions they were duly subjected to his clear reason and his holy will. He had also an executive power, answerable to his will; a power to do the good which he knew should be done, and which he inclined to do; even to fulfill the whole law of God. If it had not been so, God would not have required perfect obedience of him. For to say that 'the Lord gathereth where he hath not strowed' is but the blasphemy of a slothful

servant.

"From what has been said it may be gathered that man's original righteousness was universal and natural, yet mutable.

"1. It was universal, both with respect to the subject of it, the whole man, and the object of it, the whole law; it was diffused through the whole man; it was a blessed leaven that leavened the whole lump. Man was then holy in soul, body, and spirit; while the soul remained untainted, the members of the body were con