longer able to maintain their Order and the Island in a safe and respectable state. Possibly these confiscations were not foreseen at the time of signing the treaty of Amiens: but we cannot suppress our opinion, that they were not effected without the interference, or at least the acquiescence of France; and if France did in any way contribute to them, it would be highly unjust if she should now insist upon opening a negotiation for a new regulation of Malta, and thus avail herself of the difficulties which those confiscations have opposed to the literal performance of the treaty of Amiens. It is however said by you, "that "there being no prospect or probability

that the Order will be re-established, "good faith requires that the treaty shall "be executed as far as it is practicable "pursuant to its true spirit and meaning." -We profess to be not only desirous to execute, but to have in fact executed the treaty with perfect good faith, as punctually and as speedily as it was practicable to do so. And we do not evacuate Malta be<cause it is n't practicable to do it pursuant to the letter and spirit of the treaty, if by the word "spirit" is to be understood the intention of the parties. We engaged by the letter of the treaty to restore Malta to the Order; and we have offered important, as it appears to us, sufficient reasons to prove that we should not have agreed to put that Island into the hands of any other power. We therefore say, that our intention is fully expressed in the treaty. If your intention was different from, or went beyond the words of the treaty; if, for instance, your meaning was that the British forces should evacuate Malta absolutely, and not conditionally only; could any thing be more easy or more glaringly obvious than to have proposed a proviso, that "in case the Order should not be re-establish"ed within a given time, we should eva"cuate the Island in favour of some other "power;" or more generally, "that a "negotiation should be opened for the "further regulation of the article respect"ing Malta?" We do not mean even to hint that we should have agreed to such a proviso; but, if that was your meaning, why was it not declared, instead of signing a stipulation which expresses in the most explicit terms a different meaning? You will not surely answer, that this omission was purely accidental, and a mere oversight! That avowal would be too disgraceful to your ministers who negotiated, and your government which ratified the treaty; nor could such an answer be admitted without shaking all confidence in future nego

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tiations and treaties. You will not surely allow that you were unapprized of one of the most evident and beneficial principles of national law," that any political pos"session or right which is to be changed "on certain specific conditions is under"stood to remain unchanged until those "conditions are performed!" Yet we do not perceive on what other ground you can allege that your intention was not fully expressed in this fourth stipulation, or, in other words, that there is a difference between its letter and its spirit. - For the foregoing reasons we say, that you have no right or reasonable cause to require a negotiation to be opened for the evacuation of Malta. But we further declare our opinions, that such a negotiation could not answer the end you propose, namely, that we should put that island into the possession of a Neapolitan garrison. For, by your own construction, Malta is to be entirely independent of both England and France. But we consider the King of Naples himself to be not sufficiently independent of France to secure the independence of any place garrisoned by troops under his command; and therefore it is expressly provided by the fifth stipulation, that the Grand Master should have the commandership of the garrison, and consequently of the Neapolitan troops that were to be sent by the twelfth stipulation. But by the admission of a Neapolitan garrison under the command of the King of Naples, we plainly say, that the dependence of the Island would be only transferred from Great Britain to France, with this striking difference; that its remaining dependent upon Great Britain is, under the existing circumstances, pursuant to the treaty of Amiens; whereas its being rendered dependent upon France, would be in direct opposition to it.-To remove this objection, "Russia (it is said) will become guarantee "for the independence of Malta in the

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hands of the King of Naples."-The confidence, which one state can place in another state, as guarantee of some particular object, must be in proportion to the power, local situation, and interest of the guarantee. To the power of Russia, whenever it can have opportunities of fully exerting itself, we can make no objection. But the dominions of Russia seem to be most inconveniently situated for a guarantee of Malta to the King of Naples; since France might wrest that Island from Naples, and use it in a manner extremely injurious to the trade and foreign possessions of Great Britain, not only before Russia could exert herself in maintaining her guarantee,

but even before she could receive intelligence of its having been violated. Nor can we perceive that Russia has any very cogent interest in preserving the indepen dence of Malta, or why she should be very forward to engage in a war with France, for the purpose of procuring to Great Britain a reparation for the injury she might have sustained by a violation of that independence. On the contrary, we can discover a possibility that Russia might expect to reap some advantage from Malta being in the hands of France, instead of a state of entire independence. And if, in order to enable Russia to act more efficiently as a guarantee, by being nearer to the scene of action, a part of the garrison were to be composed of Russian troops; then we can see something more than a bare possibility that Russia may be tempted to make use of Malta for certain purposes of her own, instead of adhering to her engagement as guarantee. It is a delicate thing to impute any hostile designs or plans of aggrandisement to powers with whom we are at peace but to save time, we will venture to declare frankly our apprehensions and the causes of them. Suppose France were to compel the King of Naples to yield up the possession of Malta, it is natural to expect, that this act of violence, which could be evidently directed against Great Britain only, would be immediately followed by a descent in Egypt: for our defeat of her first attempt to reduce that country to a French colony was not accomplished in so rapid and triumphant a manner, as to render a second expedition hopeless. In this situation of affairs, might not arguments be offered on the part of France, which might induce Russia to turn her arms towards Turkey, rather than join her forces to those of Great Britain, in order to restore Malta to a state of entire independence! The Empress Catharine_pointed

:

out to her successors the road to Constantinople as their most practicable and natura! path to aggrandisement; and a favourable opportunity might shew that her recommendation has not been forgotten. On the other hand, if Russian troops were permitted to form a part of the garrison of Malta, we are of opinion, that Russia might in time prevail upon France to consent that the Neapolitan troops should be withdrawn, and the garrison consist of Russians only. The consequence would be, that one Russian fleet stationed in the Black Sea, and another at Malta, would put Constantinople and the whole Black Sea and Archipelago at the absolute disposal of the Emperor of Russia. And why

should France not consent? Formerly, indeed, while a balance of power in Europe was thought worth preserving, France had a strong interest in protecting the Grand Signior, the situation of whose dominions enabled him to be an useful ally to France in her contests with Austria, whose territories on the side of the Danube were always accessible to the Turks. But that interest is now done away by the incalcula. ble superiority of France, and the complete humiliation of the House of Austria. We can therefore see no reason to expect that a concern for the integrity of the Ottoman empire would prevent an arrangement (which may one day be thought of) between the two powers, by which France might obtain the secure possession of Egypt, in return for permitting Russia to make acquisitions from the Turkish dominions. To any arrangement of this kind, Malta, even in the hands of the Order, would oppose considerable difficulties. For, the operations of a British fleet in the Mediterranean could be farther extended, and it might keep the sea with little loss, or hazard, through the year, by having Malta a neutral port, as a place of refuge for her distressed ships. Nor would that island again serve as a rendezvous for a French fleet, or a secure point of communication between Alexandria and Toulon. These reasons, which induced us to agree that Malta should be restored to the Order, may convince you that we were sincere in asserting, that it never was our intention to yield it to any other European power. For Malta, in the possession of Great Britain, must not only add much more surely and effectually to the security of her commerce and foreign possessions, but may also prove to be the only permanent and insurmountable obstacle to a plan of aggrandisement, which experience forbids us to regard as a merely visionary project.-To conclude; her own particular interests, the general interests of Europe, the express terms, and the evident intent and spirit of the several stipulations of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, all unite in determining Great Britain to decline the proposed negotiation.

IGNOTUS.

WEST-INDIA COMMISSION.

SIR, I prefer addressing myself on a question of considerable importance to you, rather than to any of your brother journalists, as your paper appears to me to be conducted on the most independent priaciples:

"Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri," unbiassed by any name, however great, un

influenced by any party, however powerful, the sole object you seem to aim at, is to support the great cause of truth and of your country. Having passed too, some years of your life on the other side of the Atlantic, you know something more of the British Empire, than that part of it, the shores of which are washed by the British seas, and can the more easily detect any mis-statement or misrepresentation of which, unconsciously to myself, I may be guilty; in either of which cases, I request what I am about to offer may not be permitted to meet the public eye. A hint, the papers inform us, was some time past thrown out in the House of Commons, that the interests of the West-India Islands were not sufficiently or properly attended to by government. The observation was not suffered to pass unnoticed, Mr. Vansittart being reported to have stated in reply, that the vast importance of those numerous and opulent colonies, was fully felt by administration, who would eagerly seize all fit opportunities of promoting their welfare. How far this assurance may be relied on with respect to those now in power, I presume not to determine. Certainly as referring to all who have preceded them in his Majesty's service, an assertion of this nature would want proof to support it; and I fear much there are yet no solid grounds on which to build hopes, that we are now about to see an exception to the rule. No one acquainted with West-India affairs who has had any occasion to have communication with people in authority here, but must have been often surprized at questions put to him, betraying the grossest ignorance of the internal policy and civil history of these important settlements. Some have gone

so far as to assert, that there is not the most petty borough in the united kingdom, the interests and prevailing parties in which are not more studied and better understood by ministers, than those of the great Island of Jamaica itself, one of the brightest jewels in the British diadem. It may be thought refining too far to infer, that to this negligence may be ascribed all the evils the nation at present suffers, and those still greater misfortunes there is too much reason to fear she has still to look forward to. In a total ignorance of facts and opinions on the Western Continent, there can be no doubt the American war took its origin; and to the same cause must the manner in which it was conducted, and its too much lamented event, be ascribed.-That from

"Hor fonte derivata clades, in patriam populosque fluxit,"

mitted, that I will not trespass, Sir, upon your indulgence by any arguments to confirm it; having matter of much more importance, than retrospect, to which I wish to call the attention of your readers.-Ignorance, Mr. Cobbett, of the concerns of great constituent parts of an empire is a serious fault in those entrusted with its administration; and not far less deserving of censure than a gross violation of their rights: of which a most striking instance has, within the by-gone year presented itself. In the last session of the last Parliament a bill was brought in to examine into the army accounts in the West-Indies, founded exactly on the same grounds, and in every respect a counterpart * with that which was first introduced in the present session, to inquire into the supposed abuses in the navy department.-Into the necessity, the expediency, or the propriety of either one or the other of these bills, it is not my purpose to inquire, and I shall dismiss what I have to say on the subject in few words. The history of the last of these two bills, you have yourself given, in so masterly a manner, that there is nothing for me to add to your account. There can be but two ways of thinking on this occasion. Either the injury government is supposed to have sustained, and the necessity of knowing the extent of the evil for the purpose of future regulation is so great, that a constitutional principle ought to be sacrificed; or, admitting the evil to exist to the full extent it is supposed, it should rather be endured (as my Lord Chancellor is reported to have asserted) than such a principle be infringed. On this question men may very naturally think differently; but there surely can be no difference in opinion, that the Parliament of this country is in duty bound, as carefully to guard the rights and privileges of British subjects who reside in any part of the Antillean Archipelago, as of those whose habitations are in Portsmouth or Plymouth. In the present instance has this been done? During the passage of the first bill through both houses, not a syllable was said, not a murmur was heard in opposition to it; it passed: and commissioners are said to have gone out armed, at least as far * That these two bills were originally twin brothers will not be disputed: nay, a young member brought forward in debate the one as a precedent for the other. The same gentleman mentioned another bill in the reign of Charles 11. and said it was a good precedent, as having been carried through the House of Commons in oppo sition to the court: as if any transaction of that reign either on one side or the other, could justify an infringement of the people's rights. We may next expect to hear of the veracity of Titus Oates, or the guilt of poor old Lord Strafford.

lodged with the first Lord of the Admiralty, (and still continues in his disposal) which, if properly applied, would correct every future abuse in his department: if not, for the immediate occasion, Parliament ought to have increased his power; and for the purpose of retrospective enquiry, a committee of the House of Commons was the best resource.Your correspondent of the 15th, R. B., has ably stated, that commissioners are already too numerous in the naval department, for any probability of benefit, to arise from their number being increased. In the ordnance, which has been less suspected of malversation than the others, there are none.-The provisions respecting prize-money, which the Navy Bill contains, ought not to have been connected with it, and were so most certainly for the ill concealed purpose of throwing over the whole a veil of popularity. The distribution of prize-money, is an interesting and important subject, which ought to have been separately and immediately brought under consideration; delay and confusion must arise from its being classed with the naval enquiry which, report says, is to go back to the times of James the 2d; documents of that period, having been demanded by the commissioners from those offices, where the originals are lodged. -As to the fitness of those appointed to execute it, I think with you, the several naval Boards would have afforded a better selection; a selection certainly possessing more knowledge of the subject to be submitted to them, at least of those relative to purchases, sales, &c.; and whose operations would have been unattended with any additional expense. For the purpose of more general enquiry, men of the first rate abilities and independence should have been chosen. Sir Charles Pole, I have generally heard spoken of as a good sort of man, of a very accommodating disposition; qualities, which alone, it might be supposed, would not entitle their possessor to the very singular situation he now holds, and the distinctions that have lately been heaped upon him.

Sir Charles Pole is the officer who was judged the best qualified to succeed the gallant Lord Nelson, in command of our fleet in the Baltic, (where he had never served) though that command had been previously promised to Sir J. Colpoys. Soon after, when the Admiralty determined (for unknown reasons) to take the command of the blockade of Cadiz from Sir James Saumerez, who had served there with very distinguished credit during several years, and who had about that time, fought two gallant actions with the French and Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, by which he

has immortalised his name; Sir Charles Pole was again selected as the most able Admiral for that service; and provisionally to succeed Lord Keith, in the command of the Mediterranean fleet. This gentleman's talents must have been undervalued by the Public. Lord St. Vincent has surely found him to possess powers of a very extraordi nary kind, for he has even condescended to put himself under his controul, though one of the oldest Admirals in our service; an arrangement apparently very objectionable, but not new in his Lordship's system of naval management. When commanding off Cadiz, as I am told, he sent the master of the Ville de Paris on board the Centaur, then commanded by Captain Markham, (now one of the Lords of the Admiralty,) to put that ship in good order, directing the captain to aid and assist that master in the operation!-However considerable Sir Charles's abilities may be, he will find it no easy task to reconcile his situation of Commissioner and Admiral; his friendship for Lord St. Vincent, and his guardianship of the public interest, when he has to enquire into the abuses of the Board of Admiralty at which his patron presides, to whom he appears greatly indebted; and whose successor, as a termination of his late career, he is, perhaps, to become, should his Lordship from real illness be unable to execute the duties of First Lord.-Interrogating the Board of Admiralty is unquestionably to form part of Sir Charles' undertaking, or the whole enquiry will prove useless. Public money has been squandered in the purchase of hemp and iron, in the building and fitting ships, &c. This is a serious evil, but not greater than wasting it by unnecessary promotion of officers, which is also prejudicial, by degrading the service, and increasing the gigantic patronage of the Admiralty. Nor are these the most important points for his investigation; the general dissatisfaction. and disgust now prevalent in all departments of the naval service; numbers of boys parading the streets as captains and lieutenants; ships put in commission when without a plank on their bottom; others ruined by mismanagement; deserving captains refused their flags on the most shameful pretences; strangers and men ignorant of the service, brought into our Naval Boards, and Dock-yards, over the heads of old servants; -these are fatal symptoms of that corruption, which consumes the vitals of our Navy.

If the country flatters itself, Sir Charles Pole has skill and resolution enough to ap ply such caustics as will stop them; if they farther hope, the Admiralty will submit to