the other two speakers will be given in our Supplement. Bill passed the Committee.

From the London Gazette St. James's, March 16. -The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood on S. Wathen, Esq. High Sheriff for the County of Gloucester.

Whitehall, March 19.-The King has been pleas ed to grant to the Rev. M. Surtees, Clerk, Master of Arts, the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Metropolitical Church of Canterbury, void by the death of the Rev. J. Barton, late Canon thereof.

The King has also been pleased to present the Rev. Caleb Rockett, Clerk, Bachelor of Arts, to the Vicarage of Stockingham, otherwise Stokenham, in the County of Devon, and Diocese of Exeter.

Downing-Street, March 22.-By Dispatches received this morning from the Earl of Elgin, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary at Constantinople, dated January 15, 1803, it appears, that the differences which had subsisted between the Sublime Porte and the Beys of Egypt, have been satisfactorily arranged through the mediation of his Majesty's Ambassador.

Whitehall, March 22.-The King has been pleas ed to present the Rev. J. Hawtrey, Clerk, Master of Arts, to the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Cathedral Church of Winchester, void by the Promotion of Dr. G. Pelham, late Prebendary thereof, to the See of Bristol.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS. WEST-INDIES.-ST. DOMINGO.-From the signature of the preliminaries of peace to the present hour, we have not ceased to represent to our readers the great and imminent danger which must inevitably arise to our West India colonies from the establishment of a considerable French force in the island of St. Domingo. The last intelligence from this grand deposit of troops pretty fully confirms our opinions, as to the result of the contest between the blacks and the whites. We will give this intelligence in the words of the ministerial paper, the True Briton, of the 22d instant." Ac"counts of a recent date were yesterday "received from St. Domingo by the Ja"maica mail. These represent the state "of that colony as much more favourable "than it has ever been since the first land"ing of the French. For the violence, in"justice, and folly of Leclerc, General "Rochambeau has substituted conciliatory ❝conduct, moderation and good faith, and "the consequence is, that though bands of "brigands still exist, the rancorous spirit "which prevailed has entirely subsided. He "had issued a proclamation, inviting the 66 negroes to return to the estates of their

proprietors, and promising an amnesty, "in consequence of which many had actually "returned. There can be no doubt, but that,

if General Rochambeau had at first been ❝sent with the chief command, the recovery " of St. Domingo would have been easy.—When

"these accounts left St. Domingo for Ja"maica, a three-decker, and some other "vessels had hove in sight, supposed to be

a squadron with reinforcements from "France."So! away go, then, all the thousand and one tales, heretofore received through Jamaica and the United States; and, if the ministers had any sense of shame remaining, how could they hold up their heads after the accounts, which were said to be almost official, and which, in the month of December last, represented that the French army had, in part, gone over to the blacks, and that the rest, consisting of 1,500 men, who, together with their general, had actually evacuated and abandoned St. Domingo !* Let it be observed, too, that they have constantly magnified the danger of the French enterprize in that island. They took delight in regarding it as one of those Herculean labours, which would occupy the Consul and divert his attention from England and her possessions; but now, behold, they have discovered the truth of what we always asserted, that the task was a very easy one. "There can be no doubt, but that, "if General Rochambeau had at first been "sent with the chief command, the reco66 very of St. Domingo would have been

66

very easy!" And, how did we know, or how did they know, that General Rochambeau would not be sent with the chief command? When they gave their consent, or rather when the Consul extorted that consent; when they, long before the treaty of peace was signed, recalled our gallant fleet, and opened a free passage for our enemies to sail out with an armament almost unexampled in magnitude; when they did this, how did they know that General Rochambeau would not be the commander in chief, or that Leclerc would act with that violence, injustice, and folly, which they now (falsely we believe) impute to him? What could possibly encourage them to hope, that the French would send out such generals as our humane Williamson, and our more humane Maitland, to expend twenty millions of money merely for the philanthropic purpose of preventing the effusion of blood?---Troops had been constantly arriving at St. Domingo for some months before the last intelligence came away; and, from the best

See Register, Vol. II. p. 765 and 766.-True Briton, 3d and 4th of December, 1802, where it will be seen, that the accounts here spoken of were stated to have been received through the channel of government.-Never was a system of deception so unremittingly pursued as by these modest and conscientious minister .-There is no one trick which has not been played off for the purpose of deceiving the people, and of reconciling them to the disgraceful peace of Amiens.

and by which we think they will be convinced, that immediate steps ought to be taken to frustrate the views of France in this respect. The armament should be prevented from sailing. "But this is war!" War! aye; and what are we arming for, if not for war? Besides, are we not, or were we not, holding the Cape of Good Hope, even when the provocation or danger, was not sufficient to produce, or, at least, did not produce, an armament in our ports; and, shall we, now that an armament has been thought necessary, not be justified in preventing the departure of the fleets and armies of our enemy? But, "the Message?" Yes, the Message does, indeed, intimate, that, if the thousands upon thousands of troops, with which Buonaparté has lined the opposite coast, are destined for "colonial service," then all is right; then there is no hostility to be apprehended; and, of course, it would be a flagrant act of aggression, on our part, to prevent the sailing of those troops; for, until we can ascertain their destination, which we cannot while they are in port, it is absolutely impossible for us to ascertain, that they are not intended for colonial service. So that, according to this notion, we must either send a squadron to accompany each detachment to the French colonies, and see it safely landed, or run the risk of seeing the whole of them land in our own dominions, at home or abroad! Such an idea never before entered the mind even of a maniac. It is a symptom of idiotism such as was never yet heard of.-If this armament is suffered to sail for Louisiana, it may chance to land in Ireland, and we have no hesitation to say, that it would, in that case, be much less dangerous to the interests of the kingdom. In Ireland, it might, and, we trust, it would, be defeated; but, if it obtains a fast footing in Louisiana, and six months of peace, or of nominal peace, follow, it strikes a blow, which this country cannot long survive.--This prediction we have repeated over and over so often, that we have no apology to offer but the magnitude of the evil which we dread, and which we again call upon the ministers to avert, while yet it is in their power, or to prepare themselves for the execrations of a ruined and enslaved people.

THE TURKISH EMPIRE appears to be, in some sort, taken possession of by the French. French Engineers, alias Commercial Agents, have been stationed in all the sea ports, and, indeed, in all other places of defence. Divers rumours are afloat as to the particular acts of encroachment, which the Consul has in view; but none of these acts seem to be decidedly fixed, and we will

venture to say, that they cannot, without the concurrence of Russia. The most probable conjecture is, that France will make use of all her power and her policy to obtain the re-possession of Egypt, in which object, maugre the arrangement, made through the mediation of Lord Elgin, we are fully persuaded she will succeed, upon condition of winking at an equivalent acquirement, on the part of Russia. The fate, then, of Turkey, and, eventually of India, will depend, as far, at least, as present appearances allow us to calculate, on the disposition of Russia. If that power is, as we formerly observed, under the guidance of ambition, if her projects with respect to Persia and India are revived, our Empire in the East must be placed in an uncertain, not to say a dangerous situation, especially when we recollect that Cochin and the Cape of Good Hope are at the com mand of the French, to which latter place the armament under Decaen and Linois is certainly gone.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.-From every thing we have been able to learn, on the subject, and we can venture to state, that our information is tolerably correct, this most important of the outworks of India is,at this moment, completely surrendered and evacuated by us, in consequence of orders sent out since the date of those by which General Dundas was authorized to retain it. The capitulation by which this retention was effected is without a precedent in the history of the world. Nothing like it, or bearing any resemblance to it, was ever before known, thought of, or dreamt of.-As to our right to retain the Cape, beyond the time stipu lated for its delivery to the Dutch, or even for ever, no doubt can possibly exist in the mind of any one, who does not, with the honest Talleyrand and his master, regard the treaty of Amiens as having abrogated, with respect to this country, all the maxims of the law of nature as well as of nations. That the ministers of Great-Britain have tacitly acknowledged this unjust, this degrading, this monstrous principle, we, with shame, confess; but, it does not follow, that it has been, or that it will be, acknowledged by the nation, which cannot, in this unlimited sense, renounce its natural rights, rights necessary to its existence as a nation, without violating its duty to the world, a duty paramount to all those which it can possibly owe to any particular nation. The doctrine, therefore, which has been inculcated by those London editors who are supposed to speak the sentiments of Mr.

* Capitulation in our next.

Fox and Mr. Sheridan, is not less unfounded in itself than it is pernicious in its tendency. Mr. Fox has, indeed, spoken for himself: he has declared, that, "whatever "may have bappened since the signing of the "treaty of Amiens, it is our duty to fulfil, " on our part, every stipulation of that "treaty; but, after having done that," says he, "if our bonour demands it, let us go to "war." Without stopping to ask how long it is since the honourable gentleman took up these " quixotic" notions, we shall endeavour to show, that they are quite inapplicable to the present case. All the writers on public law, reprobate, in the strongest terms, a wilful and unjust breach of a treaty of peace; but, they do not say, that there is no cause which can justify such breach. Not to take up the readers' time with authorities, to which we could here appeal, let us suppose, that France had invaded Jersey ten days after the treaty of Amiens was concluded, would any one, in that case, have had the assurance to insist, that, we were, notwithstanding this act of violence, still bound in good faith, to restore Martinico? This is certainly a strong case, but it serves to show, that the principle, in its unlimited unqualified sense, is a perfect absurdity. The true doctrine is, that, if, between the conclusion and the fulfilment of a treaty of peace, one of the contracting parties does any act which would fully justify the other party in renewing the war, that same act justifies the latter party in doing all things short of war, and, amongst these, is the retention of territories stipulated to be restored. This being admitted, as we think it must, who is there that will deny the fact of France having, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, done act upon act, which would have fully justified us in taking up arms against her? But, "we have overlooked these acts," says the Morning Post," and, therefore, we cannot

now plead them." This also is new doctrine. Exactly the contrary is true. Or having made the treaty of Amiens with the know. ledge that our enemy had already obtained the possession of, or the mastery over, Elba, Louisiana, Piedmont, and the Italian Republic, does, indeed, preclude all complaint on those accounts, because, knowing of these encroachments at the time of making the treaty, we, by that treaty, gave our tacit consent to them. They would have formed a good ground for refusing to conclude the definitive treaty upon the basis of the preliminaries, but they form no justification for non-fulfilment of the definitive treaty. Not so, however, with regard to the subjugation of Switzer

land and the new division of Germany, either of which formed a good and lawful plea for non-fulfilment, though not upon the principles of our "safe politicians," who, at every step, become more and more involved in inconsistency." These acts of aggression, too, were overlooked." They were so; but, if there be now, or if there have been, any other act, sufficient to justify us in taking up arms, the acts abovementioned and other hostile acts, committed since the conclusion of the peace, revive, and are fairly and forcibly enumerated in justification of a war on our part, or in the retention of any thing ceded to France by the treaty.With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, however, another difficulty is started.

"It

was to Holland and not to France that we were to restore the Cape, and we cannot accuse Holland of any act of bostility." No; but we have as good a plea against the restitution of the Cape as we should have had if Holland had committed all the acts, of which France has been guilty. A treaty is an act of reciprocity, if there are three parties on one side, and one on the other, the whole of the three are, as to every thing connected with the fulfilment of the treaty, responsible for each, and each is responsible for the whole. It might have happened, that at the end of three months, one restoration was to be made by England to Holland; and, at the end of two months, one was to be made by France to England. If France refused to fulfil her part of the engagement, will any one contend that England ought nevertheless to fulfil hers, merely because the restoration was not to be made to France? But, there is another ground for retaining any one, or all of, the Dutch possessions; a ground, which existed from the hour the treaty was signed, which has become more and more solid from that hour to this, and which never ought to have been abandoned for one single moment. When a treaty is made, the parties are always understood to take into view not only their situation relative to each other, but the situation of each other relative to other powers. Any thing, therefore, which has an existence at the time of making the treaty, and which adds to the power of one of the parties, may, if unknown to the other party, be afterwards a just ground for non-fulfilment of the treaty on his part. Suppose that the French had, previous to the treaty of Amiens, obtained a cession of the island of Sardinia, and this had not been known to us till after the treaty was ratified, should we still have been obliged, in good faith, to evacuate Minorca and Elba? We imagine, that no one, except Mr. Fox, will attempt

the

to maintain the affirmative of this question. If, then, the disguising from a party a circumstance of this nature would justify the non-fulfilment of his share of the contract, and would, in fact, if he chose it, nullify the contract altogether, a less effect cannot be attributed to a failure, in one of the parties, to execute engagements which he is well known to have entered into with some other power, particularly if that power be a party to the treaty, and if the fulfilment of those engagements is entirely to depend upon Conclusion of that treaty. Now this is precisely the case before us. The French, in the year 1795, invaded Holland, and became masters of the country, to the annoyance and danger of Great Britain. The people became, in reality, the slaves of France; their pecuniary, military, and naval means became hers; but, as self-preservation was the pretext of the invader, it was agreed, in a public treaty, concluded between the Dutch and the French, that the latter should keep troops in the territories of Holland, "during the present war only."-The words are these: "ARTICLE XVII. The French

Republic shall continue to occupy such "places and positions as are necessary for "the defence of the country, but with a fixed "number of troops, to be agreed on, and There are

during the present war only." *

several other stipulations of this treaty, which were to be executed at the general peace, and which, if they had been so executed, would have contributed materially to change the situation of Holland, with respect to France and to England; but, not to confuse the question, we confine ourselves to that which we have here cited. When the treaty of Amiens came to be negotiated, England, of course, reckoned amongst its advantages that of delivering Holland from French troops, that of restoring to her some degreee of independence, that of leaving her somewhat more free to follow her own will, that of returning, perhaps, in time, to her ancient relations with this kingdom, and, above all, that of withdrawing her sailors and her ships from the service of France, and of removing from ourselves the continual danger of a French invasion from her coasts. But, this stipulation not having been executed by France, the French troops still remaining in Holland, none of these great and important advantages, which were reckoned upon by

XVII. La République Française continuera d'occuper militairement, mais par un nombre de troupes déterminé et convenu entre les deux nations, pendant la présente guerre seulement, les places et positions qu'il sera utile de garder pour la défense du pays.

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| England, in concluding the treaty of Amiens, and for which she made such immense sacrifices, have been, or are likely to be, obtained on the contrary, Holland is more than ever under the power of Buonaparté ; he lays her under contribution at his pleasure, makes her ships and sailors serve him as if they were his own, fits out his expeditions in her ports and at her expense, and has lined her coasts with troops evidently for the purpose of menacing or invading this country. With respect to Holland, therefore, he has violated a positive, and, with respect to us, a tacit convention, which, though not actually making a part of the treaty of Amiens, is nevertheless, in point of execution, to be considered as inseparable from it; and, as it ought to have been executed immediately after the treaty was concluded, the failure to execute it was the first infraction of that treaty, and, of course, fully justified not only the retention of the Cape, but of every other possession, which we had stipulated to restore.Here, then, was clear, solid, and honourable ground, whereon for the ministers to make a stand against the assaults of the honest Talleyrand and the no less honest Mr. Fox. Nor is this ground at all impaired by lapse of time, or by the miserable ignorance, indecision, and pusillanimity of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies; for whatever be their faults, whatever their offences against the interest and honour of their royal master and their country (and, God knows, they are great enough!) none of these can be pleaded in justification of a breach of faith committed by France. We are aware, that these arguments, as applicable to the Cape of Good Hope, may have been rendered useless by the ministers, whose saying and unsaying, in this as well as in all other cases, bear no very feeble resemblance, whe ther in matter or in manner, to the faultering accents of an illiterate culprit; but, lest they should attempt to eke out their political existence by another disgraceful compromise, we think it right to deprive them before. hand of every pretence grounded upon a want of matter to justify hostilities.

MALTA. As the infraction of a treaty, by one of the parties, may, if the other party chooses, render the whole compact null and void, England would, on this ground, be fully justified in the retention of Malta. But, she has other ground, whereon to justify that retention; and, with all due deference to Mr. Fox and the Morning Chronicle, we think it no difficult matter to prove, that, without pleading any of the other numerous infractions of the treaty of Amiens by France, England is not, even according to